THE   PANAMA   GATEWAY 


/v 


THE 

PANAMA  GATEWAY 


BY 

JOSEPH  BUCKLIN  BISHOP 

SECRETARY    OF    THE    ISTHMIAN    CANAL  .COMMISSION 


ILLUSTRATED 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 
1913 


COPYRIGHT,  1913,  BY 
CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 


Published  August,  1913 


So 
MY   WIFE   AND   DAUGHTER 

CHEERING    AND    HELPFUL 
COMPANIONS    IN    EXILE 


267375 


CONTENTS 

tf  * 

PART  I 

HISTORICAL 

1502-1879 

CHAPTEB  PAGE 

I.  COLUMBUS  AND  THE  ISTHMUS — His  SEARCH  FOR 
THE  HIDDEN  STRAIT — BALBOA'S  DISCOVERY 
OF  THE  PACIFIC — His  JUDICIAL  MURDER  BY 

AVILA   AT   ACLA        .      .      .    ^      .     *.      .      .      .      .  3 

II.  FOUNDING  OF  OLD  PANAMA — THE  CITY'S 
GROWTH  AND  IMPORTANCE — EXAGGERATED 
ACCOUNTS  OF  ITS  SIZE  AND  WEALTH — THE 
NEW  CITY 13 

III.  FIRST  TRANSIT  ROUTES  ACROSS  THE  ISTHMUS — 

EARLY  PROJECTS  FOR  A  WATERWAY — THREE 
CENTURIES  OF  SPANISH  RULE  AND  OBSTRUC- 
TION    ......  27 

IV.  AWAKENING  OF  AMERICAN  INTEREST  ....      32 
V.    A  CANAL  FOR  ALL  NATIONS 36 

VI.    THE  FIRST  PANAMA  RAILROAD 44 

VII.    A  FIFTY-YEAR  OBSTACLE  .  54 


PART  II 

THE  FRENCH  EFFORT  AND  FAILURE 
1879-1902 

I.  LEADERSHIP  AND  METHODS  OF  FERDINAND  DE 
LESSEPS — His  INTERNATIONAL  CONGRESS  OF 
1879 — PURCHASE  OF  THE  FIRST  CANAL  CON- 
CESSION   63 

vii 


viii  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAQB • 

II.     LESSEPS'S  FIRST  VISIT  TO  THE  ISTHMUS — FIRST 

BLOWS  OF  PICK  AND  DYNAMITE 69 

III.  ESTIMATED  COST  OF  THE  PROPOSED  CANAL — 

REDUCED  BY  LESSEPS — No  SUBSCRIPTIONS  IN 
UNITED  STATES — ABUNDANCE  IN  FRANCE     .      75 

IV.  WORK  ON  THE  ISTHMUS — SECOND  VISIT  OF  LES- 

SEPS      78 

V.  LIFE  AT  PANAMA  IN  FRENCH  DAYS — ITS  PECU- 
LIARITIES, HARDSHIPS,  AND  PERILS — EXTRAV- 
AGANCE AND  GRAFT 84 

VI.  PESTILENCE  AND  DEATH — RAVAGES  OF  YELLOW 
FEVER  —  TESTIMONY  OF  EYE-WITNESSES  — 
HEROISM  OF  THE  MEN  IN  THE  FIELD  ...  91 

VII.  RETURN  OF  LESSEPS  TO  FRANCE — COLLAPSE  OF 
His  COMPANY — SHOCKING  REVELATIONS  OF 
ITS  FINANCIAL  PROCEEDINGS — WORK  DONE  AT 
PANAMA — SENTENCE  AND  DEATH  OF  LESSEPS  99 

VIII.    NEW  FRENCH  CANAL  COMPANY  106 


PART  III 

AMERICAN  PURCHASE  AND  CONTROL 
1902-1904 

I.     CONTEST  BETWEEN  NICARAGUA  AND  PANAMA 

ROUTES — DECISION  IN  FAVOR  OF  THE  LATTER    113 

II.    COLOMBIA'S  REJECTION  OF  THE  HAY-HERRAN 

TREATY 118 

III.  THE  PANAMA  REVOLUTION 123 

IV.  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PANAMA  132 


CONTENTS  ix 


PART  IV 

PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION 

1904-1915 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.    BEGINNINGS  OF  AMERICAN  RULE  AND  WORK    .     143 

II.  THE  TAFT  "  MODUS  VIVENDI  "  WITH  THE  REPUB- 
LIC OF  PANAMA 149 

III.  INEFFICIENCY  OF  A  SEVEN-HEADED  EXECUTIVE 

BODY — FAILURES  AND  REMOVAL  OF  THE  FIRST 
COMMISSION.  .  ...  . 155 

IV.  REORGANIZATION  OF  THE  COMMISSION  ON  EF- 

FECTIVE LINES — JOHN  F.  STEVENS  AS  CHIEF 
ENGINEER  —  INTERNATIONAL  CONSULTING 
BOARD — LOCK  CANAL  DECREED 160 

V.  VISIT  OF  PRESIDENT  ROOSEVELT — CANAL  MED- 
ALS—SPECIAL MESSAGE  TO  CONGRESS — RE- 
BUKE TO  CALUMNIATORS 169 

VI.  THE  THIRD  COMMISSION — U.  S.  A.  ENGINEERS 
IN  CHARGE — QUALIFICATIONS  OF  COLONEL 
GOETHALS — THE  CANAL  RECORD  .  .  .  .  175 

VII.  CULEBRA  CUT — ONE-FOURTH  OF  ITS  ENTIRE  EX- 
CAVATION DUE  TO  SLIDES  AND  BREAKS  .  .  184 

VIII.    THE  WONDERFUL  CULEBRA  CUT .193 

IX.     CHANGES  IN  CANAL  PLANS — LARGER  LOCKS  AND 

WIDER  CHANNEL — ESTIMATES  OF  TOTAL  COST     198 

X.  GATUN  DAM  AND  LOCKS — FIRST  SUGGESTION  OF 
THE  SITE — ITS  NATURAL  ADVANTAGES — HU- 
MOROUS AND  OTHER  ASSAULTS 202 

XI.    LOCKS  AND  DAMS  ON  THE  PACIFIC  SIDE — THE 

TASK  MUCH  SIMPLER  THAN  THAT  AT  GATUN  .    217 

XII.  SANITATION  OF  THE  ISTHMUS — SCIENTIFIC  DIS- 
COVERIES WHICH  MADE  IT  POSSIBLE — MAR- 
TYRDOM OF  LAZEAR  ,  222 


XIII. 


XIV. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

ACTIVE  WORK  UNDER  COLONEL  GORGAS  AND 
THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  MUNICIPAL  ENGINEER- 
ING—FINAL OUTBREAK  AND  ROUT  OF  YELLOW 
FEVER 238 


COMPLETENESS  OF  THE  VICTORY  OVER  YELLOW 
FEVER — REWARDS  GIVEN  BY  CONGRESS  TO 
THE  MEN  WHO  MADE  IT  POSSIBLE 


245 


XV.  WARFARE  UPON  MALARIA — COST  OF  MAKING 
THE  ISTHMUS  HEALTHFUL — Is  IT  A  HEALTH 
RESORT? 249 

XVI.  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  A  "BENEVOLENT  DESPOT- 
ISM"— INDUCEMENTS  TO  ENTER  THE  CANAL 
SERVICE 258 

XVII.     ESTABLISHING  A  FOOD-SUPPLY  AND  ASSEMBLING 

A  LABOR  FORCE 265 

XVIII.  PROVISIONS  FOR  THE  COMFORT  AND  CONTENT- 
MENT OF  THE  FORCE — CLUB-HOUSES  AND 
OTHER  AGENCIES 273 

XIX.  AUTOCRATIC  POWER  CONFERRED  ON  THE  CHAIR- 
MAN AND  CHIEF  ENGINEER — RULE  OF  THE 
"BENEVOLENT  DESPOT"  281 


XX.  A  SQUARE  DEAL  FOR  ALL — AN  OPEN  DOOR  FOR 
ALL  COMPLAINTS — GOOD  EFFECTS  OF  THE 
POLICY — A  NOVEL  COURT  OF  JUSTICE 


290 


XXI.  CANAL  LABORERS — DIFFERENT  NATIONALITIES 
EMPLOYED — CHARACTERISTICS  AND  EFFI- 
CIENCY— EFFECTS  OF  CLIMATE  AND  OF  CIVIL- 
IZATION 299 


XXII.  LIFE  IN  THE  CANAL  COLONY — ITS  ATTRACTIONS, 
DISTRACTIONS,  PECULIARITIES,  AND  SPECIAL 
CHARM  


308 


XXIII.    THE  NEW  PANAMA  RAILROAD  318 


CONTENTS  xi 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

XXIV.  VALUE  OF  THE  FRENCH  PROPERTY — WHAT  THE 
UNITED  STATES  RECEIVED  IN  RETURN  FOR  THE 
PAYMENT  OF  $40,000,000  TO  THE  FRENCH 
COMPANY .  324 

XXV.     AMERICAN  AND  FRENCH  MACHINERY — RELATIVE 

CAPACITIES  OF  THE  Two  EXCAVATING  PLANTS    330 

XXVI.     VETERANS  IN  THE  CANAL  SERVICE  .  342 


PART  V 
THE  COMPLETED  CANAL 

I.     NOT  A  CANAL  THROUGH  THE  ISTHMUS,  BUT  A 

BRIDGE  OF  WATER  ABOVE  IT 351 

II.     GATUN  DAM,  SPILLWAY,  AND  HYDRO-ELECTRIC 

STATION     .     .     .     , 355 

III.  LOCKS  AND  GATES 362 

IV.  PASSAGE  OF  THE  LOCKS 369 

V.     ELECTRIC  CONTROL  OF  LOCK  MACHINERY     .     .  376 

VI.     LIGHTING  SYSTEM   .     .     ......     .     .  380 

VII.     THE  APPROACH  CHANNELS 384 

VIII.     PERMANENT  CANAL  BUILDINGS 390 

IX.    TERMINAL  FACILITIES,  DRY-DOCKS,  AND  REPAIR- 
SHOPS    395 

X.     FOOD,  COAL,  OIL,  AND  OTHER  SUPPLIES  .     .     .  400 

XI.     FORTIFICATIONS  .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .  408 

XII.     THE  CANAL  ZONE  A  MILITARY  RESERVATION  415 


xii  CONTENTS 

APPENDIXES 

PAGE 

A.  CANAL  COMMISSIONS 425 

B.  CANAL  APPROPRIATIONS  AND  EXPENDITURES   .     .     .  428 

C.  AN  ACT  TO  PROVIDE,  ETC 430 

D.  EQUIPMENT  AT  PERIOD  OF  GREATEST  ACTIVITY    .    .  447 

INDEX  451 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

Colonel  George  Washington  Goethals     .      .     .      .  Frontispiece 

FACING 
PAGE 

Vasco  Nunez  de  Balboa     .           6 

Sir  Henry  Morgan 6 

The  tower  of  cathedral  in  Old  Panama  .      .     .      '.  14 

Bridge  on  ancient  road  to  Old  Panama  ......  16 

Ruins  of  sea-wall  at  Old  Panama 16 

Picturesque  sea-wall,  Panama       .......*..  18 

Cathedral  Plaza,  Panama  City     ........  20 

The  flat  arch  in  ruins  of  San  Domingo  church  ....  20 

Plan  and  perspective  of  the  City  of  Panama,  1688       .      .  22 

Plaza,  1748  .....     .     v     .    ..,     .     .  .  .,  ;•.     .  24 

The  American  settlement  and  quarry  plant  at  Porto  Bello  28 

Street  scene  in  Old  Porto  Bello .     *     .  30 

Village  of  Cruces,  Canal  Zone      .      .      .     ...     .'    .     .  30 

John  C.  Trautwine 48 

Colonel  George  M.  Totten .  _' .  48 

Scene  on  the  old  Panama  Railroad,  now  under  Gatun  Lake  50 

Count  Ferdinand  de  Lesseps 70 

Columbus  statue  on  water-front,  Cristobal,  near  Lesseps 

residences    .      »....,.»     .     .     .     .     .....  80 

xiii 


xiv  ILLUSTRATIONS 

FACING 
PAGE 

Count  Ferdinand  de  Lesseps,  his  second  wife,  and  nine 

children 82 

Group  of  Lesseps  and  his  friends 82 

Grand  Hotel,  Panama 86 

Front  Street,  Colon,  during  the  flourishing  French  times  86 

" La  Folie  Dingier"      ...........  94 

French  machinery  in  the  jungle ,  94 

Christening  the  flag  of  the  Republic  of  Panama,  Panama 

City,  November  6,  1903 .  134 

Founders  of  the  Panama  Republic 138 

First  Commission  for  Canal  Construction 144 

John  F.  Wallace 162 

John  F.  Stevens 162 

Second  Commission  for  Canal  Construction      ....  164 

The  International  Board  of  Consulting  Engineers  .      .      .  166 

President  Roosevelt  addressing  President  Amador  on  the 

steps  of  the  Cathedral,  Panama,  November  15,  1906  170 

Builders  of  the  Canal 176 

The  Third  Commission  for  Canal  Construction      .      .      .180 

Culebra  Cut.     Cucaracha  slide.     Steam-shovel  working  on 

the  bottom  of  the  Canal,  January  4,  1913  ....  188 

Culebra  Cut,  looking  north  from  La  Pita,  showing  close 

view  of  rock  break  in  east  bank,  October  9,  1912   .      .  196 

Old  village  of  Gatun  from  dam  site,  November,  1906        .  200 

Canal  Channel,  looking  south  from  San  Pablo  to  Caimito  200 

Gatun  Upper  Locks.     The  foot-bridge  across  the  Upper 

Guard  gates,  January  14,  1913 204 


ILLUSTRATIONS  xv 

FACING 
PAGE 

Special  Commission  of  Civil  Engineers,  January,  1909      .  208 

Gatun  Locks,  looking  toward  the  Atlantic,  June  1,  1913  .  214 

Spillway   Dam.     Regulation   gates   in   position   between 

the  piers,  June  1,  1913 218 

Emergency  dam  swung  across  entrance  of  Gatun  Lock, 

June  1,  1913     .      .      .     : .  -.  218 

Pedro  Miguel  Locks,  January  25,  1912  .      .      .     ...  220 

Gatun  Upper  Locks.     South  entrance  to  east  chamber     .  220 

Heroes  of  the  yellow-fever  tests *  228 

Camp  Lazear     . '  •  .     .      . 232 

Types  of  Canal  quarters    .      .......      .      .  278 

Arrival  of  1,500  laborers  from  Barbados  at  Cristobal  on 

S.  S.  Ancon,  September  2,  1909  .......  300 

White  Canal  laborers   .    .-.    :.     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .  304 

Sir  Claude  Coventry  Mallet    ......'...  314 

Lady  Mallet      .     .     .     , 314 

The  embankment  across  the  valley  of  the  Gatun  River  in 

first  stages  of  construction,  June,  1910     ....  320 

New  Panama  Railroad.     Gold  Hill  Line.     Looking  north 

up  the  Pedro  Miguel  Valley,  June,  1912     ....  322 

Culebra  Cut,  looking  north,  as  left  by  the  French.     Amer- 
icans using  French  equipment,  December,  1904    .      .  332 

French  transporter . '    .     .      ...     .     ...     T     .  332 

Track-shifting  machine  which  does  the  work  of  600  men  .  336 

Steam-shovel  loading  rock,  Culebra  Cut      ...      .      .  336 

A  spreader  at  work,  Corozal  Dump,  August  31,  1907  .      .  338 


PART  I 

HISTORICAL 

1502-1879 

CHAPTER  I 

COLUMBUS  AND  THE  ISTHMUS— HIS  SEARCH  FOR  THE 
HIDDEN  STRAIT  — BALBOA'S  DISCOVERY  OF  THE 
PACIFIC— HIS  JUDICIAL  MURDER  BY  AVILA  AT 
ACLA 

THE  Panama  Canal  is  the  realization  of  an  idea  four 
centuries  old.  It  dates  almost  from  the  discovery  of 
America  by  Columbus,  for  scarcely  had  he  found  the 
new  continent  when  he  began  the  search  for  a  passage 
through  the  centre  of  it.  The  native  Indians  had  told 
him  of  a  "narrow  place  between  two  seas."  He  in- 
terpreted this  to  mean  a  waterway,  though  they  had 
in  mind  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  In  his  imagination 
this  became  the  "hidden  strait"  which  would  prove 
to  be  that  westward  passage  to  Asia  which  he  sought, 
and  through  which  he  hoped  to  sail  and  circumnavi- 
gate the  globe.  In  his  fourth  and  last  voyage,  which 
began  in  May,  1502,  and  lasted  nearly  two  years,  he 
sailed  along  the  entire  northern  coast  of  the  Isthmus 
of  Panama,  from  Honduras  to  the  Gulf  of  Darien, 
seeking  eagerly  and  confidently  in  every  recess  of  the 

3 


4  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

shore  line  for  the  "hidden  strait."  He  discovered  and 
named  the  Bay  of  Puerto  Bello,  entered  what  is  now 
Limon  Bay  and  the  harbor  of  Colon,  and  explored  the 
mouth  of  the  Chagres  River.  Thus  he  was  seeking 
for  the  waterway  which  he  supposed  nature  had  sup- 
plied, in  the  very  region  through  which  the  canal  of 
to-day,  constructed  four  hundred  years  later  by  the 
hand  of  man,  joins  the  two  oceans. 

Failure  to  find  the  "hidden  strait"  did  not  shake 
the  faith  of  Columbus  in  its  existence,  and  he  died  in 
1506  as  firmly  convinced  of  its  reality  as  he  was  igno- 
rant of  the  fact  that  he  had  discovered  a  new  world. 
The  contemporary  explorers,  whom  his  discoveries  had 
inspired  in  England,  Germany,  and  France,  and  who 
sailed  across  the  Atlantic  after  him  to  the  new  lands, 
all  shared  his  faith.  They  sought  the  "hidden  strait" 
in  eager  rivalry  and  in  complete  ignorance  that  a  new 
world  had  been  found.  Even  when  Vasco  Nunez  de 
Balboa,  his  curiosity  aroused  by  the  talk  of  the  native 
Indians  about  a  "mighty  sea  beyond  the  mountains," 
climbed  the  Cordilleras  and  discovered  the  Pacific,  the 
truth  was  not  suspected. 

Balboa  was  one  of  the  most  intrepid  and  reckless  of 
the  many  soldiers  of  fortune  who  had  hastened  to  the 
New  World  soon  after  Columbus  discovered  it.  Arriv- 
ing in  1500,  he  led  a  riotous  and  variegated  existence 
in  the  new  colonies,  until  finally  he  became  so  deeply 
involved  in  debt  while  living  on  the  island  of  Hispani- 
ola,  now  Hayti,  that  he  escaped  from  his  creditors 
hidden  in  a  cask  supposed  to  contain  provisions.  He 
had  the  cask  taken  on  board  a  vessel  which  was  about 


HISTORICAL  5 

to  sail  on  an  expedition  to  find  a  suitable  site  for  a  new 
colony.  When  the  ship  was  well  under  way,  Balboa 
emerged  from  his  cask,  made  friends  with  the  com- 
mander and  his  associates,  and  finally,  when  the  expe- 
dition was  in  danger  of  failure  through  troubles  with 
hostile  Indians,  took  virtual  command  and  guided  it 
into  the  Gulf  of  Darien,  where  a  prosperous  Indian 
village  was  attacked  and  overcome  and  a  colony 
founded  which  subsequently  became  the  city  of  Santa 
Maria  de  la  Antigua  del  Darien.  Balboa  made  him- 
self so  popular  in  the  new  colony  that  in  due  course 
he  became  its  alcalde,  or  ruler  of  the  province.  It  was 
while  holding  this  office  that  he  heard  the  Indians  of 
the  country  speak  of  the  "mighty  sea  beyond  the 
mountains"  which  could  be  seen  from  their  loftiest 
peak.  The  Indians  told  him  also  that  "all  the  streams 
that  flow  down  the  southern  side  of  those  mountains 
abound  in  gold." 

His  curiosity  aroused  by  these  tales,  Balboa  deter- 
mined to  ascend  the  mountains  and  see  for  himself. 
He  organized  an  expedition  of  one  hundred  and  ninety 
Spaniards,  a  nunfber  of  native  Indians,  and  several 
bloodhounds,  which  were  said  to  be  of  great  service  in 
fighting  Indians,  who  fled  in  terror  at  the  mere  sight 
of  them. 

Balboa  started  with  this  expedition  from  Santa 
Maria  de  la  Antigua  on  September  1, 1513,  embarking 
in  a  brigantine  -and  nine  large  canoes.  He  proceeded 
northward  along  the  coast  for  about  sixty  miles,  to  a 
point  near  Puerto  Carreto  or  Careta.  Here  he  landed, 
and  on  September  6  turned  westward  to  cross  the 


HISTORICAL  7 

quence  the  emotions  which  he  himself  experienced  as 
he  stood  on  that  spot,  in  the  very  footprints  of  Bal- 
boa. There  is  near  the  line  of  the  canal,  a  few  miles 
west  of  the  northern  entrance  to  Culebra  Cut,  a  hill 
about  one  thousand  feet  in  height,  which  is  called 
Balboa  Hill,  because  from  a  lookout  in  the  trees  on 
its  summit  both  oceans  can  be  seen  on  a  clear  day. 
But  the  mountain  on  which  Balboa  stood  was  fully 
one  hundred  and  twenty-five  miles  east  of  the  Canal 
Zone  line,  on  the  extreme  eastern  coast  of  the  isthmus, 
and  north  of  the  Gulf  of  Darien.  The  location  above 
the  Gulf  of  San  Miguel  establishes  that  fact  beyond 
question. ' 

As  reward  for  his  discovery  of  the  Pacific  the  King 
of  Spain  made  Balboa  governor  of  the  province  of 
Castilla  del  Oro,  which  extended  from  Cape  Gracias  d, 
Dios,  on  the  extreme  eastern  coast  of  Honduras,  to 
the  Gulf  of  Ureba  or  Darien,  giving  him  the  title  of 
"Adelantado  de  la  Mer  del  Sur."  But  hardly  had 
Balboa  assumed  office  when  Ferdinand  sent  Pedro 
Arias  de  Avila  from  Spain  with  an  expedition  of  two 
thousand  men  with  orders  to  found  a  colony  on  the 
coast  of  the  new  ocean  and  supersede  Balboa  as  gov- 
ernor. Avila,  who  is  known  in  history  under  this 
name,  and  also  under  several  variations  of  it,  of  which 
the  most  common  is  Pedrarias,  was  at  the  time  a  colonel 
of  infantry  who  had  served  with  distinction  in  the 
Moorish  wars  of  Spain  and  Africa.  His  subsequent 
career  showed  him  to  be  one  of  the  most  treacherous, 
inhuman,  and  rapacious  of  the  many  wild  beasts  in 
human  form  that  Spain  was  sending  forth  into  the 


8  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

world  at  that  time — soldiers,  pirates,  buccaneers,  whose 
profession  was  pillage  and  whose  pastime  was  mur- 
der. 

Avila  arrived  in  the  Gulf  of  Darien,  off  the  colony 
of  Santa  Maria  de  la  Antigua,  in  June,  1514.  He  was 
well  received  by  Balboa,  who  had  no  suspicion  of  what 
his  fate  was  to  be  at  the  hands  of  the  new  ruler.  Avila, 
who  was  jealous  of  Balboa's  great  fame  as  the  dis- 
coverer of  the  South  Sea,  and  of  his  popularity  in  the 
colony  because  of  his  bravery  and  his  ability  and 
fairness  as  a  ruler,  began  at  once  to  lay  plans  to  get 
rid  of  him.  He  had  Balboa  arrested  and  tried  on  va- 
rious trumped-up  charges,  and  was  greatly  incensed 
when  the  trial  resulted  in  acquittal.  He  subsequently 
sanctioned  Balboa's  request  for  permission  to  fit  out 
an  expedition  to  explore  the  South  Sea,  and  Balboa 
proceeded  with  his  usual  energy  and  zeal  to  make 
preparations.  As  there  was  no  suitable  timber  on  the 
south  or  Pacific  side,  he  had  such  as  he  needed  for  the 
construction  of  his  ships  cut  on  the  Atlantic  side,  in 
the  vicinity  of  Puerto  Carreto. 

Balboa  had  the  timber  for  his  ships,  together  with 
anchors,  rigging,  and  all  other  material,  carried  across 
the  isthmus  on  the  backs  of  Indians.  The  task  in- 
volved tremendous  hardships,  occupied  many  months, 
and  cost  the  lives,  it  is  said,  of  hundreds  of  Indians, 
for  the  trail*  was  over  rugged  mountains,  across  numer- 
ous mountain  torrents,  and  through  dense  forests. 
During  the  journeyings  Balboa  discovered  a  large 
river  flowing  from  the  mountains  into  the  Gulf  of  San 
Miguel,  which  he  named  Rio  de  las  Balsas,  or  "River 


HISTORICAL  9 

of  the  Rafts,"  which  is  supposed  to  be  the  river  now 
called  Sabana.  In  two  brigantines  which  he  succeeded 
in  constructing  Balboa  sailed  to  the  Pearl  Islands,  to 
which  he  gave  that  name,  which  lie  in  the  Gulf  of 
Panama,  about  fifty  miles  off  the  Gulf  of  San  Miguel, 
and  then  turned  back.  Avila  sent  messengers  to  him 
commanding  him  to  return  to  Acla  to  vindicate  him- 
self from  certain  charges  that  had  been  brought  against 
him.  He  was  at  once  seized  and  thrown  into  prison, 
and  after  a  trial  which  was  such  only  in  name,  was 
convicted,  sentenced  to  death,  and,  with  four  of  his 
companions,  beheaded  in  January,  1519.  Two  of  these 
companions,  Andres  de  Valderrabano  and  Herman 
Munos,  had  stood  with  Balboa  on  the  mountain  top 
when  he  first  saw  the  Pacific. 

While  on  the  scaffold  awaiting  execution,  proclama- 
tion was  made  that  Balboa  was  condemned  to  death 
as  a  traitor  and  usurper  of  the  territories  of  the  Crown. 
With  great  indignation  he  exclaimed:  "It  is  a  lie!  It 
is  a  lie!  No  such  crime  ever  entered  my  mind.  I 
have  served  the  King  with  loyalty,  with  no  thought 
except  to  enlarge  his  dominions."* 

The  town  of  Acla  owes  the  preservation  of  its  name 
in  history  solely  to  this  execution.  It  was  founded  in 
1515  by  Gabriel  Rojo  under  the  orders  of  Avila,  and 
retained  the  name  given  to  the  locality  by  the  In- 
dians, it  signifying  "bones,"  because  it  had  been  the 
scene  of  many  bloody  battles  between  two  rival  tribes 
that  had  as  chiefs  two  brothers.  Avila  chose  the  site 
as  the  most  favorable  one  for  a  settlement  which  should 

*  Juan  B.  Sosa. 


10  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

serve  as  a  basis  of  communication  with  the  town  which 
he  intended  to  build  on  the  Gulf  of  San  Miguel.  There 
has  been  much  dispute  among  historians  as  to  its  exact 
location.  Juan  B.  Sosa,  the  Panama  historian  whose 
work  on  the  early  history  of  the  isthmus,  based  on 
careful  and  exhaustive  study  of  the  original  archives 
in  Spain,  must  be  accepted  as  final  authority,  places 
it  on  the  extreme  point  of  the  peninsula  which  forms 
the  outer  barrier  of  Caledonia  Bay,  called  Puerto  Es- 
coces.  It  was  never  more  than  a  small  village  of 
thatched  huts,  protected  by  a  wooden  stockade  against 
the  native  Indians,  who  were  the  only  enemies  against 
whom  the  Spanish  colonists  had  to  guard  themselves. 
It  was  abandoned  in  1532,  and  no  trace  of  it  has  been 
discoverable  for  centuries.  The  unfortunate  Scotch 
settlement  or  colony,  led  by  William  Paterson,  selected 
the  same  site  for  its  ambitious  town  of  New  St.  An- 
drew, in  1698,  abandoning  it  a  year  later  after  intense 
sufferings.  The  year  of  Balboa's  execution  has  been 
a  matter  of  uncertainty,  some  authorities  giving  1517 
and  others  1518.  I  have  accepted  the  authority  of 
Sosa  for  1519. 

It  had  been  Balboa's  ambition  to  sail  through  the 
South  Sea  to  the  southward  in  search  of  the  "Land  of 
Gold"  (Peru),  which  the  Indians  told  him  existed  there. 
Ten  years  later,  one  of  his  companions  in  the  discov- 
ery of  the  Pacific  and  in  his  voyage  to  the  Pearl  Is- 
lands, Francisco  Pizarro,  carrying  out  the  designs  of 
Balboa  as  he  had  learned  them  from  him,  discovered 
Peru,  and  six  years  afterward  made  conquest  of  it. 
What  the  future  of  Peru  might  have  been  had  Balboa 


HISTORICAL  11 

instead  of  Pizarro  discovered  it  is  an  interesting  sub- 
ject for  speculation. 

It  was  not  till  seven  years  after  Balboa's  discovery 
of  the  new  ocean  that  its  name  was  changed  from 
the  South  Sea  to  the  Pacific.  On  November  28,  1520, 
Ferdinand  Magellan,  a  Portuguese  navigator  sent  out 
by  Charles  V  of  Spain  to  find  the  "hidden  strait," 
having  sailed  south  from  the  mouth  of  the  La  Plata, 
on  the  South  American  coast,  found  the  strait  which 
bears  his  name  and  passed  through  it  into  a  great 
body  of  water,  which,  because  of  its  calm  character 
and  the  fine  weather  which  he  experienced  while  on 
it,  he  named  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

These  discoveries  of  Balboa  and  Magellan,  as  well 
as  that  of  two  Dutch  navigators,  Schouten  and  Le 
Maire,  who  in  1616  sailed  around  Cape  Horn  into  the 
Pacific,  did  not  dispel  faith  in  the  existence  of  the 
" hidden  strait"  farther  north,  although  repeated  fail- 
ure to  find  such  a  passage  had  somewhat  shaken  it. 
Very  slowly,  but  surely,  as  new  discoveries  in  North 
and  South  America  were  made,  there  was  developed 
a  realization  that  a  new  world  had  been  found  which 
was  in  no  sense  a  part  of  the  old,  and  that  it  lay  di- 
rectly across  that  route  to  the  East  which  had  been 
sought  with  such  indomitable  courage  and  persistence 
in  the  face  of  supreme  hardship  by  Columbus  and  the 
hardy  navigators  who  followed  in  his  wake  in  the  last 
years  of  the  fifteenth  and  the  first  half  of  the  sixteenth 
centuries. 

With  loss  of  faith  in  the  existence  of  a  hidden  strait 
there  was  born  a  demand  for  the  opening  of  a  strait 


12  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

through  the  obstructing  land.  This  owed  its  origin 
to,  and  was  steadily  strengthened  by,  the  rapidly  grow- 
ing importance  of  the  Spanish  colonies  on  the  Atlantic 
side  of  the  isthmus  that  had  sprung  up  after  the  first 
voyages  of  Columbus,  and  by  the  discovery  of  the 
Inca  Empire  and  the  rich  mines  of  Peru.  Early  in 
the  sixteenth  century  Ferdinand  of  Spain  directed  that 
a  line  of  posts  be  established  between  the  new  settle- 
ments on  the  Pacific  side  of  the  isthmus  and  the 
Atlantic. 


CHAPTER  II 

FOUNDING  OF  OLD  PANAMA  — THE  CITY'S  GROWTH  AND 
IMPORTANCE  — EXAGGERATED  ACCOUNTS  OF  ITS 
SIZE  AND  WEALTH  — THE  NEW  CITY 

THE  most  important  of  the  new  settlements  on  the 
Pacific  side  from  which  transit  routes  were  opened 
across  the  isthmus  was  the  first  city  of  Panama.  This 
was  founded  in  1519  by  Avila  soon  after  his  judicial 
murder  of  Balboa.  So  much  misinformation  has  crept 
into  historical  writing  both  about  the  method  of  the 
city's  founding  and  its  size  and  wealth  in  the  days  of 
its  greatest  prosperity  and  power  that  it  seems  desir- 
able to  give  here  a  somewhat  fuller  account  of  it  than 
accords  with  the  studiously  condensed  scope  of  the 
present  historical  narrative. 

Avila's  treatment  of  Balboa,  combined  with  his 
many  other  brutalities  and  murders  as  governor  of  the 
province  of  Castilla  del  Oro,  not  only  had  made  him 
thoroughly  detested,  but,  what  was  far  more  serious 
for  him,  had  deprived  him  of  the  sympathy  and  sup- 
port of  the  Jerome  monks  of  Santo  Domingo,  who,  by 
authority  of  the  Crown,  exercised  jurisdiction  over 
all  lands  that  had  been  discovered  in  the  West  Indies. 
He  was  virtually  powerless,  though  nominally  governor. 
To  rid  himself  of  ecclesiastical  opposition  and  to  regain 

13 


14  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

his  lost  popularity  by  means  of  new  ventures,  he  de- 
cided to  execute  the  royal  order  to  found  a  settlement 
on  the  Gulf  of  San  Miguel  which  should  serve  as  a 
centre  for  all  expeditions  and  enterprises  in  that  re- 
gion. Accordingly,  in  July,  1519,  he  assembled  a  band 
of  four  hundred  followers  and  crossed  the  mountains 
to  the  headwaters  of  the  Gulf  of  San  Miguel,  over 
the  route  taken  by  Balboa.  Embarking  in  Balboa's 
ships  with  the  intention  of  seeking  a  site  for  a  new 
settlement  on  the  shores  of  the  gulf,  his  curiosity  led 
him  much  farther,  for  he  sailed  out  of  the  gulf  into 
what  is  now  known  as  the  Bay  of  Panama,  passing 
first  the  Pearl  Islands,  then  the  islands  of  Taboga  and 
Taboguilla,  and  then  those  of  Flamenco,  Naos,  and 
Perico,  which  are  now  the  bases  of  the  American  for- 
tifications at  the  Pacific  entrance  to  the  canal,  until  he 
came  to  a  deep  and  shallow  bay,  about  four  miles  east 
of  the  site  of  the  present  city  of  Panama.  Here  he 
cast  anchor,  attracted  by  the  wide  acres  of  level  and 
rolling  country  lying  between  the  coast  and  the  blue 
summits  of  the  Cordilleras  rising  far  away  in  the  east 
and  north.  At  the  head  of  this  bay  he  found  a  squalid 
little  Indian  village,  called  by  its  inhabitants  Panama, 
signifying  "abounding  in  fish,"  because  of  the  plenti- 
fulness  of  fish  in  its  waters. 

Like  many  other  matters  in  Panama  history,  there 
are  conflicting  legends  about  the  real  meaning  of  this 
name.  One  is  that  it  was  the  name  of  a  cacique  who 
lived  in  the  vicinity  at  the  time  of  the  arrival  of  the 
conquistadores.  Another  is  that  it  signifies  the  "land 
or  place  of  the  mariposas,"  and  still  another  is  that  it 


The  tower  of  cathedral  in  Old  Panama. 
Destroyed  by  Morgan  in  1671. 


HISTORICAL  15 

was  the  name  of  a  tree  abounding  on  the  site  of  the 
city  at  the  time  of  its  founding.  In  support  of  the  last- 
named  legend  a  picture  of  a  tree  which  is  to  be  seen 
in  all  parts  of  the  isthmus  and  in  other  tropical  coun- 
tries is  produced  in  some  ambitious  histories.  But 
the  accurate  meaning  is  the  one  I  have  given,  as  Sosa 
shows  conclusively.  "Panama"  is  derived  from  the 
primitive  language  of  the  Cueva  Indians,  which  was 
the  language  most  extensively  used  by  the  aborigines 
of  the  isthmus,  and  it  meant  "abundance  of  fish,"  or 
"place  abounding  in  fish."  Sosa  cites  in  support  of 
this  derivation  a  letter  written  by  Avila  himself  in 
1516  to  King  Ferdinand  and  his  daughter,  Princess 
Juana,  in  which  he  says:  "Your  Highness  should  know 
that  Panama  is  a  fishing  place  on  the  coast  of  the  South 
Sea,  for  the  Indians  call  fishermen  'Panama/7  This 
citation  shows  that  Avila  knew  of  the  existence  of  the 
place  three  years  before  he  founded  his  city  there. 

Avila  decided  to  found  there  his  new  settlement, 
induced  probably  by  the  attractive  country  lying  near 
the  shore,  for  the  bay  was  very  shallow  even  at  high 
tide,  and  at  low  tide  was  completely  devoid  of  water. 
On  August  15,  1519,  under  the  orders  of  Avila  and  in 
accordance  with  the  royal  decree,  the  new  city  was  for- 
mally established  by  Caspar  de  Espinosa,  chief  alcalde 
of  the  Darien,  and  was  called  Panama.  As  rapidly  as 
possible  the  civil  and  ecclesiastic  governments  were 
transferred  to  Panama  from  Santa  Maria  de  la  Antigua, 
and  the  people  with  their  flocks,  herds,  and  other  pos- 
sessions followed.  On  September  15,  1521,  Panama 
was  made  a  city  by  royal  decree,  of  Charles  V,  and  was 


16  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

granted  a  coat  of  arms.  The  abandoned  city  of  Santa 
Maria  de  la  Antigua  was  assaulted  by  Indians  in  Sep- 
tember, 1524,  its  few  remaining  habitants  were  butch- 
ered, and  the  city  itself  was  reduced  to  ashes. 

Pizarro  fitted  out  his  first  expedition  to  Peru  at 
Panama  in  1524,  which  was  a  failure,  and  his  second  in 
1526,  which  was  more  successful,  and  his  third,  which 
resulted  in  the  conquest  of  Peru,  in  1531.  Avila  con- 
tinued as  governor  till  1526,  when,  in  consequence  of 
many  and  grievous  complaints,  he  was  transferred  to 
Nicaragua,  where  he  died  in  1531. 

The  city  of  Panama  grew  rapidly  from  the  moment 
of  its  establishment.  Its  position  as  the  chief  port  of 
the  Pacific  and  terminus  of  the  first  transit  route  across 
the  isthmus  was  the  main  cause  of  this.  The  defects 
in  its  site  were  very  soon  apparent.  Its  harbor  was 
not  only  unsuitable  as  a  port  of  entry  and  departure 
for  even  medium-sized  vessels,  but  was  unsafe  as  an 
anchorage,  and  vessels  had  to  anchor  as  far  away  as 
Perico,  and  even  Taboga.  Furthermore,  the  locality 
was  unhealthy  and  the  town  was  a  constant  sufferer 
from  sickness.  In  1531  a  plebiscite  was  taken  on  the 
question  of  removal  to  a  more  sanitary  site  with  a 
better  harbor,  but  the  decision  was  adverse  because 
of  the  large  sums  that  had  been  expended  for  buildings 
and  other  purposes,  and  because  there  was  within  the 
province  no  site  with  a  better  harbor. 

In  spite  of  the  disadvantages  and  defects  of  its  lo- 
cation, the  city  increased  steadily  in  size  and  wealth. 
It  was  the  centre,  emporium,  and  port  for  all  com- 
merce and  travel  between  Spain  and  Spanish  posses- 


Bridge  on  ancient  road  to  Old  Panama. 


Ruins  of  sea-wall  at  Old  Panama. 


HISTORICAL  17 

sions  on  the  Pacific.  Through  it  passed  all  the  vast 
output  of  gold  and  silver  from  the  rich  mines  of 
Peru;  the  output  of  mines  in  the  isthmus  province 
of  Veraguas,  which  at  one  time  employed  a  thousand 
laborers;  the  product  of  the  pearl  fisheries  in  the  Bay 
of  Panama,  in  which  hundreds  of  men  and  thirty  brig- 
antines  were  engaged;  and  all  the  merchandise  that 
went  to  and  fro  between  Spain  and  her  West  Indian 
colonies. 

In  1563  the  city  suffered  severely  from  fire,  but  was 
quickly  rebuilt,  and  in  1575,  fifty-six  years  after  its 
foundation,  it  comprised  about  400  buildings,  nearly 
all  of  wood,  about  500  Spanish  residents,  mainly  com- 
ing originally  from  Seville,  and  more  than  3,000  ne- 
groes, or  a  total  population  of  about  4,000. 

So  great  had  been  the  commercial  activity  and  wealth 
of  the  city  by  1580  that  in  that  year  a  mint  was  estab- 
lished for  the  coinage  and  stamping  of  gold  from 
the  mines,  which,  free  from  alloy  and  in  crude  forms, 
constituted  the  chief  medium  of  exchange  in  commer- 
cial transactions.  In  December  of  the  following  year, 
by  royal  decree,  the  title  Muy  noble  y  muy  leal  (Very 
noble  and  very  loyal)  was  conferred  upon  the  city, 
and  its  rigidores,  or  magistrates,  were  given  the  right 
to  call  themselves  "The  Twenty-four,"  thus  placing 
the  city  in  the  rank  of  Seville  and  Cordova,  the  fore- 
most cities  of  Spain.  Panama  was  thus  recognized  as 
the  first  city  of  the  New  World. 

In  1610  the  number  of  buildings  had  increased  to  500, 
among  which  only  eight  were  of  rough  stone  and  mortar. 
The  city  covered  almost  150  acres,  had  three  public 


18  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

squares  and  eleven  streets,  all  paved  with  stones.  In 
1640  the  population  was  estimated  at  about  8,000,  of 
whom  about  7,000  were  negroes,  and  the  number  of 
buildings  was  about  750. 

A  second  and  disastrous  fire  destroyed  a  large  sec- 
tion of  the  city  on  February  21,  1644.  Among  the 
buildings  burned  were  those  of  the  ecclesiastical  au- 
thorities and  the  cathedral  church.  The  latter,  though 
a  frame  building,  is  said  to  have  been  a  structure  of 
considerable  architectural  merit.  The  conflagration 
checked  temporarily  the  growth  of  the  city  and  sent 
many  of  its  inhabitants  to  seek  homes  elsewhere. 
Writing  of  it  soon  afterward  to  King  Philip  of  Spain, 
the  governor  of  the  city  said : 

Panama  is  at  present  but  a  small  town  which  de- 
creases more  and  more  every  day.  The  fields  and  roads 
are  full  of  people  without  houses  or  shelter. 

The  city  made  valiant  efforts  to  recover  from  this 
disaster  during  the  remaining  twenty-seven  years  of  its 
existence  and  had  barely  succeeded  when  Morgan  and 
his  buccaneers  assaulted  and  destroyed  it  in  1671. 
The  cathedral  was  rebuilt  in  stone,  with  three  spacious 
naves,  and  with  a  stately  tower,  the  impressive  ruins 
of  which  still  stand  as  the  chief  landmark  of  the  old 
city  on  the  shore  of  Panama  Bay.  Its  stalls,  or  seats 
in  the  choir,  we  are  told  by  Sosa,  were  made  of  mahog- 
any, its  organ  loft  was  finished  in  cedar  wood,  and  its 
inner  chapel  was  richly  decorated.  Other  buildings  of 
similar  construction  erected  before  the  fire  of  1644 
and  spared  apparently  from  its  ravages  were  a  hos- 


Picturesque  sea-wall,  Panama. 


HISTORICAL  19 

pital  for  men  and  another  for  women,  six  convents 
and  two  chapels.  There  were  also  a  Cabildo,  or  city 
hall,  a  building  for  the  Court  of  Justice  and  Prison,  a 
house  for  the  President  and  Supreme  Court  Judges, 
an  accountant's  office,  and  a  "splendid  building"  for 
the  slave  traffic,  owned  by  a  private  company.  How 
many  of  these  were  stone  is  not  known.  Sosa  says 
that,  notwithstanding  its  commercial  importance  and 
political  power  as  the  first  city  of  the  New  World,  and 
"in  spite  of  the  magnificence  which  history  wishes  by 
exaggeration  to  assign  to  it,"  Panama  did  not  attain 
at  the  height  of  its  prosperity  "an  exterior  structure 
superior  to  that  of  our  present  chief  provincial  towns," 
aside  from  its  convents,  public  buildings,  hospitals,  and 
bridges.  The  same  authority  places  the  population 
of  the  city  at  the  time  of  its  greatest  size  at  about  ten 
thousand,  the  greater  part  of  whom  were  negroes,  and 
the  number  of  buildings  of  all  kinds  at  approximately 
one  thousand. 

The  fountain  and  source  of  all  the  exaggerated  stories 
of  the  wealth  and  magnificence  of  Old  Panama,  with 
which  historical  writing  about  the  isthmus  has  been 
disfigured  for  two  hundred  and  thirty  years,  is  the  fa- 
mous narrative  of  John  Esquemeling,  published  in  1678. 
He  was  one  of  Morgan's  band  and  took  part  in  the 
sacking  of  the  city  in  1671.  There  is  no  more  entranc- 
ing reading  in  piratical  history  than  his  account  of 
Morgan's  exploits,  and  especially  the  march  across  the 
isthmus  and  the  assault  and  destruction  of  Panama.* 

*  "The  Buccaneers  of  America,"  by  John  Esquemeling.  In  Dutch, 
Holland,  1678;  in  English,  London,  1684. 


20  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

In  it  he  gives  this  description  of  the  city  which  he 
helped  to  sack: 

All  the  houses  of  this  city  were  built  with  cedar, 
being  of  very  curious  and  magnificent  structure  and 
richly  adorned  within,  especially  with  hangings  and 
paintings,  whereof  part  was  already  transported  out 
of  the  Pirates7  way,  and  another  great  part  was  con- 
sumed by  the  voracity  of  the  fire. 

There  belonged  to  this  city  (which  is  also  the  head 
of  a  bishopric)  eight  monasteries,  whereof  seven  were 
for  men  and  one  for  women,  two  stately  churches  and 
one  hospital.  The  churches  and  monasteries  were  all 
richly  adorned  with  altar-pieces  and  paintings,  huge 
quantity  of  gold  and  silver,  with  other  precious  things; 
all  which  the  ecclesiastics  had  hidden  and  concealed. 
Besides  which  ornaments,  here  were  to  be  seen  two 
thousand  houses  of  magnificent  and  prodigious  build- 
ing, being  all  or  the  greatest  part  inhabited  by  mer- 
chants of  that  country,  who  are  vastly  rich.  For  the 
rest  of  the  inhabitants  of  lesser  quality  and  tradesmen, 
this  city  contained  five  thousand  houses  more.  Here 
were  also  great  number  of  stables,  which  served  for 
the  horses  and  mules,  that  carry  all  the  plate,  belong- 
ing as  well  to  the  King  of  Spain  as  to  private  men, 
towards  the  coast  of  the  North  Sea.  The  neighboring 
fields  belonging  to  this  city  are  all  cultivated  with 
fertile  plantations  and  pleasant  gardens,  which  afford 
delicious  prospects  to  the  inhabitants  the  whole  year 
long. 

Any  one  familiar  with  historical  writing  about  the 
isthmus  will  have  no  difficulty  in  tracing  all  of  it  that 
relates  to  Old  Panama  to  this  source.  Because  Esque- 
meling  was  an  eye-witness,  and  the  only  one  who  has 
written  on  the  subject,  his  account  has  been  accepted 


Cathedral  Plaza,  Panama  City,  with  front  of  cathedral,  on  the  platform 
of  which  President  Roosevelt  spoke  in  1906. 


The  flat  arch  in  ruins  of  San  Domingo  church. 


HISTORICAL  21 

as  truthful  and  has  been  passed  on  from  one  historical 
writer  to  another,  each  adding  such  embellishments 
as  his  fancy  dictated.  That  a  professional  pirate  with 
a  facile  pen  might  possibly  be  a  facile  liar  few  of  these 
writers  seem  to  have  suspected.  That  the  same  pirate 
might  naturally  exaggerate  the  value  of  the  booty  which 
he  and  his  fellow-pirates  had  captured  seems  also  not 
to  have  been  suspected.  Yet  to  anyone  who  will  give 
a  little  thought  to  the  subject  or  will  take  the  trouble 
to  examine  the  site  of  the  old  city  the  gross  improb- 
ability, not  to  say  absurdity,  of  his  narrative  is  easily 
apparent.  The  city  was  situated  in  a  remote  part  of  the 
wilderness  of  the  New  World.  If  its  inhabitants  pos- 
sessed art  treasures  of  the  kind  alleged  by  Esqueme- 
ling,  if  their  churches  were  "richly  adorned  with  altar- 
pieces  and  paintings,"  they  must  have  brought  them 
from  Spain — a  journey  of  four  thousand  miles  by  sea 
and  fifty  to  one  hundred  miles  by  mule-track  through 
jungle,  forest,  and  morass,  and  over  mountain  ridges. 
Esquemeling  is  careful  to  state  that  none  of  these  art 
treasures  were  captured  by  the  raiders,  that  they  were 
hidden  away  or  burned.  If  they  were  hidden,  no  one 
ever  found  them  again,  for  no  trace  of  them  exists  to 
this  day.  It  is  a  safe  assertion  that  they  existed  only 
in  his  imagination.  So,  too,  with  the  "houses  of  cedar, 
of  very  curious  and  magnificent  structure,"  and  the 
"two  thousand  houses  of  magnificent  building  inhab- 
ited by  vastly  rich  merchants,"  and  the  five  thousand 
houses  more.  The  city  area  never  exceeded  one  hun- 
dred and  fifty  acres,  according  to  the  authentic  docu- 
ments which  Mr.  Sosa,  with  praiseworthy  industry  and 


22  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

zeal,  consulted  in  Spain,  and  contained  no  buildings  of 
consequence  or  anything  approaching  "magnificence," 
save  the  few  enumerated  in  preceding  pages.  It  was 
simply  a  channel  or  clearing-house  for  the  wealth  which 
passed  through  it  from  the  mines  of  Peru  and  other 
Spanish  possessions  in  Central  and  South  America  to 
the  King's  treasuries  in  Spain.  The  houses  of  its  mer- 
chants were  doubtless  of  the  usual  modest  and  unpre- 
tentious type  to  be  seen  in  Central  and  South  Amer- 
ican cities  to-day,  and  those  of  its  very  large  negro 
population  mere  cabins  or  shacks.  Its  ruins  testify 
indubitably  to  the  accuracy  of  this  view.  The  founda- 
tions which  remain  of  the  stone  buildings  show  the 
streets  to  have  been  narrow  and  the  number  of  such 
buildings  to  have  been  comparatively  few.  The  city, 
exclusive  of  its  outlying  negro  or  slave  population, 
never  exceeded  two  thousand  souls.  Put  to  the  test 
of  final  proof,  the  tales  of  the  city's  wonderful  art 
treasures,  the  wealth  and  luxury  of  its  merchant 
princes,  and  the  magnificence  of  its  buildings  which 
imaginative  historical  writers  have  been  telling  for 
more  than  two  centuries  ^have  no  other  foundation 
than  the  picturesque  narrative  of  a  bold  buccaneer 
with  literary  proclivities  and  the  story-telling  gift,  who 
was  as  cheerfully  careless  of  truth  in  describing  the 
deeds  and  assessing  the  value  of  the  booty  captured  by 
his  band  of  thieves  and  assassins,  "demons  of  the 
sea,"  as  they  had  been  of  human  life  in  pursuing  their 
business  of  pillage  and  murder.  His  is  a  true  "pirate's 
tale,"  one  of  the  best  in  literature.  To  treat  it  as  his- 
tory is  grotesque. 


HISTORICAL  23 

Immediately  after  the  destruction  of  the  old  city 
its  surviving  inhabitants  began  to  plan  a  new  one, 
seeking  especially  a  site  which  could  be  made  impreg- 
nable both  on  land  and  water  sides.  They  selected  a 
point  of  volcanic  rock  jutting  about  a  mile  into  the 
Bay  of  Panama  from  the  foot  of  Ancon  Hill.  Here 
they  planned  a  walled  city,  and  on  January  21,  1673, 
it  was  formally  established  by  royal  decree,  with  solemn 
religious  ceremonies  in  which  the  head  of  the  church 
in  the  New  World  marked  with  a  white  cross  the  spot 
at  which  construction  of  the  new  cathedral  should  be 
begun,  and  blessed  the  site  of  the  new  city.  .Work 
was  begun  at  once  on  the  cathedral,  which  stands  to- 
day on  Independence  or  Cathedral  Plaza.  It  was  upon 
the  platform  in  front  of  it  that  President  Amador, 
more  than  two  centuries  later,  received  President 
Roosevelt  in  November,  1906. 

Work  was  begun  also  at  once  on  the  great  wall 
which  was  to  enclose  the  city.  This  was  a  colossal 
structure,  varying  from  twenty  to  thirty  feet  in  height, 
and  in  places  sixty  feet  thick.  On  the  sea-front  was  a 
fort  or  bastion  commanding  the  approach  by  water, 
and  on  the  landside,  between  the  walls  and  the  land 
outside,  a  deep  moat  with  drawbridge  and  massive 
door,  and  upon  the  walls  two  bastions,  with  the  heavi- 
est fortifications  known  at  the  time.  For  the  building 
of  the  wall  stone  was  brought  by  water  from  the  ruins 
at  Old  Panama.  Several  years  were  consumed  in  the 
work,  and  the  cost  is  said  to  have  reached  eleven  mil- 
lion dollars.  There  is  a  legend*  that  during  its  progress 

*  Some  versions  of  this  legend  apply  the  royal  remark  to  Cartagena, 
Colombia,  also  a  walled  city. 


24  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

the  King  of  Spain,  who  was  shading  his  eyes  with  his 
hand  and  looking  intently  from  a  window  of  his  palace 
at  Madrid,  on  being  asked  what  he  was  looking  for, 
replied:  "I  am  looking  for  the  walls  of  Panama,  for 
the}r  have  cost  enough  to  be  seen  even  from  here!" 
They  were  designed  to  make  the  city  safe  against  all 
attack,  and  in  this  they  were  successful.  ^ — ' 

Inside  these  walls,  portions  of  which,  includmgsome 
on  the  water-front,  are  still  standing,  there  were  erected, 
in  addition  to  the  cathedral,  seven  churches  and  a 
college  and  convent,  all  of  rubble  laid  in  cement,  much 
of  the  stone  being  brought  from  Old  Panama.  Most 
of  these  are  still  standing,  though  some  of  them  are  in 
a  partial  condition  of  ruin.  In  the  ruins  of  one  of  them, 
Santo  Domingo,  the  interior  of  which  was  destroyed 
by  fire  in  1756,  there  was  to  be  seen  the  famous  "flat 
arch,"  which  excited  great  interest  and  curiosity  be- 
cause of  its  unusual  construction.  It  was  declared 
that  no  arch  so  flat  could  remain  in  place  without  me- 
chanical aid  of  some  sort,  and  it  was  alleged  that  there 
was  a  concealed  beam  or  plank  running  through  it. 
When  the  ruins  of  the  church  began  to  be  removed  in 
1913  and  the  arch  was  examined  it  was  found  to  be  a 
genuine  construction  of  masonry,  and  not  a  "fake." 

The  new  city  was  a  long  time  in  building.  An  elab- 
orate plan  "in  perspective"  was  prepared  in  1688,  a 
colored  copy  of  which,  said  to  be  the  original,  is  pre- 
served in  the  National  Institute  at  Panama.  Through 
the  courtesy  of  the  director  of  the  institute,  Dr.  E.  G. 
Dexter,  an  American,  I  am  able  to  present  a  photo- 
graphic copy  of  this  document,  and  also  a  like  copy  of 


*  § 

5*       -gas       §•=  - 


«       -s 


o        o, 

S-     JS 


I!  HI  HI  a  »lll  1  !  i 

«°,;  i|^  .*8.i  ;  *   *  *   *  3    I5l2 


HISTORICAL  25 

another  original  plan  showing  the  city  as  it  really 
was  in  1748. 

The  first  plan  shows  the  wall  surrounding  the  city 
and  the  city  itself  as  it  appeared  many  years  later.  It 
seems  quite  certain  that  the  plan  was  executed  in  sub- 
stantially unchanged  form.  The  wall  was  constructed 
on  precisely  the  lines  indicated,  and  parts  of  it,  includ- 
ing the  water-landing,  marked  K,  still  exist. 

The  second  chart  is  of  great  interest  and  value  as 
showing  the  slowness  of  the  city's  growth  during  its 
first  three-quarters  of  a  century.  The  cathedral  had 
not  passed  the  first  stages  of  construction,  only  the 
foundation  and  arches  having  been  placed.  More 
rapid  progress  was  made  in  the  succeeding  years,  for 
the  structure  was  completed  in  December,  1760,  nearly 
eighty-eight  years  after  its  site  was  consecrated.  It  was 
built  entirely  through  the  efforts  of  one  man,  who  de- 
voted to  the  task  all  his  energies  and  savings  for  many 
years.  He  was  the  son  of  a  charcoal-burner,  a  poor 
negro,  who  was  able  to  give  him  only  a  meagre  educa- 
tion. He  entered  the  priesthood  and  through  his 
natural  abilities  advanced  till  he  became  bishop  of 
Panama,  the  only  colored  man  who  has  ever  held  that 
position. 

It  is  evident  from  the  size  and  elaborate  arrangement 
of  buildings  about  the  bull-ring,  or  square,  that  the  in- 
terest of  the  city  centred  in  that.  It  occupied  the  entire 
central  plaza,  and  all  the  main  avenues  of  the  city  led 
up  to  it.  It  had  private  boxes  for  civic  and  church 
dignitaries,  rows  of  boxes  for  merchants,  and  ample 
accommodations  for  the  people,  with  outside  flights  of 


26  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

steps  leading  to  the  seats,  much  in  the  style  of  a  mod- 
ern baseball  ground.  At  what  date  the  plaza  was  con- 
verted from  a  bull-ring  to  a  park  is  uncertain,  but 
probably  soon  after  the  cathedral  was  completed. 


CHAPTER  III 

FIRST  TRANSIT  ROUTES  ACROSS  THE  ISTHMUS  —  EARLY 
PROJECTS  FOR  A  WATERWAY  —  THREE  CENTURIES 
OF  SPANISH  RULE  AND  OBSTRUCTION 

THE  first  transit  route  across  the  isthmus  for  the  trans- 
portation of  gold,  silver,  and  merchandise  from  .the 
various  Spanish  colonies  on  the  Pacific  to  Spain  ran 
from  the  city  of  Panama  to  Nombre  de  Dios,  on  the 
shores  of  the  Caribbean,  a  distance  of  about  ninety 
miles.  It  was  cut  through  the  forest  and  jungle  and 
over  mountain  tops  and  across  mountain  streams,  and 
was  roughly  paved  with  stones.  It  ran  from  Panama 
in  a  northeasterly  direction  for  about  twenty  miles  to 
a  point  on  the  Chagres  River,  which  was  given  the 
name  of  Venta  Cruz,  changed  later  to  Cruces.  Thence 
it  extended  northward  for  about  seventy  miles  to 
Nombre  de  Dios.  A  line  of  posts  was  established  along 
the  route.  It  was  put  in  use  in  1519,  and  was  the  sole 
route  between  the  two  oceans  till  about  1535,  when 
the  Chagres  River  between  Venta  Cruz  and  the  At- 
lantic, a  distance  of  about  thirty-six  miles,  was  made 
navigable  for  boats  of  light  draught,  and  a  water  route 
was  established  between  Venta  Cruz  and  Nombre  de 
Dios.  The  land  route  between  these  points  was  not 
abandoned,  however,  but  continued  to  be  used  in  con- 

27 


28  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

nection  with  the  water  route.  So  well  was  the  paving 
laid  that  parts  of  it  remain  in  position  to-day,  and  the 
entire  trail  from  Panama  City  to  Graces  is  open  and 
is  used  by  the  natives  as  a  highway  for  pack-mules  and 
ponies.  In  1597  Puerto  Bello  was  substituted  for 
Nombre  de  Dios  as  the  Atlantic  terminus.  This  town, 
which  was  situated  about  twenty  miles  northeast  of 
the  present  city  of  Colon,  and  nearer  to  that  city  than 
Nombre  de  Dios  by  about  fifteen  miles,  was  in  a  bay 
which  had  been  visited  and  given  that  name  by 
Columbus  in  1502.  It  was  taken  and  sacked  by  Mor- 
gan in  1668,  previous  to  his  descent  on  Old  Panama.* 
It  is  an  interesting  fact  that  when  the  American  build- 
ers of  the  canal  were  in  search  of  suitable  sand  and 
cracked  stone  with  which  to  construct  the  locks  at 
Gatun,  they  found  the  former  at  Nombre  de  Dios  and 
the  latter  at  Puerto  Bello,  erecting  temporary  quarters 
and  machinery  at  both  places  for  the  purpose  of  secur- 
ing the  needed  supplies. 

In  addition  to  the  Panama  route  there  were  others 
across  the  isthmus  at  Tehuantepec  and  Nicaragua 
which  at  one  time  were  of  great  importance.  The  use 
of  these  overland  routes  led  naturally  to  talk  about 
the  possibility  of  opening  a  waterway  between  the  two 
oceans.  As  early  as  1529  Alvaro  de  Saavedra  Ceron, 
a  follower  of  Balboa  who  had  made  a  voyage  along  the 
coast  of  the  isthmus,  proposed  to  connect  the  two 
oceans  by  a  waterway,  mentioning  as  suitable  places 

*  Sir  Francis  Drake  attacked  it  on  his  second  freebooting  expedition, 
but  was  repulsed  and  died  of  fever  on  board  his  fleet,  lying  off  the  harbor, 
on  January  28,  1596. 


HISTORICAL  29 

Panama,  Nicaragua,  Darien,  and  Tehuantepec.  Each 
of  these  lines  had  its  advocates,  and  from  the  outset 
there  was  keen  rivalry  between  the  advocates  of  Panama 
and  those  of  Nicaragua. 

Charles  V,  whose  interest  in  the  question  was  con- 
stant and  keen,  issued  a  royal  decree  in  February, 
1534,  directing  a  survey  of  the  lands  between  the 
Chagres  River  and  the  Pacific  for  the  purpose  of  de- 
ciding as  to  the  most  effective  means  of  establishing 
water  communication.  This  is  the  first  formal  step  of 
record  toward  the  construction  of  an  isthmian  canal. 
The  governor  of  the  Panama  region,  Pascual  Andagoya, 
who  made  the  survey,  reported  that  the  work  proposed 
was  impossible,  and  that  no  king,  however  powerful  he 
might  be,  was  capable  of  forming  a  junction  of  the  two 
seas  or  of  furnishing  the  means  of  carrying  out  such  an 
undertaking. 

This  report  apparently  discouraged  Charles,  for  dur- 
ing the  remaining  twenty-two  years  of  his  reign  he 
took  no  further  steps  in  that  direction.  He  abdicated 
in  favor  of  his  son  Philip  II  in  1556,  and  this  monarch, 
after  directing  a  survey  of  Nicaragua  in  1567,  and  re- 
ceiving a  report  quite  as  unfavorable  as  that  which  his 
father  had  received  in  regard  to  Panama,  entered  upon 
a  policy  which  postponed  all  consideration  of  an  isth- 
mian canal  for  two  centuries. 

The  basis  of  this  policy  was  the  conviction  that  a 
waterway  would  be  a  menace  to  that  monopoly  of 
South  American  commerce  and  products,  including 
the  rich  output  of  the  gold  and  silver  mines  of  Peru, 
which  Spain  was  able  to  maintain  through  her  control 


30  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

of  the  land  routes  of  the  isthmus.  Philip  realized  as 
fully  as  did  Sir  Walter  Raleigh  the  value  of  the  position 
held  by  Spain,  and  undoubtedly  concurred  in  the 
latter 's  statement  to  Queen  Elizabeth:  "By  seizing  the 
Isthmus  of  Darien  you  will  wrest  the  keys  of  the  world 
from  Spain."  He  knew  that  so  long  as  the  monopoly 
of  isthmus  transit  remained  unbroken  Spain  held  the 
"keys  of  the  world,"  and  he  not  only  opposed  the  con- 
struction of  a  canal  on  the  ground  that,  since  the  Al- 
mighty had  divided  the  two  oceans,  for  man  to  unite 
them  would  be  to  invite  Divine  wrath,  but  also  for- 
bade, on  penalty  of  death,  the  opening  of  new  land 
routes.  This  policy  was  so  attractive  to  Spain  that  it 
was  continued  till  the  end  of  her  three  hundred  years 
of  South  American  domination,  or  till  the  beginning  of 
the  nineteenth  century.  During  all  that  time  no  prog- 
ress whatever  was  made  in  the  direction  of  a  canal, 
and  no  information  was  accumulated  in  regard  to  the 
physical  structure  of  the  isthmus. 

When  Humboldt  visited  Central  and  South  America, 
in  the  early  part  of  the  nineteenth  century,  he  spoke  of 
this  lack  of  accurate  knowledge,  saying  that  the  ele- 
vation of  no  mountain,  plain,  or  city  from  Granada  to 
Mexico  was  known.  He  gave  conclusive  evidence  of 
his  innocence  of  such  knowledge  by  proposing  no  less 
than  nine  routes  for  a  maritime  canal,  including  Te- 
huantepec,  Nicaragua,  Panama,  and  Darien,  saying 
he  had  no  doubt  of  the  practicability  of  construction, 
and  that  the  enterprise  would  "immortalize  a  govern- 
ment occupied  with  the  interests  of  humanity."  Most 
of  the  statements  which  he  made  in  regard  to  the  phys- 


Street  scene  in  Old  Porto  Bello. 
December,  1911. 


Village  of  Cruces,  Canal  Zone. 
A  street  scene,  1912. 


HISTORICAL  31 

ical  character  of  the  isthmus  were  shown  by  later  inves- 
tigations to  have  been  mere  guesses. 

Humboldt's  views,  which  were  widely  published,  re- 
vived interest  in  the  question  of  an  interoceanic  water- 
way, and  in  April,  1814,  the  Spanish  Cortes  passed  a 
decree  for  the  construction  of  an  isthmian  canal  ade- 
quate for  the  passage  of  vessels  of  the  largest  size,  and 
providing  for  the  formation  of  a  company  to  undertake 
the  enterprise.  Nothing  was  done  under  this  decree. 
Five  years  later  the  Spanish  provinces  in  Central  and 
South  America  began  to  throw  off  the  yoke  of  Spain, 
and  by  1823  all  of  them  had  established  their  independ- 
ence. With  this  separation  from  her  American  pos- 
sessions the  possibility  of  constructing  an  isthmian 
canal  passed  from  Spain. 


CHAPTER  IV 

AWAKENING  OF  AMERICAN  INTEREST 

WITH  the  passing  of  Spanish  domination  in  Central 
and  South  America  there  came  a  general  revival  of  in- 
terest in  the  subject  of  an  isthmian  waterway.  For  the 
first  time  the  United  States  took  official  notice  of  the 
project.  Scarcely  had  Guatemala;  San  Salvador,  Hon- 
duras, Nicaragua,  and  Costa  Rica  formed  the  Federal 
Republic  of  the  United  Provinces  of  Central  America, 
when  Aaron  H.  Palmer,  a  merchant  of  New  York 
City,  in  behalf  of  himself  and  other  merchants,  made 
formal  proposals  to  the  new  federal  republic  for  the 
construction  of  a  canal  through  Nicaragua.  Prompted 
by  these  proposals,  the  envoy  of  the  federal  republic 
at  Washington  was  instructed  to  call  the  attention  of 
the  United  States  Government  to  the  matter.  This  he 
did  in  a  letter  addressed  to  Henry  Clay,  Secretary  of 
State,  under  date  of  February  8,  1825,  stating  that  a 
company  of  respectable  American  merchants  was 
ready  to  undertake  the  task  as  soon  as  it  could  be  ar- 
ranged by  treaty  between  the  two  governments,  and 
assuring  the  secretary  that  nothing  would  be  more 
grateful  to  the  "Republic  of  the  Centre  of  America " 
than  the  co-operation  of  the  American  people  in  the 
work.  Mr.  Clay  responded  favorably,  assuring  the 

32 


HISTORICAL  33 

envoy  of  the  "deep  interest  taken  by  the  government 
of  the  United  States  in  an  undertaking  so  highly  cal- 
culated to  diffuse  an  extensive  influence  on  the  affairs 
of  mankind,"  and  informing  him  that  the  President 
had  decided  to  instruct  the  United  States  envoy  to 
Central  America  to  investigate  the  merits  of  the  Nica- 
raguan  route. 

The  American  envoy  was  so  instructed  in  1826. 
There  is  no  record  of  a  report  by  him.  Without  wait- 
ing for  action  by  the  United  States  Government,  the 
Republic  of  Central  America  entered  into  a  contract 
with  Palmer  and  his  associates  on  June  16,  1826,  for 
the  construction  of  a  canal,  but  after  nearly  a  year  of 
futile  effort  to  induce  capitalists  to  invest  in  the  enter- 
prise, Palmer  abandoned  it. 

An  agreement  between  the  Central  American  Re- 
public and  a  company  in  the  Netherlands,  in  1830, 
resulted  in  like  failure.  The  Congress  of  the  republic 
appealed  to  the  United  States  again  in  1835,  and  in' 
Response  the  United  States  Senate,  on  March  3  of  that 
year,  passed  a  resolution  requesting  the  President  to 
consider  the  expediency  of  opening  negotiations  with 
the  new  republics  of  Central  and  South  America  for 
the  purpose  of  protecting  by  suitable  treaties  such  in- 
dividuals and  companies  as  might  undertake  to  con- 
struct a  canal,  and  for  securing  forever  to  all  nations 
the  free  and  equal  right  of  navigating  it  on  payment 
of  reasonable  tolls. 

In  accordance  with  this  resolution  President  Jack- 
son sent  Charles  Biddle  to  Nicaragua  and  Panama, 
.with  instructions  to  examine  the  different  routes  of  pro- 


34  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

posed  communication  and  report;  but  nothing  of  impor- 
tance resulted;  and  on  June  9;  1837;  the  President  sent 
a  message  to  the  Senate  saying  it  was  not  expedient 
at  the  time  to  enter  into  negotiations  with  foreign  gov- 
ernments with  reference  to  an  interoceanic  canal.  A 
year  later  a  memorial  was  sent  to  Congress,  signed  by 
the  mayor  and  other  influential  citizens  of  New  York, 
setting  forth  the  national  importance  of  a  canal  and 
requesting  that  competent  engineers  be  sent  to  the 
isthmus  to  investigate  the  various  routes  and  report 
as  to  the  most  desirable.  A  committee  report  was  the 
only  outcome. 

In  1839  President  Van  Buren  sent  John  L.  Stephens 
to  the  isthmus  to  investigate  and  report  on  the  different 
routes.  He  recommended  the  Nicaraguan  route,  es- 
timated the  cost  of  a  canal  there  at  $25,000,000,  but 
said  the  time  was  not  favorable  for  the  enterprise  be- 
cause of  the  revolutionary  condition  of  the  country. 

There  were  many  other  proposals  and  investigations 
by  various  persons  and  governments  between  the  years 
1824  and  1840,  but  nothing  of  importance  resulted. 

In  November,  1831,  New  Granada,  Venezuela,  and 
Ecuador,  which  in  1819  had  united  in  forming  the 
Republic  of  Colombia,  separated  into  three  independent 
republics.  As  the  Panama  route  was  in  the  territory 
of  New  Granada,  that  republic  had  full  control  of  it, 
and  in  1838  it  granted  a  concession  to  a  French  com- 
pany to  construct  railways  or  canals  across  the  isthmus, 
with  the  Pacific  terminus  at  Panama.  Several  years 
were  spent  by  the  company  in  making  surveys,  and  a 
statement  was  put  forth  to  the  effect  that  a  depression 


HISTORICAL  35 

had  been  found  in  the  mountains  of  the  continental 
divide  which  offered  a  passage  only  about  thirty-seven 
feet  above  Pacific  sea-level. 

This  was  so  much  in  conflict  with  previous  reports 
that  Guizot,  at  the  time  French  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  sent  Napoleon  Garella  to  Panama  in  Septem- 
ber, 1843,  to  investigate  the  matter.  He  reported  that 
the  lowest  mountain-pass  was  about  375  feet  above 
sea-level.  He  favored  a  lock  canal,  about  158  feet 
above  sea-level,  with  34  locks,  18  on  the  Atlantic  side 
and  16  on  the  Pacific  side,  and  proposed  either  a  cut 
through  the  mountain  range  or  a  tunnel.  The  esti- 
mated cost,  with  a  tunnel,  was  $25,000,000;  with  an 
open  cut,  about  $28,000,000.  This  report  was  a  seri- 
ous disappointment,  and  led  to  the  abandonment  of 
the  project  and  the  forfeiting  of  the  concession. 


CHAPTER  V 

A  CANAL  FOR  ALL  NATIONS 

FROM  the  very  beginning  of  its  active  interest  in  an 
isthmus  canal  the  United  States  Government  con- 
tended that  if  such  a  waterway  were  to  be  opened  it 
should  be  free  to  all  nations  on  equal  terms.  In  1825, 
when  the  matter  was  formally  presented  for  the  first 
time  to  the  United  States  Government,  President 
Adams  appointed  Messrs.  Anderson  and  Sergeant 
delegates  to  a  congress  of  nations  at  Panama,  and 
in  his  instructions  to  them  Secretary  Clay  said: 

A  cut  or  canal  for  purposes  of  navigation  somewhere 
through  the  Isthmus  that  connects  the  two  Americas, 
to  unite  the  Pacific  and  Atlantic  oceans,  will  form  a 
proper  subject  of  consideration  at  the  Congress.  That 
vast  object,  if  it  should  be  ever  accomplished,  will  be 
interesting,  in  a  greater  or  less  degree,  to  all  parts  of 
the  world.  But  to  this  continent  will  probably  accrue 
the  largest  amount  of  benefit  from  its  execution;  and 
to  Colombia,  Mexico,  the  Central  Republic,  Peru  and 
the  United  States  more  than  to  any  other  of  the  Amer- 
ican nations.  What  is  to  redound  to  the  advantage  of 
all  America  should  be  effected  by  common  means  and 
united  exertions  and  should  not  be  left  to  the  separate 
and  unassisted  efforts  of  any  one  power.  ...  If  the 
work  should  ever  be  executed  so  as  to  admit  of  the  pas- 

36 


HISTORICAL  37 

sage  of  sea  vessels  from  ocean  to  ocean,  the  benefits  of 
it  ought  not  to  be  exclusively  appropriated  to  any  one 
nation,  but  should  be  extended  to  all  parts  of  the 
globe  upon  the  payment  of  a  just  compensation  or 
reasonable  tolls. 

In  1835  the  Congress  of  the  Republic  of  Central 
America  offered  to  grant  to  the  United  States  the  right 
to  construct  a  canal  across  the  isthmus,  and  in  re- 
sponse to  this  action  the  United  States  Senate,  on 
March  3  of  that  year,  passed  the  following  resolution: 

Resolved,  That  the  President  of  the  United  States  be 
respectfully  requested  to  consider  the  expediency  of 
opening  negotiations  with  the  Governments  of  other 
nations,  and  particularly  with  the  Governments  of 
Central  America  and  New  Granada,  for  the  purpose  of 
effectually  protecting,  by  suitable  treaty  stipulations 
with  them,  such  individuals  or  companies  as  may  under- 
take to  open  a  communication  between  the  Atlantic 
and  Pacific  Oceans  by  the  construction  of  a  ship  canal 
across  the  isthmus  which  connects  North  and  South 
America,  and  of  securing  forever,  by  such  stipulations, 
the  free  and  equal  right  of  navigating  such  canal  to  all 
such  nations,  on  the  payment  of  such  reasonable  tolls 
as  may  be  established,  to  compensate  the  capitalists 
who  may  engage  in  such  an  undertaking  and  complete 
the  work. 

The  House  of  Representatives  took  up  the  question 
four  years  later,  1839,  and  adopted  unanimously  a 
resolution  in  which  the  President  was  requested: 

To  consider  the  expediency  of  opening  or  continuing 
negotiations  with  the  governments  of  other  nations, 


38  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

and  particularly  with  those  the  territorial  jurisdiction 
of  which  comprehends  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  and  to 
which  the  United  States  have  accredited  ministers  or 
agents,  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  the  practicabil- 
ity of  effecting  a  communication  between  the  Atlantic 
and  Pacific  Oceans  by  the  construction  of  a  ship  canal 
across  the  Isthmus;  and  of  securing  forever,  by  suitable 
treaty  stipulations,  the  free  and  equal  right  of  navigat- 
ing such  canal  to  all  nations. 

Seven  years  later  the  principle  of  a  canal  for  all 
nations  was  embodied,  in  a  form  which  established  it 
as  the  traditional  policy  of  the  United  States,  in  a 
treaty  with  New  Granada,  which  was  concluded  in 
December,  1846,  but  not  ratified  and  proclaimed  till 
June,  1848.  In  that  treaty  the  government  of  New 
Granada  granted  to  the  government  of  the  United 
States  the  right  of  free  and  open  transit  across  the 
Isthmus  of  Panama  upon  any  modes  of  communication 
then  existing  or  that  might  thereafter  be  constructed, 
and  in  return  the  United  States  guaranteed  the  per- 
fect neutrality  of  the  isthmus,  with  a  view  that  free 
transit  from  the  one  to  the  other  might  not  be  inter- 
rupted or  embarrassed,  and  guaranteed  also  the  rights 
of  sovereignty  and  property  which  New  Granada  pos- 
sessed over  said  territory. 

In  his  message  to  Congress,  transmitting  this  treaty 
for  ratification,  on  February  10,  1847,  President  Polk 
said: 

In  entering  into  the  mutual  guarantees  proposed  by 
the  thirty-fifth  article  of  the  treaty,  neither  the  Govern- 
ment of  New  Granada  nor  that  of  the  United  States 


HISTORICAL  39 

has  any  narrow  or  exclusive  views.  The  ultimate  ob- 
ject, as  presented  by  the  Senate  of  the  United  States 
in  their  resolution  (of  March  3,  1835),  to  which  I  have 
already  referred,  is  to  secure  to  all  nations  the  free  and 
equal  right  of  passage  over  the  isthmus.  If  the  United 
States,  as  the  chief  of  the  American  nations,  should 
first  become  a  party  to  the  guarantee,  it  cannot  be 
doubted,  indeed  it  is  confidently  expected  by  the 
Government  of  New  Granada,  that  similar  guarantees 
will  be  given  to  that  Republic  by  Great  Britain  and 
France. 

Secretary  Cass,  in  a  letter  to  Lord  Napier,  British 
minister  to  the  United  States,  on  September  10,  1857, 
spoke  of  the  treaty  as  offering  "free  transit  to  all  de- 
siring it,"  on  condition  of  such  guarantee. 

The  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  of  1850  declared  the 
"great  design  of  this  convention"  to  be  "that  of  con- 
structing and  maintaining  the  said  canal  as  a  ship  com- 
munication between  the  two  oceans  for  the  benefit  of 
mankind,  on  equal  terms  to  all." 

On  January  14,  1869,  a  treaty  was  concluded  with 
the  United  States  of  Colombia  and  sent  to  the  Senate 
for  ratification  by  President  Johnson,  containing  a 
clause  which  read:  "The  Government  of  the  United 
States  of  America  shall  establish  a  tariff  of  tolls  and 
freights  for  the  said  canal  on  a  basis  of  perfect  equality 
for  all  nations,  whether  in  time  of  peace  or  war." 

This  was  not  ratified.  On  January  26,  1870,  another 
treaty  was  concluded  with  the  same  republic  and  sent 
to  the  Senate  by  President  Grant,  on  March  31,  for 
ratification,  containing  a  clause  authorizing  the  United 
States  to  establish  and  from  time  to  time  change  and 


40  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

alter  a  tariff  "upon  a  basis  of  perfect  equality  at  all 
times  and  among  all  nations."  This  also  was  not 
ratified,  but  in  neither  instance  was  objection  made  to 
the  free  and  equal  provision. 

Hamilton  Fish,  Secretary  of  State,  writing,  on  Sep- 
tember 4,  1869,  to  S.  A.  Hurlbut,  United  States  min- 
ister at  Bogota,  in  reference  to  a  canal  treaty  with 
Colombia,  said: 

The  President  (Grant)  is  disinclined  to  enter  into 
any  entanglement  in  participation  of  control  over  the 
work  with  other  powers.  He  regards  it  as  an  Ameri- 
can enterprise,  which  he  desires  to  be  undertaken  under 
American  auspices,  to  the  benefit  of  which  the  whole 
commercial  world  should  be  fully  admitted. 

Secretary  Evarts,  writing  to  Ernest  Dickman,  Amer- 
ican minister  at  Bogota,  on  April  19,  1880,  said: 

In  all  language  that  this  Government  has  ever  used, 
in  all  the  action  it  has  ever  proposed,  in  reference  to 
an  interoceanic  canal,  it  has  expressed  not  only  its 
willingness,  but  its  anxiety  that  such  an  enterprise 
should  be  for  the  benefit  of  the  world's  commerce,  and 
in  no  proposition  that  it  has  ever  made  has  it  sought 
for  its  citizens  or  its  commerce  special  advantages. 

When  the  question  of  modifying  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty  was  under  discussion  in  1881,  Secretary  Blaine 
wrote,  on  June  24,  to  James  Russell  Lowell,  American 
minister  at  London: 

Nor,  in  time  of  peace,  does  the  United  States  seek  to 
have  any  exclusive  privileges  accorded  to  American 


HISTORICAL  41 

» 

ships  in  respect  to  precedence  or  tolls,  through  an  inter- 
oceanic  canal  any  more  than  it  has  sought  like  privi- 
leges for  American  goods  in  transit  over  the  Panama 
Railway,  under  the  exclusive  control  of  an  American 
corporation.  It  would  be  our  earnest  desire  and  ex- 
pectation to  see  the  world's  peaceful  commerce  enjoy 
the  same  just,  liberal,  and  rational  treatment. 

In  his  anuual  message  to  Congress,  in  1885,  President 
Cleveland  said: 

The  lapse  of  years  has  abundantly  confirmed  the 
wisdom  and  foresight  of  those  earlier  administrations 
which,  long  before  the  conditions  of  maritime  inter- 
course were  changed  and  enlarged  by  the  progress  of 
the  age,  proclaimed  the  vital  need  of  interoceanic  transit 
across  the  American  Isthmus  and  consecrated  it  in 
advance  to  the  common  use  of  mankind  by  their  posi- 
tive declarations  and  through  the  formal  obligation  of 
treaties. 

The  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty,  abrogating  and  succeed- 
ing the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  was  ratified  on  Decem- 
ber 16,  1901.  It  contained  this  clause,  which  embodied, 
as  the  foregoing  citations  abundantly  prove,  the  un- 
broken "free  and  equal"  canal  policy  of  the  United 
States  Government  for  three-quarters  of  a  century: 

The  canal  shall  be  free  and  open  to  the  vessels  of 
commerce  and  of  war  of  all  nations  observing  these 
rules,  on  terms  of  entire  equality,  so  that  there  shall  be 
no  discrimination  against  any  such  nation,  or  its 
citizens  or  subjects,  in  respect  of  the  conditions  or 
charges  of  traffic,  or  otherwise.  Such  conditions  and 
charges  of  traffic  shall  be  just  and  equitable. 


42  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

I 

In  transmitting  the  treaty  to  the  Senate,  President 
Roosevelt  said  in  his  special  message: 

It  specifically  provides  that  the  United  States  alone 
shall  do  the  work  of  building  and  assume  the  responsi- 
bility of  safeguarding  the  canal  and  shall  regulate  its 
neutral  use  by  all  nations  on  terms  of  equality  without 
the  guaranty  or  interference  of  any  outside  nation  from 
any  quarter. 

In  another  message  sent  to  Congress  on  January  4, 
1904,  President  Roosevelt  said: 

If  ever  a  Government  could  be  said  to  have  received 
a  mandate  from  civilization  to  effect  an  object  the  ac- 
complishment of  which  was  demanded  in  the  interest 
of  mankind,  the  United  States  holds  that  position  with 
regard  to  the  interoceanic  canal. 

This  was  the  unbroken  attitude  of  the  United  States 
Government  down  to  August  24,  1912,  when  President 
Taft  approved  a  bill*  which  had  been  passed  by  Con- 
gress, providing  for  the  opening,  operation,  etc.,  of  the 
Panama  Canal,  in  which  American  ships  engaged  in 
coastwise  trade  were  exempted  from  the  payment  of 
tolls.  This  action  called  out  a  formal  protest  from 
Great  Britain,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  a  violation 
of  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty,  and  the  question  became 
a  subject  for  animated  controversy  on  both  sides  of 
the  Atlantic.  In  the  United  States  there  was  formi- 
dable opposition  to  the  law,  and  a  strong  demand  for 
its  repeal.  The  most  influential  newspapers  of  the 

*  Appendix  C. 


HISTORICAL  43 

country  were  nearly  or  quite  unanimous  in  favor  of 
repeal,  and  popular  sentiment,  so  far  as  it  manifested 
itself  through  the  expressions  of  commercial  and  other 
organizations,  sustained  their  position.  Senator  Root, 
of  New  York,  introduced  in  the  Senate,  on  January  14, 
1913,  a  bill  repealing  the  exemption,  but  it  did  not 
reach  a  vote  before  adjournment,  on  March  4.  The 
question  was  thus  passed  on  by  the  Taft  administra- 
tion to  that  of  its  successor,  President  Wilson,  who  as- 
sumed office  on  that  date. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  FIRST  PANAMA  RAILROAD 

THE  treaty  with  New  Granada  in  1846  was  the  outcome 
of  a  steadily  increasing  need  for  a  better  route  of  com- 
munication between  the  eastern  section  of  the  United 
States  and  its  new  possessions  on  the  Pacific  coast. 
Its  negotiations  were  begun  at  the  opening  of  an  im- 
portant epoch  in  human  progress.  In  1846  a  treaty 
was  concluded  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States  which  settled  the  dispute  between  those  two 
nations  as  to  the  boundary  line  west  of  the  Rocky 
Mountains  and  in  accordance  with  which  Oregon  be- 
came a  territory  of  the  United  States  in  1848.  The  war 
between  the  United  States  and  Mexico  began  in  May, 
1846,  and  resulted  in  a  treaty,  signed  February  2,  1848, 
by  which  California  was  added  to  the  United  States. 
Almost  simultaneously  with  the  signing  of  the  treaty 
gold  was  discovered  in  California  (January  24,  1848), 
and  the  demand  for  a  transit  route  across  the  isthmus 
was  greatly  increased.  The  value  of  a  right  of  way 
across  it  was  correspondingly  enhanced. 

To  the  thousands  of  gold-seekers  who  started  almost 
immediately  from  the  East,  haste  in  reaching  the  new 
gold-fields  was  the  great  desideratum.  To  enable  them 
to  avoid  the  tedious  and  arduous  journey  across  the 

44 


HISTORICAL  45 

plains  and  the  no  less  tedious  and  arduous  one  around 
Cape  Horn,  steamship  and  packet  lines  were  opened 
between  New  York  and  the  Atlantic  termini  of  the 
isthmus  trails  and  between  Panama  and  San  Francisco 
on  the  Pacific.  The  trials  and  tribulations  of  those 
crossing  the  isthmus  in  this  manner  naturally  called 
renewed  and  most  insistent  attention  to  the  need  of  a 
better  isthmus  route,  and  the  matter  was  brought  be- 
fore Congress  in  the  form  of  a  joint  resolution  in  the 
House  of  Representatives,  at  the  thirteenth  session, 
1848-9,  authorizing  the  survey  of  certain  routes  for  a 
canal  or  railway  between  the  two  oceans.  The  resolu- 
tion was  referred  to  a  committee,  which  reported  it 
back,  on  February  20,  1849,  recommending  its  passage. 

In  the  meantime  three  enterprising  American  citi- 
zens had  taken  the  first  steps,  never  to  be  retraced,  in 
the  actual  construction  of  an  isthmian  railway. 

The  first  contract  for  a  railroad  across  the  isthmus 
was  granted  by  the  government  of  New  Granada  in 
June,  1847,  to  Mateo  Klein,  agent  and  attorney  for  an 
organization  in  Paris  called  the  Panama  Company. 
This,  under  certain  conditions,  conferred  upon  the 
company,  for  a  period  of  ninety-nine  years,  the  ex- 
clusive privilege  of  constructing  and  maintaining  a 
railway  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  to  be  completed 
within  six  years.  Because  of  the  failure  of  the  French 
company  to  secure  the  capital  necessary  its  privileges 
lapsed  in  June,  1848. 

In  December  of  that  year,  William  Henry  Aspinwall, 
John  Lloyd  Stephens,  and  Henry  Chauncey,  of  New 
York,  under  the  name  of  the  Panama  Railroad  Corn- 


46  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

pany,  obtained  from  New  Granada  a  grant  which  was 
a  modified  form  of  the  Klein  concession.  It  conferred 
the  same  exclusive  privileges,  declared  all  previous 
concessions  of  like  character  null  and  void,  and  was 
to  run  for  forty-nine  years  after  the  completion  and 
opening  of  the  road  to  public  use.  The  road  was  to  be 
completed  in  six  years,  with  the  agreement  that  if  it 
were  found  to  be  impracticable  to  complete  it  in  that 
time,  an  extension  of  two  years  would  be  allowed  with- 
out penalty. 

A  few  months  later,  April  7,  1849,  the  New  York 
Legislature  passed  an  act  incorporating  the  Panama 
Railroad  Company  with  a  capital  stock  of  one  million 
dollars,  with  privilege  of  increasing  it  to  five  million 
dollars,  and  liberty  to  begin  operations  when  five 
hundred  thousand  dollars  had  been  subscribed  and 
twenty  per  cent  of  each  share  subscribed  for  had  been 
paid  in.  On  April  12,  1855,  the  Legislature  passed  an 
amendment  increasing  the  capital  stock  to  seven  mil- 
lion dollars.  The  road  is  still  operated  under  the  orig- 
inal charter  as  thus  amended. 

Soon  after  the  granting  of  the  charter  the  Panama 
Railroad  Company  sent  a  party  of  experienced  engi- 
neers, under  the  command  of  Colonel  G.  W.  Hughes,  of 
the  United  States  army,  to  the  isthmus  to  make  a  sur- 
vey of  the  line  of  the  road  with  a  view  to  its  loca- 
tion. In  his  report  Colonel  Hughes  confirmed  pre- 
vious opinion  as  to  the  practicability  of  the  road,  and 
announced  the  discovery  of  a  gap  in  the  continental 
divide  that  was  thirty-seven  feet  lower  than  any  previ- 
ously found. 


HISTORICAL  47 

In  the  meantime  the  company  had  made  a  contract 
with  Colonel  George  M.  Totten  and  John  C.  Trautwine 
for  the  construction  of  the  road.  They  visited  the 
isthmus  and  located  the  line  to  run  from  Manzanilla 
Island  (afterward  Aspinwall,  now  Colon)  to  Panama. 
Returning  to  the  United  States,  they  asked  to  be  re- 
leased from  their  contract  on  the  ground  that  they 
had  entered  into  it  in  ignorance  of  conditions  on  the 
isthmus  and  were  unable  to  execute  it.  The  company 
released  them,  took  charge  of  construction  itself,  and 
retained  them  as  associate  engineers-in-chief. 

The  real  pioneers  of  an  isthmian  canal  were  these 
builders  of  the  Panama  Railroad:  John  Lloyd  Stephens, 
Colonel  George  M.  Totten,  John  C.  Trautwine,  and. 
their  chief  associates,  James  L.  Baldwin  and  Captain 
John  J.  Williams.  They  cut  through  pestilential  jungle 
and  morass  the  pathway  which  the  canal  of  the  future 
was  to  follow.  The  story  of  their  struggles  with  the 
obstacles  and  perils  of  a  tropical  wilderness,  with  sick- 
ness and  death  as  their  constant  companions,  is  a  record 
of  American  pluck  and  indomitable  persistence  rarely 
equalled  and  never  surpassed  in  our  annals.*  Nothing 
that  those  who  followed  them  in  canal  work,  under 
French  and  American  direction,  were  called  upon  to 
endure  was  comparable  to  what  they  encountered  and 
overcame.  It  cost  Mr.  Stephens  his  life,  and  the  price 

*  "Handbook  of  the  Panama  Railroad,"  Dr.  F.  N.  Otis,  New  York, 
1361. 

"Panama  in  1885,"  Robert  Tomes,  New  York,  1855. 

"Five  Years  at  Panama,"  Dr.  Wolfred  Nelson,  New  York,  1889. 

"Fifty  Years  at  Panama,  1861-1911,"  Tracy  Robinson,  Panama, 
1912. 


48  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

that  many  of  his  associates  paid  was  years  of  debilitat- 
ing illness  ending  in  permanent  loss  of  health.  Mr. 
Trautwine  and  Captain  Baldwin  retired  at  the  end  of 
the  first  year,  the  former  because  of  disagreement  with 
the  directors  of  the  company  on  questions  of  policy, 
and  the  latter  because  of  impaired  health,  though  he 
returned  to  the  work  later  and  continued  to  the  end. 
Colonel  Totten  remained  chief  engineer  in  charge  till 
the  completion  of  the  road,  riding  over  it  from  ocean 
to  ocean  on  the  locomotive  which  made  the  first  trip 
on  January  28,  1855. 

The  road  had  cost  in  money  about  $8,000,000.  What 
it  cost  in  human  suffering  is  incalculable,  and  in  human 
life  mainly  a  matter  of  estimate,  for  no  accurate  record 
of  deaths  was  kept.  Colonel  Totten,  who  was  the  best 
authority,  placed  the  number  at  835,  divided  as  fol- 
lows: white  laborers,  295;  black,  140;  Chinese,  about 
400;  in  a  total  force  of  about  6,000.*  There  had  been 
brought  to  the  isthmus  by  the  railway  company  about 
1,000  Chinese.  "Every  possible  care,"  says  Otis, 
"had  been  taken  which  could  conduce  to  their  health 
and  comfort.  Their  hill-rice,  their  tea  and  opium,  in 
sufficient  quantity  to  last  several  months,  had  been  im- 
ported with  them — they  were  carefully  housed  and  at- 
tended to — and  it  was  expected  that  they  would  prove 
efficient  and  valuable  men.  But  they  had  been  en- 
gaged upon  the  work  scarcely  a  month  before  almost 
the  entire  body  became  infected  with  a  melancholic, 
suicidal  tendency,  and  scores  of  them  ended  their  un- 
happy existence  by  their  own  hands.  Disease  broke 

*L.  N.  B.  Wyse,  "Le  Canal  de  Panama,"  1885. 


I 


*#«'-•  •!.«* 

I 


HISTORICAL  49 

out  among  them  and  raged  so  fiercely  that  in  a  few 
weeks  scarcely  200  remained."  * 

This  incident  has  been  made  the  basis  of  one  of  the 
most  persistent  of  the  many  historic  "fakes"  of  the 
isthmus.  On  the  original  line  of  the  Panama  Railroad, 
now  under  the  waters  of  Gatun  Lake,  there  was  a 
station  called  "Matachin."  It  was  said  that  this  was 
a  combination  of  two  Spanish  words,  mata,  meaning 
dead,  and  chin,  meaning  Chinaman.  It  was  a  plausible 
fable  and  commanded  general  belief  until  the  dis- 
covery was  made  that  the  name,  affixed  to  the  same 
locality,  appears  upon  a  map  published  in  Esquemeling's 
Buccaneer  "Narrative,"  in  1678,  about  one  hundred 
and  seventy-five  years  before  the  Panama  Railway  was 
under  construction!  The  word  matachin  appears  in 
every  Spanish  dictionary  and  means  "butcher,"  and 
the  place  was  probably  the  headquarters  of  such  a  per- 
sonage, or  a  slaughter-house.  But  so  deep  and  abid- 
ing is  the  love  of  historic  "fakes"  that  the  "dead 
Chinaman"  tradition  lives  and  finds  ready  believers  to 
the  present  day.  An  amusing  version  of  it  is  to  be 
found  in  the  Bulletin  of  the  French  Canal  Company. 
In  the  bound  volume  of  that  publication  for  the  year 
1884,  there  appears  an  elaborate  article  by  L.  Simonin 
on  the  history  of  the  isthmus,  which  contains  this  pas- 
sage: "It  is  said  that  upon  the  railway  of  the  Isthmus, 
which  is  seventy-five  kilometres  in  length,  there  is 
buried  a  Chinaman  under  each  cross-tie:  that  would 
make  exactly  seventy-five  thousand  Chinamen!  Ah, 
well !  in  having  recourse  to  the  statistics  of  the  time  it 

*  Otis,  "Handbook  of  the  Panama  Railroad." 


50  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

appears  that  two  or  three  thousand  Chinamen  at  most 
had  died  in  a  work  which  lasted  nearly  five  years." 

This  is  an  amusing  confusion  of  two  favorite  isthmus 
"fakes,"  the  "Dead  Chinaman — Matachin,"  and  the 
"  Dead-man-f or-e very-tie."  In  its  usual  form  the 
latter  does  not  put  a  defunct  Chinaman  under  each 
tie,  but  merely  says  that  the  "Panama  Railroad  cost 
the  life  of  a  man  for  every  tie."  This  is  repeated  by 
nearly  every  visitor  to  the  canal,  and  by  nearly  all 
high  medical  authorities  who  have  written  upon  past 
and  present  sanitary  conditions  on  the  isthmus.  As 
there  were  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  ties 
on  the  original  Panama  Railway,  it  will  be  observed 
that  as  a  "thriller"  this  version  of  the  "fake"  has 
doubled  the  capacity  of  the  French-Chinaman  version. 
An  entirely  new  "fake"  appeared  as  late  as  1911,  in  a 
statement  that  at  one  time  the  "Panama  Railway 
construction  company  imported  one  thousand  negroes 
from  the  West  Coast  of  Africa,  and  within  six  months 
these  had  all  died  off." 

This  is  the  first  and  only  appearance  in  print,  so  far 
as  my  observation  goes,  of  such  an  importation,  and 
no  record  of  it  is  to  be  found  anywhere.  If  the  one 
thousand  were  not  imported,  they  could  not  have  died. 
It  is  needless  to  say  that  if  such  a  veritable  holocaust 
had  taken  place  it  could  not  have  escaped  the  attention 
of  Doctor  Otis  and  other  historians  of  the  building  of 
the  railway.  It  is,  in  fact,  the  most  purely  imaginative 
of  all  the  fables  connected  with  the  project.  It  lifts 
the  death  total  at  a  single  bound  one  thousand  higher 
than  it  had  ever  been  placed  before,  or  to  about  one 


Scene  on  the  old  Panama  Railroad,  now  under  Gatun  Lake 

The  tree,  one  of  the  most  imposing  in  the  Canal  Zone,  was  known  as  the  Stephens 
Tree,  because  of  a  false  tradition  that  John  L.  Stephens,  president  of  the  railroad 
at  the  time  of  construction,  died  under  it.  He  died  in  New  York,  October  10, 
1852,  from  effects  of  hardships,  exposure,  and  disease  incurred  on  the  Isthmus. 


HISTORICAL  51 

hundred  and  fifty-one  thousand.  This,  in  a  total  force 
of  six  thousand  is  an  achievement  that  must  rank  as 
the  supreme  triumph  of  Direful  Death.  Colonel  Tot- 
ten's  statistics,  cited  above,  show  conclusively  what 
gross  exaggerations  all  these  inventions  are. 

The  chief  cause  of  illness  and  death  was  malarial 
fever  in  various  forms,  the  worst  of  which  was  known 
as  Chagres  fever.  No  mention  is  made  by  Doctor  Otis 
or  any  other  contemporary  writer  of  yellow  fever,  and 
there  is  no  record  of  a  case  of  it  during  the  period  of  rail- 
way construction,  so  that  there  was  no  heavy  mortality 
from  that  disease.  Malarial  fevers,  while  causing  great 
suffering  and  debilitation,  have  a  much  lower  percent- 
age of  deaths.  That  the  railway  working  force  was  at 
times  completely  incapacitated  by  these  is  a  matter  of 
record.  It  is  also  a  matter  of  record  that  the  anopheles 
mosquitoes  were  the  busy  and  swift  agents  of  dissemi- 
nation. The  working  force  was  compelled  during  the 
early  months  of  construction  to  labor  by  day  amid 
swarms  of  these  insects  and  to  sleep  at  night  in  the 
hull  of  an  old  brig  at  Colon  amid  other  swarms  of  them. 
Dr.  Otis  gives  harrowing  accounts  of  the  sufferings 
thus  entailed.  Mr.  Trautwine,  writing  on  January  6, 
1851,  to  the  American  Railroad  Journal,  said  in  a  long 
and  extremely  interesting  letter: 

At  this  time  (May  and  June,  1850)  no  accommoda- 
tion was  procurable  for  ourselves  and  our  workmen, 
except  a  small  brig.  Our  laboring  force  was  conse- 
quently very  limited,  and  the  rainy  season  having  fully 
set  in,  converted  the  earth  into  a  perfect  swamp;  and 
moreover  prevented  the  burning  of  the  dense  forest 


52  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

which  we  were  attempting  to  clear.  The  mosquitoes 
and  sand  flies  were  at  the  same  time  so  numerous,  that 
it  was  with  difficulty  we  could  induce  the  laborers  to 
continue  at  their  work — and  that  only  by  remaining 
with  them,  in  person,  and  aiding  them  during  the  whole 
day.  These  discomforts,  together  with  the  stifling 
heat  and  myriads  of  insects  in  the  cabin  and  hold  of 
our  small  brig,  prevented  other  sleep  than  that  arising 
from  exhaustion  and  frequently  compelled  us  to  pass 
whole  nights  on  deck,  in  the  rain,  rather  than  encounter 
the  annoyances  below. 

There  was  no  suspicion  at  that  time  that  the  mosqui- 
toes were  transmitting  the  fevers  from  one  person  to 
another,  and  were  something  worse  than  annoying  pests. 
In  his  "Private  Notes,"  published  some  years  ago,  Mr. 
Trautwine  made  this  interesting  and  curious  entry: 

TROPICAL  PRECAUTIONS 

A  veil  over  the  face  is  a  partial  protection  from  mi- 
asmatic vapors. 

Dry  rooms  are  important.  Sheet  iron  stoves.  When 
camping  out  a  large  brushwood  fire  all  night. 

Keep  closed  such  doors  and  windows  as  open  to 
winds  blowing  across  marshes,  very  important;  es- 
pecially to  the  sick.  But  if  they  must  be  open  have 
screens  of  gauze  or  copper  wire,  which  is  better  than 
iron,  if  near  salt  water,  as  it  does  not  rust. 

Mosquito  nets  are  good,  not  only  against  insects  but 
miasma.  Bolting  cloth  is  strongest  and  best. 

Because  there  was  less  fever  among  persons  pro- 
tected by  veils  and  screens,  it  was  a  natural  conclusion 
that  those  barriers  were  excluding  the  miasma  itself 
rather  than  the  transmitters  of  it. 


HISTORICAL  53 

The  original  contract  between  the  Panama  Rail- 
road Company  and  New  Granada  was  revised  in  I860, 
and  modified  in  1867,  1876,  1880,  and  1891.  As  thus 
amended  the  contract  was  to  run  for  ninety-nine 
years  from  August  16,  1867,  or  till  August  16,  1966, 
dining  which  time  the  company  was  to  enjoy  the 
exclusive  privileges  conferred  in  (he  original  grant,  and 
to  have  use  and  possession  of  all  the  property  con- 
nected with  the  road  and  its  service.  In  return  the 
company  was  to  pay  an  annual  indemnity  of  two  hun- 
dred and  fifty  thousand  dollars  to  the  Republic  of 
Colombia.  At  the  expiration  of  ninety-nine  years  the 
entire  property  was  to  revert  to  Colombia.. 

In  August,  1881,  the  French  Canal  Company  se- 
cured possession  of  the  Panama  Railroad  through  a 
total  expenditure  of  about  twenty-five  million  dollars. 

Under  the  treaty  of  Jfiebruary  26,  1904,  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Republic  of  Panama  all  rights 
to  the  property  of  the  Panama  Railroad  Company 
which  the  Republic  of  Panama  had  as  a  result  of  the 
transfer  of  sovereignty  from  Colombia  to  Panama  were 
granted  to  the  United  States.  The  road  thus  became 
the  property  of  the  United  States  Government,  which 
now  owns  all  its  stock. 

A  few  years  later  the  construction  of  the  canal  com- 
pelled the  relocation,  or  rather  abandonment,  of  the 
road,  and  the  cutting  through  forest,  jungle,  and  morass 
of  a  new  one  in  its  stead.  The  story  of  this  portion 
of  auxiliary  canal  work  is  related  in  another  part  of 
this  volume. 


CHAPTER  VII 
A  FIFTY-YEAR  OBSTACLE 

IN  1850  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  entered 
into  a  compact  for  the  avowed  purpose  of  hastening 
the  construction  of  a  ship-canal  across  the  isthmus. 
The  astonishing  result  was  that  they  blocked  completely 
for  half  a  century  every  enterprise  of  the  kind  that  was 
undertaken.  They  agreed,  in  the  famous  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty,  ratified  July  5,  1850,  that  "it  being 
desirable  that  no  time  should  be  unnecessarily  lost  in 
commencing  and  constructing  said  canal,"  they  would 
"give  their  support  and  encouragement"  to  all  efforts 
in  that  direction  and  would  extend  their  joint  protec- 
tion over  any  canal  or  railway  that  might  be  constructed 
anywhere  across  the  isthmus.  They  agreed  that  neither 
of  them  should  exercise  exclusive  control  over  an  isth- 
mian canal  or  should  fortify  the  same,  but  that  they 
would  mutually  guarantee  its  neutrality  and  security 
and  would  invite  other  nations  to  co-operate  with 
them  in  thus  protecting  it. 

There  were  many  political  considerations,  domestic 
and  international,  which  had  a  controlling  influence  in 
the  making  of  this  compact,  but  they  are  not  a  neces- 
sary part  of  the  present  narrative. 

54 


HISTORICAL  55 

The  deadly  provision  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty 
was  that  of  "joint  control."  Between  1850  and  1860 
there  were  many  projects,  all  futile,  for  the  construc- 
tion of  a  canal.  The  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  had  been 
designed  especially  to  aid  the  plan  of  a  canal  across 
Nicaragua,  but  it  failed  in  this  respect,  and  the  con- 
tract of  1849  between  Nicaragua  and  an  American 
company  for  such  a  waterway  was  revoked  because  of 
the  company's  default,  in  1856.  One  project  after  an- 
other was  broached,  discussed,  and  investigated,  only 
to  be  abandoned.  During  the  Civil  War  the  interest 
of  the  American  people  was  necessarily  suspended,  but 
it  was  reawakened  soon  after  peace  had  been  declared. 
In  1866  the  Senate  passed  a  resolution  requesting  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  furnish  such  information  as 
had  been  collected  in  regard  to  the  various  proposed 
routes  for  an  isthmian  canal.  In  response  Secretary 
Welles  transmitted  to  the  Senate  a  report  compiled 
by  Rear- Admiral  Charles  H.  Davis,  which  mentioned 
nineteen  canal  and  seven  railway  routes  on  the  isthmus 
between  Tehuantepec  and  the  Atrato  River. 

By  this  time  there  had  developed  in  the  United 
States  a  distinct  sentiment  in  favor  of  a  canal  con- 
structed and  controlled  by  Americans.  This  senti- 
ment had  shown  itself  only  slightly  at  the  time  of  the 
ratification  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  It  found 
partial  expression  in  the  Senate  when  Senator  Stephen 
A.  Douglas,  of  Illinois,  opposed  ratification  in  1850 
on  the  ground  that  the  United  States  should  have 
no  partnership  with  Great  Britain  in  the  control  of 
a  canal,  but  should  have  exclusive  control  over  the 


56  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

transit  route  and  open  it  to  the  world  on  such  terms 
as  were  compatible  with  American  interests.* 

When  General  Grant  became  President,  in  1869,  this 
sentiment  had  become  so  strong  and  wide-spread  that 
it  could  be  called  properly  the  American  doctrine  in 
regard  to  an  isthmian  canal.  Writing  to  S.  A.  Hurl- 
but,  United  States  minister  at  Bogota,  Colombia, 
under  date  of  September  4,  1869,  Hamilton  Fish,  Sec- 
retary of  State,  gave  this  interpretation  of  President 
Grant's  attitude: 

The  President  is  disinclined  to  enter  into  any  en- 
tanglement in  participation  of  control  over  the  work 
with  other  powers.  He  regards  it  as  an  American  enter- 
prise, which  he  desires  to  be  undertaken  under  American 
auspices,  to  the  benefit  of  which  the  whole  commercial 
world  should  be  fully  admitted. 

In  his  first  message  to  Congress,  in  December,  1869, 
President  Grant  recommended  consideration  of  the 
question  of  an  isthmian  canal.  On  March  13, 1872,  the 
President,  by  proclamation,  appointed  "  Brevet  Major 
General  Andrew  A.  Humphreys  of  the  United  States 
army,  Professor  Benjamin  Pierce  of  Massachusetts,  and 
Captain  Daniel  Ammen  of  the  United  States  navy,  to  be 
Commissioners  for  the  United  States  to  examine  and 
consider  all  surveys,  plans,  proposals,  or  suggestions 
of  routes  of  communication  by  canal  or  water  connec- 
tion between  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Oceans,  across, 

*  Speech  in  secret  session  in  1850,  as  reported  by  Senator  Douglas 
to  his  brother-in-law,  J.  Madison  Cutts.  in  1859.  Senate  Document 
No.  41,  2d  session,  56th  Congress. 


HISTORICAL  57 

over,  or  near  the  isthmus  connecting  North  and  South 
America;  which  have  already  been  submitted,  or  which 
may  be  hereafter  submitted  to  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  during  the  pendency  of  this  appoint- 
ment, or  which  may  be  referred  to  them  by  the  Presi- 
dent, and  to  report  in  writing  their  conclusions  and  the 
result  of  such  examination  to  the  President  of  the 
United  States  with  their  opinion  as  to  the  probable 
cost  and  practicability  of  each  route  or  plan,  and  such 
other  matters  in  connection  therewith  as  they  may 
think  proper  and  pertinent."  Professor  Pierce  resigned 
in  December,  1874,  and  on  the  24th  of  that  month  the 
President  appointed  as  his  successor,  Carlisle  P.  Pat- 
terson, Superintendent  of  the  United  States  Coast 
Survey.  Under  the  direction  of  this  commission  thor- 
ough and  valuable  surveys  were  made  of  the  Tehuan- 
tepec,  Nicaragua,  and  Panama  routes  between  1870 
and  1875,  the  reports  of  which  were  published  as  con- 
gressional documents  and  proved  of  great  service  to 
subsequent  canal  commissions. 

There  was,  in  fact,  during  the  eight  years  of  Presi- 
dent Grant's  administration  a  great  increase  of  pub- 
lic interest  in  a  canal,  with  a  steady  consolidation  of 
opinion  in  favor  of  the  exclusive  American  control  of 
such  a  waterway,  which  continued  undiminished  after 
President  Hayes  came  into  office,  in  1877.  When  Fer- 
dinand de  Lesseps  paid  a  personal  visit  to  him  at  Wash- 
ington in  the  spring  of  1880,  in  the  hope  of  getting  the 
consent  of  the  American  Government  to  what  he  called 
a  European  control  of  his  projected  canal  at  Panama, 
President  Hayes  not  only  refused  his  aid,  but  sent,  on 


58  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

March  8,  a  special  message  to  Congress  in  which  he 
used  the  memorable  words: 

The  policy  of  this  country  is  a  canal  under  American 
control.  The  United  States  cannot  consent  to  the  sur- 
render of  this  control  to  any  European  powers. 

The  failure,  in  1888,  of  the  French  effort  at  Panama, 
a  history  of  which  appears  in  another  part  of  this  vol- 
ume, made  it  apparent  that  if  an  isthmian  canal  was 
ever  constructed  the  work  would  have  to  be  done  by 
the  United  States.  Experience  had  demonstrated  that 
private  enterprise  and  private  capital  were  entirely 
inadequate  to  the  task.  The  fixed  policy  of  the  United 
States  Government  to  permit  no  European  power, 
either  singly  or  in  combination  with  other  European 
powers,  to  control  a  canal  if  one  were  built  made  it 
morally  impossible  for  any  of  those  powers  to  under- 
take the  work. 

After  the  French  failure  various  canal  projects  were 
undertaken  by  Americans,  the  most  important  being 
that  of  the  Maritime  Canal  Company  of  Nicaragua, 
which  was  incorporated  by  Act  of  Congress  on  Febru- 
ary 7,  1899,  but  all  of  them  were  confronted  with  the 
"joint  control"  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  which 
stood  squarely  and  immovably  in  the  way  of  a  canal 
built  by  Americans  and  controlled  exclusively  by  Amer- 
icans. Several  efforts  were  made  to  have  it  abrogated, 
but  none  was  successful  till  1901.  On  December  16 
of  that  year  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  was  ratified, 
superseding  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  and  giving  the 
United  States  the  right  to  construct  a  canal,  and 


HISTORICAL  59 

the  exclusive  right  of  providing  for  its  regulation  and 
management,  the  canal  to  be  free  and  open  to  the  ves- 
sels of  commerce  and  of  war  of  all  nations  on  terms  of 
entire  equality.  It  was  stipulated  that  the  canal  "shall 
never  be  blockaded,  nor  shall  any  right  of  war  be 
exercised  nor  any  act  of  hostility  be  committed  with 
it,"  but  that  the  United  States  "shall  be  at  liberty  to 
maintain  such  military  police  along  the  canal  as  may 
be  necessary  to  protect  it  against  lawlessness  and  dis- 
order." The  United  States  Government  has  con- 
strued the  last  clause  to  mean  that  it  may,  at  its  dis- 
cretion, fortify  the  canal,  and  it  is  erecting  fortifications 
at  the  entrance  in  both  oceans. 

Thus  the  way  was  cleared,  after  fifty  years  of  ob- 
struction, for  "an  American  canal,  built  by  Americans 
and  controlled  by  Americans." 


PART   II 

THE   FRENCH   EFFORT  AND   FAILURE 

1879-1902 


PART  II 

THE  FRENCH  EFFORT  AND  FAILURE 

1879-1902 

CHAPTER  I 

LEADERSHIP  AND  METHODS  OF  FERDINAND  DE  LES- 
SEPS  — HIS  INTERNATIONAL  CONGRESS  OF  1879  — 
PURCHASE  OF  THE  FIRST  CANAL  CONCESSION 

FOR  several  years  after  the  Americans  entered  upon 
the  task  of  opening  a  waterway  across  the  isthmus 
there  were  visible  from  the  car  windows  of  Panama 
Railroad  trains  long  rows  of  abandoned  locomotives, 
dump-cars,  excavating  and  other  machinery,  partially 
hidden  by  a  jungle  growth  of  creeping  vines.  Visitors 
were  told  that  this  was  "old  French  machinery/'  stand- 
ing where  it  had  been  left  when  the  French  company 
collapsed  twenty  years  earlier.  The  little  locomotives 
and  cars,  almost  toy-like  in  appearance  when  compared 
with  those  in  use  by  the  Americans,  bore  eloquent  tes- 
timony to  the  irresistible  onward  march  of  mechanical 
invention.  Time  had  retired  them  from  active  service 
as  completely  as  if  they  had  never  existed,  leaving  them 
stranded  as  mere  "junk"  along  the  wayside  of  progress. 
Covered  with  the  softening  mantle  of  vine  and  leaf  and 
flower,  and  overshadowed  by  waving  palms,  they  stood, 

63 


64  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

in  silent  dignity,  as  the  fitting  monuments  of  a  "lost 
cause/'  making  a  spectacle  so  eloquent  with  the  sad- 
ness of  failure,  the  pathos  of  defeat,  that  few  behold- 
ers could  contemplate  it  unmoved,  and  no  Frenchman 
could  look  upon  it  with  eyes  undimmed. 

The  story  told  by  these  silent  witnesses  was  a  true 
one,  for  the  record  of  French  effort  and  failure  at  Pan- 
ama, with  its  mingling  of  folly,  absurdity,  greed,  and 
heroism  of  the  highest  quality,  is  one  of  the  most 
pathetic  as  it  is  one  of  the  most  diverting  in  the  history 
of  human  endeavor.  The  project  was  doomed  to  fail- 
ure from  the  outset,  and  was  fairly  rushed  to  destruction 
by  reckless  and  rascally  management;  but  it  deserved 
to  succeed  because  of  the  rare  courage  and  patriotic 
devotion  of  the  men,  many  of  them  the  very  flower  of 
young  France,  who  did  the  work  in  the  field.  The 
shame  of  the  failure  has  been  told  by  many  pens,  and 
not  always  with  either  charity  or  careful  regard  of 
truth;  but  the  deeds  of  the  men  who  faced  pestilence 
and  death  with  unflinching  courage,  many  of  them 
dropping  into  unnamed  graves,  have  passed  with  slight 
and  far  from  adequate  mention.  The  Americans  who 
have  succeeded  them  in  the  task  at  Panama,  and  who 
have  studied  the  results  of  their  work,  have  a  very 
high  appreciation  of  their  intelligence  and  zeal  and 
the  warmest  admiration  for  their  courage.  They  were 
a  brave  and  skilled  army  led  to  pitiful  disaster  by  in- 
competent and  unworthy  commanders. 

I  have  said  that  the  story  of  the  French  endeavor  is 
one  of  the  most  diverting  as  well  as  one  of  the  most 
pathetic  in  human  annals,  and  this  is  the  simple  truth. 


FRENCH  EFFORT  AND  FAILURE        65 

One  reads  the  narrative  in  bewilderment  and  wonder. 
Through  it  comedy  and  tragedy  walk  hand  in  hand. 
At  intervals  there  is  presented  a  performance  of  opera- 
bouffe  in  a  grisly  setting  of  pestilence  and  death,  with 
the  leading  actor,  the  all-powerful  director  of  the  enter- 
tainment, dancing  and  pirouetting  in  the  front  of  the 
stage  blissfully  unconscious,  apparently,  of  everything 
except  his  own  capers.  His  deeds  and  doings  fill  large 
space  in  the  record,  and  have  for  many  years  been  the 
subject  of  animated  and  bitter  controversy.  Was  he 
an  enthusiast  so  blind  as  to  be  irresponsible,  or  was  he 
so  bent  upon  success  that  he  was  willing  to  adopt  any 
means  to  secure  it,  or  was  he  the  foremost  impostor  of 
his  time?  The  record  of  his  proceedings  may  be  left 
to  supply  the  correct  answer  to  these  questions. 

It  was  his  success  with  the  Suez  Canal  which  in- 
spired Lesseps  with  the  ambition  to  score  a  second  tri- 
umph at  Panama.  The  completion  of  the  Suez  project 
in  1869,  with  the  world-wide  fame  which  it  brought 
him,  including  the  intoxicating  adulation  and  high 
honors  bestowed  upon  him  by  the  people  and  govern- 
ment of  France,  came  at  the  time  when  interest  in  the 
question  of  an  isthmian  waterway  was  at  a  higher  point 
than  it  had  attained  hitherto.  President  Grant  had 
widened  and  intensified  this  interest  by  his  expressions 
of  approval  soon  after  taking  office,  in  1869,  and  espe- 
cially by  his  appointment,  in  1872,  of  an  Interoceanic 
Canal  Commission,  with  General  A.  A.  Humphreys, 
Chief  Engineer,  United  States  Army,  at  its  head,  to 
make  a  thorough  investigation  of  all  explorations,  sur- 
veys, etc.  In  no  part  of  the  world  did  this  action 


66  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

arouse  keener  interest  than  in  France,  for  steps  were 
under  way  there  already  to  secure  a  concession  for  an 
isthmus  canal  from  the  republic  of  Colombia.  The 
leader  in  this  enterprise  was  Etienne  Turr,  a  Hungarian 
by  birth  and  a  royal  major-general  in  the  Italian  army, 
who  was  an  intimate  friend  and  fervent  admirer  of 
Lesseps.  The  plan  was  discussed  in  the  International 
Geographical  Congress  at  Antwerp  in  1871  and  in 
Paris  in  1875.  In  the  spring  of  1876  General  Turr  sent 
Anthoine  Gogorza  to  Colombia,  where  he  obtained  from 
the  Colombian  Government,  for  himself  and  General 
Turr,  under  date  of  May  28,  1876,  a  ninety-nine-year 
concession  in  the  name  of  himself  and  General  Turr, 
authorizing  them  to  make  a  survey  of  the  Isthmus  of 
Darien,  and,  in  case  the  survey  should  show  the  prac- 
ticability of  a  canal  without  locks  or  tunnels,  to  form 
a  company  for  the  construction  of  such  a  canal  and  an 
auxiliary  railway. 

When  Gogorza  returned  to  France  with  this  conces- 
sion, General  Turr  organized  a  company  styled  the 
Societ^  Civile  Internationale  du  Canal  Interoc6anique 
de  Darien.  In  November,  1876,  this  company  sent 
Lucien  Napoleon  Bonaparte  Wyse,  a  lieutenant  of  ma- 
rines, and  brother-in-law  of  General  Turr,  with  a  party 
of  engineers  to  the  isthmus  to  make  the  survey  required 
by  the  Gogorza-Tiirr  concession.  Wyse  returned  to 
France  in  1877,  and  made  a  second  trip  to  Colombia  in 
1878,  accompanied  by  Armand  Reclus,  completing 
the  survey  and  obtaining  from  the  Colombian  Govern- 
ment, on  May  22  of  that  year,  a  contract  superseding 
and  amending  that  obtained  by  Gogorza,  and  granting 


FRENCH  EFFORT  AND  FAILURE        67 

to  the  society  of  which  General  Turr  was  the  president 
exclusive  right  to  construct  and  operate  for  ninety- 
nine  years  after  completion  a  canal  across  the  territory 
of  Colombia,  provided  that  in  case  they  were  to  select 
for  a  route  the  region  in  which  the  Panama  Railroad 
had  exclusive  rights  an  amicable  arrangement  should 
be  made  with  that  company. 

A  stipulation  of  the  contract  was  that  the  route  of 
the  canal  should  be  determined  by  an  international 
commission  of  individuals  and  competent  engineers, 
who  should  make  a  survey  on  the  ground  and  report 
to  the  Colombian  Government  not  later  than  1881. 
A  "Congres  International  d'Etudes  de  Canal  Inter- 
oceanique"  was  assembled  through  the  exertions  of 
Ferdinand  de  Lesseps,  at  Paris,  on  May  15,  1879.  It 
opened  with  135  delegates,  74  of  whom  were  French 
and  very  friendly  to  Lesseps,  and  only  42  of  whom 
were  engineers.  There  were  11  delegates  from  the 
United  States.  Lesseps  presided,  and  among  the  vari- 
ous projects  considered  was  that  of  the  Wyse  conces- 
sion. General  Turr  as  well  as  Wyse  and  Reclus  ap- 
peared in  advocacy  of  it. 

After  a  fortnight's  session  the  congress,  by  a  vote  of 
78  ays,  8  noes,  and  12  abstentions,  declared  in  favor 
of  a  sea-level  canal  at  Panama  from  the  Bay  of  Panama 
to  the  Gulf  of  Limon.  Of  the  American  delegates,  3 
voted  ay,  4  abstained,  and  4  were  absent.  Of  the  78, 
only  20  were  engineers,  and  only  one  of  these  had 
been  on  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  The  cost  was  esti- 
mated at  1,070,000,000  francs  ($214,000,000),  and  the 
least  time  of  completion  at  twelve  years. 


68  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

On  July  5,  1879,  the  company  of  which  General  Tiirr 
was  president  transferred  to  Lesseps  all  the  rights  ac- 
quired under  the  Wyse  contract  of  1878,  which  Les- 
seps was  authorized  to  transfer  to  a  canal  company 
to  be  organized  in  such  manner  as  he  should  see  fit. 
The  consideration  was  the  payment  to  General  Tiirr 
of  10,000,000  francs  by  the  canal  company  when 
organized* 

On  August  6  and  7,  1879,  Lesseps  sent  out  circulars 
in  Europe  and  America  announcing  the  formation  of 
the  Compagnie  Universelle  du  Canal  Interoceanique, 
with  a  capital  of  400,000,000  francs  ($80,000,000),  rep- 
resented by  800,000  shares  at  500  francs  ($100)  each. 
The  subscription,  which  was  opened  in  Europe  and 
America,  was  a  failure,  only  30,000,000  francs  ($6,000,- 
000)  being  taken.  The  project  was  bitterly  assailed, 
and  in  order  to  overcome  hostility,  Lesseps  ordered  new 
surveys  of  the  route  and  started  in  person  for  the  isth- 
mus, accompanied  by  an  international  technical  com- 
mission of  nine  members,  to  make  the  survey  required 
by  the  Wyse  concession. 


CHAPTER  II 

LESSEPS'S  FIRST  VISIT  TO  THE  ISTHMUS  —  FIRST  BLOWS 
OF  PICK  AND  DYNAMITE 

SURELY  no  great  engineering  work  was  ever  undertaken 
in  a  more  jocund  spirit  than  Ferdinand  de  Lesseps  ex- 
hibited when  he  entered  upon  his  second  task  as  the 
world's  chief  canal-builder.  His  success  with  the  Suez 
Canal  seemed  to  have  turned  his  head  so  completely 
that  all  obstacles  were  virtually  invisible  to  him.  He 
was  the  first  promoter  of  the  age,  the  flamboyant  col- 
lector of  capital  under  whose  seductive  appeals  all 
French  purses  flew  open.  Had  he  been  an  engineer, 
his  appeals  would  necessarily  have  been  deprived  of 
that  appearance  of  boundless  confidence,  that  jaunty 
disregard  of  all  difficulties,  which  made  them  so  at- 
tractive and  so  nearly  irresistible  to  his  own  people. 
If  he  saw  obstacles,  he  refused  to  take  cognizance  of 
them.  When  trained  engineers  called  his  attention  to 
them,  he  pushed  them  aside  as  unworthy  of  serious  at- 
tention. He  had  cut  a  sea-level  canal  through  the 
Isthmus  of  Suez,  he  would  cut  a  sea-level  canal  through 
the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  He  had  ruled  his  so-called 
"  Scientific  Congress "  at  Paris,  in  1879,  carefully  con- 
stituted to  do  his  bidding,  with  a  rod  of  iron,  "jamming 
through,"  in  a  manner  which  would  do  credit  to  a 


70  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

modern  American  political  boss,  his  sea-level  plans  for 
Panama,  turning  a  deaf  ear  to  all  arguments  advanced 
by  the  few  experienced  engineers  in  that  body  against 
the  feasibility  of  those  plans,  and  securing  adoption 
through  the  votes  of  delegates  who  were  not  engineers 
and  who  had  never  been  on  the  Isthmus  of  Panama. 

As  soon  as  he  had  secured  this  prearranged  approval 
of  his  plans,  he  established  in  Paris,  on  September  1, 
1879,  a  fortnightly  publication,  called  the  Bulletin  du 
Canal  Inter  oceanique,  which  from  its  first  issue  till  the 
final  one  in  February,  1889,  was  devoted  mainly  to  his 
personal  glorification  and  the  unqualified  defence  of  all 
his  proceedings.  In  it  he  published  his  circulars  ap- 
pealing for  funds,  stating  at  the  outset  his  conviction 
that  "Le  Canal  de  Panama  sera  plus  facile  a  commencer, 
a  terminer  et  a  entretenir  que  le  canal  de  Suez.11 

The  stage  having  been  set,  the  performance  opened 
with  the  first  visit  of  Lesseps  to  the  isthmus  in  Decem- 
ber, 1879.  Every  step  of  preparation,  every  stage  of 
his  journey,  was  heralded  and  accompanied  by  an  un- 
broken blare  of  trumpetings  in  the  Bulletin.  His 
party  comprised  his  wife  and  three  children  and  an 
international  technical  commission  of  nine  members. 
They  reached  the  isthmus  on  December  30,  and  were 
joined  there  by  a  party  of  American  visitors,  guests  of 
Lesseps,  among  whom  were  Colonel  Totten,  builder  of 
the  Panama  Railroad,  Trenor  W.  Park,  president  of 
that  road,  and  Nathan  Appleton,  of  Boston. 

Lesseps  was  at  that  time  in  his  seventy-fifth  year, 
but  alert  and  active  and  bubbling  over  with  enthusi- 
asm. To  all  questions  about  the  proposed  canal,  all 


Count  Ferdinand  de  Lesseps. 

Photograph  taken  at  time  of  his  first  visit  to  the 
Isthmus,  1879-80,  in  his  75th  year. 


FRENCH  EFFORT  AND  FAILURE        71 

suggestions  of  difficulties  or  obstacles,  he  replied  with 
smiling  amiability:  "The  canal  will  be  made!"  In 
fact,  he  began  to  make  it  at  once  in  person.  Two  days 
after  landing  he  conducted  his  guests  across  the  isth- 
mus from  Colon  to  Panama  to  take  part  in  an  elabo- 
rately organized  ceremony  of  striking  the  first  blow  of 
the  pick  (le  premier  coup  de  pioche)  at  the  Pacific  en- 
trance of  the  proposed  canal.  A  small  steam-boat 
had  been  chartered  for  the  purpose  of  conveying  the 
party  to  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande,  in  the  Bay  of 
Panama,  where  the  ceremony  was  to  take  place.  It 
had  been  stocked  liberally  with  provisions  and  cham- 
pagne, and  the  Bishop  of  Panama,  officials  of  the 
Colombian  Government,  and  other  distinguished  per- 
sonages had  been  invited.  A  reception,  with  much 
toasting,  was  held  on  board,  and  many  of  the  guests 
were  dilatory  in  arriving.  The  tide  in  the  Bay  of  Pan- 
ama, which  has  an  average  oscillation  of  about  twenty- 
one  feet,  is  no  respecter  of  persons.  It  began  to  recede 
while  the  toasting  and  feasting  were  in  progress,  and, 
having  a  considerable  distance  to  go,  it  travelled  with 
rapidity.  The  result  was  that  when  the  expedition 
finally  got  under  way  it  was  discovered  that  the  steam- 
boat could  not  get  within  two  miles  of  the  spot  chosen 
for  the  ceremony.  This  would  have  been  dishearten- 
ing to  an  ordinary  master  of  ceremonies,  but  it  was  not 
a  particle  so  to  Lesseps.  As  for  the  guests,  they  were 
at  the  time  in  a  condition  of  cheerfulness  that  rose 
superior  to  any  disappointment.  Lesseps  promptly  ral- 
lied them  on  the  deck  of  the  steam-boat,  armed  with 
a  beautiful  shovel  and  pickaxe  which  he  had  brought 


72  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

from  Paris  for  the  purpose,  and  proceeded  to  address 
them. 

He  explained  the  heedless  action  of  the  tide,  and 
said  that  while  it  was  in  a  way  disappointing,  it 
really  did  not  matter,  since  the  proposed  ceremony, 
being  only  a  simulacra,  could  as  well  be  given  on  ship- 
board as  on  land,  and  he  had  decided  to  proceed  with 
it  accordingly.  A  champagne-box  filled  with  earth 
was  then  brought  forward,  and  a  young  daughter  of 
Lesseps  administered  the  first  blow  of  the  pick  to  its 
contents,  amid  enthusiastic  applause.  The  represent- 
atives of  Colombia  and  other  distinguished  visitors 
also  gave  successive  blows  of  the  pick  and  delivered 
their  speeches,  and  the  venerable  Bishop  of  Panama 
invoked  a  benediction  upon  the  entire  performance. 
So  far  as  the  testimony  of  eye-witnesses  still  living 
goes,  no  one  giggled  while  this  delightful  opera-bouffe 
act  was  in  progress.  In  the  faithful  Bulletin  no  mention 
of  the  delay  or  the  champagne-box  of  earth  was  made, 
but  the  events  of  the  day  were  set  forth  in  the  best 
Lesseps  manner  in  the  text  of  his  speech  over  the  box 
concluding  the  ceremony,  which  was  as  follows  (I  give 
the  French  text.  Translation  would  so  far  deprive  it 
of  its  theatric  merits  as  to  be  little  less  than  criminal) :  * 

Sous  Fautorite  de  la  R6publique  des  Etats-Unis  de 
Colombie: 

Avec  la  benediction  de  Monseigneur  Teveque  de 
Panama: 

En  Presence  du  delegue  du  gouvernement  general  et 
de  ceux  des  Etats-Unis  de  Colombie : 

*  Bulletin  du  Canal  Interoceanique,  Feb.  1,  1880. 


FRENCH  EFFORT  AND  FAILURE        73 

Avec  Passistance  des  membres  de  la  Commission 
technique  des  etudes  definitives  du  Canal  maritime 
universel  interoceanique : 

II  sera  donne,  aujourdhui,  ler  Janvier  1880,  par  Mile. 
Ferdinande  de  Lesseps,  le  premier  coup  de  pioche,  sur 
le  point  qui  marquera  T entree  du  Canal  maritime  sur 
la  cote  de  TOcean  Pacifique. 

Tous  les  assistants  donneront  successivement  leur 
coup  de  pioche,  en  signe  de  Talliance  de  tous  les  peuples 
qui  contribuent  a  Tunion  des  deux  oceans,  pour  le  bien 
de  rhumanite. 

The  second  act  in  this  entertaining  drama  was  per- 
formed a  few  days  later,  on  January  10,  with  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Culebra  Cut  as  the  scene.  Lesseps  was  ac- 
companied on  this  occasion  by  the  same  distinguished 
party  that  had  assisted  at  the  first  blow  of  the  pick. 
A  heavy  charge  of  dynamite  had  been  placed  in  ad- 
vance deep  in  a  rock  near  the  line  of  the  canal,  and  an 
electric  battery  had  been  connected  with  it.  Made- 
moiselle Ferdinande  de  Lesseps  was  on  hand  to  press  the 
button.  According  to  the  faithful  Bulletin,  the  opera- 
tion was  "perfectly  successful,"  and  all  present  "hailed 
the  explosion  as  the  beginning  of  an  immense  series  of 
labors  that  should  have  for  their  termination  the  open- 
ing of  the  interoceanic  canal."  It  was  added  with 
much  gravity  that  the  explosion  showed  that  the  "rocks 
were  much  less  resistent  than  we  had  anticipated, 
which  is  a  good  augury  of  the  rapidity  with  which  the 
great  trench  will  be  made."  It  was  also  stated  that 
the  performance  took  place  on  the  summit  of  Cerro  de 
Culebra.  Again  the  official  narrative  is  in  sad  conflict 
with  the  testimony  of  eye-witnesses.  Mr.  Tracy  Rob- 


74  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

inson,  who  was  a  member  of  the  local  committee  of 
reception,  and  was  present  at  the  time,  gives  in  his 
interesting  book  of  reminiscences*  this  account  of  the 
affair: 

In  order  that  the  enterprise  might  have  the  blessing 
of  Heaven  and  be  officially  inaugurated  at  the  same 
time,  with  that  gayety  so  dear  to  the  French  heart,  a 
numerous  audience  was  invited  to  Empire  Station,  on 
the  line,  to  witness  the  good  Bishop  of  Panama  bestow 
his  benediction  upon  the  great  undertaking;  and  then 
to  see  what  dynamite  could  do  in  the  way  of  blowing 
up  a  few  hundred  thousand  cubic  meters  of  rock  and 
earth,  along  a  part  of  the  canal  where  tons  of  that  ex- 
plosive had  been  placed  for  the  purpose. 

Was  it  prophetic?  The  blessing  had  been  pronounced, 
and  the  champagne,  duly  iced,  was  waiting  to  cool  the 
swelter  of  that  tropic  sun,  as  soon  as  the  explosion 
"went  off."  There  the  crowd  stood,  breathless,  ears 
stopped,  eyes  blinking  half  in  terror  lest  this  artificial 
earthquake  might  involve  general  destruction.  But 
there  was  no  explosion!  It  wouldn't  go!  Then  a  hu- 
morous sense  of  relief  stole  upon  the  crowd.  With  one 
accord  everybody  exclaimed  "Good  gracious!"  and 
hurried  away,  lest  after  all  the  dynamite  should  see  fit 
to  explode. 

*"  Fifty  Years  at  Panama,  1861-1911,"  Tracy  Robinson. 


CHAPTER  III 

ESTIMATED  COST  OF  THE  PROPOSED  CANAL  —  REDUCED 
BY  LESSEPS  —  NO  SUBSCRIPTIONS  IN  UNITED  STATES 
—  ABUNDANCE  IN  FRANCE 

WHILE  Lesseps  was  engaged  in  the  diverting  perform- 
ances mentioned  in  the  preceding  chapter,  the  nine 
members  of  the  international  technical  commission 
were  making  careful  studies  and  estimates  of  the  work 
and  cost  of  his  proposed  canal.  On  February  14,  about 
six  weeks  after  their  arrival,  they  made  their  report. 
The  head  of  this  commission  was  Colonel  George  M. 
Totten,  the  builder  of  the  Panama  Railway.  The  re- 
port, which  was  signed  by  all  the  members  and  which 
was  a  very  thorough  and  scientific  document,  estimated 
the  cost  of  the  canal  at  843,000,000  francs  ($168,500,- 
000)  and  the  period  of  construction  at  eight  years. 
Lesseps  took  the  report  and  on  the  following  day  set 
sail  with  it  for  New  York.  During  the  voyage,  pursu- 
ing his  regular  policy  of  disregarding  the  opinions  of 
experienced  engineers,  he  composed  a  "note"  on  the 
report,  in  which  he  reduced  the  estimated  cost  of  con- 
struction to  656,000,000  francs  ($131,600,000),  a  cool 
cut  of  about  $37,000,000,  or  nearly  a  quarter  of  the 
commission's  estimate.  When  he  reached  New  York 
he  issued  a  circular  to  Les  Banquiers  Americains,  in 
which  he  announced  that  he  had  fixed  the  capital  of 

75 


76  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

his  company  at  600,000,000  francs  ($1 20,000,000) ,  be- 
cause of  his  "conviction"  that  there  would  be  much 
economy  in  the  execution  of  the  work.  In  the  same 
circular  he  declared  that  since  the  European  capitalists 
who  had  taken  part  in  the  Suez  enterprise  had  expressed 
their  intention  to  subscribe  for  300,000,000  francs  of 
this  capital,  that  amount  had  been  reserved  for  them, 
leaving  an  equal  amount  for  all  the  States  of  America, 
which  had  been  set  aside  for  them. 

Lesseps  was  received  with  much  cordiality  in  New 
York.  There  were  many  receptions  and  dinners  in  his 
honor,  including  a  great  banquet  by  the  citizens  of 
New  York  at  Delmonico's,  but  there  were  no  subscrip- 
tions to  the  stock  of  his  company.  He  went  to  Washing- 
ton in  the  hope  of  getting  the  support  of  the  United 
States  Government  for  his  proposed  "Isthmian  Canal 
under  European  control/'  but  was  disappointed.  He 
had  an  interview  with  President  Hayes,  which  resulted 
in  the  President's  sending  to  the  Senate  a  special  mes- 
sage avowing  the  principle  that  the  "policy  of  this 
country  is  a  canal  under  American  control."  While 
this  message  was  a  distinct  and  serious  repulse  to  his 
plans,  Lesseps  rallied  quickly  from  it  and  sent  on  the 
following  day  a  cable  message  to  his  Bulletin,  in  Paris, 
saying:  "Le  message  du  President  Hayes  assure  la 
securite  politique  du  Canal." 

From  Washington  he  visited  Boston,  Chicago,  San 
Francisco,  and  other  American  cities,  receiving  every- 
where flattering  attentions,  which  he  described  in 
brief  and  stirring  cable  messages  to  his  Bulletin  as  "une 
adhesion  enthousiaste  et  unanime  a  notre  entreprise,"  "un 


FRENCH  EFFORT  AND  FAILURE        77 

accueil  chaleureux,"  "un  plein  succks."  But  the  enthusi- 
asm, however  warm,  was  unaccompanied  by  subscrip- 
tions to  the  capital  stock  of  the  Lesseps  company,  and 
when  he  sailed  from  New  York,  on  April  1,  1880,  for 
France  by  way  of  England,  Holland,  and  Belgium,  he 
had  still  in  his  possession  the  300,000,000  francs  of  that 
stock  which  he  had  reserved  for  the  United  States. 

In  France  it  was  quite  another  story.  He  made  a 
tour  of  its  principal  cities  during  the  summer  of  1880, 
and  aroused  such  enthusiastic  faith  in  his  project  that 
when  he  opened  his  subscription,  in  November,  for  a 
capital  of  300,000,000  francs  ($60,000,000)  in  600,000 
shares  of  500  francs  each,  the  stock  was  subscribed  for 
twice.  He  announced  during  that  tour  that  a  firm  of 
French  contractors  had  offered  to  build  the  canal  for 
512,000,000  francs  ($102,400,000)  and  to  complete  it 
within  eight  years.  The  subscription  was  closed  on 
December  10,  and  the  first  assembly  of  shareholders 
was  held  in  Paris  on  January  31,  1881.  At  a  second 
assembly,  on  March  3  following,  the  Compagnie  Uni- 
verselle  du  Canal  Interoceanique  was  definitely  con- 
stituted (definitivement  cvnstituee),  with  a  capital  of 
300,000,000  francs  ($60,000,000)  and  with  102,230 
subscribers,  of  whom  16,000  were  women. 

The  great  promoter  was  thus  entering,  in  the  jaun- 
tiest manner  upon  the  task  of  constructing  with  a 
capital  of  $60,000,000  a  canal  which,  according  to  the 
estimate  of  its  own  chosen  commission  of  engineers, 
was  to  cost  $160,000,000,  and  according  to  the  lowest 
estimate  which  he  himself  was  able  to  reach  would 
cost  $131,600,000. 


CHAPTER  IV 

WORK  ON  THE  ISTHMUS  —  SECOND  VISIT  OF  LESSEPS 

THE  arrival  of  the  first  detachment  of  the  canal  con- 
struction force  at  Panama  was  proclaimed  by  Lesseps 
in  his  best  promoter  manner.  The  detachment  sailed 
from  France  for  the  isthmus  on  January  6,  1881.  It 
was  under  the  direction  of  Armand  Reclus,  who  had 
surveyed  the  canal  route  with  Wyse,  and  comprised 
thirty-five  men,  five  of  whom  were  accompanied  by 
their  wives.  It  arrived  at  Colon  on  January  29,  and  a 
few  days  later  Lesseps  gave  out  for  publication  in  the 
Paris  newspapers  the  following  cable  message  from  the 
isthmus,  dated  February  1 :  "  Travail  commence."  Upon 
which  the  newspaper  La  France  commented,  "  Voila  de 
V eloquence  en  pen  de  mots"  and  Lesseps  himself,  in  his 
formal  report  under  date  of  February  22,  spoke  of  it 
as  "ce  telegramme  eloquent  dans  son  laconisme." 

This  was  pure  humbug.  Aside  from  crossing  the  isth- 
mus on  the  Panama  Railroad,  responding  to  addresses 
of  welcome  from  local  Panama  officials,  and  finding 
living  quarters  in  Panama,  there  had  been  no  "travail" 
of  any  kind.  In  fact,  actual  work  in  construction  did 
not  begin  till  nearly  a  year  later,  January  20,  1882, 
when  the  first  chantier,  or  working  section,  was  Opened 
with  formal  ceremonies  at  Empire.  In  the  evening 

78 


FRENCH  EFFORT  AND  FAILURE        79 

there  was  a  banquet,  followed  by  a  ball,  in  the  city  of 
•Panama.*  Other  chantiers  were  opened  during  the  year 
at  Culebra,  Mindi,  Monkey  Hill  (now  Mount  Hope), 
Bas  Obispo,  Gorgona,  Cristobal,  and  Paraiso.  On 
September  17  of  the  same  year  the  present  Ancon 
Hospital,  on  the  slopes  of  Ancon  Hill,  near  the  Pacific 
terminus  of  the  canal,  was  dedicated  with  formal  exer- 
cises. It  comprised  at  the  time  twelve  buildings. 

It  had  been  made  plain  to  Lesseps  and  his  repre- 
sentatives on  the  isthmus,  very  soon  after  preparatory 
work  began,  that  it  was  absolutely  necessary  for  them 
to  purchase  the  Panama  Railroad.  What  with  the  rail- 
road company's  contract  with  Colombia  and  its  own 
arbitrary  rates  and  methods,  it  constituted  an  insur- 
mountable obstacle  to  economic  and  expeditious  canal 
construction.  It  had  Lesseps  at  its  mercy,  and  he  had 
no  choice  except  to  purchase  a  controlling  interest  at 
the  company's  own  price,  which  he  did  when  he  paid 
$17, 133,500  for  68,534  of  its  70,000  shares  of  stock.  The 
full  significance  of  this  "hold-up"  by  the  railroad  com- 
pany is  revealed  when  it  is  stated  that  Lesseps  was 
compelled  to  pay  $250  for  every  share  of  stock  the  par 
value  of  which  was  $100,  and  which  at  the  time  was 
barely  at  par.  In  addition,  he  paid  the  directors  of 
the  railroad  company  a  cash  bonus  of  $1,102,000, 
bought  $7,000,000  of  the  company's  bonds;  and  these 


*  There  is  an  erroneous  statement,  published  in  several  books  on 
Panama,  to  the  effect  that  the  work  was  "  inaugurated  formally  "  on 
February  1,  1881,  and  that  Sarah  Bernhardt  went  to  the  isthmus  to 
take  part  in  it  and  gave  a  performance  at  a  theatre  in  Panama  in  the 
evening.  This  is  pure  fiction.  Sarah  Bernhardt  was  not  in  Panama 
cither  in  1881  or  1882,  her  only  visit  to  the  isthmus  being  in  1886. 


80  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

outlays,  together  with  commissions,  etc.,  brought  the 
total  cost  of  the  railroad  to  the  Lesseps  company  up  to 
about  $25,000,000.  It  was  an  expensive  introduction 
of  the  great  promoter  to  the  mysteries  and  possibil- 
ities of  a  Wall  Street  railway  "deal." 
Very  little  actual  excavation  was  accomplished  in 

1882.  The  French  contractors  who  had  offered  to  con- 
struct the  canal  for  512,000,000  francs  in  eight  years, 
and  who  had  been  in  charge  of  the  preliminary  work, 
asked  on  December  31,  1882,  to  have  their  contract 
annulled,  recommending  a  division  of  the  work  among 
several  contractors.    Lesseps  consented  to  the  annul- 
ment and  appointed  Jules  Dingier  director-general  of 
the  work.    Dingier  sailed  for  the  isthmus  February  6, 

1883,  arriving  at  Colon  on  February  27.    He  made  a 
thorough  examination  of  the  route,  and  in  an  elaborate 
report  recommended  a  canal  with  a  depth  of  29.5  feet 
and  a  bottom  width  of  72  feet,  with  a  large  dam  at 
Gamboa  to  control  the  waters  of  the  Chagres.    The 
total  excavation  was  estimated  at  157,000,000  cubic 
yards,  which  was  more  than  the  estimate  of  the  Inter- 
national Congress  of  1879.    The  plan  was  accepted,  and 
the  work,  under  Dingler's  direction,  was  divided  into 
seven  divisions  and  let  to  as  many  contracting  com- 
panies, two  of  which  were  American,  and  all  of  which 
agreed  to  have  their  tasks  finished  before  the  end  of 
1889. 

Work  began  on  a  large  scale  in  1883,  and  continued 
with  steadily  increasing  activity  through  1884  and  1885. 
In  March,  1885,  an  insurrection  occurred,  during  which 
the  city  of  Colon,  then  called  Aspinwall,  was  burned 


Columbus  statue  on  water-front,  Cristobal,  near  Lesseps  residences. 

Presented  to  the  United  States  of  Colombia  by  the  Empress  Eugenie,  and  by  Colombia 
presented  to  the  French  Canal  Company,  to  be  erected  at  the  Atlantic  entrance  to 
the  canal.  Formally  dedicated  by  Lesseps  on  February  24, 1886,  during  his  second 
visit  to  the  Isthmus. 


FRENCH  EFFORT  AND  FAILURE        81 

and  the  city  of  Panama  was  threatened.  Order  was 
restored  by  the  intervention  of  the  United  States,  act- 
ing under  the  obligations  of  the  treaty  of  1846  with 
New  Granada,  to  preserve  the  neutrality  of  the  isthmus 
and  maintain  free  and  open  transit  across  it.  President- 
Cleveland  sent  three  war  vessels,  under  command  of 
Rear- Admiral  James  E.  Jouett,  and  about  five  hundred 
marines  at  once  to  Aspinwall,  thus  saving  the  city  of 
Panama  from  destruction  and  preventing  damage  to 
canal  property  and  serious  interruption  of  construction 
work. 

Early  in  1885  it  became  apparent  that  the  canal 
company  was  in  serious  financial  trouble.  The  cost 
of  the  work  was  known  to  be  greatly  in  excess  of  the 
estimates,  and  money  was  not  forthcoming  to  meet  it. 
At  a  meeting  of  shareholders  of  his  company,  in  Paris, 
on  July  29,  1885,  Lesseps  postponed  the  completion  of 
the  canal  from  the  end  of  the  year  1888  till  July,  1889, 
and  admitted  that  the  cost  of  construction  would  reach 
the  amount  fixed  by  the  international  congress  of  1879 
—1,070,000,000  francs  ($214,000,000).  At  the  same 
meeting  he  announced  that  on  May  27  preceding  he 
had  asked  the  French  Government  for  authority  to 
issue  lottery  bonds  for  a  loan  of  600,000,000  francs 
($120,000,000).  The  government  decided,  before  act- 
ing on  this  request,  to  send  a  special  commission  of  its 
own  to  the  isthmus  to  investigate  conditions  and  report. 
It  selected  for  this  task  Armand  Rousseau,  an  eminent 
French  engineer,  who  went  to  the  isthmus  in  the  latter 
part  of  1885,  and  returned  in  February,  1886. 

Lesseps  then  took  steps  to  forestall  the  report  of 


82  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

the  government  commission  by  assembling  a  sort  of 
commission  of  his  own  to  accompany  him  to  the  isth- 
mus. He  invited  representatives  of  the  chambers  of 
commerce  of  the  principal  cities  of  France,  an  eminent 
engineer  from  Germany  and  another  from  Holland. 
The  party  sailed  from  France  in  January,  1886,  reach- 
ing Colon  on  February  17,  where  it  was  joined  by  the 
Duke  of  Sutherland  and  Admiral  Carpenter,  of  the 
British  navy;  and  by  John  Bigelow,  representing  the 
Chamber  of  Commerce  of  New  York;  Nathan  Apple- 
ton,  representing  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Boston; 
and  Admiral  Jouett,  of  the  United  States  navy. 

This  second  visit,  only  a  fortnight  in  length,  was  as 
continuously  theatric  as  Lesseps  could  make  it.  There 
was  an  almost  unbroken  series  of  banquets  and  speeches, 
and  an  unrestrained  flood  of  adulation  and  eulogy  for 
Lesseps,  to  which  the  most  expert  contributor  was 
Monsignor  Thiel,  Bishop  of  Costa  Rica.  When  Pan- 
ama was  reached  the  whole  city,  according  to  the  faith- 
ful Bulletin,  waited  to  "  render  homage  to  the  Creator 
of  Canals." 

The  homage  found  expression  in  a  gorgeous  pro- 
cession with  allegorical  floats;  triumphal  arches  upon 
which  Lesseps  was  acclaimed  the  "  Genius  of  the  Nine- 
teenth Century,"  and  his  portrait  was  displayed  with 
Glory  crowning  him  with  laurel;  an  obelisk  in  his 
honor  and  a  garden  of  flowers  into  which  Lesseps 
stepped  from  his  carriage  to  receive  a  crown  of  laurel 
from  the  hands  of  a  little  girl.  The  line  of  march  from 
the  railway  station  to  the  central  square  of  the  city  was 
"une  veritable  procession  triomphale."  In  the  evening 


By  courtesy  of  Mr.  Tracy  Robinson 

Count  Ferdinand  de  Lesseps,  his  second  wife,  and  nine  children. 
Photograph  taken  about  the  time  of  his  first  visit,  1879-80. 


By  courtesy  of  Mr.  Tracy  Robinson. 

Group  of  Lesseps  and  his  friends. 

Taken  ^Cristobal  at  the  time  of  the  dedication  of  the  Columbus  statue,  with 
Bishop  Thiel,  of  Costa  Rica,  standing  at  the  right  of  Lesseps. 


FRENCH  EFFORT  AND  FAILURE        83 

there  was  a  popular  fete,  with  fireworks  and  illumina- 
tions, a  banquet  with  innumerable  speeches  and  felici- 
tations, and  a  grand  ball. 

The  tour  of  inspection  along  the  line  of  the  canal  was 
also  a  "procession  triomphale,"  with  Lesseps  in  the 
front,  usually  on  a  prancing  horse.  "M.  de  Lesseps," 
says  a  member  of  the  party,  recorded  in  the  Bulletin, 
11  always  indefatigable,  held  the  head  of  the  caravan. 
I  saw  him  escalade  at  a  gallop  an  escarpement  of  Cule- 
bra  amid  a  roar  of  enthusiastic  hurrahs  from  blacks 
and  whites,  astounded  by  so  much  ardor  and  youthful- 
ness."  There  is  a  tradition  on  the  isthmus  that  he 
went  about  in  a  flowing  robe  of  gorgeous  colors,  like 
an  Eastern  monarch. 

Delightful  opera-bouffe  this,  but  in  a  very  grewsome 
setting.  If  Lesseps  had  even  the  most  superficial  knowl- 
edge of  the  financial  condition  of  his  company  he  must 
have  known  that  it  was  on  the  verge  of  collapse.  His 
spectacular  antics  on  the  isthmus  were  simply  a  final 
frantic  effort  to  conceal  the  truth  about  the  situation 
and  raise  more  funds.  If  ever  a  man  danced  above 
the  crater  of  a  volcano  he  did  during  that  fortnight  of 
his  last  visit.  He  was  in  the  eighty-first  year  of  his 
age  and  the  bodily  vigor  which  he  displayed  was  amaz- 
ing. That  he  knew  what  he  was  about,  knew  how  to 
succeed  with  his  own  countrymen,  subsequent  events 
were  to  prove. 


CHAPTER  V 

LIFE  AT  PANAMA  IN  FRENCH  DAYS  — ITS  PECULIAR- 
ITIES, HARDSHIPS,  AND  PERILS  —  EXTRAVAGANCE 
AND  GRAFT 

THE  tragic  and  heroic  phases  of  the  enterprise  began 
with  the  arrival  of  the  French  engineering  and  organiz- 
ing forces  on  the  isthmus.  They  landed  in  a  country 
which,  with  the  exception  of  two  cities,  one  on  the 
shore  of  either  ocean,  was  little  more  than  a  wilderness. 
Along  the  line  of  the  railroad  there  were  a  few  scattered 
villages  composed  of  rude  buildings  and  shacks  whose 
population  was  mainly  native.  As  for  the  section 
through  which  the  proposed  canal  was  to  run,  it  was 
for  the  most  part  an  impenetrable  jungle.  Throughout 
the  entire  country  pestilence  and  the  worst  forms  of 
malarial  fever  were  epidemic.  The  two  ocean  cities, 
Colon  and  Panama,  were  the  permanent  abodes  of 
disease,  for  they  were  without  even  the  most  element- 
ary provisions  for  health  protection.  They  had  no 
sewers,  no  water  supply,  no  sanitary  appliances  what- 
ever. Their  only  scavengers  were  the  huge  flocks  of 
buzzards  that  circled  constantly  above  them.  Colon 
was  a  collection  of  wooden  buildings  harboring  a  popu- 
lation which  contained  more  of  the  dregs  of  humanity 
than  could  be  found  in  any  other  settlement  of  its  size 
on  the  face  of  the  globe.  Panama  was  superior  to 

84 


FRENCH  EFFORT  AND  FAILURE        85 

Colon  in  its  buildings,  which  were  mostly  of  stone,  and 
while  the  bulk  of  its  population  was  mongrel — a  mixture 
of  many  races,  Indian,  negro,  Spanish,  Chinese,  Japan- 
ese, and  others — it  contained  also  a  white  element  of 
merchants,  bankers,  and  persons  engaged  in  other  oc- 
cupations who  were  the  dominating  class.  But  with 
these  elements  of  superiority,  its  sanitary  condition 
was  as  bad  as  that  of  Colon,  and  its  moral  condition 
differed  only  in  degree.  Both  cities  had,  in  fact,  all  the 
debasing  qualities  of  a  mining  camp  or  rude  frontier 
town,  with  the  usual  facilities  for  gambling,  drinking, 
vice,  and  general  debauchery  supplemented  by  trop- 
ical laxity  in  morals  and  conduct. 

A  graphic  picture  of  life  in  Panama  at  this  period 
is  given  in  a  narrative  of  personal  experience  on  the 
isthmus,  published  in  Paris  in  1886,  under  the  title  of 
"Deux  Ans  a  Panama."  Its  author,  H.  Cermoise,  was 
a  French  engineer  who  went  to  the  isthmus  with  the 
third  party  that  was  sent  out  by  the  French  company. 
He  arrived  on  the  isthmus  in  the  spring  of  1881,  and 
was  in  the  canal  service  for  two  years.  Describing  the 
scenes  which  he  witnessed  in  the  Grand  Hotel  at  Pan- 
ama on  the  evening  of  his  arrival,  he  wrote: 

A  great,  an  enormous  nail  with  a  stone  floor  was  the 
bar-room,  in  which  all  persons  about  the  hotel  were  now 
assembled.  In  the  centre  were  two  billiard  tables,  the 
largest  I  have  ever  seen.  They  were  so  large  that 
there  were  four  balls  to  a  game;  with  three  it  was  im- 
possible, in  most  of  the  strokes,  to  reach  the  ball  to  be 
played,  lost  as  it  was  in  the  middle  of  this  steppe  of 
green  cloth. 


86  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

Beyond  the  billiard  tables,  at  one  end  of  the  hall, 
stood  one  of  those  vast  bars  which  are  so  much  a  part 
of  American  life. 

In  front  of  these  rows  of  bottles  with  many  colored 
labels  most  of  the  commercial  business  of  Panama  is 
transacted; — standing  and  imbibing  cocktails, — always 
the  eternal  cocktail! 

Afterwards,  if  the  consumer  had  the  time  and  money 
to  lose  he  had  only  to  cross  the  hall  to  find  himself  in 
a  little  room  crowded  with  people,  where  roulette  was 
going  on. 

Every  diversion  was  there  at  hand  in  the  hall  of  this 
hotel.  But  then  it  was  useless  to  look  for  other  pleas- 
ures. They  were  nowhere  to  be  found.  In  this  town 
there  was  neither  theatre,  concert  nor  cafe, — nothing, 
but  the  hall  of  the  Grand  Hotel,  to  which  one  must 
always  return. 

Oh,  this  roulette,  how  much  it  has  cost  all  grades 
of  canal  employes!  Its  proprietor  must  make  vast 
profits.  Admission  is  absolutely  free;  whoever  wishes 
may  join  in  the  play.  A  democratic  mob  representing 
every  class  of  society  pushes  and  crowds  around  the 
table.  One  is  elbowed  at  the  same  time  by  a  negro, 
almost  in  rags,  anxiously  thrusting  forward  his  ten 
sous  and  by  a  portly  merchant  with  his  pockets  stuffed 
with  piastres  and  banknotes. 

Very  like  a  mining-town  episode  is  the  following: 

Some  time  before  our  arrival  on  the  Isthmus,  on  an 
evening  when  the  play  was  especially  high  and  furious, 
a  band  of  thieves  planned  to  rob  the  roulette-table. 
Under  it  they  concealed  a  powerful  petard  or  bomb, 
which  they  lighted  at  the  critical  moment.  There  was 
an  explosion  and  a  frightful  panic.  Everyone,  believing 
that  the  house  was  blown  up,  rushed  for  the  doors  and 


Grand  Hotel,  Panama. 

Made  administration  headquarters  of  the  French  company  about  1884.     Used  for  a 
time  as  administration  headquarters  by  Americans. 


Front  Street,  Colon,  during  the  nourishing  French  times. 


FRENCH  EFFORT  AND  FAILURE        87 

windows.  The  lights  went  out.  When  the  panic  sub- 
sided it  was  discovered  that  all  the  stakes  had  disap- 
peared under  cover  of  the  tumult. 

This  accident  was  more  disagreeable  than  serious 
and  the  authorities  paid  little  heed  to  it.  But  then 
the  authorities  never  minded  anything,  letting  the 
manager  of  the  game  take  such  steps  as  he  saw  fit  to 
prevent  the  repetition  of  the  occurrence.  He,  accord- 
ingly, surrounded  himself  with  certain  precautions 
which  at  first  seemed  odd  to  us  until  we  understood 
them. 

Before  each  turn  of  the  wheel,  at  the  solemn  moment 
of  "Make  your  plays,  gentlemen!"  the  following  dia- 
logue took  place  between  the  chief  croupier  and  his 
assistants: 

"Mira  la  bomba!  (Look  for  the  bomb!)"  he  com- 
manded. 

A  croupier  immediately  went  down  on  all  fours, 
lifted  the  carpet,  inspected  the  under  side  of  the 
table,  reappeared  and  announced  that  he  had  seen 
no  bomb. 

"Very  well!"  gravely  replied  the  chief  croupier. 

And  only  then,  strong  in  this  assurance,  he  pro- 
nounced the  "Make  your  plays,  gentlemen!" 

He  threw  the  ball.  When  it  stopped  he  announced 
the  number  in  three  languages,  as  was  necessary  for  the 
cosmopolite  attendance  with  which  he  had  to  deal: 
"  Treinta  y  seis,  Colorado!  Thirty-six  and  red!  Trente- 
six,  rouge!" 

Colon  differed  from  Panama  in  having  no  central 
point  for  its  debauchery.  It  had  no  Grand  Hotel  in 
which  all  its  gambling,  drinking,  and  accompanying 
vices  were  congregated,  but  it  had  a  single  main  street, 
running  along  the  water-front,  which  was  composed 


88  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

almost  entirely  of  places  in  which  these  diversions  were 
in  full  progress  day  and  night  with  such  abandon  as 
to  make  the  town  uninhabitable  for  decent  persons. 
It  was  a  veritable  sink  of  iniquity,  if  ever  one  existed. 
In  these  two  centres  of  isthmus  life,  Panama  and 
Colon,  the  French  canal-builders  found  their  sole  places 
of  abode  outside  the  jungle.  There  was  nowhere  else 
to  go  for  habitation  or  recreation.  The  advent  of  the 
various  detachments  from  France,  with  plenty  of 
money  and  generous  cargoes  of  wines  and  other  liquors, 
gave  a  tremendous  incentive  to  the  wild  gayety  of  the 
two  towns.  Nothing  like  the  supply  of  liquor  which 
the  French  poured  out  upon  the  isthmus  during  the 
years  of  their  occupation  was  ever  seen  there  before, 
or  has  been  seen  there  since.  It  was  well-nigh  unlimited 
in  quantity  and  was  sold  to  everybody  at  the  prices  at 
which  it  had  been  bought  in  large  quantities  at  whole- 
sale in  France.  Nothing  was  added  for  transportation 
across  the  ocean  or  to  defray  the  cost  of  handling. 
Champagne,  especially,  was  comparatively  so  low  in 
price  that  it " flowed  like  water,"  and  other  wines  were  to 
be  had  in  scarcely  less  profusion  and  cheapness.  The 
lack  of  a  pure  water  supply  was  doubtless  the  moving 
cause  for  this  abundance,  which  was  justified  on  the 
ground  of  health  preservation,  but  the  consequences 
were  as  deplorable  as  they  were  inevitable.  The  in- 
gredients for  a  genuine  bacchanalian  orgy  being  sup- 
plied, the  orgy  naturally  followed. 

Money  was  scarcely  less  abundant  than  wine.  Vast 
sums  were  sent  from  France  to  the  isthmus  during  the 
first  five  or  six  years  of  canal  work,  and  at  least  one- 


FRENCH  EFFORT  AND  FAILURE        89 

half  of  it,  according  to  most  competent  authorities,  was 
either  misapplied  or  stolen.  The  chief  canal  officials 
received  enormous  salaries,  ranging  from  $50,000  to 
$100,000  a  year,  were  allowed  travelling  expenses  rang- 
ing from  $5  to  $50  a  day,  were  provided  with  expensive 
residences  and  with  fine  horses  and  carriages.  Previous 
to  June,  1886,  there  was  expended  for  office  buildings 
and  residences  $5,250,000.  The  residence  of  the  di- 
rector-general cost  $150,000,  including  a  $40,000  bath- 
house. He  had  a  private  railway  car  which  cost  $42,- 
000.  In  order  to  select  a  suitable  carriage  and  horses 
for  him  a  commission  of  seven  of  his  assistants  was  sent 
to  New  York  at  the  expense  of  the  company  to  make 
the  purchase.  The  hospital  buildings  at  Ancon  cost 
$5,600,000  and  those  at  Colon  $1,400,000.  Stables 
had  cost  $600,000,  carriages  and  horses  for  employees, 
$215,000,  and  $2,700,000  had  been  spent  for  servants 
for  employees.  Three  men  were  employed  in  nearly 
every  instance  to  do  the  work  of  one,  and  all  were 
extravagantly  paid.  Every  house,  hospital,  stable  or 
other  building  that  was  erected,  nearly  or  quite  every 
purchase  that  was  made  of  machinery  and  supplies  of 
every  sort,  were  charged  to  the  company  at  double  or 
treble  the  original  cost,  and  the  surplus  was  divided. 
If  there  was  an  orgy  of  gambling  and  drinking  and 
vice,  there  was  in  progress  with  it  one  of  the  most 
unrestrained  orgies  of  extravagance,  corruption,  and 
" graft"  that  the  world  has  ever  seen.  Froude  scarcely 
overpainted  the  picture  when  he  wrote,  after  visiting 
the  isthmus  during  his  tour  of  the  West  Indies  in 
1885-6: 


90 


THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 


In  all  the  world  there  is  not,  perhaps,  now  concen- 
trated in  any  single  spot  so  much  swindling  and  vil- 
lainy, so  much  foul  disease,  such  a  hideous  dung-heap 
of  moral  and  physical  abomination  as  in  the  scene  of 
this  far-famed  undertaking  of  nineteenth-century  en- 
gineering. The  scene  of  operations  is  a  damp,  tropical 
jungle,  intensely  hot,  swarming  with  mosquitoes, 
snakes,  alligators,  scorpions,  and  centipedes,  the  home, 
even  as  Nature  made  it,  of  yellow  fever,  typhus  and 
dysentery  and  now  made  immeasurably  more  deadly 
by  the  multitudes  of  people  who  crowd  thither. 


CHAPTER  VI 

PESTILENCE  AND  DEATH  —  RAVAGES  OF  YELLOW  FEVER 
—  TESTIMONY  OF  EYE-WITNESSES  —  HEROISM  OF  THE 
MEN  IN  THE  FIELD 

BEHIND  all  the  debauchery,  extravagance,  and  bad 
management  there  lurked  constantly  the  grim  shadow 
of  death.  "Eat,  drink,  and  be  merry,  for  to-morrow 
you  die!"  This  could  well  have  been  the  motto  to 
hang  above  the  bars  and  gambling-tables  in  Colon 
and  Panama,  and  in  the  camps  amid  the  jungle.  The 
most  vigorous  among  the  living  to-day  might  be  among 
the  dead  and  buried  to-morrow,  smitten  without  warn- 
ing by  the  swift  and  (at  that  time)  mysterious  scourge 
of  yellow  fever.  It  is  not  surprising,  when  one  reads 
the  authentic  accounts  of  the  ravages  of  this  disease, 
that  men  sought  to  forget  their  peril  by  plunging  into 
the  wildest  forms  of  diversion.  What  is  surprising  is 
that  so  many  remained  and  faced  the  danger — faced 
it  only  to  fall  before  it. 

Estimates  of  the  number  of  the  French  who  lost 
their  lives  by  this  disease,  mainly,  vary  greatly  because 
no  accurate  record  was  kept,  but  it  is  a  reasonably  safe 
assertion  that  two  out  of  every  four  who  went  from 
France  died  of  it,  and  possibly  three  out  of  every  four. 
It  is  said  that  many  of  them  were  induced  to  go  to  the 
isthmus  in  the  first  place  and  to  remain  there  by  the 

91 


92  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

very  high  salaries  paid  and  by  the  opportunities  for 
illicit  gain;  but  this  is  not,  in  my  opinion,  either  an 
adequate  or  a  just  explanation.  There  was  something 
more  than  desire  for  pecuniary  profit  necessary  to  in- 
duce men  to  remain  under  the  conditions  which  pre- 
vailed both  in  the  working  camps  and  in  the  two  cities. 
It  required  no  ordinary  kind  or  degree  of  courage  to 
induce  a  man  who  saw  his  companions  fall  one  after 
another  dead  beside  him,  to  continue  at  his  post;  yet 
this  is  what  hundreds  of  Frenchmen  did.  To  get  a 
proper  estimate  of  their  courage  and  devotion,  let  me 
cite  a  few  authentic  instances  of  the  silent  and  swift 
working  of  disease. 

Sir  Claude  Coventry  Mallet,  at  present  British 
minister  at  Panama,  was,  in  the  early  days  of  French 
occupation,  British  consul  at  the  same  place.  Through 
love  of  adventure  he  accompanied  one  of  the  French 
surveying  parties  to  the  upper  waters  of  the  Chagres 
River.  The  expedition  started  with  twenty-two  men. 
Within  a  few  weeks  all  its  members  except  Mallet  and 
the  engineer  in  charge  were  incapacitated  by  disease. 
Twenty  men  went  into  hospital,  where  ten  died.  Mal- 
let and  the  engineer  in  charge,  a  Russian  named  Dziem- 
bowski,  returned  to  Panama,  both  in  apparently  unim- 
paired health.  Dziembowski  asked  Mallet  to  advance 
him  money  with  which  to  buy  a  suit  of  clothes,  since 
he  could  get  no  money  till  his  accounts  had  been  ren- 
dered and  approved.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  day  of 
their  return,  the  suit  was  bought  and  Dziembowski 
accepted  Mallet's  invitation  to  luncheon  on  the  fol- 
lowing day.  The  luncheon  hour  arrived,  but  the  guest 


FRENCH  EFFORT  AND  FAILURE        93 

did  not  appear.  Going  to  the  Grand  Hotel  in  the  even- 
ing Mallet  inquired  for  Dziembowski,  saying  he  had 
promised  to  lunch  with  him  but  had  failed  to  appear. 
"Why,"  was  the  reply,  "have  you  not  heard  of  his 
death?  He  died  of  yellow  fever  at  three  o'clock  this 
morning  and  was  buried  at  six!"  He  had  been  buried 
in  the  new  suit  of  clothes. 

M.  Cermoise,  from  whose  book  I  have  quoted  on 
previous  pages,  records  several  equally  dramatic  cases. 
A  dinner  had  been  arranged  at  a  field  camp  near 
Gamboa,  in  one  instance,  in  honor  of  Henry  Bionne, 
general  secretary  of  the  company,  who  was  on  the 
isthmus  charged  with  a  confidential  mission. 

The  guests  had  assembled  and  were  waiting  to  sit 
down  when  M.  Bionne  should  arrive.  Suddenly  a  lady 
present,  who  had  been  looking  at  the  table  with  par- 
ticular attention,  cried  out  in  much  agitation:  "We 
are  thirteen  at  table!" 

At  this  moment  M.  Bionne  arrived.  He  heard  her 
exclamation.  "Be  assured,  madame,"  said  he  gayly, 
"in  such  a  case  it  is  the  last  to  arrive  who  pays  for  all." 
And  he  sat  down  without  seeming  in  the  least  disturbed 
by  this  sinister  portent. 

Never  was  there  so  gay,  so  lively  a  meal.  M.  Bionne 
was  at  his  best,  a  delightful  and  witty  conversationalist. 
He  drank  to  our  success  on  the  Isthmus;  we  drank  to 
his  good  luck,  for  in  fifteen  days  he  was  to  take  the 
steamer  and  return  to  Europe. 

Fifteen  days  later  he  sailed  from  Colon.  At  the  end 
of  forty-eight  hours  he  was  taken  with  yellow  fever 
and  died  in  a  few  days.  The  body  was  thrown  into 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  He  had  not  long  delayed  the  pay- 
ment of  his  debt! 


94  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

Continuing,  M.  Cermoise  gives  a  further  history  of 
what  happened  in  the  same  camp: 

Blasert  had  also  left  the  camp.  His  wife  wished  to 
return  to  Europe  with  her  children.  He  accompanied 
them  to  Colon,  put  them  on  board  a  steamer,  and  re- 
turned to  Panama  that  same  evening. 

What  could  have  affected  him?  Was  it  the  result  of 
the  sudden  change  from  life  in  the  open  air  to  that  in 
town?  At  all  events,  the  day  after  his  return  he  took 
to  his  bed  with  yellow  fever. 

And  he  had  crossed  the  far  West  and  believed  him- 
self invulnerable.  Certainly  his  moral  character  was 
above  reproach.  Alas!  Nothing,  neither  strict  moral- 
ity nor  crossing  the  far  West,  renders  one  invulnerable 
to  yellow  fever.  Some  days  later  the  unfortunate  man 
died  like  a  new  arrival  from  Europe. 

He  had  also  taken  part  at  M.  Bionne's  dinner. 

His  wife  and  children,  who  had  left  him  in  good 
health,  learned  of  his  death  on  reaching  France.  That 
was  a  sad  period  for  the  administration.  It  seemed 
as  though  a  wind  of  death  were  blowing  over  its  em- 
ployes. 

After  M.  Bionne,  Blasert;  after  Blasert,  M.  Blanchet 
continued  the  black  series.  He  had  just  made  an  ex- 
pedition on  horseback  into  the  interior  of  the  isthmus, 
during  which  he  had  endured  great  fatigue.  On  his 
return  the  yellow  fever  declared  itself,  he  took  to  his 
bed,  and  died  in  three  days. 

Perhaps  the  most  tragic  case  was  that  of  Jules 
Dingier,  who  was  the  first  director-general  of  canal 
work  on  the  isthmus.  It  was  for  him  that  the  one- 
hundred-and-fifty-thousand-dollar  residence  had  been 
erected.  This  was  placed  high  upon  the  southern  slope 


"La  Folie  Dingier." 
The  $150,000  residence  of  the  first  French  director-general  as  it  appeared  in  1904. 


French  machinery  in  the  jungle. 


FRENCH  EFFORT  AND  FAILURE        95 

of  Ancon  Hill,  overlooking  La  Boca,  now  Balboa,* 
and  the  Bay  of  Panama.  Before  he  could  occupy  it 
his  wife,  son,  and  daughter  died  of  yellow  fever,  within 
a  few  months  of  each  other,  and  he  returned  to  France 
a  broken-hearted  man,  where  he  died  soon  afterward. 
The  house  was  known  for  many  years  as  "La  Folie 
Dingier,"  on  account  of  its  excessive  cost  and  rather 
inaccessible  location.  It  was  used  for  a  time  as  a 
small-pox  isolation  house,  later  as  barracks  for  Colom- 
bian troops,  still  later  by  the  Americans  as  a  quaran- 
tine detention  station,  and  finally,  in  February,  1910, 
was  razed  to  the  ground  to  make  room  for  works  in  con- 
nection with  canal  construction. 

Dingier  was  succeeded  by  Leon  Boyer,  who  arrived 
on  the  isthmus  in  January,  1886,  and  had  hardly  entered 
upon  his  duties  when  he  was  smitten  with  yellow  fever, 
dying  on  May  1. 

Philippe  Bunau-Varilla,  who  was  a  division  engineer 
during  this  period,  makes  many  references  to  the  rav- 
ages of  yellow  fever  in  his  book  on  the  "Past,  Present, 
and  Future"  at  Panama.  He  says  the  effect  the  dis- 
ease had  upon  the  courage  and  activity  of  the  working 
force  cannot  be  estimated;  that  the  elusive  and  mys- 
terious malady  defied  all  precautions,  laughed  at  all 
remedies,  and  that  all  that  the  most  expert  physicians 
could  do  for  its  victims  was  to  administer  palliatives 
whose  effect  was  moral  rather  than  curative. 


*  The  name  was  changed  to  Balboa  by  order  of  President  Taft,  on 
April  30,  1909,  in  accordance  with  a  suggestion  by  Federico  Alfonso 
Pezet,  at  that  time  Peruvian  minister  at  Panama.  See  Canal  Record, 
May  5,  1909. 


96  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

"Two  talented  engineers,"  he  says,  "Messrs.  Petit 
and  Sordillet,  were  sent  to  me  from  Paris  to  occupy 
posts  as  chiefs  of  division.  Their  coming  had  given  me 
hope  of  a  strong  reinforcement,  but  unfortunately, 
arriving  together,  they  were  taken  to  the  cemetery 
fifteen  days  later,  victims  of  the  fatal  malady  which 
had  so  terribly  thinned  the  ranks  of  the  personnel  of 
all  classes." 

Speaking  generally  of  the  working  force,  he  says: 

Out  of  every  one  hundred  individuals  arriving  on  the 
isthmus,  I  can  say  without  exaggeration  that  only 
twenty  have  been  able  to  remain  at  their  posts  at  the 
working  stations,  and  even  in  that  number,  many  who 
were  able  to  present  an  appearance  of  health  had  lost 
much  of  their  courage. 

Colonel  Gorgas,  in  an  address  delivered  at  Los  An- 
geles, Cal.,  in  June,  1911,  gives  the  following  instances 
which  came  within  his  personal  knowledge: 

One  of  the  French  engineers,  who  was  still  on  the 
isthmus  when  we  first  arrived,  stated  that  he  came  over 
with  a  party  of  seventeen  young  Frenchmen.  In  a 
month  they  had  all  died  of  yellow  fever  except  himself. 
The  superintendent  of  the  railroad  brought  to  the  isth- 
mus his  three  sisters;  within  a  month  they  had  all  died 
of  yellow  fever.  The  mother  superior  of  the  sisters 
nursing  in  Ancon  Hospital  told  me  that  she  had  come 
out  with  twenty-four  sisters.  Within  a  few  years 
twenty-one  had  died,  the  most  of  yellow  fever. 

Conditions  like  these  were  calculated  to  try  even  the 
strongest  nerves.  That  for  eight  years  Frenchmen 
were  found  in  considerable  numbers  who  were  willing 


FRENCH  EFFORT  AND  FAILURE        97 

to  fill  the  constantly  thinning  ranks  is  a  fact  of  which 
their  nation  may  well  be  proud.  They  kept  the  force 
recruited  sufficiently  to  enable  the  work  to  be  carried 
forward  till  funds  for  its  prosecution  were  exhausted. 

How  many  of  them  gave  up  their  lives  in  the  strug- 
gle? It  is  impossible  to  state  the  number  accurately. 
The  Ancon  Hospital  records  show  that  during  the  eight 
years  of  work  by  the  first  French  company  1,026  pa- 
tients died  of  yellow  fever.  As  the  West  Indian  ne- 
groes are  immune  to  yellow  fever,  these  were  all  white 
persons,  and  nearly  all  French.  Colonel  Gorgas  esti- 
mates that  as  many  died  of  yellow  fever  outside  the 
hospital  as  in,  and  places  the  number  of  victims  at 
about  2,000.  This  is,  of  course,  mere  surmise,  but  it 
is  not  unreasonable.  Neither  is  the  supposition,  quite 
general  among  those  who  have  studied  the  subject 
carefully,  that  two  out  of  every  three  Frenchmen  who 
went  to  the  isthmus  died  there.  But  there  is  no  exact 
information  obtainable.  Lesseps,  in  accordance  with 
his  uniform  policy,  minimized  or  suppressed  the  truth, 
and  outside  the  hospital  rolls  no  records  were  kept. 
The  hospital  rolls  show  that  during  the  eight  years  of 
the  first  French  company's  work  5,527  employes  of 
all  kinds  died  of  various  diseases.  As  the  French  con- 
tractors were  charged  a  dollar  a  day  for  each  hospital 
patient,  only  a  small  proportion  of  sick  laborers  were 
sent  to  them.  It  is  not  an  unreasonable  supposition, 
quite  generally  made,  that  for  one  who  died  in  hospital 
two  died  outside,  which  would  raise  the  total  death-roll 
during  the  eight  years  to  about  16,500.  This  again  is 
mere  surmise,  but  after  carefully  weighing  all  attain- 


98  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

able  evidence;  it  seems  to  me  to  be  a  plausible  estimate. 
Colonel  Gorgas,  who  adopted  that  figure  for  several 
years,  raised  it  later  to  about  22,000,  but  his  reasons  for 
doing  so,  which  he  has  not  published,  but  which  he  has 
stated  to  me,  do  not  strike  me  as  convincing. 

It  is  the  undivided  testimony  of  the  Americans  who 
succeeded  the  French  that  they  did  their  work  well  and 
accomplished  results  which  were  little  short  of  marvel- 
lous when  the  conditions  which  surrounded  them  are 
taken  into  consideration.  It  is  also  the  opinion  of 
those  Americans  that,  had  similar  conditions  prevailed 
when  the  United  States  undertook  the  task,  no  better, 
if  as  good,  results  could  have  been  secured.  The  French 
were  ignorant  of  the  mosquito  transmission  of  disease, 
for  the  discover}'  had  not  been  made.  They  erected 
and  equipped  admirable  hospitals,  and,  in  their  igno- 
rance, furnished  them  with  the  means  of  spreading, 
rather  than  checking,  disease.  To  protect  their  pa- 
tients from  annoyance  from  the  hordes  of  ants  which 
infest  the  isthmus,  they  placed  the  posts  of  the  hospital 
bedsteads  in  bowls  of  water.  In  these  bowls  the  deadly 
stegomyia  mosquito  was  bred,  and  when  a  yellow-fever 
patient  came  in  the  mosquito  fed  on  him  and  carried 
the  germs  of  the  pest  throughout  the  hospital,  infecting 
other  patients.  Being  ignorant  also  that  another  mos- 
quito, anophdeSj  transmitted  malaria,  they  placed  no 
screens  in  the  windows  and  doors  of  hospitals  and  other 
buildings,  and  thus  permitted  the  unchecked  dissem- 
ination of  that  disease. 


CHAPTER  VII 

RETURN  OF  LESSEPS  TO  FRANCE  —  COLLAPSE  OF  HIS 
COMPANY  — SHOCKING  REVELATIONS  OF  ITS  FINAN- 
CIAL PROCEEDINGS  —  WORK  DONE  AT  PANAMA  — 
SENTENCE  AND  DEATH  OF  LESSEPS 

LESSEPS  sailed  for  France  from  the  isthmus,  after  his 
second  visit,  on  March  3,  and  on  arrival  declared,  with 
customary  buoyance  and  disregard  of  facts,  that  the 
situation  on  the  isthmus  was  all  that  could  be  desired 
and  that  the  canal  would  be  completed  in  1889.  The 
delegates  of  the  French  chambers  of  commerce,  docile 
as  ever  to  the  great  promoter,  made  favorable  reports, 
but  nothing  was  heard  from  the  eminent  engineers  of 
the  party. 

In  the  meantime  the  government's  special  commis- 
sioner, M.  Rousseau,  had  returned  and  had  reported 
that  the  completion  of  the  proposed  canal  was  impos- 
sible unless  there  was  a  change  to  a  lock  plan.  Similar 
reports  were  made  by  two  engineers  in  the  employ  of 
the  Lesseps  company,  Le*on  Boyer,  at  the  time  its  di- 
rector-general on  the  isthmus,  and  L.  Jacquet.  Les- 
seps paid  no  heed  to  these  reports,  and  refused  to  con- 
sent to  a  change  of  plan.  He  withdrew  his  request  for 
authority  to  issue  lottery  bonds,  and  in  July,  1886, 
obtained  permission  from  the  shareholders  of  his  com- 
pany to  issue  a  new  series  of  bonds. 

99 


100  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

The  success  of  this  issue,  in  the  face  of  all  that  had 
been  disclosed,  was  an  astonishing  proof  of  the  hold 
Lesseps  had  upon  the  French  people.  It  resulted  in 
the  sale  of  bonds  to  the  value  of  about  354,000,000 
francs  or  $70,000,000.  This  was,  however,  only  a  tem- 
porary relief.  The  outflow  of  money  was  so  tremen- 
dous that  even  Lesseps  was  compelled  finally  to  give 
heed  to  the  demand  for  a  change  in  canal  plan.  At  a 
meeting  of  the  stockholders  of  the  company  in  July,  he 
gave  out  the  information  that  a  new  plan  was  under 
consideration  for  a  temporary  canal  with  locks,  which 
would  not  prevent  the  ultimate  construction  of  a  sea- 
level  canal.  A  superior  commission,  appointed  by  him, 
reported  in  October,  1887,  that  such  a  plan  was  feasi- 
ble, that  the  cost  would  not  exceed  600,000,000  francs 
($120,000,000),  and  that  the  date  of  completion  would 
not  be  later  than  1891. 

A  plan  was  adopted  which  provided  a  lock  canal  at 
a  summit  level  above  the  flood  line  of  the  Chagres 
River,  to  be  supplied  with  water  by  elevating  ma- 
chinery. Alexandre  Gustave  Eiffel,  known  to  fame  a 
year  later  as  the  constructor  of  the  Eiffel  Tower  in 
Paris,  early  in  1888  was  awarded  a  contract  for  the 
lock  construction.  He  pushed  work  on  the  new  plan 
till  the  collapse  of  the  Lesseps  company,  accomplish- 
ing very  little. 

In  November,  1887,  Lesseps  again  applied  to  the 
government  for  permission  to  issue  lottery  bonds. 
Permission  was  granted  in  June,  1888,  and  on  June  26 
an  issue  of  2,000,000  bonds  was  made,  but  only  800,000 
were  taken.  A  new  issue  was  made  on  November  29, 


FRENCH  EFFORT  AND  FAILURE      101 

when  the  1,200,000  bonds  remaining  were  offered;  but 
less  than  200,000  were  taken.  The  end  had  come.  On 
December  14  Lesseps  petitioned  the  courts  to  appoint 
temporary  managers  of  the  company,  which  was  done. 
The  temporary  managers  sought  to  reorganize  the  en- 
terprise, but  were  unsuccessful,  and  they  informed  the 
shareholders,  at  a  general  meeting  on  January  26, 
1889,  that  they  considered  the  appointment  of  a  judi- 
cial receiver  necessary.  The  shareholders  so  informed 
the  court,  and  in  accordance  with  that  expression  the 
civil  court  of  the  Seine,  on  February  4,  appointed  a 
receiver  for  the  company. 

When  the  affairs  of  the  company  were  examined  it 
appeared  that  about  $260,000,000  had  been  collected 
and  expended.  About  800,000  persons  held  stock  of 
the  company  or  obligations  of  some  kind  against  it, 
and  its  treasury  was  empty.  The  official  figures  of 
receipts  and  expenditures,  expressed  in  dollars,  were  as 
follows: 

Receipts  from  all  sources $266,000,000 

Expenditures  on  the  isthmus: 

Management  and  salaries 16,540,000 

Excavation  and  construction 88,634,000 

Heavy  material 23,875,000 

Material  and  articles  for  consumption  5,848,000 

Buildings  and  management 15,397,000 

Rents,  care,  etc 3,301,000 

Surveys  and  preparatory  work 275,000 

Sanitary  and  religious  service 1,836,000 

Purchase  of  lands 950,000 

Total  on  isthmus $156,656,000 


102 


THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 


Expenditures  in  Paris $78,140,000 

Purchase  Panama  R.R.  shares 18,653,000 

Other  purposes 9,235,000 

Grand  total  of  expenditures $262,684,000 

The  total  excavation  accomplished  by  this  outlay 
of  $262,684,000  was,  according  to  the  records  of  the 
company,  51,031,081  cubic  metres,  or  66,743,551  cubic 
yards.  The  following  table  shows  the  amount  of  ex- 
cavation claimed  by  the  company,  the  maximum  size 
of  the  working  force,  and  the  number  of  deaths  re- 
corded in  the  hospitals  in  each  of  the  eight  years  of 
the  company's  operations: 


YEAR 

EXCAVATION, 
CUBIC  YARDS 

MAXIMUM  NO. 
EMPLOYES 

DEATHS 

1881  

1,515 

58 

1882  

5,838 

125 

1883  

3,500,000 

10,252 

423 

1884  

9,847,556 

19,243 

1,232 

1885  

9,425,031 

17,751 

1,096 

1886  ... 

15,438,962 

15,978 

955 

1887 

15,748,936 

17,885 

1,033 

1888 

16,605,308 

16,059 

605 

Totals  

70,565,793 

5,527 

The  figures  of  yearly  excavation  given  in  the  above 
table  are  compiled  from  the  Bulletin  of  the  company. 
They  were  revised  when  the  company  went  into  the 
hands  of  a  receiver,  and  the  total  was  brought  down 
to  51,031,081  cubic  metres,  or  about  66,743,551  cubic 
yards. 


FRENCH  EFFORT  AND  FAILURE      103 

The  mortality  figures  are  those  recorded  in  the  hospital, 
and,  as  explained  in  the  preceding  chapter,  are  thought 
to  be  only  about  one-third  of  the  actual  mortality  in 
the  canal  force. 

The  revelations  which  were  made  when  the  affairs^ 
of  the  company  were  investigated  not  only  filled  France 
with  consternation  and  humiliation  but  the  civilized 
world  with  amazement.  Wholesale  bribery  of  legis- 
lators and  government  officials  in  France,  reckless  ex- 
travagance and  misuse  of  funds  by  the  directors  of  the 
company,  and  a  total  disregard  of  legal  or  moral  obli- 
gations of  all  kinds — these  were  the  distinguishing  fea- 
tures of  the  company's  policy  and  conduct/'It  was 
shown  that  the  chief  financial  agent  of  the  company 
had  received  over  6,000,000  francs,  partly  as  commis- 
sions on  the  sale  of  stock,  partly  as  "expense  of  pub- 
licity," a  euphemism  for  bribery  of  government  officials. 
When  the  full  exposure  came  the  chief  financial  agent 
committed  suicide.  Another  financial  agent  received 
nearly  4,000,000  francs  for  service  and  commissions. 
Charles  de  Lesseps,  son  of  Ferdinand,  confessed  that 
he  paid  600,000  francs  to  another  agent  "  because  of 
his  great  influence  with  the  government."  He  paid 
375,000  francs  to  the  French  Minister  of  Public  Works, 
who  confessed  that  he  kept  300,000  francs  of  it  and  gave 
75,000  francs  to  another  person  as  reward  for  having 
tempted  him  to  accept  the  bribe.  The  press  of  Paris 
received  1,362,000  francs  for  advertising  the  various 
stock  subscriptions.  One  favored  editor  alone  received 
100,000  francs.  A  distinguished  contractor  received 
12,000,000  francs  for  material  amounting  to  2,000,000 


104  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

francs  in  value,  and  6,000,000  francs  for  "transporting 
material"  which  was  never  delivered.  It  cost  a  hand- 
some sum  to  convert  a  majority  of  the  parliamentary 
committee  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  to  a  favorable 
view  of  the  lottery  project,  one  member  receiving  500,000 
francs,  another  400,000,  another  300,000,  and  others 
200,000  each.  The  Minister  of  the  Interior  was  per- 
suaded to  view  the  project  with  favor  by  a  present  of 
300,000  francs.  Charles  de  Lesseps  justified  his  conduct 
in  making  these  payments  on  the  ground  that  they  were 
absolutely  necessary  to  protect  the  interests  of  the  stock- 
holders. Public  opinion  in  France  took  a  surprisingly 
lenient  view  both  of  his  conduct  and  that  of  his  father. 
Several  years  had  elapsed  between  the  collapse  of  the 
company  and  the  trial,  and  the  first  bitterness  felt  by 
the  stockholders  over  their  loss  had  been  softened  by 
time.  Their  faith  in  Lesseps  and  in  his  good  inten- 
tions was  still  strong,  and  they  regarded  him  as  the 
victim  of  dishonest  agents  and  associates  rather  than 
as  the  responsible  author  of  the  disaster. 

Lesseps  and  his  son  Charles  were  sentenced  by  the 
court  to  a  fine  and  five  years'  imprisonment,  and  similar 
sentences  were  passed  upon  others  of  their  associates. 
The  sentence  against  Charles  de  Lesseps  was  annulled 
by  the  Court  of  Appeals.  That  against  his  father  was 
never  executed,  for  he  was  eighty-eight  years  old  at 
the  time,  January  10,  1893,  and  a  physical  and  mental 
wreck.  He  died  in  December  following. 

His  last  appearance  in  the  world,  according  to  a 
report  published  at  the  time,  was  characteristically 
dramatic.  While  he  was  lying  ill  in  bed  at  his  Paris 


FRENCH  EFFORT  AND  FAILURE      105 

residence,  in  November,  1894;  apparently  unconscious 
and  without  memory,  unable  to  move  without  assist- 
ance, a  summons  came  for  him  to  appear  before  the 
examining  magistrate  in  the  judicial  inquiry  which 
preceded  the  trial.  In  some  mysterious  way  he  got 
knowledge  of  the  summons  and  comprehended  it.  He 
rose  from  his  bed,  demanded  his  clothes  and  his  Grand 
Order  of  the  Legion  of  Honor,  dressed  himself,  put  on 
the  Grand  Order,  descended  the  stairs  without  assist- 
ance and  went  to  the  house  of  the  magistrate.  Arriv- 
ing there,  he  made  an  impassioned  defence  of  himself 
and  the  canal  management.  Returning  to  his  home, 
he  went  to  bed  and  was  seized  with  high  fever.  On 
the  following  day  he  said  to  his  wife:  "What  a  terrible 
nightmare  I  have  had.  I  imagined  I  was  summoned 
before  the  examining  magistrate!  It  was  atrocious !" 
By  degrees  he  became  conscious  it  was  not  a  dream, 
but  he  never  spoke  of  the  canal  again. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

NEW  FRENCH  CANAL  COMPANY 

THE  task  of  the  receiver  in  organizing  a  new  canal 
company  was  made  exceedingly  difficult  by  the  scan- 
dalous revelations  which  had  followed  the  collapse  of 
the  first  company.  Public  confidence  in  the  enter- 
prise was  nearly  or  quite  destroyed.  The  receiver  en- 
deavored to  continue  work  on  the  isthmus,  but  was 
obliged  to  suspend  it  on  May  15,  1889.  Then,  in  order 
to  determine  the  feasibility  of  the  canal  project,  he 
selected  a  survey  commission  of  five  members  to  make 
thorough  investigation  of  the  exact  situation  on  the 
isthmus  and  report.  This  commission  sailed  for  the 
isthmus  on  December  10,  1889,  and  on  May  5,  1890, 
rendered  a  report  in  which  it  was  declared  to  be  the 
opinion  of  the  commission  that  it  would  be  possible 
to  complete  in  eight  years,  at  a  cost  of  900,000,000 
francs  ($180,000,000),  a  canal  with  a  system  of  locks  in 
groups  on  each  slope  of  the  continental  divide;  that 
the  plant  on  the  isthmus  was  in  a  satisfactory  condi- 
tion and  might  suffice  for  the  completion  of  the  canal; 
and  that  an  "intuitive  estimate"  of  the  value  of  the 
plant  and  of  the  work  done  was  450,000,000  francs 
($90,000,000).  The  commission  also  reported  that 
there  was  an  excessive  number  of  homes  for  employes, 

106 


FRENCH  EFFORT  AND  FAILURE      107 

there  being  accommodations  for  a  force  of  27,000 
men. 

The  Wyse  concession,  under  which  the  Lesseps  com- 
pany had  been  working,  fixed  the  date  of  canal  comple- 
tion at  twelve  years  after  the  formation  of  the  com- 
pany— or  1893.  In  order  to  continue  the  work  it  was 
necessary  to  obtain  from  Colombia  an  extension,  and 
Mr.  Wyse  was  sent  to  Bogota  by  the  receiver  in  July, 
1890,  to  secure  it.  In  December  following  Colombia 
passed  a  law  granting  an  extension  of  ten  years,  pro- 
vided a  new  company  should  be  formed  and  work  on 
the  canal  begun  on  or  before  February  28,  1893.  This 
condition  not  having  been  complied  with,  a  second 
extension  of  ten  years  was  sought  and  obtained  on 
April  4,  1893,  beginning  not  later  than  October  31, 
1894.  On  April  26, 1900,  a  third  extension  was  granted, 
placing  the  date  of  completion  at  October  31, 1910. 

All  legal  and  other  obstacles  in  the  way  of  a  new 
company  were  cleared  away  during  1891,  1892,  1893, 
and  the  first  part  of  1894,  and  on  October  20,  1894,  the 
new  company  was  definitely  established  with  a  capital 
stock  of  65,000,000  francs  in  shares  of  100  francs  each, 
600,000  shares  of  which  had  been  subscribed  for,  and 
50,000  shares  were  given  as  full-paid  stock  to  the 
Colombian  Government.  The  cash  capital  of  the  com- 
pany was  thus  60,000,000  francs  ($12,000,000). 

Immediately  following  its  organization  the  new  com- 
pany took  possession  of  the  property  and  resumed  the 
work  of  construction  on  the  isthmus,  having  assembled, 
by  the  end  of  1 894,  a  working  force  of  about  one  thou- 
sand men. 


108  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

Early  in  1896  the  new  company  appointed  an  inter- 
national technical  commission  of  fourteen  members 
to  make  a  thorough  examination  of  the  situation  on 
the  isthmus  and  report  with  recommendations.  This 
commission,  which  was  organized  in  February,  1896, 
was  composed  of  seven  Frenchmen,  two  Americans, 
two  Germans,  one  Russian,  one  Belgian,  and  one  Co- 
lombian, all  engineers  of  experience  and  established 
reputation.  They  devoted  nearly  three  years  to  the 
most  thorough  and  intelligent  study  that  had  yet  been 
made  of  the  subject,  and  stated  their  conclusions  in  an 
elaborate  and  valuable  report  on  November  16,  1893. 

They  recommended  the  construction  of  a  canal  with 
two  levels  above  sea-level,  with  four  locks  on  each  slope, 
and  with  dams  at  Bohio  and  Alhajuela.  It  was  to 
have  a  depth  of  29.5  feet,  a  bottom  width  of  98  feet,  and 
the  lock  chambers  were  to  be  782  feet  long  and  32  feet 
wide.  The  cost  was  estimated  at  $102,000,000,  and 
the  time  of  completion  ten  years.  This  plan  was  ap- 
proved by  the  special  engineering  commission  of  the 
company,  who  reported  in  1899  that  it  was  feasible 
and  that  the  proposed  canal  could  be  built  for  the  sum 
estimated  and  within  the  time  named. 

Work,  which  had  been  carried  forward  since  its  re- 
sumption in  1893  mainly  in  the  Culebra  Cut,  with  a 
view  to  usefulness  under  any  type  of  canal,  was  con- 
tinued in  accordance  with  the  new  plan  till  the  transfer 
of  the  rights  and  property  of  the  company  to  the  United 
States  on  May  4,  1904.  During  this  period  the  force 
varied  from  700  to  4,000  men,  touching  the  highest 
point  in  1897.  At  the  time  of  the  transfer  to  the  United 


FRENCH  EFFORT  AND  FAILURE      109 

States  it  comprised  about  700  men.  The  total  excava- 
tion by  the  new  company  was  11,403,409  cubic  yards, 
bringing  the  grand  total  of  the  two  French  companies 
up  to  78,146,960  cubic  yards.  The  number  of  deaths 
recorded  in  the  hospital  between  1889  and  1893,  both 
inclusive,  the  period  during  which  work  was  suspended 
and  the  force  was  small,  was  199;  the  number  between 
1894  and  1904,  during  the  operations  of  the  new  com- 
pany, was  557,  making  the  total  hospital  mortality 
between  1881  and  1904,  the  full  period  of  French  oc- 
cupation, 6,283.  Taking  this  as  about  one-third  of 
the  actual  mortality  during  the  thirteen  years,  the 
grand  total  would  be  about  18,000. 


PART  III 

AMERICAN    PURCHASE    AND    CONTROL 
1902-1904 


PART  III 

AMERICAN  PURCHASE  AND  CONTROL 

1902-1904 

CHAPTER  I 

CONTEST  BETWEEN  NICARAGUA  AND  PANAMA  ROUTES 
—  DECISION  IN  FAVOR  OF  THE  LATTER 

WHILE  the  efforts  of  the  French  companies  to  con- 
struct a  canal  were  culminating  in  final  failure,  an 
animated  campaign  was  in  progress  in  the  United  States 
between  the  advocates  of  the  Nicaragua  route  and  those 
of  the  Panama.  Acting  under  the  charter  granted  by 
Congress  in  February,  1889,  the  Maritime  Canal  Com- 
pany was  organized  on  May  9  following,  with  a  capital 
of  $250,000,000,  and  in  March,  1900,  a  sub-organiza- 
tion, called  a  construction  company,  was  formed  with 
a  capital  stock  of  $12,000,000,  the  shares  of  which 
were  sold  at  50  per  cent  discount,  netting  $6,000,000. 

Work  was  begun  in  Nicaragua  in  June,  1890,  and 
continued  for  three  years,  during  which  time  the  $6,- 
000,000  capital  was  exhausted,  and  the  company  went 
into  the  hands  of  a  receiver.  Repeated  efforts  were 
made  to  induce  Congress  to  authorize  the  government 
to  purchase  the  rights  and  property  of  the  company 
and  assume  its  indebtedness,  but  without  success. 

113 


114  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

Several  commissions  were  appointed  to  investigate  the 
situation  at  Nicaragua,  but  nothing  resulted  from  their 
reports.  On  March  3;  1899,  President  McKinley  ap- 
pointed a  commission  of  nine  members,*  with  Rear- 
Admiral  J.  G.  Walker  at  its  head,  to  make  thorough 
investigation  of  all  routes  for  a  canal  across  the  isth- 
mus, particularly  those  at  Nicaragua  and  Panama,  and 
report  as  to  which  was  the  "most  feasible  and  prac- 
ticable route"  for  a  "canal  under  the  control,  man- 
agement, and  ownership  of  the  United  States."  This 
commission  made  its  report  on  November  16,  1901. 
After  an  elaborate  and  exhaustive  discussion  of  the 
two  routes,  the  commission  concluded  by  saying  that 
its  estimate  of  the  cost  of  constructing  a  canal  at 
Nicaragua  was  $189,864,062,  and  of  a  canal  at  Panama 
was  $144,233,000;  that  the  new  Panama  Canal  com- 
pany offered  to  sell  its  rights,  property,  and  franchises 
for  $109,141,500,  which  would  bring  the  cost  of  a 
canal  by  the  Panama  route  up  to  $253,374,858;  that 
the  commission  estimated  the  value  of  the  new  Panama 
Canal  company's  property  at  $40,000,000;  and  that, 
in  view  of  the  terms  offered  by  that  -  company,  the 
commission  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  "most  prac- 
ticable and  feasible  route"  was  by  way  of  Nicaragua. 

This  report  was  transmitted  to  Congress  by  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  on  December  4,  1901.  On  January  4, 
1902,  the  president  of  the  new  Panama  Canal  com- 
pany sent  word  by  cable  from  Paris  to  Rear- Admiral 
Walker  that  the  company  was  willing  to  sell  its  proper- 
ties and  concessions  to  the  United  States  Government 

• 

*  Appendix  A. 


AMERICAN  PURCHASE  AND  CONTROL    115 

for  $40,000,000.  On  January  18  the  Walker  commis- 
sion rendered  to  President  Roosevelt  a  supplementary 
report,  transmitting  the  offer  of  the  French  company  to 
sell  for  $40,000,000,  and  declaring  it  to  be  the  commis- 
sion's opinion,  in  view  of  the  changed  conditions,  that 
the  "most  practicable  and  feasible  route"  for  a  canal 
was  that  by  way  of  Panama. 

In  the  meantime,  while  these  negotiations  with  the 
French  company  were  in  progress,  the  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives, on  January  8,  1902,  passed  by  a  vote  of 
225  to  25  a  bill  authorizing  the  President  to  proceed 
with  the  construction  of  a  canal  by  way  of  Nicaragua, 
at  a  cost  of  .$180,000,000,  and  appropriating  $10,000,000 
on  account  for  immediate  use.  When  the  bill  reached 
the  Senate  it  encountered  vigorous  opposition.  The 
supplementary  report  of  the  Walker  commission  'was 
sent  to  Congress  on  January  20,  and  proved  to  be  the 
doom  of  the  Nicaraguan  project.  An  amendment  to 
the  House  bill  was  offered  by  Senator  Spooner  which 
converted  it  virtually  into  a  new  measure. 

After  a  long  debate,  marked  at  times  by  some  animos- 
ity, the  Spooner  bill  passed  the  Senate  on  June  19, 1902, 
by  a  vote  of  67  to  6,  and  passed  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives on  June  26  by  a  vote  of  259  to  8.  It  was  signed 
by  President  Roosevelt  on  June  28.  In  substance  it 
authorized  the  President  to  acquire  for  and  in  behalf  of 
the  United  States,  at  a  cost  not  exceeding  $40,000,000, 
all  the  rights,  privileges,  franchises,  concessions,  and 
property  on  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  owned  by  the  new 
Panama  Canal  company;  to  acquire  from  the  Republic 
of  Colombia,  on  such  terms  as  he  might  deem  reason- 


116  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

able,  control  of  a  strip  of  land,  not  less  than  six  miles 
in  width,  between  the  two  oceans,  in  which  to  con- 
struct and  operate  a  canal;  to  acquire  such  additional 
territory  and  rights  from  Colombia  as  in  his  judgment 
would  facilitate  the  general  purpose;  and,  when  a  sat- 
isfactory title  had  been  secured  from  the  new  Panama 
Canal  company,  to  proceed  to  construct  a  canal  of  suffi- 
cient capacity  and  depth  to  afford  "convenient  pass- 
age for  vessels  of  the  largest  tonnage  and  greatest 
draft  now  in  use,  and  such  as  may  be  reasonably  antici- 
pated." In  case  satisfactory  title  could  not  be  ob- 
tained from  the  French  company,  the  act  authorized 
the  President  to  take  the  necessary  steps  to  permit  of 
the  construction  of  a  canal  at  Nicaragua.  A  prelim- 
inary appropriation  of  $10,000,000  was  made  toward 
the  project  by  either  route.  Further  appropriation  of 
$135,000,000  was  authorized  in  case  the  Panama  route 
was  chosen,  and  $180,000,000  in  case  the  Nicaraguan 
was  the  choice.  To  enable  him  to  construct  the  canal, 
the  President  was  authorized  to  appoint  a  commission 
of  seven  members,  subject  to  approval  by  the  Senate, 
to  serve  till  the  completion  of  the  canal  unless  sooner 
removed  by  him,  and  to  be  in  all  matters  subject  to  his 
direction  and  control.  He  was  to  fix  their  compensa- 
tion until  otherwise  provided  by  Congress.  At  least 
four  of  the  commissioners  must  be  "persons  learned 
and  skilled  in  the  science  of  engineering,"  and  of  these 
four,  at  least  ope  an  officer,  active  or  retired,  of  the 
United  States  army,  and  at  least  one  an  officer,  active 
or  retired,  of  the  United  States  navy. 
The  next  step  was  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  between 


AMERICAN  PURCHASE  AND  CONTROL    117 

the  United  States  and  Colombia,  in  accordance  with 
the  requirements  of  the  Spooner  law,  and  on  this  hung 
events  of  momentous  and  far-reaching  importance 
which  will  be  described  in  detail  in  other  chapters. 


CHAPTER  II 

COLOMBIA'S  REJECTION  OF  THE  HAY-HERRAN  TREATY 

IMMEDIATELY  following  the  enactment  of  the  Spooner 
law,  negotiations  were  opened  between  the  United 
States  Government  and  that  of  Colombia  for  the  con- 
clusion of  a  treaty  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of 
that  law.  They  were  conducted  by  John  Hay,  Sec- 
retary of  State  of  the  United  States,  and  Doctor  Tomas 
Herran,  charge*  d'affaires  of  the  Colombian  Govern- 
ment at  Washington.  They  resulted  in  what  is  known 
as  the  Hay-Herran  convention,  which  was  signed  on 
January  22,  1903,  Doctor  Herran  signing  with  the 
authority  of  the  Colombian  Government.  It  was  sent 
to  the  Senate  on  January  23,  and  was  ratified  without 
change  on  March  17.  It  authorized  the  new  Panama 
Canal  company  to  sell  and  transfer  to  the  United 
States  all  its  rights,  privileges,  properties,  and  conces- 
sions, as  well  as  the  Panama  Railroad;  ceded  to  the 
United  States  for  the  purpose  of  canal  construction  a 
strip  of  land  thirty  miles  in  width  between  the  two 
oceans,  over  which  the  United  States  should  have  ad- 
ministrative control  for  police  and  sanitation  purposes, 
but  of  which  the  sovereignty  should  remain  vested  in 
Colombia;  stipulated  that  upon  the  exchange  of  rati- 
fications, the  United  States  should  pay  to  Colom- 

118 


AMERICAN  PURCHASE  AND  CONTROL    119 

bia  $10,000,000  in  gold,  and,  in  addition,  beginning 
nine  years  after  the  date  of  ratification,  should  pay 
annually  $250,000  in  gold.  It  was  pointed  out  by 
Secretary  Hay,  after  the  rejection  of  the  treaty  by  Co- 
lombia, that  the  bonus  of  $10,000,000  was  a  sum  equiv- 
alent to  two-thirds  of  what  was  reputed  to  be  the 
Colombian  public  debt,  and  that  the  annual  payment 
of  $250,000  was  equivalent  to  the  interest  on  $15,000,- 
000  at  the  rate  at  which  loans  could  be  obtained  by  the 
American  Government. 

The  Colombian  Congress  met  in  extra  session,  con- 
vened for  the  purpose  of  considering  the  treaty,  on 
June  20,  1903.  It  was  known  that  a  large  majority  of 
its  members  were  opposed  to  ratification,  and  that  the 
Colombian  Government  controlled  it  absolutely.  The 
treaty  itself  was  withheld  on  a  pretext  that  it  must  be 
signed  by  the  Vice-President  before  being  sent  to  the 
Congress.  In  the  meantime  a  general  clamor  was 
raised  for  more  favorable  terms  for  Colombia  and  for 
amendments  that  should  grant  them. 

On  June  10  the  agent  of  the  new  Panama  Canal  com- 
pany at  Bogota  received  from  the  Colombian  Govern- 
ment an  official  note  saying  that  it  did  not  think  the 
convention  would  be  ratified,  because  of  the  opinion 
that  the  compensation  was  insufficient,  but  that,  if  the 
canal  company  would  pay  to  Colombia  $10,000,000, 
ratification  could  be  secured. 

On  July  9  General  Rafael  Reyes,  spokesman  of  the 
government,  requested  the  American  minister  at  Bo- 
gota to  say  to  Secretary  Hay,  as  the  minister  did  at 
once  by  cable,  that  he  (Reyes)  did  not  think  the  treaty 


120  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

could  be  ratified  without  two  amendments — one  stip- 
ulating the  payment  of  $10,000,000  gold  by  the  new 
Panama  Canal  company  for  the  right  to  transfer  its 
isthmus  property  to  the  United  States,  and  the  other 
increasing  the  bonus  which  the  United  States  was 
to  pay  to  Colombia  from  $10,000,000  to  $15,000,000. 
These  direct  attempts  to  extort  more  money  as  the 
price  of  ratification  were  unsuccessful.  Secretary  Hay 
replied,  on  July  13,  that  neither  of  the  proposed  amend- 
ments would  stand  any  chance  of  acceptance  by  the 
Senate,  while  any  amendment  whatever  or  unneces- 
sary delay  in  ratification  of  the  treaty  would  greatly 
imperil  its  consummation. 

Two  days  later,  July  15,  the  treaty  was  submitted 
to  a  special  committee  of  nine  in  the  Colombian  Senate. 
It  was  reported  to  the  Senate  on  August  4  with  a  series 
of  amendments  which  completely  changed  the  char- 
acter of  the  treaty.  On  July  31  Secretary  Hay  sent 
the  following  cable  message  to  the  American  minister 
at  Bogota: 

Instructions  heretofore  sent  to  you  show  the  great 
danger  of  amending  the  treaty.  This  government  has 
no  right  or  competence  to  covenant  with  Colombia  to 
impose  new  financial  obligations  upon  canal  company 
arid  the  President  would  not  submit  to  our  Senate  any 
amendment  in  that  sense,  but  would  treat  it  as  voiding 
the  negotiation  and  bringing  about  a  failure  to  conclude 
a  satisfactory  treaty  with  Colombia.  No  additional 
payment  by  the  United  States  can  hope  for  approval 
by  the  United  States  Senate,  while  any  amendment 
whatever  requiring  reconsideration  by  that  body  would 
most  certainly  imperil  its  consummation. 


AMERICAN  PURCHASE  AND  CONTROL    121 

The  substance  of  this  message  was  communicated  at 
once  to  the  Colombian  Government.  On  August  12 
the  Colombian  Senate  rejected  the  treaty  in  its  entirety 
by  unanimous  vote.  On  the  same  date  General  Reyes 
called  upon  the  American  minister  and  informed  him 
that  the  treaty  had  been  rejected  in  accordance  with 
a  plan  which  had  been  perfected  by  the  Colombian 
Government  and  leading  senators  in  the  belief  that 
there  would  be  a  reaction  in  public  sentiment  in  its 
favor,  when  it  would  be  possible  to  reconsider  and 
ratify  it  without  amendment.  He  requested  the  Amer- 
ican minister  to  ask  the  American  Government  to 
grant  two  more  weeks  for  the  consummation  of  this 
plan.  In  response  Secretary  Hay  cabled  on  August 
24:  "The  President  will  make  no  engagement  on  the 
canal  matter,  but  I  regard  it  as  improbable  that  any 
definite  action  will  be  taken  within  two  weeks."  On 
August  29,  Secretary  Hay  cabled  again  as  follows: 

The  President  is  bound,  by  the  Isthmian  Canal 
statute,  commonly  called  the  Spooner  law.  By  its  pro- 
visions he  is  given  a  reasonable  time  to  arrange  a  satis- 
factory treaty  with  Colombia.  When,  in  his  judgment, 
the  reasonable  time  has  expired,  and  he  has  not  been 
able  to  make  a  satisfactory  arrangement  as  to  the 
Panama  route,  he  will  then  proceed  to  carry  into 
effect  the  alternative  of  the  statute.  Meantime  the 
President  will  enter  into  no  engagement  restraining  his 
freedom  of  action  under  the  statute. 

On  September  5  the  Senate  special  committee  re- 
ported a  bill  approving  the  rejection  of  the  treaty  and 
authorizing  the  President  of  Colombia  to  conclude 


122  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

treaties  for  the  construction  of  a  Panama  canal  under 
certain  conditions,  and  on  terms  most  generous  to 
Colombia,  but  the  measure  never  came  to  a  vote.  It 
was  referred  to  a  committee  that  made  a  report  on 
October  14,  which  was  read  in  the  Senate  and  which 
presented,  without  approval  or  dissent,  a  contention 
that  the  last  extension  of  the  Wyse  concession,  granted 
by  Colombia  in  1900,  fixing  October  31,  1910,  as  the 
date  for  completion  of  the  canal,  was  not  valid,  and 
that  if  this  was  the  case,  the  previous  extension  would 
expire  at  the  end  of  1904  and  all  canal  properties, 
rights,  and  franchises  would  revert  to  Colombia. 
Colombia  would  then  be  in  positionj  to  receive  the 
$40,000,000  which  the  treaty  proposed  the  United 
States  should  pay  to  the  new  Panama  Canal  company, 
as  well  as  the  $10,000,000  bonus,  and  also  be  in  more 
advantageous  position  for  demanding  terms  from  the 
United  States.  This  plan  found  great  favor,  and  it 
was  even  contended  that  the  Colombia  Congress  had 
full  power  to  annul  the  extension  in  case  it  saw  fit  to  do 
so.  No  action  was  taken  on  the  report,  and  on  October 
31  the  Congress  adjourned,  with  the  air  of  Bogota 
alive  with  rumors  of  impending  revolution  at  Panama. 


CHAPTER 

THE  PANAMA  REVOLUTION 

THE  Colombian  Congress  had  scarcely  been  convened 
in  special  session,  on  June  20,  1903,  when  notice  was 
served  upon  the  Colombian  Government  that  if  the 
Hay-Herran  treaty  were  rejected  the  department  or 
state  of  Panama  would  revolt.  On  June  9  Secretary 
Hay  sent  a  cable  message  to  the  American  minister  at 
Bogota,  in  which  he  said,  in  reference  to  Colombian 
proposals  to  amend  the  treaty,  that  the  Colombian 
Government  "apparently  does  not  appreciate  the  grav- 
ity of  the  situation,"  that  the  treaty  embodied  the 
propositions  presented  by  Colombia  with  slight  modi- 
fications, and  that  if  Colombia  should  now  reject  it 
the  "friendly  understanding  between  the  two  coun- 
tries would  be  so  seriously  compromised  that  action 
might  be  taken  by  the  Congress  next  winter  which 
every  friend  of  Colombia  would  regret."  The  sub- 
stance of  this  message  was  communicated  at  once  to 
the  Colombian  Government.  On  July  5  the  American 
minister  sent  the  following  cable  message  to  Secretary 
Hay: 

Confidential.    Have  received  information  privately 
that  a  paraphrase  of  your  cipher  telegram  of  June  9 

123 


124  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

was  read  in  the  Senate  secret  session.  Created  sensa- 
tion. Construed  by  many  as  threat  of  direct  retalia- 
tion against  Colombia  in  case  the  treaty  is  not  ratified. 
This,  and  the  statement  of  just  arrived  members  of  Con- 
gress from  Panama  that  this  department  would  revolt  if 
the  treaty  is  not  ratified,  caused  alarm,  and  the  effect  is 
favorable. 

The  treaty  was  rejected  by  the  Senate  on  August  12, 
and  three  days  later  the  American  minister,  in  a  letter 
to  Secretary  Hay,  describing  the  situation,  wrote: 
"The  Panama  representatives  have  lately  become  so 
thoroughly  imbued  with  the  idea  of  an  independent 
republic  that  they  have  been  more  or  less  indifferent 
to  the  fate  of  the  treaty."  On  August  31,  the  Amer- 
ican minister  sent  a  cable  message  to  Secretary  Hay  in 
which  he  said  that  Senator  Jose  Domingo  de  Obaldia, 
who  had  been  appointed  governor  of  Panama,  had  in- 
formed him  that  in  accepting  the  position  he  had  told 
the  Colombian  President  that  "in  case  the  depart- 
ment found  it  necessary  to  revolt  to  secure  canal  he 
would  stand  by  Panama."  In  another  message,  on 
September  10,  the  American  minister  said:  "The  ap- 
pointment of  Obaldia  is  regarded  as  the  forerunner  of 
separation,"  and  in  a  letter  on  the  following  day  he 
wrote : 

Senator  Obaldia's  separatist  tendencies  are  well 
known,  and  he  is  reported  to  have  said  that,  should  the 
canal  treaty  not  pass,  the  department  of  Panama  would 
declare  its  independence,  and  would  be  right  in  doing 
so.  That  these  are  his  opinions  there  is,  of  course,  no 
doubt. 


AMERICAN  PURCHASE  AND  CONTROL    125 

Again,  on  October  21,  the  American  minister  wrote 
to  Secretary  Hay: 

I  have  the  honor  to  inform  you  that  there  is  no  dis- 
guising the  alarm  existing  as  to  the  possible  action  of 
the  government  of  the  United  States  should  the  feel- 
ing of  dissatisfaction  undoubtedly  existing  in  the  de- 
partment of  Panama  find  expression  in  overt  acts. 

The  Colombian  Congress  adjourned  on  October  31, 
and  on  the  same  day  the  American  minister  cabled  to 
Secretary  Hay:  "The  people  here  in  great  anxiety  over 
conflicting  reports  of  secession  movements  in  the 
Cauca  and  Panama." 

In  the  United  States  the  possibility  of  a  revolution 
in  Panama,  in  case  of  the  rejection  of  the  treaty,  was 
a  matter  of  public  knowledge  in  August,  1903.  To- 
ward the  end  of  that  month  the  newspapers  began  to 
publish  information  in  various  forms  from  the  isthmus 
and  Bogota  similar  to  that  quoted  above  from  the  files 
of  the  State  Department.  Toward  the  end  of  October 
it  was  announced  in  the  American  press  that  the  Co- 
lombian Government  had  already  begun  the  move- 
ment of  troops  to  the  isthmus.  On  October  15  the 
President  was  informed  by  Commander  John  Hub- 
bard,  of  the  navy,  that  a  revolution  had  broken  out  in 
the  department  of  Cauca,  and  on  the  following  day,  at 
the  request  of  Lieutenant-General  Young,  of  the  United 
States  army,  the  President  received  two  officers  of  the 
navy  who  had  just  returned  by  way  of  Panama  from 
a  four  months'  trip  in  Venezuela  and  Colombia.  They 
informed  him  that  a  revolutionary  party  was  organiz- 


126  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

ing  in  Panama  with  the  object  of  separation  from  Co- 
lombia, and  was  collecting  arms  and  ammunition,  and 
that  it  was  the  general  belief  on  the  isthmus  that  fail- 
ure on  the  part  of  Colombia  to  ratify  the  treaty  would 
lead  to  immediate  revolution. 

In  view  of  this  condition  of  affairs,  President  Roose- 
velt, acting  in  accordance  with  the  unbroken  policy  of 
the  government  since  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  of 
1846  with  New  Granada,  directed  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment to  issue  such  instructions  as  would  insure  having 
American  naval  vessels  within  easy  reach  of  the  isth- 
mus in  the  event  of  disorder  there.  Orders  were  issued 
on  October  19  for  one  ship,  the  Boston,  to  proceed  to 
San  Juan  del  Sur,  Nicaragua;  to  another,  the  Atlanta, 
to  proceed  to  Guantanamo,  Cuba;  and  to  a  third,  the 
Dixie,  to  prepare  to  sail  from  League  Island.  On 
October  30  a  fourth,  the  Nashville,  Commander  Hub- 
bard,  was  ordered  to  proceed  to  Colon.  On  Novem- 
ber 2,  when  it  was  evident  that  an  outbreak  was  im- 
minent, instructions  were  sent  to  the  Nashville,  Bos- 
ton, and  Dixie  as  follows: 

Maintain  free  and  uninterrupted  transit.  If  inter- 
ruption is  threatened  by  armed  force,  occupy  the  line 
of  railroad.  Prevent  landing  of  any  armed  force, 
either  government  or  insurgent,  at  any  point  within 
50  miles  of  Panama.  Government  force  reported  ap- 
proaching Isthmus  in  vessels.  Prevent  their  landing 
if,  in  your  judgment,  the  landing  would  precipitate  a 
conflict. 

Instructions  similar  to  these  had  been  issued  re- 
peatedly during  previous  disorders  of  various  kinds  on 


AMERICAN  PURCHASE  AND  CONTROL    127 

the  isthmus,  the  latest  instance  being  in  September, 
1902,  when,  as  in  1856,  1860,  1861,  1862,  1873,  1885, 
and  in  1901,  sailors  and  marines  from  United  States 
war-ships  were  landed  to  patrol  the  isthrnus  to  protect 
life  and  property  and  keep  transit  free  and  open.  In 
most  of  these  instances  the  troops  had  been  landed  at 
the  request  of  the  Colombian  Government. 

The  Nashville  arrived  at  Colon  at  5.30  p.  M.  on  No- 
vember 2.  At  daylight  on  the  following  morning  Com- 
mander Hubbard  learned  that  a  Colombian  gun-boat, 
Cartagena,  had  come  in  during  the  night  with  four 
hundred  or  five  hundred  troops  on  board.  He  had  her 
boarded  and  learned  that  the  troops  were  for  the  gar- 
rison at  Panama.  As  he  had  not  yet  received  instruc- 
tions, he  did  not  feel  justified  in  preventing  their  land- 
ing, and  they  were  disembarked  at  8.30  A.  M.  Their 
commanding  officers,  Generals  Amaya  and  Tovar, 
with  four  others,  took  the  train  to  Panama,  leaving 
Colonel  Torres  in  command.  At  10.30  Commander 
Hubbard  received  the  cable  message  with  the  instruc- 
tions cited  above,  and  at  once  went  ashore.  Late  in 
the  afternoon  he  learned  that  there  had  been  a  revolu- 
tion in  Panama;  that  Generals  Amaya  and  Tovar  and 
the  other  four  Colombian  officers  had  been  seized  and 
were  held  as  prisoners;  that  a  provisional  government 
had  been  established  and  a  military  force  of  one  thou- 
sand five  hundred  men  had  been  organized;  and  that 
the  provisional  government  wished  the  Colombian 
troops  at  Colon  to  be  sent  to  Panama. 

The  general  superintendent  of  the  Panama  Railroad 
had  agreed  to  transport  the  Colombian  troops,  but 


128  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

Commander  Hubbard,  on  the  morning  of  November 
4,  prohibited  the  transportation  of  troops  in  either 
direction  in  order  to  preserve  the  neutrality  of  the 
isthmus  and  free  and  uninterrupted  transit.  During 
the  forenoon  of  November  4  Commander  Hubbard 
was  informed  that  Colonel  Torres  had  sent  word  to 
the  United  States  consul  at  Colon  that  if  Generals 
Amaya  and  Tovar  and  the  other  Colombian  officers 
who  had  been  seized  at  Panama  were  not  released  by 
2  P.  M.  he,  Torres,  would  open  fire  on  the  town  of  Colon 
and  kill  every  United  States  citizen  in  the  place.  Com- 
mander Hubbard  had  all  the  American  citizens  of 
Colon  assembled  in  the  stone  building  of  the  Panama 
Railroad,  quickly  fortified  it  as  much  as  possible,  and 
at  1.30  P.  M.  landed  forty-two  men  from  the  Nashville 
to  protect  the  building,  with  orders  not  to  fire  unless 
fired  upon.  The  American  women  and  children  were 
placed  aboard  a  Panama  Railroad  steamer  and  a  Ger- 
man steamer  which  were  lying  at  the  wharf. 

The  Colombians  surrounded  the  railroad  building 
soon  after  the  Americans  had  taken  possession  of  it, 
and  tried  to  provoke  attack  from  the  American  troops, 
but  the  latter  were  cool  and  steady  and  the  effort 
failed. 

At  about  3.15  P.  M.  Colonel  Torres  entered  the  build- 
ing for  an  interview,  declaring  that  the  whole  affair 
was  a  misapprehension,  that  he  was  most  friendly  to 
Americans,  and  saying  that  he  should  like  to  send  the 
alcalde  of  Colon  to  Panama  to  see  General  Tovar  and 
have  him  direct  a  discontinuance  of  a  show  of  force. 
This  request  was  granted  and  a  special  train  over  the 


AMERICAN  PURCHASE  AND  CONTROL    129 

Panama  Railroad  was  supplied  by  the  general  super- 
intendent for  the  alcalde's  journey.  At  about  5.30 
Colonel  Torres  stated  to  Commander  Hubbard  that 
he  would  withdraw  his  Colombian  troops  to  Monkey 
Hill,  about  two  miles  outside  of  Colon,  on  condition 
that  the  American  troops  should  be  withdrawn  to  the 
Nashville.  This  proposition  was  accepted  and  faith- 
fully complied  with  by  Commander  Hubbard.  On  the 
morning  of  November  5  Commander  Hubbard  dis- 
covered that  Colonel  Torres  had  not  withdrawn  his 
troops  to  Monkey  Hill,  but  only  to  some  buildings  near 
the  outskirts  of  the  town,  giving  a  trivial  excuse  for 
failure  to  keep  his  word.  Learning  that  it  was. the 
purpose  of  Colonel  Torres,  in  case  he  did  not  receive 
orders  from  General  Tovar  to  withdraw,  to  bring  in 
his  troops  and  occupy  Colon,  Commander  Hubbard 
again  landed  an  armed  force,  reoccupied  the  railroad 
building,  brought  ashore  two  one-pounder  guns,  and 
mounted  them  in  position  of  defence  near  the  build- 
ing. In  company  with  the  United  States  consul  he 
then  sought  and  obtained  an  interview  with  Colonel 
Torres,  in  which  he  told  him  that  he  had  relanded  his 
troops  because  of  his,  Torres's,  failure  to  keep  his  agree- 
ment; that  his  sole  purpose  in  landing  them  was  to 
preserve  the  lives  and  property  of  American  citizens; 
that  his  attitude  was  one  of  strict  neutrality;  that  the 
troops  of  neither  side  should  be  transported;  and  that 
free  and  uninterrupted  transit  should  be  maintained,  if 
necessary  by  force. 

He  tried  to  induce  Colonel  Torres  to  withdraw  to 
Monkey  Hill,  but  the  latter  replied  that  it  was  un- 


130  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

healthy  out  there.  Later  in  the  forenoon  of  Novem- 
ber 5  the  alcalde  returned  from  Panama  without  or- 
ders, and  Colonel  Torres  marched  his  Colombian  troops 
again  into  Colon,  but  they  made  no  threatening  dem- 
onstrations. During  the  afternoon  representatives  of 
the  new  Panama  Government  succeeded  in  persuading 
Colonel  Torres  to  embark  with  his  troops  on  a  Royal 
Mail  steamer,  Orinoco,  and  sail  to  Cartagena.  The 
gun-boat  Cartagena,  on  which  he  had  come  to  Colon, 
had  left  port  immediately  after  the  threat  against 
Americans  had  been  made,  on  November  4. 

In  the  meantime,  while  the  American  naval  officer 
was  preventing  bloodshed  at  Colon,  the  new  Panama 
Republic  was  becoming  established  on  the  other  side 
of  the  isthmus.  As  early  as  August,  1903,  a  junta  of 
six  men  had  been  named  by  advocates  of  separation  in 
Panama  to  take  the  leadership  in  plans  for  securing 
independence.  It  had  been  decided  first  to  have  the 
revolution  on  September  22,  the  date  set  for  the  ad- 
journment of  the  Colombian  Congress.  When  adjourn- 
ment was  delayed  till  October  31,  preparations  were 
made  to  have  the  revolution  take  place  on  November  4. 
The  arrival  of  the  Colombian  troops  at  Colon  on  No- 
vember 3  forced  the  event  forward  twenty-four  hours. 

The  Colombian  generals  arrived  in  Panama  about 
11  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  November  4  and  were 
received  with  courtesy  by  the  authorities  and  the  popu- 
lace. Later,  when  they  had  got  wind  of  the  impending 
revolution,  they  started  for  the  government  barracks 
on  the  sea-wall  to  call  out  the  troops  and  signal  to  three 
Colombian  gun-boats  that  were  lying  in  the  bay,  in 


AMERICAN  PURCHASE  AND  CONTROL    131 

the  hope  of  frustrating  the  plans  of  the  revolutionists. 
On  their  arrival  they  were  met  by  General  Esteban 
Huertas,  in  command  of  the  garrison,  who  was  in  league 
with  the  revolutionists,  who  ordered  out  a  company  of 
soldiers  and  arrested  them  as  prisoners  of  war.  Gov- 
ernor Obaldia,  the  Colombian  head  of  the  department 
of  Panama,  was  also  arrested,  as  a  mere  formal  act  of 
deposition,  but  was  released  immediately.  The  three 
Colombian  gun-boats  were  informed  by  signal  that  the 
revolution  had  been  effected,  it  being  supposed  that 
they  would  acquiesce  in  it.  Two  of  them  did,  but  the 
commanding  officer  of  the  third  sent  official  word  to 
the  chief  of  police  that  unless  the  imprisoned  Colombian 
officers  were  set  at  liberty  within  two  hours  he  would 
shell  the  city.  At  the  expiration  of  that  time  he  fired 
two  shells,  one  of  which  killed  a  Chinaman  on  the 
street  near  the  barracks,  but  when  fire  was  opened  upon 
the  vessel  from  the  fortifications  she  steamed  away, 
never  to  return. 

On  the  following  morning  the  two  remaining  gun- 
boats ran  up  the  flag  of  the  new  Panama  Republic. 
With  the  exception  of  the  Chinaman's  death  the  revo- 
lution was  bloodless. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  REPUBLIC  OF  PANAMA 

THE  formal  declaration  of  independence  was  made  on 
November  4.  The  municipal  council  of  the  city  of 
Panama  met  and  after  a  free  discussion  voted  unani- 
mously in  favor  of  separation  from  Colombia  and  the 
creation  of  the  free  and  independent  Republic  of  Pan- 
ama. Pending  the  formation  of  the  new  republic,  the 
direction  of  affairs  was  placed  in  the  hands  of  three 
men,  who  later,  with  eleven  others,  constituted  the 
Committee  of  Provisional  Government.  At  3  P.  M.  on 
the  same  day  a  formal  declaration  of  independence  was 
read  at  a  mass-meeting  in  Cathedral  Plaza. 

Generals  Amaya  and  Tovar,  with  their  associates, 
were  released  on  November  5,  on  pledge  of  leaving  the 
isthmus  as  soon  as  possible.  They  were  given  a  mili- 
tary escort  to  Colon,  but  arrived  there  too  late  to  sail 
with  Colonel  Torres  and  the  Colombian  troops  on 
board  the  Royal  Mail  steamer  Orinoco,  but  they  took 
passage  for  Cartagena  on  November  12. 

The  Dixie,  with  a  force  of  about  four  hundred  men, 
entered  the  harbor  of  Colon  at  7  P.  M.  in  the  evening 
of  November  5,  just  as  the  Orinoco  was  sailing  away. 
On  the  following  morning  the  Atlanta  arrived,  bringing 
the  combined  American  force  at  Colon  up  to  about 

132 


AMERICAN  PURCHASE  AND  CONTROL    133 

one  thousand  men.  The  Maine  arrived  a  few  days 
later.  The  Boston  arrived  at  Panama  on  November  7, 
and  was  joined  there  later  by  three  other  naval  vessels. 

On  November  7  the  American  minister  at  Bogota 
sent  a  cable  message  to  Secretary  Hay,  saying  that 
General  Reyes  was  about  to  start  for  Panama  with  full 
powers,  and  wished  to  be  informed  by  the  Secretary 
before  starting  if  the  American  commander  at  Panama 
would  be  ordered  to  co-operate  with  him  and  with  the 
new  Panama  Government  to  arrange  peace  and  ap- 
proval of  the  treaty,  which  would  be  accepted  on  con- 
dition that  the  integrity  of  Colombia  be  preserved. 
On  the  same  day  the  Colombian  Government  asked  to 
be  informed  through  the  American  minister  whether 
it  would  be  allowed  to  land  troops  at  Colon  and  Pan- 
ama to  fight  there  and  along  the  line  of  the  railway. 

These  messages  were  received  at  Washington  on 
November  10,  and  on  the  following  day  Secretary  Hay 
replied  that  it  "is  not  thought  desirable  to  permit 
landing  of  Colombian  troops  on  Isthmus,  as  such  a 
course  would  precipitate  civil  war  and  disturb  for  an 
indefinite  period  the  free  transit  which  we  are  pledged 
to  protect." 

The  Republic  of  Panama  was  formally  recognized  by 
the  United  States  on  November  6  in  the  following 
message  from  Secretary  Hay  to  the  consulate-general 
at  Panama: 

The  people  of  Panama  having  by  an  apparently 
unanimous  movement  dissolved  their  political  connec- 
tion with  the  Republic  of  Colombia  and  resumed  their 
independence,  and  having  adopted  a  government  of 


134  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

their  own,  republican  in  form,  with  which  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  of  America  has  entered  into 
relations,  the  President  of  the  United  States,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  ties  of  friendship  which  have  so  long  and 
so  happily  existed  between  the  respective  nations,  most 
earnestly  commends  to  the  governments  of  Colombia 
and  of  Panama  the  peaceful  and  equitable  settlement 
of  all  questions  at  issue  between  them.  He  holds  that 
he  is  bound,  not  merely  by  treaty  obligations,  but  by 
the  interests  of  civilisation,  to  see  that  the  peaceable 
traffic  of  the  world  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  shall 
not  longer  be  disturbed  by  a  constant  succession  of  un- 
necessary and  wasteful  wars. 

The  same  message  was  sent  to  the  American  minister 
at  Bogota  on  November  6.  Within  a  few  weeks  all  the 
so-called  "great  powers"  of  the  earth,  following  the 
lead  of  the  United  States,  formally  recognized  the  in- 
dependence of  the  Republic  of  Panama,  and  by  the  1st 
of  March  following  practically  all  the  governments  of 
the  world  except  Colombia  had  recognized  it. 

The  news  of  the  revolution  had  scarcely  reached 
Colombia  before  its  government  began  to  confess  judg- 
ment on  its  conduct  toward  the  Hay-Herran  treaty. 
On  November  6  the  American  minister  at  Bogota  sent 
a  cable  message  to  Secretary  Hay  containing  an  offer 
from  General  Reyes  to  reassemble  the  Colombian  Con- 
gress and  ratify  the  treaty  as  signed,  or  to  approve  it 
by  government  decree,  provided  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment would  uphold  Colombia  in  declaring  martial 
law  and  suppressing  the  revolution  on  the  isthmus. 
In  commenting  upon  this  proposal,  President  Roose- 
velt, in  his  special  message  to  Congress  on  January  4, 


AMERICAN  PURCHASE  AND  CONTROL    135 

1904;  containing  a  statement  of  his  action  in  recog- 
nizing the  Republic  of  Panama,  said: 

I  pass  by  the  question  as  to  what  assurance  we  have 
that  they  [the  Colombians]  would  now  keep  their 
pledge  and  not  again  refuse  to  ratify  the  treaty,  if 
they  had  the  power;  for,  of  course,  I  will  not  for  one 
moment  discuss  the  possibility  of  the  United  States 
committing  an  act  of  such  baseness  as  to  abandon  the 
new  Republic  of  Panama. 

Both  President  Roosevelt  and  Secretary  Hay  made 
formal  and  unequivocal  denial  of  the  charge  that  was 
made  in  the  press  of  collusion  between  the  United 
States  Government  and  the  Panama  revolutionists. 
The  President,  in  the  message  quoted  above,  said: 

I  hesitate  to  refer  to  the  injurious  insinuations  which 
have  been  made  of  complicity  of  this  government  in 
the  revolutionary  movement  in  Panama.  They  are 
as  destitute  of  foundation  as  of  propriety.  The  only 
excuse  for  my  mentioning  them  is  the  fear  lest  unthink- 
ing persons  might  mistake  for  acquiescence  the  silence 
of  mere  self-respect.  I  think  proper  to  say,  therefore, 
that  no  one  connected  with  this  Government  had  any 
part  in  preparing,  inciting,  or  encouraging  the  late 
revolution  on  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  and  that  save 
from  the  reports  of  our  military  and  naval  officers,  no 
one  connected  with  this  Government  had  any  previous 
knowledge  of  the  revolution  except  such  as  was  acces- 
sible to  any  person  of  ordinary  intelligence  who  read 
the  newspapers  and  kept  up  a  current  acquaintance 
with  public  affairs. 

Secretary  Hay,  in  a  letter  to  General  Reyes,  under 
date  of  January  5,  1904,  said: 


136  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

Any  charge  that  this  government  or  any  responsible 
member  of  it  held  intercourse,  whether  official  or  un- 
official, with  agents  of  revolution  in  Colombia  is  utterly 
without  justification.  Equally  so  is  the  insinuation 
that  any  action  of  this  government  prior  to  the  revolu- 
tion in  Panama  was  the  result  of  complicity  with  the 
plans  of  the  revolutionists.  The  department  sees  fit 
to  make  these  denials,  and  makes  them  finally. 

In  a  private  letter  to  James  F.  Rhodes,  the  historian, 
written  under  date  of  December  8,  1903,  Secretary 
Hay  said :  * 

It  is  hard  for  me  to  understand  how  anyone  can  criti- 
cize our  action  in  Panama  on  the  grounds  upon  which 
it  is  ordinarily  attacked.  The  matter  came  on  us  with 
amazing  celerity.  We  had  to  decide  on  the  instant 
whether  we  would  take  possession  of  the  ends  of  the 
railroad  and  keep  the  traffic  clear,  or  whether  we  would 
stand  back  and  let  those  gentlemen  cut  each  other's 
throats  for  an  indefinite  time,  and  destroy  whatever 
remnant  of  our  property  and  interests  we  had  there. 
I  had  no  hesitation  as  to  the  proper  course  to  take,  and 
have  had  no  doubt  of  the  propriety  of  it  since. 

In  the  light  of  all  the  facts  in  the  case  which  have 
been  disclosed  since  the  revolution,  a  brief  outline  of 
which  has  been  given  in  this  and  preceding  chapters, 
these  denials  seem  unnecessary.  The  government  at 
Washington  would  have  been  blind  and  deaf  had  it» 
not  perceived  what  was  planning  on  the  isthmus,  and 
a  government  that  was  aware  of  what  was  going  on 
there  and  yet  did  not  take  all  necessary  precautions  to 

*  By  kind  permission  of  Mr.  Rhodes. 


AMERICAN  PURCHASE  AND  CONTROL    137 

preserve  order,  prevent  bloodshed,  and  fulfil  its  treaty 
obligations  would  have  been  unfaithful  to  its  duty. 
What  Colombia  was  doing  in  regard  to  the  treaty  was 
disclosed  by  the  course  of  its  representatives  and  the 
demands  of  its  authorized  agents — it  was  "holding  up" 
the  United  States  for  more  money.  This  was  admitted 
by  the  final  proposal  of  General  Reyes  which  was  fitly 
characterized  by  President  Roosevelt  as  too  base  for 
discussion. 

One  of  the  first  acts  of  the  provisional  government 
of  the  Republic  of  Panama  was  to  appoint,  on  Novem- 
ber 6,  1903,  Philippe  Bunau-Varilla  envoy  extraor- 
dinary and  minister  plenipotentiary  to  the  United 
States,  with  full  powers  to  conduct  diplomatic  and 
financial  negotiations.  Bunau-Varilla  was  in  Wash- 
ington at  the  time,  and  on  November  13  he  was  re- 
ceived formally  by  President  Roosevelt  at  the  White 
House.  On  the  following  day  the  Secretary  of  State 
sent  a  cable  message  to  all  the  diplomatic  representa- 
tives of  the  United  States  in  foreign  countries  as  follows: 

The  President  yesterday  fully  recognized  the  Re- 
public of  Panama  and  formally  received  its  Minister 
Plenipotentiary.  You  will  promptly  communicate  this 
to  the  government  to  which  you  are  accredited. 

The  negotiation  of  a  treaty  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Republic  of  Panama  was  begun  at  once 
by  Secretary  Hay  and  Bunau-Varilla,  and  was  com- 
pleted and  signed  by  them  at  Washington  on  Novem- 
ber 18,  1903.  It  was  ratified  by  Panama  on  Decem- 
ber 2,  was  sent  to  the  Senate  on  December  7,  and 


138  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

ratified  by  that  body  on  February  23,  1904.  It  was 
approved  by  the  President  on  February  25  and  pro- 
claimed on  February  26.*  Under  its  provisions  the 
United  States  guarantees  and  will  maintain  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  Republic  of  Panama.  In  return  for 
the  payment  of  $10,000,000  made  on  the  date  of  the 
exchange  of  ratifications,  and  for  an  annual  payment 
of  $250,000  beginning  nine  years  after  that  date,  the 
Republic  of  Panama  grants  in  perpetuity  to  the  United 
States  a  strip  of  territory  ten  miles  wide  and  extending 
three  marine  miles  into  the  sea  at  either  terminal,  for 
use, '  occupation,  and  control,  together  with  all  lands 
lying  outside  this  zone  which  are  necessary  for  the  con- 
struction of  the  canal  or  for  its  auxiliaries,  and  the 
islands  of  Perico,  Naos,  Culebra,  and  Flamerico  in  the 
Bay  of  Panama.  The  cities  of  Colon  and  Panama  are 
not  embraced  in  the  zone,  but  the  United  States  as- 
sumes their  sanitation  and,  in  case  of  need,  the  main- 
tenance of  public  order  therein.  Within  the  zone  the 
United  States  has  all  the  rights,  power,  and  authority 
which  it  would  possess  and  exercise  were  it  the  sov- 
ereign of  the  territory,  to  the  entire  exclusion  of  the 
exercise  of  sovereign  rights  by  the  Republic  of  Panama. 
All  railway  and  property  rights  possessed  by  Panama 
pass  to  the  United  States.  The  right  is  granted  to  the 
United  States  to  use  its  police  and  military  forces  and 
to  build  fortifications  at  its  discretion  and  at  all  times 
for  the  protection  of  the  canal.  In  many  of  its  details 

*  See  First  Annual  Report  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission,  1904, 
for  full  text  of  the  treaty,  of  the  Spooner  Act,  and  other  documents 
bearing  on  the  subject. 


AMERICAN  PURCHASE  AND  CONTROL    139 

the  treaty  follows  the  stipulations  of  the  Hay-Herran 
treaty,  but  it  differs  from  that  in  granting  to  the  United 
States  absolute  sovereignty  in  the  Canal  Zone,  a  power 
that  has  been  of  incalculable  advantage  in  constructing 
the  canal. 

Delegates  to  a  national  constitutional  convention 
were  elected  in  the  Republic  of  Panama  on  December 
28,  1903,  and  the  convention  assembled  in  the  city  of 
Panama  on  January  15,  1904.  It  was  composed  of 
thirty-two  deputies  anol  the  members  of  the  provisional 
government.  A  constitution  was  completed  and  signed 
on  February  13  and  proclaimed  and  put  in  force  on 
February  15.  After  finishing  its  task  the  convention 
resolved  itself  into  a  national  assembly  and  elected 
Doctor  Manuel  Amador  Guerrero  President  of  the 
republic  and  Pablo  Arosemena,  Jose  Domingo  de 
Obaldia,  and  Carlos  Mendoza  first,  second,  and  third 
Designates  or  Vice-Presidents.  Doctor  Amadpr  Guer- 
rero was  inaugurated  President  on  February  20. 


PART  IV 

PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION 

1904-1915 


PART  IV 

PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION 

1904-1915 

CHAPTER  I 
BEGINNINGS  OF  AMERICAN  RULE  AND  WORK 

THE  most  formidable  obstacle  that  confronted  the 
United  States  Government  as  it  entered  upon  the  task 
of  canal  construction  was  the  evil  reputation  of  the 
isthmus  as  a  place  of  disease  and  death.  The  heavy 
mortality  among  the  laborers  during  the  construction 
of  the  Panama  Railroad  and  later  during  the  operations 
of  the  French  canal  company  had  given  the  isthmus  a 
world-wide  fame  as  the  permanent  abode  of  yellow 
fever,  the  worst  forms  of  malaria,  and  all  tropical  dis- 
eases— a  veritable  pest-hole  of  the  earth,  into  which 
no  dweller  of  the  temperate  zone  could  enter  without 
peril  to  his  health  and  life.  In  order  to  construct  the 
canal,  it  was  necessary  to  collect  a  working  force,  and 
it  was  impossible  to  collect  and  maintain  an  efficient 
force  unless  the  isthmus  was  first  made  a  place  in  which 
men  could  live  with  reasonable  assurance  of  safety. 

President  Roosevelt  realized  at  the  outset  that  thor- 
ough sanitation  must  precede  and  accompany  actual 

143 


144  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

construction.  Following  closely  upon  the  ratification 
of  the  treaty  with  Panama  he  had  selected,  on  Febru- 
ary 29,  1904,  an  Isthmian  Canal  Commission*  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  specifications  of  the  Spooner  Act 
which  authorized  him  to  nominate,  subject  to  approval 
by  the  Senate,  a  body  of  seven  men,  "at  least  four  of 
whom  shall  be  persons  learned  and  skilled  in  the  science 
of  engineering,  and  of  the  four  at  least  one  shall  be  an 
officer  of  the  United  States  Army,  and  at  least  one 
other  shall  be  an  officer  of  the  United  States  Navy,  the 
said  officers  respectively  being  either  upon  the  active 
or  retired  list  of  the  Army  or  of  the  Navy."  The  mem- 
bers of  the  commission  were  to  serve  until  the  com- 
pletion of  the  canal  unless  sooner  removed  by  the 
President,  were  to  receive  such  compensation  as  he 
should  prescribe  until  otherwise  fixed  by  Congress,  and 
should  "in  all  matters  be  subject  to  the  direction  and 
control  of  the  President." 

The  commission  was  confirmed  by  the  Senate  on 
March  3,  and  its  members  organized  immediately, 
with  Rear-Admiral  John  G.  Walker  as  chairman,  fixing 
its  headquarters  in  Washington.  On  March  8,  the 
commission  called  in  a  body  upon  the  President,  and 
in  a  formal  address  of  instructions  to  them,  he  said: 
"There  is  one  matter  to  which  I  wish  to  ask  your  special 
attention — the  question  of  sanitation  and  hygiene. 
You  will  take  measures  to  secure  the  best  medical  ex- 
perts for  this  purpose  whom  you  can  get."  Again,  on 
May  9,  in  a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  placing  him 
in  charge  of  canal  matters,  he  wrote: 

*  Appendix  A. 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  145 

It  is  a  matter  of  first  importance  that  the  most  ap- 
proved and  effective  methods  and  measures  known  to 
sanitary  science  be  adopted  in  order  that  the  health 
conditions  on  the  Isthmus  may  be  improved.  It  is 
the  belief  of  those  who  have  noted  the  successful  re- 
sults secured  by  our  army  in  Cuba  in  the  obliteration 
of  yellow-fever  in  that  island  that  it  is  entirely  feasible 
to  banish  the  diseases  that  have  heretofore  caused 
most  mortality  on  the  isthmus,  or  at  least  to  improve 
as  greatly  the  health  conditions  there  as  in  Cuba  and 
Porto  Rico.  I  desire  that  every  possible  effort  be  made 
to  protect  our  officers  and  workmen  from  the  dangers 
of  tropical  and  other  diseases,  which  in  the  past  have 
been  so  prevalent  and  destructive  in  Panama. 

Before  the  work  of  sanitation  could  be  begun  a 
form  of  government  must  be  devised  and  established 
in  the  Canal  Zone.  The  treaty  between  the  United 
States  and  Panama  had  provided  for  the  payment  of 
forty  million  dollars  to  the  French  canal  company  for 
all  its  rights,  privileges,  property,  etc.,  on  the  isthmus, 
and  ten  million  dollars  to  the  Republic  of  Panama  for 
Canal  Zone  and  other  territory.  An  Act  of  Congress, 
approved  on  April  28,  1904,  appropriated  the  fifty 
million  dollars  necessary  for  these  two  purchases,  and 
authorized  the  President,  on  the  acquisition  of  the 
canal  properties,  to  take  possession  of  and  occupy  on 
behalf  of  the  United  States  the  Canal  Zone;  and  until 
the  expiration  of  the  Fifty-eighth  Congress,  unless  pro- 
vision for  the  temporary  government  of  the  Canal  Zone 
were  sooner  made  by  Congress,  all  the  military,  civil, 
and  judicial  powers,  as  well  as  the  power  to  make  all 
rules  and  regulations  necessary  for  the  government  of 


146  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

the  Canal  Zone,  and  all  the  rights,  powers,  and  au- 
thority granted  by  the  terms  of  the  treaty  with  Pan- 
ama were  vested  in  such  person  or  persons,  and  were 
to  be  exercised  in  such  manner  as  the  President  should 
direct. 

Under  the  authority  thus  conferred,  President  Roose- 
velt, on  May  9,  issued  an  executive  order,  placing  the 
work  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission,  both  in  the 
construction  of  the  canal  and  in  the  exercise  of  govern- 
mental powers  in  the  Canal  Zone,  under  the  super- 
vision and  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  who  at 
the  time  was  William  H.  Taft.  In  the  same  executive 
order  the  commission  was  given  power  to  legislate, 
and  Major-General  George  W.  Davis,  U.  S.  A.,  member 
of  the  commission,  was  appointed  governor  of  the 
Canal  Zone.  Governor  Davis  entered  upon  his  duties 
on  May  17,  and  also  assumed,  temporarily,  charge  of 
canal  properties  and  engineering  work. 

The  purchase  of  canal  properties  was  completed  on 
April  23  by  the  payment  of  forty  million  dollars  to  the 
French  company,  and  on  May  4,  at  7.30  A.  M.,  at  the 
French  administration  building  in  the  city  of  Panama, 
formal  transfer  of  them  was  made  to  Lieutenant  Mark 
Brooke,  U.  S.  A.,  who  had  been  authorized  by  the  United 
States  Government  to  receive  them  in  its  name.  On 
May  7,  the  French  company  transferred  68,887  of  the 
70,000  shares  of  the  Panama  Railroad  Company  to  the 
authorized  agent  of  the  United  States  Government. 

The  commission  sailed  from  New  York  on  March  29 
for  its  first  visit  to  the  isthmus,  arriving  on  April  5, 
and  remaining  till  April  20.  In  compliance  with  the 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  147 

President's  suggestion,  the  commission  was  accom- 
panied by  Colonel  William  C.  Gorgas,  Medical  Corps, 
U.S.  A. ;  Doctor  John  W.  Ross,  Medical  Director, 
U.  S.  N.;  Captain  C.  E.  Gillette,  Corps  of  Engi- 
neers, U.  S.  A.,  and  Major  Louis  La  Garde,  Medical 
Corps,  U.  S.  A.,  as  experts  on  sanitation,  detailed  by 
their  respective  departments  of  the  government  to  ex- 
amine health  conditions  on  the  isthmus  and  report  a 
plan  of  sanitation.  They  returned  to  Washington, 
after  a  thorough  investigation,  and  reported  a  plan  for 
the  sanitation  of  the  Canal  Zone  and  the  cities  of 
Panama  and  Colon.  This  plan  was  adopted  by  the 
commission,  and  on  June  2, 1904,  Colonel  W.  C.  Gorgas 
was  appointed  chief  sanitary  officer  under  it,  and  was 
authorized  to  proceed  with  its  execution. 

In  the  meantime  General  Davis  had  taken  the  first 
steps  toward  the  establishment  of  a  civil  government 
in  the  Canal  Zone.  His  first  official  act  had  been 
the  issuing,  on  May  19,  1904,  of  a  proclamation  an- 
nouncing to  the  people  of  the  Canal  Zone  that  he  had 
assumed  government  of  their  territory  by  order  of  the 
President  of  the  United  States.  On  June  16  an  agree- 
ment was  signed  by  him  and  by  the  officials  of  the 
Panama  Government,  which  contained  a  provisional 
delimitation  of  the  zone  as  described  in  the  canal  treaty. 

Colonel  Gorgas  arrived  on  June  28,  and  on  June  30, 
General  Davis,  as  governor  of  the  Canal  Zone,  issued 
an  order  announcing  the  organization  of  the  Sanitary 
Department,  with  ColoneJ  Gorgas  at  its  head.  On  Sep- 
tember 2  there  was  created  a  Department  of  Public 
Health,  with  jurisdiction  over  the  cities  of  Panama  and 


148  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

Colon  as  well  as  the  Canal  Zone.  It  was  composed  of 
the  chief  sanitary  officer,  chairman;  the  director  of 
hospitals,  Doctor  John  W.  Ross;  the  chief  quarantine 
officer,  Doctor  H.  R.  Carter,  of  the  United  States 
Health  and  Marine  Hospital  Service;  and  the  chief 
sanitary  inspector  of  the  Canal  Zone,  Joseph  Le 
Prince.  It  was  under  the  authority  of,  and  reported  to, 
the  governor  of  the  Canal  Zone. 

During  1904  Governor  Davis,  acting  in  connection 
with  the  commission  as  a  legislative  body,  and  under 
the  advice  of  Charles  E.  Magoon,  its  general  counsel, 
and  in  accordance  with  executive  orders  of  the  Presi- 
dent, established  a  zone  government,  with  a  governor, 
executive  secretary,  treasurer,  and  auditor;  a  judicial 
department  consisting  of  a  supreme  court,  three  circuit 
courts,  and  five  municipal  courts;  departments  of  pub- 
lic health,  revenues,  police,  and  prisons;  a  postal  serv- 
ice; and  a  bureau  of  education  with  a  school  system; 
and  enacted  a  penal  code,  a  code  of  criminal  procedure, 
and  laws  suppressing  lotteries  and  prohibiting  gambling. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE    TAFT  MODUS   VIVENDI  WITH  THE  REPUBLIC  OF 

PANAMA 

MOST  of  the  legislation  and  other  governmental  acts  of 
the  commission  and  Governor  Davis;  outlined  in  the 
preceding  chapter,  proved  to  be  satisfactory  in  prac- 
tice. There  were  several  matters,  however,  concerning 
which  there  was  much  dissatisfaction  among  the  Pan- 
amanians. One  of  these  was  the  tariff  regulations,  and 
another  was  the  postal  service.  An  executive  order 
was  issued  on  June  24,  putting  into  force  on  the  isth- 
mus the  Dingley  tariff  act,  the  effect  of  which  was  to 
make  the  Canal  Zone  for  tariff  purposes  a  part  of  the 
United  States,  and  to  exclude  it  from  the  Republic  of 
Panama  by  a  tariff  wall.  There  was  such  vigorous 
protest  to  this  order  that  Governor  Davis  postponed 
the  execution  till  November  19,  and  for  reasons  which 
will  be  mentioned  later  it  was  never  enforced. 

A  postal  service  had  been  established  by  executive 
order  on  June  24,  with  nine  post-offices  and  with  Pan- 
ama Railroad  station-agents  as  postmasters.  Panama 
postage-stamps  (which  were  Colombian  stamps  sur- 
charged "Panama")  having  the  words  "Canal  Zone" 
overprinted  with  a  rubber  stamp  were  used,  and  the 

149 


150  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

rate  was  two  cents.  As  the  Panama  postage  rate  for 
United  States  mail  was  five  cents — the  rate  of  the  Uni- 
versal Postal  Union — the  establishment  of  a  two-cent 
rate  in  the  Canal  Zone  completely  destroyed  the  postal 
revenue  of  the  Panamanian  Government  from  United 
States  mail.  All  persons  wishing  to  send  a  letter  from 
the  Panama  Republic  to  the  United  States  had  only  to 
step  across  the  zone  line,  buy  zone  stamps,  and  send  it 
for  two  cents  instead  of  five. 

Furthermore,  when  the  Republic  of  Panama  was  es- 
tablished, its  only  currency  was  depreciated  Colom- 
bian silver.  In  the  days  of  the  French  canal  com- 
panies the  fluctuations  in  the  price  of  this  currency  had 
led  to  much  gambling  in  exchange,  great  confusion, 
and  heavy  loss  to  the  working  force.  A  Panama  cur- 
rency of  some  kind  was  imperatively  demanded. 

To  settle  these  and  some  other  minor  matters  in  dis- 
pute Secretary  Taft,  at  the  request  of  President  Roose- 
velt, went  to  the  isthmus  in  November,  1904,  arriving 
there  on  the  27th  and  remaining  till  December  7.  He 
was  accompanied  by  the  chairman  of  the  Isthmian 
Canal  Commission,  Admiral  Walker;  its^ general  counsel, 
Charles  E.  Magoon;  and  Jose  Domingo  de  Obaldia,  who 
was  then  envoy  extraordinary  and  minister  pleni- 
potentiary of  the  Republic  of  Panama  at  Washington. 

President  Taft  entered  at  once  upon  a  series  of  nego- 
tiations with  the  Panamanian  Government,  which  re- 
sulted in  an  executive  order,  or  modus  vivendi*  which 
was  issued  by  the  Secretary  in  the  President's  name 
on  December  3.  By  the  terms  of  this  order  there 

*  First  Annual  Report  of  Isthmian  Canal  Commission,  1904. 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  151 

was  to  be  free  trade  between  the  Canal  Zone  and  the 
Republic  of  Panama,  and  all  importations  of  merchan- 
dise to  the  isthmus,  except  those  which  the  treaty  of 
Panama  stipulated  should  be  admitted  free  of  duty 
for  the  United  States  Government  or  its  employes, 
must  be  entered  through  Panama  ports  and  pay  Pan- 
ama duties,  providing  existing  duties  of  fifteen  per 
cent  ad  valorem  were  reduced  to  ten  per  cent.  The 
United  States  retained  terminal  ports  at  Ancon  and 
Cristobal  for  clearing  and  entering  by  foreign  vessels. 

In  regard  to  postage,  Panama  conceded  the  two-cent 
rate  in  return  for  an  agreement  that  the  United  States 
Government  should  purchase  its  stamps  from  the 
Panama  Government  for  forty  per  cent  of  their  face 
value,  surcharging  them  with  the  words  "Canal  Zone," 
the  remaining  sixty  per  cent  to  be  retained  by  the 
zone  government  to  defray  its  own  postal  expenses. 
This  proved  to  be  a  valuable  concession  to  Panama, 
for  down  to  the  close  of  1912  there  had  been  paid  to 
that  republic,  as  its  share  of  zone  postal  revenues, 
about  $280,000,  an  average  of  $35,000  a  year  for  eight 
years. 

In  order  to  get  rid  of  the  depreciated  and  fluctuating 
Colombian  currency,  an  agreement  which  had  been 
made  on  June  24,  1904,  at  a  monetary  conference  held 
in  Washington  between  representatives  of  the  United 
States  and  Panama,  was  put  into  execution.  It  pro- 
vided that  the  Panamanian  Government  should  coin 
three  millions  of  silver  pesos  for  issue  on  the  isthmus. 
The  intrinsic  value  of  the  peso  was  forty  cents,  and  it 
was  declared  to  be  equal  to  fifty  cents  gold  and  main- 


152  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

tained  at  that  value  by  the  Panama  Government  with 
the  assistance  of  the  United  States  authorities.  The 
Panama  Government  deposited  fifteen  per  cent  in  value 
of  the  three-million  issue  in  a  New  York  bank  to  main- 
tain the  fifty-cent  parity. 

Under  this  agreement  three  million  pesos  were 
coined  at  the  mint  in  Philadelphia  and  were  put  into 
circulation  on  February  12,  1905.  On  April  1  an 
additional  million  was  put  in  circulation  to  meet  a 
monetary  stringency  on  the  isthmus.  From  the  time 
that  this  agreement  went  into  effect  till  April  29,  1906, 
the  funds  necessary  to  pay  commission  expenses  on 
the  isthmus  were  furnished  by  local  banks  under  an 
agreement  fixing  three-fourths  of  one  per  cent  premium 
as  compensation  for  the  service.  After  that  date  the 
funds  were  obtained  by  shipment  of  United  States 
money  direct  from  the  Sub-Treasury  in  New  York,  thus 
saving  a  considerable  sum  annually  in  bankers'  com- 
missions. 

In  the  original  modus  Vivendi  it  was  not  stipulated 
that  there  should  be  any  discrimination  between  native 
and  other  laborers  in  regard  to  the  free  importation, 
provided  in  Article  XII  of  the  treaty  with  Panama,  of 
"  all  provisions,  medicines,  clothing,  supplies,  and  other 
things  necessary  and  convenient  for  the  officers,  em- 
ployes, workmen,  and  laborers  in  the  service  and  em- 
ploy of  the  United  States  and  their  families."  The 
Panama  merchants  made  such  strong  appeals  to  Sec- 
retary Taft  to  have  native  laborers  excluded  from  the 
privileges  of  buying  supplies  at  the  United  States  com- 
missaries that  he  issued  a  supplementary  executive 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  153 

order  on  January  7,  1905,  exempting  "all  employes 
and  workmen  who  are  natives  of  tropical  countries" 
from  commissary  privileges,  but  declaring  that  should 
it  develop  thereafter  that  Panama  merchants  charged 
prices  in  excess  of  legitimate  profit,  or  practised  other 
extortion,  the  commission  should  at  once  extend  com- 
missary benefits  and  privileges  to  native  or  tropical 
employes. 

It  developed  in  July,  1905,  that  either  through  scant 
supplies  or  a  desire  to  force  up  prices  the  Panama 
merchants  were  unable  to  meet  the  demands  of  trop- 
ical laborers  at  reasonable  prices,  and  at  once  the  com- 
mission opened  its  commissaries  to  them.  There  were 
repeated  and  emphatic  protests  subsequently  from 
Panama  merchants,  but  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment refused  to  heed  them. 

Other  stipulations  of  the  modus  vivendi  were  the 
granting  to  the  United  States  of  complete  sanitary 
and  quarantine  control  over  the  ports  of  Panama  and 
Colon,  confirming  the  delimitation  of  the  Canal  Zone 
and  boundary  of  Ancon  harbor,  and  directing  the  con- 
struction of  a  road,  about  four  miles  in  length,  at  the 
expense  of  the  United  States  Government,  from  the 
city  of  Panama  across  the  " Savannas"  to  the  eastern 
limit  of  the  zone  line.  This  was  in  consideration  of  the 
waiver  by  the  Panamanian  Government  of  its  claim 
for  compensation  for  the  use  in  perpetuity  of  munic- 
ipal buildings  located  in  the  Canal  Zone. 

The  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  exercised  legisla- 
tive powers  under  the  Act  of  April  28,  1904,  till  the 
expiration  of  the  Fifty-eighth  Congress,  on  March  4, 


154  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

1905,  when,  according  to  the  terms  of  that  act,  it  ceased 
to  possess  such  powers.  After  March  4,  1905,  the 
Canal  Zone  government  was  administered  in  accord- 
ance with  laws  already  enacted  and  through  executive 
orders  down  to  the  completion  of  the  work. 


CHAPTER  III 

INEFFICIENCY  OF  A  SEVEN-HEADED  EXECUTIVE  BODY 
—  FAILURES  AND  REMOVAL  OF  THE  FIRST  COMMIS- 
SION 

ACTIVE  operations  had  scarcely  begun  on  the  isthmus 
when  it  became  apparent  that  a  commission  of  seven 
members,  each  one  an  executive,  and  all  called  upon  to 
exercise  executive  functions  as  a  unit,  was  poorly 
adapted  for  a  work  of  such  kind  and  magnitude. 
Though  composed  of  excellent  material,  the  first  com- 
mission was  an  ineffective  body  almost  from  the  start. 
It  was  made  up  of  strong  individualities,  several  of 
whom,  either  by  temperament  or  through  age,  were 
incapable  of  harmonizing  with  or  yielding  to  others. 
The  result  was  constant  friction,  with  no  common 
policy  of  action  and  no  general  comprehension  of  the 
magnitude  of  the  work.  There  was  no  question  of  the 
honesty  and  professional  ability  of  its  members,  but 
they  showed  themselves  incapable  of  working  together 
for  a  common  purpose.  As  a  body  they  were  at  odds 
with  one  another,  with  their  chief  engineer,  and  with 
the  governor  of  the  Canal  Zone.  Requisitions  for 
needed  supplies  were  either  not  granted  at  all  or  only 
granted  after  long  delay,  and  then  only  in  part.  There 
were  confusion,  procrastination,  lack  of  system  every- 
where. 

155 


156  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

Immediately  after  its  return  from  its  first  visit  to 
the  isthmus  the  commission  had  appointed  John  F. 
Wallace,  a  civil  engineer  of  Chicago  with  large  experi- 
ence in  railway  construction,  chief  engineer  of  canal 
work,  at  a  salary  of  twenty-five  thousand  dollars  and  a 
residence  on  the  Isthmus,  his  appointment  taking 
effect  on  June  1.  Mr.  Wallace  arrived  on  the  isthmus 
on  June  29,  and  entered  upon  his  duties  on  July  1. 
He  was  from  the  outset  the  worst  sufferer  from  the  in- 
efficiency of  the  commission.  He  complained  bitterly 
of  the  incompetency  of  the  men  sent  to  him  through 
the  commission,  and  of  its  delay  and  failure  in  granting 
his  requisitions.  Similar  complaint  was  made  by  the 
chief  sanitary  officer  in  regard  to  requisitions,  and  in 
both  cases  subsequent  examination  showed  ample  prov- 
ocation. Requisitions  were  either  disregarded  entirely 
or  granted  after  long  delay  and  in  such  reduced  meas- 
ure as  to  make  them  of  little  value. 

Success  under  such  conditions  was  an  impossibility, 
but  they  were  only  a  part  of  the  obstacles  with  which 
Mr.  Wallace  had  to  contend.  An  ignorant  and  un- 
reasoning clamor  to  make  the  "dirt  fly"  had  arisen  in 
the  United  States  immediately  after  the  purchase  of 
canal  properties  from  the  French.  Mr.  Wallace  started 
for  the  isthmus  with  this  cry  ringing  in  his  ears.  He 
endeavored  to  comply  with  it  by  beginning  the  work  of 
excavation  at  once.  There  were  at  the  time  about 
seven  hundred  men  employed  by  the  French  at  work 
in  Culebra  with  out-of-date  machinery  that  was  in 
very  poor  condition.  There  was  an  immense  amount 
of  railway  and  other  equipment,  mostly  out  of  date 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  157 

and  useless,  scattered  along  the  line  of  the  canal.  The 
machine-shops  were  in  bad  repair,  and  their  equipment 
was  also  out  of  date.  There  were  two  thousand  one 
hundred  and  fifty  buildings  that  had  been  left  by  the 
French,  most  of  which  were  worth  repairing,  but  few 
of  which  were  suitable  for  quarters  in  their  existing 
condition.  There  was  no  system  of  food  supply.  The 
native  supply  was  inadequate,  unsuitable,  and  prices 
were  exorbitant.  The  Panama  Railroad  was  fully  a 
quarter  of  a  century  behind  the  times  in  personnel, 
roadway,  and  rolling-stock. 

In  short,  conditions  on  the  isthmus  were  such  that 
a  period  of  at  least  two  years  should  have  been  allowed 
exclusively  for  preparatory  work,  with  no  attempt  at 
actual  construction.  In  that  time  the  question  of 
type  of  canal  could  have  been  settled  finally,  a  working 
force  could  have  been  assembled  and  provided  with 
quarters  and  a  food  supply,  and  the  work  of  sanitation 
could  have  been  completed.  This  would  have  been 
the  policy  adopted  but  for  the  absurd  clamor  to  make 
the  "dirt  fly."  Mr.  Wallace  and  the  commission  felt 
compelled  to  yield  to  it.  He,  with  their  approval,  at- 
tempted to  go  ahead  with  excavation  with  inferior 
working  machinery,  without  an  adequate  railway 
system,  and  without  suitable  quarters  or  food  for  his 
men.  He  was  able  to  assemble  during  the  year  in 
which  he  held  his  position  an  inefficient  working  force 
of  about  eight  thousand  five  hundred  men,  and  to 
excavate  a  total  of  about  seven  hundred  and  forty-two 
thousand  cubic  yards.  During  that  period  also  about 
three  hundred  and  fifty  of  the  French  buildings  were 


158  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

repaired,  the  various  machine-shops  were  overhauled 
and  enlarged,  the  construction  of  water  and  sewer 
systems  for  Panama  and  Colon  was  begun,  surveys 
and  soundings  were  made,  and  as  much  of  a  working 
plant  as  the  commission  would  consent  to  order  was 
ordered,  including  steam-shovels  and  cars  for  the  rail- 
road. Wharves  at  the  terminals  of  the  railway  on  the 
Atlantic  and  Pacific  were  repaired  and  enlarged,  and 
the  first  steps  toward  organizing  a  system  for  receiving 
and  handling  supplies  were  taken. 

The  commission  had  not  been  in  office  six  months 
before  its  ineffectiveness  became  so  apparent  that  one 
of  its  members,  Mr.  Hecker,  resigned  on  November  16, 
1904,  and  another,  Mr.  Parsons,  advised  the  Presi- 
dent of  his  intention  to  do  so,  on  the  ground  that  it 
was  not  so  organized  as  to  make  executive  work  by 
it  successful.  In  a  letter  to  the  President,  on  January 
12,  1905,  transmitting  the  first  annual  report  of  the 
commission,  Secretary  Taft  said  that  the  commission 
had  shown  itself  to  be  an  unelastic  body  and  not  well 
adapted  to  canal  work.  About  the  same  time  General 
Davis  wrote  to  the  Secretary,  alluding  to  newspaper 
rumors  of  a  reduction  In  the  size  of  the  commission 
and  saying  that  he  hoped  they  were  true  because  he 
was  "satisfied  that  the  present  body  is  far  and  away 
too  cumbersome  and  ineffective." 

President  Roosevelt  had  reached  a  like  conclusion, 
and  in  transmitting  the  Secretary's  letter  and  the  com- 
mission's report  to  Congress  he  accompanied  it,  on 
January  12,  1905,  with  a  message  requesting  such 
amendment  of  the  Spooner  Act  as  would  enable  him 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  159 

to  select  a  smaller  commission,  preferably  one  of  three 
persons.  The  House  passed  a  bill  in  accordance  with 
his  desires,  but  it  failed  in  the  Senate.  The  President 
thereupon  decided  to  exercise  the  power  already  vested 
in  him,  and  proceeded  to  reorganize  the  commission  in 
the  interest  of  centralized  authority  and  greater  effi- 
ciency. After  the  adjournment  of  Congress  on  March 
4,  1905,  he  asked  the  members  of  the  commission  for 
their  resignations,  and  on  April  1  he  appointed  an 
entirely  new  commission,  with  the  single  exception  of 
Major  Benjamin  M.  Harrod,  who  was  retained.* 

The  plain  truth  about  the  first  commission  was 
stated  with  characteristic  clearness  and  force  by  Sec- 
retary Taft  in  his  testimony  before  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee on  Interoceanic  Canals  on  April  1,  1906: 

The  chief  defect  of  the  old  Commission,  if  I  may  say 
so,  became  apparent  when  it  essayed  the  tremendous 
executive  task  of  perfecting  an  organization  to  furnish 
the  equipment,  the  material,  and  the  supplies  required 
in  increasing  quantity  on  the  Isthmus  as  the  work  ex- 
panded, with  promptness  and  dispatch.  This  was  a 
complaint  which  Mr.  Wallace  might  most  justly  make 
and  which  he  did  make.  It  was  one  of  the  chief  ob- 
stacles in  the  performance  of  his  task. 

I  do  not  mean  to  say  that  under  any  circumstances 
and  under  any  management  the  opening  of  the  canal 
project  and  the  ordering  of  equipment,  supplies  and 
construction  material  at  such  a  long  distance  would 
not  have  been  attended  with  exasperating  delays,  but 
it  is  quite  apparent  that  the  methods  of  the  Commis- 
sion for  this  purpose  were  not  businesslike,  expeditious, 
or  systematic. 

*Appendix  A. 


CHAPTER  IV 

REORGANIZATION  OF  THE  COMMISSION  ON  EFFECTIVE 
LINES  — JOHN  F.  STEVENS  AS  CHIEF  ENGINEER  - 
INTERNATIONAL  CONSULTING  BOARD  —  LOCK  CANAL 
DECREED 

CONGRESS  having  declined  to  grant  President  Roose- 
velt's request  for  a  smaller,  more  efficient,  and  less 
expensive  commission,  he  decided  to  use  the  large  pow- 
ers which  he  possessed  under  the  Spooner  Act  to  con- 
vert the  required  seven-headed  body,  so  far  as  pos- 
sible, into  an  efficient  executive  and  administrative 
force.  In  an  executive  order  addressed  to  the  mem- 
bers of  the  new  commission,  April  1,  1905,  he  directed 
that  the  chairman,  chief  engineer,  and  governor  of  the 
Canal  Zone  should  be  constituted  an  executive  com- 
mittee, and  that  the  executive  work  should  be  divided 
into  three  departments,  the  head  of  the  first  to  be  the 
chairman,  who  should  have  charge  of  making  contracts 
and  purchasing  supplies  and  be  in  executive  control  of 
the  entire  business  of  the  commission;  the  head  of 
the  second  to  be  the  governor  of  the  Canal  Zone,  who 
should  have  charge  of  the  administration  and  enforce- 
ment of  law  on  the  isthmus  and  all  matters  of  sanita- 
tion; the  head  of  the  third  to  be  the  chief  engineer, 
who  should  have  full  charge  of  the  work  of  construc- 
tion on  the  isthmus.  The  chairman  was  to  reside  in  the 

160 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  161 

United  States,  visiting  the  isthmus  from  time  to  time. 
The  governor  of  the  Canal  Zone  and  the  chief  engineer 
were  to  reside  on  the  isthmus.  Quarterly  meetings  of 
the  full  commission  were  to  be  held  in  January,  April, 
July,  and  October  on  the  isthmus,  and  all  action  by 
the  executive  committee  was  to  be  submitted  to  the 
commission  for  approval.  The  four  last-named  mem- 
bers of  the  commission  were  constituted  an  engineering 
committee  to  act  in  an  advisory  capacity. 

The  new  arrangement  was  put  in  operation  at  once, 
but  had  scarcely  got  under  headway  when  Mr.  Wallace 
resigned,  on  June  28.  He  was  succeeded  as  chief  en- 
gineer by  John  F.  Stevens,  who  was  appointed  on  July 
1,  sailed  for  the  isthmus  on  July  20,  and  took  charge 
on  July  26.  His  salary  was  fixed  at  thirty  thousand 
dollars.  Mr.  Wallace's  resignation  had  been  a  great 
surprise  to  the  government,  and  he  was  rebuked  pub- 
licly and  with  much  vigor  by  Secretary  Taft  for  his 
conduct  in  the  premises.  All  the  papers  in  the  case  are 
on  record  in  the  files  of  the  War  Department  and  in 
reports  of  investigations  by  senate  and  congressional 
committees.  They  have  no  place  in  the  present  nar- 
rative. 

The  second  commission,  after  the  arrival  of  Mr.  Ste- 
vens as  chief  engineer,  took  hold  of  the  task  upon  the 
isthmus  with  great  energy.  Mr.  Stevens  had  qualifi- 
cations for  the  work  which  were  second,  perhaps,  to 
those  of  no  other  engineer  in  the  United  States.  The 
problem  before  him  for  solution  was,  first  of  all,  one  of 
transportation.  To  construct  the  canal  an  enormous 
amount  of  earth  and  rock  must  not  only  be  excavated 


162  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

but  moved  over  distances  ranging  from  three  to  thirty 
miles.  For  this  purpose  a  railway  system  on  the 
most  approved  lines  and  with  the  best  modern  equip- 
ment must  be  constructed.  In  work  of  this  kind 
Mr.  Stevens  had  had  large  experience  in  the  far  West- 
ern section  of  the  United  States  and  was  an  acknowl- 
edged expert  of  the  first  rank.  Mr.  Shonts,  who  was 
to  work  with  him  on  the  isthmus,  was  a  practical  rail- 
way man  but  not  an  engineer,  and  while  he  was  nom- 
inally Mr.  Stevens's  superior  officer  he  was  actually 
his  intelligent  coadjutor  and  prompt  agent  in  executing 
the  comprehensive  and  masterly  plans  which  the  fer- 
tile and  trained  mind  of  Mr.  Stevens  evolved. 

Mr.  Stevens  had  been  on  the  isthmus  but  a  very 
short  time  when  he  reached  the  conclusion  that  it  was 
unwise  to  attempt  excavation  on  a  large  scale  under 
existing  conditions.  Acting  on  his  suggestion,  the  new 
commission,  during  its  first  visit  in  July,  1905,  directed 
that  excavation  should  practically  cease  until  the  nec- 
essary preliminary  work  should  be  accomplished,  and 
that  in  the  meantime  canal  work  should  be  confined  to 
putting  the  various  levels  in  Culebra  Cut  into  proper 
condition  for  the  installation  and  operation  of  the 
maximum  number  of  steam-shovels  when  these  should 
arrive  and  the  laying  of  additional  railway  tracks. 

From  that  moment  till  the  end  of  the  year  1906 
the  commission  devoted  all  its  energies  to  the  neces- 
sary preliminary  work.  During  that  year  and  a  half 
it  spent  in  this  field  $30,000,000,  of  which  about 
$5,000,000  was  for  government  and  sanitation;  about 
$7,000,000  for  construction  of  quarters  and  other  build- 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  163 

ings,  docks,  wharves,  railway  enlargement,  water- 
works, and  sewers  for  the  Canal  Zone,  and  engineering 
work;  about  $12,000,000  for  permanent  plant;  about 
$4,500,000  in  miscellaneous  material  and  supplies;  and 
more  than  $1,500,000  in  sewers,  water-works,  and  pav- 
ing in  the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon. 

At  the  end  of  that  time  the  isthmus  had  been  con- 
verted into  as  healthful  a  place  of  abode  as  could  be 
found  anywhere  in  the  tropics  and  more  so  than 
many  places  outside  the  tropics;  yellow  fever  had  been 
banished  for  all  time;  the  harmful  activities  of  ma- 
larial mosquitoes  had  been  greatly  restricted;  adequate 
quarters,  comfortably  furnished,  had  been  provided 
for  all  employes;  a  system  for  the  abundant  supply  of 
pure  food  at  moderate  prices,  brought  from  the  United 
States,  had  been  established  and  was  working  well;  an 
ample  supply  of  pure  water  had  been  secured  for  all 
cities,  towns,  villages,  and  camps;  the  Panama  Rail- 
road had  been  double-tracked  for  the  greater  part  of 
its  length  and  furnished  with  new  and  heavier  rails 
and  a  modern  personnel  and  equipment;  terminal  rail- 
way yards  and  two  great  intermediate  forwarding  and 
receiving  yards  for  dirt-trains  had  been  constructed; 
new  wharves  at  the  terminals  on  the  Atlantic  and 
Pacific,  with  modern  unloading  machinery,  had  been 
built  and  the  harbors  about  them  dredged;  a  thorough 
system  for  receiving,  handling,  and  distributing  the 
vast  amount  of  supplies  which  came  on  every  steamer 
had  been  created  and  put  in  operation;  great  machine- 
shops,  with  modern  appliances,  had  been  enlarged  from 
the  old  ones,  and  in  these  all  the  locomotives,  cars, 


164  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

steam-shovels,  and  other  portions  of  the  canal  plant, 
which  arrived  from  the  States  in  parts,  were  set  up  or 
put  together. 

This  would  have  been  a  remarkably  rapid  achieve- 
ment under  favorable  conditions;  accomplished  as  it 
was,  two  thousand  miles  from  the  base  of  supplies,  it 
constituted  a  notable  tribute  to  American  enterprise 
and  energy.  The  work  was  not  only  done  quickly, 
but  with  intelligence  and  sagacity.  The  plans  which 
Mr.  Stevens  evolved,  and  which  the  commission  under 
Mr.  Shonts's  leadership  executed,  proved,  when  put  to 
the  test  in  subsequent  action  and  construction,  to  be 
admirably  adapted  to  the  purposes  for  which  they  had 
been  designed.  Mr.  Stevens  had  laid  the  foundation 
securely  and  well.  The  men  who  took  up  the  task 
after  he  had  laid  it  down  were  one  and  all  unstinted 
in  praise  of  the  ability  and  far-seeing  intelligence  which 
had  characterized  his  labors.  President  Roosevelt  rec- 
ognized the  value  of  his  services  by  appointing  him 
a  member  of  the  commission  in  July,  1906,  making 
him  thereby  a  member  of  the  executive  committee 
with  Mr.  Shonts  and  Governor  Magoon. 

During  the  first  half  of  1906  there  was  a  gradual  in- 
crease in  the  amount  of  excavation,  but  until  the  final 
decision  as  to  the  type  of  canal  to  be  constructed  should 
be  reached  Mr.  Stevens  directed  operations  in  such  a 
manner  that  the  excavation  accomplished  would  be 
useful  for  any  type  of  canal.  He  was  also  steadily 
assembling  a  working  force.  That  which  the  French 
had  left,  amounting  to  about  seven  hundred  men,  was 
very  inefficient,  and  was  gradually  replaced  by  a  new 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  165 

one  which  at  the  end  of  1905  comprised  about  seven- 
teen thousand  men.  Early  in  1906  the  commission 
began  systematic  efforts  to  recruit  laborers  from  Eu- 
rope, chiefly  from  northern  Spain,  and  by  the  end  of 
the  year  about  nine  hundred  had  arrived  and  were  at 
work  on  the  isthmus.  By  the  middle  of  1906  the  work 
had  advanced  nearly  as  far  as  it  could  be  carried  with 
wisdom  until  the  decision  as  to  type  was  reached. 

To  aid  in  arriving  at  this  decision  President  Roose- 
velt, under  date  of  June  24,  1905,  invited  the  most 
eminent  civil  engineers  of  the  United  States  and  Europe 
to  constitute  an  International  Board  of  Consulting  En- 
gineers, to  consider  the  various  plans  proposed  for  an 
isthmian  canal  and  report  their  verdict  to  him.  This 
board,  as  finally  constituted,  was  composed  of  eight 
Americans  and  five  Europeans,  as  follows: 

George  W.  Davis,  Major-General,  U.  S.  A.  (retired), 
and  member  first  Isthmian  Canal  Commission, 
Chairman. 

Alfred  Noble,  Chief  Engineer,  Pennsylvania  Rail- 
road Company. 

William  Barclay  Parsons,  Chief  Engineer,  Rapid 
Transit  Commission,  New  York  City,  and  mem- 
ber first  Isthmian  Canal  Commission. 

William  H.  Burr,  Professor  of  Civil  Engineering  in 
Columbia  University,  New  York  City,  and  mem- 
ber first  Isthmian  Canal  Commission. 

Henry  L.  Abbot,  Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  A.  (re- 
tired). 

Frederic  P.  Stearns,  Chief  Engineer  of  Metropol- 
itan Water  and  Sewerage  Board  of  Massachu- 
setts. 


166  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

Joseph  Ripley,  Chief  Engineer  of  the  Sault  Sainte 
Marie  Canal. 

Isham  Randolph,  Chief  Engineer,  Chicago  Drainage 
Canal. 

William  Henry  Hunter,  Chief  Engineer,  Manchester 
Ship  Canal;  nominated  by  the  British  Govern- 
ment. 

Adolph  Guerard,  Inspector  of  Bridges  and  High- 
ways, France;  nominated  by  the  French  Gov- 
ernment. 

Eugen  Tincauzer,  Chief  Engineer,  Kiel  Canal ;  nom- 
inated by  the  German  Government. 

J.  W.  Welcker,  Chief  Engineer  of  Waterstaat;  nom- 
inated by  Netherlands  Government. 

Edouard  Quellennec,  Consulting  Engineer,  Suez 
Canal;  nominated  by  Netherlands  Government. 

The  board  assembled  in  Washington  on  September 
1,  1905,  and  continued  its  deliberations  till  January 
10,  1906.  Its  members  visited  the  isthmus  in  October, 
making  a  thorough  investigation  of  the  line  of  the 
canal,  and  visited  also  water-works  of  interest  in  the 
United  States.  A  final  vote  was  reached  on  Novem- 
ber 18,  1905,  when  a  resolution  in  favor  of  a  sea-level 
canal  was  adopted  by  a  vote  of  eight  to  five,  as  follows : 

Ays:  Hunter,  Welcker,  Quellennec,  Guerard,  Tin- 
cauzer, Burr,  Parsons,  Davis. 
Noes:  Ripley,  Randolph,  Stearns,  Abbot,  Noble. 

It  was  noted  at  once  in  the  press  that  the  majority 
was  composed  of  five  foreigners  and  three  Americans; 
that  only  two  of  the  three  Americans  were  engineers, 
and  that  five  of  the  eight  American  members  of  the 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  167 

board;  all  engineers,  were  against  the  sea-level  proj- 
ect. The  lock  canal  was  hailed  in  some  quarters  as 
the  " American  canal"  as  distinguished  from  the  sea- 
level  or  European  canal.  While  the  members  of  the 
board  were  preparing  majority  and  minority  reports 
an  active  campaign  was  begun  in  the  newspapers  and 
in  Congress  by  the  advocates  of  the  two  types  of  canal. 
On  January  10,  1906,  the  board  presented  two  reports 
to  the  President,  one  signed  by  eight  members  in  favor 
of  a  sea-level  canal,  and  the  other  signed  by  five  mem- 
bers in  favor  of  a  lock  canal  at  eighty-five  feet  above 
sea-level.  Both  reports  were  referred  by  the  Presi- 
dent, through  the  Secretary  of  War,  to  the  Isthmian 
Canal  Commission  for  consideration  and  action.  The 
commission  returned  them  to  the  Secretary  of  War  on 
February  5,  1906,  accompanying  them  with  a  report 
of  its  own  approving  the  lock-canal  project  favored  in 
the  minority  report  of  the  International  Board.  Chief 
Engineer  Stevens  concurred  in  this  approval.  One 
member  of  the  commission,  Admiral  Endicott,  dissented 
and  put  himself  on  record  in  favor  of  the  sea-level  plan. 
On  February  19,  1906,  the  Secretary  of  War  trans- 
mitted the  several  reports  to  the  President  in  a  letter 
in  which  he  concurred  with  the  Isthmian  Canal  Com- 
mission in  recommending  the  lock-canal  project,  and 
on  the  same  date  the  President  sent  the  Secretary's 
letter  and  the  several  reports  to  Congress,  accompany- 
ing them  with  a  brief  message  in  which  he  also  concurred 
with  the  recommendations  of  the  commission. 

The  reports  were  before  Congress  continuously  from 
that  time  till  near  the  date  of  adjournment,  at  the  end 


168  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

of  June.  An  animated  contest  was  waged  in  the  Senate 
during  that  period,  with  much  uncertainty  as  to  the 
outcome.  There  was  no  doubt  at  any  time  concern- 
ing the  attitude  of  the  House,  as  a  large  majority  of 
that  body  was  known  to  be  in  favor  of  a  lock  canal. 
Finally,  on  June  21,  the  vote  was  taken  in  the  Senate 
and  the  lock-canal  project  was  approved  by  thirty-six 
ays  to  thirty-one  noes.  The  House  concurred  with- 
out a  division  on  June  27,  and  the  act  became  law 
through  the  President's  approval  on  June  29. 

When  the  decision  was  finally  recorded  as  law,  the 
commission  was  in  readiness  to  go  ahead  with  the  work 
of  construction  under  the  most  favorable  conditions. 
Work  began  with  much  energy  on  July  1,  and  in  spite 
of  a  record-breaking  rainfall  in  November  and  De- 
cember over  a  million  and  a  half  cubic  yards  were 
excavated  in  Culebra  Cut  during  the  final  six  months, 
bringing  the  total  excavation  at  all  points  during  the 
year  to  4,948,497.  This  was  more  than  double  the 
total  excavation  for  1904  and  1905,  which  had  been 
only  about  2,000,000. 


CHAPTER  V 

VISIT  OF  PRESIDENT  ROOSEVELT  —  CANAL  MEDALS  — 
SPECIAL  MESSAGE  TO  CONGRESS  —  REBUKE  TO  CA- 
LUMNIATORS 

IN  November  President  Roosevelt,  accompanied  by 
his  wife,  paid  a  visit  of  three  days  to  the  isthmus,  ar- 
riving on  the  U.  S.  S.  Louisiana  on  the  afternoon  of 
the  14th,  and  remaining  till  the  evening  of  the  17th. 
This  visit  was  notable  as  being  the  first  instance  in 
which  an  American  President  had  passed  out  of  United 
States  territory  while  holding  the  office.  A  special 
station  was  erected  on  the  Panama  Railroad  near  the 
Canal  Zone  boundary  at  Panama  in  order  that  he  might 
land  on  United  States  territory,  and  this  was  used  by 
him  and  his  party  during  his  visit.  A  wing  of  the 
Hotel  Tivoli,  which  was  then  nearing  completion,  was 
fitted  up  for  his  accommodation  and  that  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  canal  commission  and  the  American  min- 
ister to  Panama,  who,  with  members  of  their  families, 
had  joined  the  presidential  party.  This  was  the  first 
use  of  the  Tivoli  as  a  hotel.  The  rooms  occupied  by 
the  President  and  his  wife  were  called  the  "Presiden- 
tial Suite,"  and  have  retained  the  name  since.  At 
the  end  of  his  visit  the  hotel  was  closed  till  January  1, 
1907,  when  it  was  opened  formally  to  the  public. 

169 


170  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

The  President,  accompanied  by  the  commission, 
the  chief  engineer,  and  other  canal  officials,  made  a 
thorough  inspection  of  all  portions  of  the  work,  giving 
up  every  daylight  hour  to  the  task  for  two  and  a  half 
days  and  putting  to  a  severe  strain  the  physical  strength 
of  more  than  one  of  his  companions.  On  the  afternoon 
of  his  first  day  ashore  he  passed  over  the  boundary 
line  into  the  city  of  Panama  where  he  was  met  by  the 
President  of  the  republic,  Doctor  Amador,  who  had 
called  upon  him,  with  Mrs.  Amador  and  members  of  his 
cabinet,  on  board  the  Louisiana  in  Colon  harbor  on 
the  previous  evening.  He  was  greeted  in  the  city 
with  great  throngs  of  people,  and  was  escorted  to  the 
cathedral  steps  by  a  specially  organized  squad  of 
"Panamanian  Rough  Riders,"  clothed  in  Rough  Rider 
uniform  and  mounted  upon  prancing  horses. 

On  the  platform  in  front  of  the  cathedral  a  formal 
reception  was  held,  President  Amador  welcoming  him 
in  a  brief  address,  and  President  Roosevelt  responding. 
In  the  evening  he  attended  a  state  dinner  given  by 
President  Amador,  which  was  followed  by  a  reception. 

On  the  evening  of  his  departure,  a  mass  reception 
to  President  Roosevelt  was  held  in  the  great  building 
which  covered  the  largest  wharf  of  the  Isthmian  Canal 
Commission  at  Cristobal.  Virtually  the  entire  canal 
force  was  present,  crowding  the  immense  structure, 
which  was  decorated  with  flags  and  lanterns.  The 
President  delivered  an  address  which  aroused  great 
enthusiasm.  He  told  the  canal  workers  that  they  were 
engaged  in  one  of  the  great  works  of  the  world,  a  greater 
work  than  they  themselves  at  the  moment  realized, 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  171 

and  that  those  of  them  who  did  well  in  bringing  the 
enterprise  to  completion  would  "  stand  exactly  as  the 
soldiers  of  a  few,  and  only  a  few  of  the  most  famous 
armies  of  all  the  nations  stand  in  history.  I  do  not 
pity  you,"  he  added,  "because  you  have  before  you  a 
hard  task.  I  would  feel  ashamed  of  you  if  I  thought 
you  wanted  pity.  I  admire  you.  I  wish  that  any  one 
of  my  boys  was  old  enough  to  take  part  in  the  work. 
I  feel  that  to  each  of  you  has  come  an  opportunity 
such  as  is  vouchsafed  to  but  few  in  each  generation. 
I  shall  see  if  it  is  not  possible  to  provide  for  some  little 
memorial,  some  mark,  some  badge,  which  will  always 
distinguish  the  man  who  for  a  certain  space  of  time 
has  done  his  work  well  on  this  isthmus,  just  as  the 
button  of  the  Grand  Army  distinguishes  the  man  who 
did  his  work  well  in  the  civil  war." 

On  his  return  the  President  requested  Francis  D. 
Millet,  the  accomplished  artist  and  charming  gentle- 
man who  lost  his  life  in  the  Titanic  disaster  in  April, 
1912,  to  make  suggestions  in  regard  to  the  proposed 
memorial,  and  he  recommended  a  medal  of  the  size  of 
a  silver  dollar.  The  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  was 
asked  for  suggestions  as  to  design  and  inscriptions,  and 
it  recommended  that  on  one  side  there  should  be  a 
medallion  portrait  of  President  Roosevelt  and  on  the 
other  the  seal  of  the  Canal  Zone.  The  first  part  of  the 
recommendation  was  adopted  by  Mr.  Millet,  but  the 
second  was  rejected,  and  instead  of  the  seal  there  was 
adopted  a  bird's-eye  view  of  Culebra  Cut,  in  the  com- 
pleted canal,  with  a  ship  passing  through,  and  the 
motto  of  the  seal,  "The  Land  Divided,  the  World 


172  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

United,"  inscribed  above  it.  The  work  was  placed  in 
charge  of  Victor  D.  Brenner,  an  eminent  sculptor,  who 
modelled  a  medallion  of  President  Roosevelt  at  per- 
sonal sittings  at  Oyster  Bay  in  July,  1908. 

Over  one  hundred  pounds  of  copper,  bronze,  and 
other  material  from  French  locomotives  and  machinery 
on  the  isthmus  was  shipped  to  the  United  States  mint 
in  Philadelphia,  and  from  these  the  medals  were  cast. 
They  were  awarded  to  all  Americans  in  the  canal  and 
Panama  Railway  employ  who  had  served  two  years  or 
more  on  canal  work.  Each  additional  two  years  of 
service  was  indicated  by  the  attachment  of  a  bar  so 
inscribed.  Distribution  of  the  medals,  inscribed  with 
the  name  of  the  recipient  and  the  date  of  his  original 
employment,  was  begun  in  September,  1909,  and  in 
1913  about  six  thousand  had  been  delivered.  They 
are  very  highly  prized  by  their  owners,  and  the  be- 
stowal of  them  has  contributed  materially  to  the  pa- 
triotic pride  in  their  work  which  is  so  universal  in  the 
canal  force,  and  which  has  been  the  chief  cause  of  its 
remarkable  efficiency. 

President  Roosevelt  gave  a  detailed  account  of  his 
visit,  with  his  impressions  and  conclusions  thereon,  in 
a  special  message  to  Congress  under  date  of  December 
17,  1906.  This  document  is  unique  in  American  his- 
tory as  being  the  only  illustrated  message  ever  sent  to 
the  national  legislature.  It  was  received  with  some 
consternation  by  the  Senate,  being  regarded  as  that 
truly  awful  thing,  "an  innovation,"  but  the  august 
members  recovered  sufficiently  from  their  alarm  a  few 
days  later  to  order  the  printing  of  ten  thousand  copies 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  173 

for  distribution  by  themselves  among  their  constitu- 
ents. The  members  of  the  House,  without  even  a 
quiver  of  alarm,  greeted  it  with  delight  as  the  best 
campaign  document  possible,  and  ordered  many  thou- 
sands of  copies  printed  for  their  personal  use. 

The  message  had  a  wide  circulation  throughout  the 
United  States  and  in  Europe,  and  was  of  incalculable 
value  in  placing  before  the  world  the  truth  about  con- 
ditions on  the  isthmus.  The  position  and  character  of 
its  author  commanded  for  it  universal  attention  and 
unquestioning  acquiescence. 

Almost  from  the  very  beginning  of  American  work 
on  the  isthmus  there  had  been  in  certain  portions  of 
the  American  press  a  well-nigh  continuous  fusillade  of 
bitter  and  obviously  malicious  criticism,  the  object  of 
which  seemed  to  be  to  defeat  the  project,  and  the  effect 
of  which  was  to  aggravate  seriously  the  difficulty  of 
inducing  desirable  persons  to  go  to  the  isthmus.  Dur- 
ing the  year  immediately  preceding  the  President's 
visit  this  hostile  attack  had  been  especially  venomous 
and  apparently  systematic.  There  seemed  to  be  be- 
hind it  powerful  influences  which  were  determined  to 
prevent  the  construction  of  the  canal.  In  his  special 
message  the  President  spoke  of  two  kinds  of  criticism, 
honest  and  malicious,  and  of  the  latter  he  said:  • 

Where  the  slanderers  are  of  foreign  origin,  I  have 
no  concern  with  them.  Where  they  are  Americans,  I 
feel  for  them  the  heartiest  contempt  and  indignation; 
because,  in  a  spirit  of  wanton  dishonesty  and  malice, 
they  are  trying  to  interfere  with,  and  hamper  the  exe- 
cution of,  the  greatest  work  of  the  kind  ever  attempted, 


174  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

and  are  seeking  to  bring  to  naught  the  efforts  of  their 
countrymen  to  put  to  the  credit  of  America  one  of  the 
giant  feats  of  the  ages.  The  outrageous  accusations  of 
these  slanderers  constitute  a  gross  libel  upon  a  body  of 
public  servants  who,  for  trained  intelligence,  expert 
ability,  high  character  and  devotion  to  duty,  have  never 
been  excelled  anywhere.  There  is  not  a  man  among 
them  directing  the  work  on  the  Isthmus  who  has  ob- 
tained his  position  on  any  other  basis  than  merit  alone, 
and  not  one  who  has  used  his  position  in  any  way  for 
his  own  personal  or  pecuniary  advantage. 

The  message  did  what  no  other  utterance  could  have 
done.  It  turned  back  the  flood  of  slander  on  the 
slanderers  themselves  and  drove  them  and  all  imitators 
out  of  the  business.  The  names  of  this  unsavory  squad 
of  professional  maligners  of  their  countrymen,  this  as- 
sociation of  moral  assassins  who,  at  the  safe  distance 
of  two  thousand  miles,  assailed  the  character  and  in- 
tegrity of  those  who  were  serving  their  country  at  the 
post  of  danger,  have  passed  into  oblivion.  The  most 
reckless  and  unrestrained  of  them  staggered  into  ob- 
scurity under  the  crushing  load  of  popular  contempt 
which  President  Roosevelt  and  Secretary  Taft,  by 
their  exposure  of  his  mendacity,  placed  upon  him. 
There  was  begun  later  a  second  and  no  less  virulent 
assault  upon  the  work,  but  this  was  directed  against 
the  engineering  features  of  the  canal  plan  and  not 
against  the  personnel  of  the  workers.  It  will  be  treated 
in  a  subsequent  chapter. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  THIRD  COMMISSION  —  UNITED  STATES  ARMY  EN- 
GINEERS IN  CHARGE  — QUALIFICATIONS  OF  COLO- 
NEL GOETHALS  — THE  CANAL  RECORD 

THE  period  of  active  construction  had  scarcely  begun 
with  the  year  1907  before  another  change  in  the  com- 
position of  the  commission  was  foreshadowed.  Early 
in  the  year  Mr.  Shonts,  whose  relations  with  Mr. 
Stevens  had  ceased  to  be  harmonious,  resigned  to  ac- 
cept the  presidency  of  the  Interborough-Metropolitan 
Railway  Company  of  New  York  City,  his  resignation 
taking  effect  on  March  4.  Before  that  date  was  reached 
Mr.  Stevens  asked  the  President  to  relieve  him  as  soon 
as  possible  from  his  duties,  and  the  request  was  granted 
with  the  stipulation  that  he  should  remain  until  his 
successor  could  become  familiar  with  the  work.  On 
March  4  Mr.  Stevens  was  appointed  chairman,  as  well 
as  chief  engineer,  and  he  held  the  two  positions  till 
April  1,  when  his  resignation  went  into  effect.  His 
withdrawal  from  the  enterprise  fairly  compelled  the 
President  to  make  a  radical  reorganization  of  the  com- 
mission. As  he  said  at  the  time,  he  had  no  alternative. 
It  was  useless  to  try  to  construct  the  canal  with  a  new 
chief  engineer  every  twelve  months,  since  a  permanent, 
stable  force  would  be  unattainable  under  such  con- 

175 


176  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

ditions,  and  without  a  permanent  force  satisfactory  re- 
sults could  not  be  achieved.  He  had  made  two  efforts 
to  have  the  canal  constructed  by  civilians,  and  in  both 
instances  the  civilian  who  was  chief  engineer  had  thrown 
up  the  job  as  soon  as  he  had  tired  of  it.  "I  propose 
now,"  he  said,  "to  put  it  in  charge  of  men  who  will 
stay  on  the  job  till  I  get  tired  of  having  them  there,  or 
till  I  say  they  may  abandon  it.  I  shall  turn  it  over  to 
the  army."  He  thereupon  requested  the  chairman  of 
the  commission,  on  February  26,  1907,  "In  order  to 
secure  continuity  of  engineering  control  and  manage- 
ment in  the  future,"  to  assign  to  the  office  of  chief  en- 
gineer Lieutenant-Colonel  George  W.  Goethals,  a  mem- 
ber of  the  Corps  of  Army  Engineers. 

This  was  done  on  the  following  day.  The  commis- 
sion at  the  time  consisted  of  only  five  members.  Charles 
E.  Magoon  had,  in  October,  1906,  been  transferred  to 
Cuba  as  Provisional  Governor,  and  Colonel  Ernst  had 
a  short  time  before  been  transferred  to  the  Mississippi 
River  Commission.  These  vacancies  had  not  been 
filled.  The  resignations  of  Mr.  Shonts,  effective  March 
4,  of  Messrs.  Hains,  Harrod,  and  Endicott,  effective 
March  16,  and  of  Mr.  Stevens,  effective  April  1,  were 
accepted,  and  early  in  March  President  Roosevelt  ap- 
pointed an  entirely  new  commission,*  with  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Goethals  as  chairman  and  chief  engineer.  This 
body  assumed  its  duties  April  1,  1907.  The  salary  of 
the  chairman  and  chief  engineer  was  fixed  by  the  Presi- 
dent at  fifteen  thousand  dollars,  and  of  the  other 
members  at  fourteen  thousand  dollars. 

*  Appendix  A. 


Builders  of  the  Canal. 

1,  Lt.-Col.  H.  F.  Hodges,  U.  S.  A.  2,  Col.  W.  C.  Gorgas.  3,  Lt.-Col.  D.  D.  Gaillard, 
U.  S.  A.  4,  Sidney  B.  Williamson.  5,  Civil  Engineer  H.  H.  Rousseau,  U.  S.  N. 
6,  Col.  William  L.  Sibert,  U.  S.  A.  7,  Col.  George  Washington  Goethals,  U.  S.  A., 
chairman  and  chief  engineer,  at  the  time  of  his  appointment,  March,  1907;  from  a 
photograph,  copyright,  by  Clinedinst. 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  177 

Hitherto  the  headquarters  of  the  commission  had 
been  in  Washington,  where  all  the  members  except  the 
governor  and  chief  engineer  had  resided.  The  reor- 
ganization had  been  effected  with  two  principal  ends 
in  view:  first,  that  each  member  of  the  commission 
should  have  active  connection  with  some  branch  of 
the  work;  and,  second,  that  the  entire  body  should  live 
on  the  isthmus.  In  accordance  with  this  purpose,  the 
Washington  office  was  reduced  to  a  purchasing  depart- 
ment mainly,  and  the  headquarters  of  the  commission 
was  removed  to  the  Canal  Zone.  Also  in  accordance 
with  this  purpose,  Colonel  Gorgas  was  made  a  com- 
missioner because  of  his  connection  with  sanitary 
work,  and  in  like  manner  Jackson  Smith  because  of  his 
services  in  collecting  a  working  force  and  providing 
quarters  and  a  food  supply.  The  army  officers  and  the 
naval  officer,  under  Colonel  Goethals,  each  became  the 
head  of  a  department  or  division  of  the  work,  while  the 
second  civilian  member  of  the  commission,  ex-Senator 
Blackburn,  became  the  head  of  the  civil  government 
of  the  Canal  Zone,  also  under  direction  of  the  chairman. 

Colonel  Goethals  entered  upon  his  new  duties  at  a 
critical  moment  in  the  canal  work,  for  two  civilian 
chief  engineers,  one  after  the  other,  each  after  serving 
less  than  a  year,  had  abandoned  the  task,  their  de- 
parture leaving  the  force  in  a  condition  of  great  nervous 
uncertainty  about  the  future.  It  was  a  civilian  force, 
and  the  change  from  civil  to  military  control  was  a 
hazardous  proceeding,  for  it  might  so  aggravate  exist- 
ing uneasiness  as  to  create  thorough  demoralization. 
There  had  been  much  talk  of  "militarism"  preceding 


178  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

his  arrival,  but  he  soon  made  it  apparent  that  efficiency 
was  the  final  test  with  him,  and  that  no  civilian  subor- 
dinate with  that  qualification  need  worry  about  his 
tenure.  Soon  after  his  arrival,  at  a  reception  which 
was  given  to  him,  he  said: 

I  will  say  that  I  expect  to  be  the  chief  of  the  division 
of  engineers,  while  the  heads  of  the  various  depart- 
ments are  going  to  be  the  colonels,  the  foremen  are 
going  to  be  the  captains,  and  the  men  who  do  the  labor 
are  going  to  be  the  privates.  There  will  be  no  more 
militarism  in  the  future  than  there  has  been  in  the 
past.  I  am  no  longer  a  commander  in  the  United 
States  Army.  I  now  consider  I  am  commanding  the 
Army  of  Panama,  and  that  the  enemy  we  are  going  to 
combat  is  the  Culebra  Cut  and  the  locks  and  dams  at 
both  ends  of  the  canal.  Every  man  who  does  his  duty 
will  never  have  any  cause  to  complain  on  account  of 
militarism." 

He  carried  out  this  assurance  to  the  letter.  The  re- 
sult was  that  there  were  few  changes  in  the  force,  and 
those  were  in  the  interest  of  greater  efficiency.  In 
fact,  the  change  in  control  had  been  effected  at  the 
psychological  moment  in  canal  construction.  Mr. 
Stevens,  who  was  perhaps  the  first  expert  of  his  time 
in  the  field  of  railway  construction,  had  completed 
that  part  of  the  task.  He  had  designed  and  executed 
a  plan  of  transportation  which  experience  was  to  prove 
to  be  admirably  adapted  for  its  purpose.  He  had  ap- 
plied to  this  task  the  knowledge  acquired  in  thirty 
years  of  active  railway  engineering  work,  to  which  his 
life  had  been  devoted,  and  the  value  of  the  service  he 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  179 

thus  rendered  can  scarcely  be  overestimated.  No  one 
has  placed  a  higher  or  more  generous  estimate  upon  it 
than/  Colonel  Goethals.  In  speaking  of  it  in  1913,  he 
said:  "People  talk  about  the  success  of  the  army  en- 
gineers at  Panama,  but  it  was  fortunate  that  Mr. 
Stevens  preceded  us.  The  real  problem  of  digging  the 
canal  was  the  disposal  of  the  spoil,  and  no  army  en- 
gineer in  America  could  have  laid  out  the  transpor- 
tation scheme  as  Mr.  Stevens  did.  We  are  building 
on  the  foundations  he  laid,  and  the  world  cannot  give 
him  too  much  credit." 

For  the  next  step  in  canal  work,  dam  and  lock 
construction  on  a  scale  of  magnitude  unattempted 
hitherto,  expert  knowledge  and  practical  experience  of 
equally  high  order  were  demanded,  and  were  found 
in  the  engineering  corps  of  the  army.  Colonel  Goe- 
thals, as  well  as  several  of  his  associates,  brought  to 
the  task  trained  ability  of  the  first  order,  supplemented 
by  several  years  of  practical  experience  in  the  same  field. 
Few  men  more  thoroughly  equipped  for  the  work 
could  have  been  found  in  the  United  States.  Colonel 
Goethals  had  been  graduated  at  the  head  of  his  class 
at  West  Point  in  1880,  had  been  for  four  years  instruc- 
tor in  civil  and  military  engineering  in  that  institution, 
and  for  six  years  and  a  half  had  been  in  charge  of  lock 
and  dam  construction  under  government  direction  in 
various  parts  of  the  United  States.  At  the  time  of 
his  appointment  as  chairman  and  ..chief  engineer  of  the 
Isthmian  Canal  Commission  he  had  won  for  himself 
the  undisputed  reputation  of  ablest  member  of  the 
corps  of  engineers  of  the  United  States  army.  When 


180  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

it  became  apparent  to  President  Roosevelt  that  the 
work  of  canal  construction  must  be  put  in  charge  of 
the  army,  there  was  no  debate  as  to  the  choice  of  a 
head.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Goethals  was  by  unani- 
mous consent  the  man  for  the  place,  and  such  indeed 
he  has  proved  himself  to  be. 

The  organization  created  by  Mr.  Stevens  was  con- 
tinued for  a  time,  but  Colonel  Goethals  gradually  in- 
troduced changes  in  the  direction  of  simplicity  and  con- 
centration of  authority,  and  built  up  an  organization 
which,  while  not  conforming  strictly  to  army  methods, 
was  constructed  along  similar  lines. 

In  1908  the  quartermaster  system  of  the  army  was 
adopted,  when  the  civilian  member  of  the  commission 
who  had  been  in  charge  of  what  was  called  the  depart- 
ment of  labor,  quarters,  and  subsistence,  Mr.  Jackson 
Smith,  resigned,  and  was  succeeded  by  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  H.  F.  Hodges,  of  the  engineering  corps  of  the 
army.  The  department  as  it  had  existed  under  Mr. 
Smith's  direction  was  abolished,  and  two  new  depart- 
ments were  created  in  its  stead:  quartermaster's, 
with  Colonel  C.  A.  Devol  at  its  head  as  chief  quarter- 
master; and  commissary  and  subsistence,  with  Colonel 
Eugene  T.  Wilson  at  its  head — both  army  officers,  and 
both  responsible  directly  to  the  chairman  and  chief 
engineer. 

The  superior  merits  of  the  system  put  in  operation 
by  Colonel  Goethals  were  soon  apparent.  There  was 
less  friction,  increased  unity  of  action,  and  a  greater 
willingness  to  render  prompt  obedience  to  orders. 

While  adopting  and  following  certain  army  methods 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  181 

of  administration,  Colonel  Goethals  avoided  studi- 
ously all  appearance  of  militarism.  During  the  entire 
period  of  construction  no  one  ever  saw  him  in  uniform, 
for  he  had  none  on  the  isthmus.  He  adhered  faith- 
fully to  his  pledge  to  make  efficiency  the  supreme  test 
of  employment,  and  while  most  of  the  places  of  respon- 
sibility were  held  by  army  officers  detailed  by  the  War 
Department,  he  retained  in  others  of  the  first  impor- 
tance civilians  who  were  in  them  when  he  took  charge. 
He  found  among  these  civilians  some  of  his  most 
trusted  and  loyal,  as  well  as  most  efficient  assistants, 
and  he  was  hearty  and  unstinted  in  expressing  his  ap- 
preciation of  the  high  value  of  their  services.  By  ac- 
complishing the  gigantic  task  intrusted  to  him  Colonel 
Goethals  won  a  great  and  lasting  triumph  for  the 
engineering  corps  of  the  United  States  army,  and  he 
won  it  all  the  more  speedily  and  surely  because  for 
the  time  being  he  placed  his  profession  of  engineer 
above  that  of  soldier  and  brought  into  his  service  the 
best  talent  attainable,  wherever  it  was  to  be  found. 

A  signal  instance  of  this  was  his  prompt  recognition 
and  extremely  valuable  use  of  the  rare  and  varied  abili- 
ties of  the  naval  member  of  the  commission,  H.  H. 
Rousseau,  civil  engineer.  At  the  time  of  his  appoint- 
ment to  the  commission  Mr.  Rousseau  was  chief  of  the 
Bureau  of  Yards  and  Docks  in  the  Navy  Department, 
with  the  rank  of  rear-admiral,  having  been  selected 
for  that  position  in  January,  1907,  by  President  Roose- 
velt, who  considered  him  the  ablest  of  the  civil  engi- 
neers of  the  navy.  Colonel  Goethals  authorizes  this 
estimate  of  his  services  in  connection  with  canal  work: 


182  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

His  technical  training  and  previous  experience,  com- 
bined with  his  executive  and  administrative  ability, 
fit  him  admirably  for  his  position.  He  has  had  charge 
and  supervision  of  shops,  municipal  work,  building  con- 
struction, terminals,  and  the  design  and  construction 
of  dry  docks  and  coaling  stations.  His  counsel  in 
questions  of  organization,  cost-keeping,  and  the  prep- 
aration of  estimates,  has  been  invaluable,  and,  in  his 
way,  he  has  been  as  indispensable  to  me  as  Colonel 
Hodges.*  Twice  has  the  Navy  Department  desired  his 
return  to  duty  at  Washington,  and  on  one  occasion  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  especially  requested  the  Presi- 
dent for  his  relief  from  duty  on  the  Isthmus  in  order 
that  the  Navy  Department  might  avail  itself  of  his 
services. 

One  of  the  early  acts  of  Colonel  Goethals  was  the 
establishment  of  a  weekly  publication,  called  the 
Canal  Record,  under  the  supervision  of  the  secretary 
of  the  commission.  Colonel  Goethals  had  perceived 
that  there  was  no  means  by  which  intelligence  about 
canal  work  was  carried  from  one  division  to  another, 
and  that  the  resulting  ignorance  about  the  progress  of 
the  work  as  a  whole  was  a  distinct  obstacle  to  that 
general  interest  which  was  necessary  for  the  develop- 
ment of  esprit  de  corps.  The  Canal  Record,  which  was 
really  a  weekly  report  of  what  was  going  on  in  every 
division,  aroused  general  interest  and  stimulated  a 
healthy  rivalry,  which  was  of  incalculable  benefit  in 
various  ways.  It  increased  the  efficiency  of  the  force, 
welded  it  into  a  single  body,  and  made  it  more  con- 
tented. By  giving  space  also  to  the  social  life  and 

*  See  p.  180. 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  183 

activities  of  the  Canal  Zone  this  beneficial  influence 
was  augmented.  The  paper  was  distributed  free  to 
all  employes  on  the  isthmus,  and  was  also  sent  to  mem- 
bers of  both  houses  of  Congress,  to  libraries,  scientific 
societies,  newspapers,  civil  engineers,  and  such  other 
persons  in  the  United  States  and  in  foreign  countries 
as  seemed  entitled  to  receive  it.  Its  beneficial  effect 
outside  the  isthmus  was  no  less  than  that  which  it 
exerted  among  the  canal  force.  Through  its  official 
publication  of  the  truth  about  canal  work  it  closed  the 
mouths  of  professional  slanderers  and  sensational 
writers  in  the  United  States  by  supplying  a  constant 
and  unassailable  refutation  of  their  misstatements. 
Its  permanent  value  is  unique,  for  it  is  the  official  and 
authentic  weekly  history  of  canal  work  during  the  en- 
tire period  of  construction.  It  has  been  sought  and 
obtained  by  nearly  or  quite  all  the  engineering  and 
scientific  schools  and  societies  of  the  world,  and  its 
bound  volumes  of  yearly  issues  have  been  placed  in 
the  libraries  of  these  societies  and  of  the  educational 
institutions  of  the  United  States  and  other  countries. 


CHAPTER  VII 

CULEBRA  CUT  — ONE-FOURTH  OF  ITS  ENTIRE  EXCAVA- 
TION DUE  TO  SLIDES  AND  BREAKS 

EVERYTHING  was  in  readiness  for  vigorous  and  effective 
work  when  the  new  commission  took  charge  in  April, 
1907.  The  preparatory  stage  of  the  work  had  come 
to  an  end,  and  the  period  of  active  construction  had 
begun.  A  large  part  of  the  plant  ordered  by  Mr.  Wal- 
lace and  Mr.  Stevens,  including  about  sixty  powerful 
steam-shovels,  was  at  hand;  the  tracks  of  the  trans- 
portation system  planned  by  Mr.  Stevens  were  in 
place,  and  modern  spoil  cars,  trackshifters,  unloaders, 
and  spreaders  were  already  in  use.  A  working  force 
steadily  growing  in  numbers  and  efficiency  had  been 
assembled. 

The  chief  point  of  attack  was,  of  course,  the  Culebra 
Cut,  then,  as  always,  the  most  formidable  obstacle  to 
be  fought  and  overcome.  How  much  more  formidable 
it  really  "was  than  had  been  suspected  was  soon  to  be 
revealed. 

No  part  of  the  canal  more  completely  confounded  the 
preliminary  estimates  of  some  of  the  highest  engineering 
authorities  in  the  United  States  and  Europe  than  the 
slides  and  breaks  in  the  banks  of  the  canal  prism 
through  Culebra  Cut.  The  International  Board  of 

184 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  185 

Consulting  Engineers,  in  1906,  after  a  thorough  study 
of  the  question  by  a  special  committee,  placed  the 
probable  total  amount  at  500,000  cubic  yards.  The 
minority  report  of  the  same  board  placed  the  total 
amount  of  Culebra  Cut  excavation  for  an  85-foot  level 
canal  at  53,800,000  cubic  yards,  and  the  majority  re- 
port estimated  the  amount  necessary  at  the  same  point 
for  a  sea-level  canal  with  a  depth  of  40  feet  at  110,- 
000,000  cubic  yards.  In  1908  the  canal  commission, 
in  a  revised  estimate,  placed  the  total  Cut  excavation 
at  about  78,000,000  cubic  yards.  In  1910  it  increased 
it  to  84,000,000;  in  1911  to  89,000,000;  in  1912  to 
nearly  94,000,000;  and  in  1913  to  about  100,000,000. 
The  increase  was  due  partially  to  widening  the  bottom 
width  of  the  channel  in  the  Cut  from  200  to  300  feet, 
authorized  by  President  Roosevelt  in  1908,  an  increase 
of  about  13,000,000  cubic  yards,  and  other  enlarge- 
ments of  the  original  plan,  but  mainly  to  breaks  and 
slides. 

A  careful  study  of  the  geological  structure  of  the 
Cut  had  been  made  in  1898  by  two  eminent  French  en- 
gineers, Philippe  Ziircher  and  Marcel  Bertrans,  the 
latter  a  professor  of  geology  in  the  National  High 
School  of  Mines  at  Paris,  and  in  their  report  they  de- 
clared, in  referring  to  slides: 

The  question  of  these  cavings-in  was  formerly  a 
cause  of  great  anxiety,  but  that  cause  no  longer  exists. 
That  of  Cucaracha  was  partly  due  to  want  of  care  in 
the  method  of  constructing  the  embankments,  and  it 
was  easily  stopped  by  comparatively  simple  works  of 
drainage.  .  .  .  There  are  no  caving  belts  to  fear,  ex- 


186  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

cept  the  clays  of  the  upper  part  which  are  already 
almost  entirely  excavated,  and  if  any  special  precau- 
tions are  to  be  taken  against  cavings-in,  it  would  only 
be  for  the  small  extent  of  about  1  kilometer  (0.62  mile) 
where  the  slope  of  the  clay  is  toward  the  Cut. 

Professor  William  H.  Burr,  who  was  a  member  of 
the  International  Board  of  Consulting  Engineers,  and 
was  a  strenuous  advocate  of  the  sea-level  as  opposed 
to  the  lock-level  type  of  canal,  said  in  his  testimony 
before  the  Senate  Committee  on  Interoceanic  Canals, 
in  March,  1906,  in  regard  to  slides  in  the  Cut : 

All  that  is  necessary  to  remedy  such  &  condition  is 
simply  to  excavate  the  clay  or  to  drain  it  to  keep  the 
water  out.  It  is  not  a  new  problem.  It  is  no  formi- 
dable feature  of  the  work.  It  is  simply  to  be  treated 
down  on  the  Isthmus  as  it  would  be  treated  here. 
There  would  be  no  slipping  of  the  clay  in  the  vicinity 
of  the  Culebra  Cut  if  it  is  drained,  as  it  may  be,  or  if 
portions  of  it,  where  it  may  readily  be  treated  in  that 
way,  are  excavated.  It  is  not  a  material  difficulty; 
it  is  not  an  obstacle  to  the  construction  of  a  sea-level 
canal.  It  simply  means  drainage  and  excavation;  that 
is  all.  I  might  say  that  I  speak,  perhaps,  with  undue 
emphasis  on  this  point,  because  I  have  been  over  every 
foot  of  that  ground  myself,  and  in  view  of  my  pre- 
vious experience  with  slipping  clay,  I  speak  not  from 
hearsay  or  opinion  but  actual  observation  over  many 
years. 

These  opinions  were  based  mainly  upon  what  is 
known  as  the  Cucaracha  slide,  on  the  east  bank  of  the 
canal,  just  south  of  Gold  Hill,  which  is  the  highest 
point  of  the  Culebra  Cut.  This  first  began  to  move 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  187 

in  1887,  during  the  most  active  period  of  French  opera- 
tions, and  I  am  assured  by  persons  who  were  on  the 
isthmus  at  the  time  that  it  caused  a  feeling  among 
the  French  engineers  that  very  nearly  approached  con- 
sternation, they  seeing  in  it  a  most  formidable  obstacle 
to  the  sea-level  canal  which  they  were  engaged  in  con- 
structing. Be  that  as  it  may,  the  French  engineers 
at  once  ceased  operations  in  that  vicinity  and  never 
resumed  them.  In  consequence  the  slide  was  quies- 
cent during  the  remaining  period  of  French  work. 
Scarcely  had  the  Americans  begun  excavation  there  in 
1905  when  the  slide  began  to  move  again  in  the  first 
wet  season,  and  to  resume  movement  in  the  succeed- 
ing wet  season.  On  October  4,  1907,  after  a  period  of 
very  heavy  rains.,  it  started  afresh  in  the  night.  With- 
out warning,  it  shot  almost  completely  across  the 
canal  prism,  overwhelming  two  steam-shovels  in  its 
course,  covering  all  the  dirt-train  railway  tracks,  and 
for  ten  days  maintained  a  glacier-like  movement  of 
fourteen  feet  each  twenty-four  hours.  During  that 
time  it  filled  the  canal  prism  and  piled  up  a  mass  of 
material  thirty  feet  in  height  on  the  west  bank.  Nearly 
half  a  million  cubic  yards  of  material  were  thrown  into 
the  canal  prism  by  this  movement,  and  the  operation  of 
dirt  trains  through  this  part  of  the  Cut  was  delayed 
for  about  a  month.  In  January,  1913,  during  the  dry 
season,  it  again  became  active,  carrying  about  2,500,- 
000  cubic  yards  more  into  the  Cut,  blocking  all  tracks 
in  the  bottom  of  the  canal,  and  bringing  the  total  slide 
excavation  at  this  point  up  to  about  7,000,000  cubic 
yards. 


188  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

The  Cucaracha  slide  was  the  largest  of  those  classed 
as  normal  or  gravity  slides.  These  occurred  where 
there  was  a  top  layer  of  porous  material  resting  upon  a 
sloping  surface  of  rock  or  other  harder  material.  The 
water  of  heavy  rains,  sinking  through  the  overlying 
porous  material,  caused  a  muddy,  slippery  zone  to 
form  between  that  and  the  harder  material  below, 
sending  the  entire  top  layer,  of  a  thickness  varying 
from  ten  to  forty  feet,  into  the  canal  prism.  Slides  of 
another  type,  involving  a  very  much  greater  amount 
of  excavation,  are  cjassed  by  geologists  as  structural 
break  or  deformation  slides.  These  were  due  to  un- 
stable geological  rock  formations,  steepness  and  height 
of  slopes,  and  effects  of  Blasting.  As  excavation  ad- 
vanced, and  lateral  support  was  removed  from  the 
high  banks  in  the  deepest  portions  of  Culebra  Cut,  the 
underlying  layer  of  rock  of  poor  quality  and  soft  ma- 
terial, unable  to  sustain  the  enormous  weight  above 
it,  was  crushed  and  forced  laterally  into  the  prism  of 
the  canal,  causing  a  heaving  of  the  bottom  to  a  height 
varying  from  15  to  30  feet,  and  a  shearing  and  settling 
of  the  slopes.  The  most  formidable  slides  of  this  char- 
acter occurred  during  the  dry  season,  and  were  in  no 
way  due  to  saturation  by  rainfall.  They  were  com- 
pletely unforeseen  by  any  of  the  engineers  who  had 
studied  conditions  in  the  Culebra  Cut  before  active 
operations  were  begun  by  Americans.  The  two  most 
serious  occurred  on  opposite  sides  of  the  canal,  one  north 
of  Gold  Hill,  and  the  other  in  front  of  the  village  of 
Culebra.  That  on  the  west  bank  covered  an  area  of 
75  acres,  involved  the  removal  of  about  10,000,000 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  189 

cubic  yards  of  material,  and  invaded  the  site  of  the 
village  to  such  an  extent  that  a  large  number  of  its 
buildings  had  to  be  removed  or  demolished.  That  on 
the  east  bank  covered  an  area  of  50  acres  and  involved 
the  removal  of  about  7,000,000  cubic  yards  of  material. 
Together  these  two  slides  widened  the  top  width  of  the 
canal  at  this  point  from  840  to  about  2;000  feet. 

There  were  at  various  times  during  canal  construc- 
tion 22  slides  of  different  kinds,  covering  an  area  ag- 
gregating 220  acres,  and  compelling  an  excavation  of 
about  25,000,000  cubic  yards,  or  about  one-fourth  of 
the  excavation  required  for  the  Culebra  Cut.  In  addi- 
tion to  the  extra  work  required  for  removal  of  this 
material,  the  interruption  of  work  and  general  annoy- 
ance caused  by  the  slides  must  be  taken  into  account. 
Colonel  Gaillard,  the  division  engineer  in  charge  of  the 
work  in  Culebra  Cut,  estimated  the  amount  of  railway 
track  that  was  destroyed  by  them  within  8.8  miles  of 
the  Cut  at  fully  200  miles,  and  that  they  delayed  the 
completion  of  the  excavation  in  the  Cut  by  at  least  a 
year  and  a  half.  This  delay  did  not  affect  the  date  of 
canal  completion,  however,  because  that  depended 
upon  the  concrete  and  gate  work  in  the  locks.  In  spite 
of  the  addition  of  the  25,000,000  cubic  yards  of  slide 
excavation,  the  Culebra  Cut  was  ready  for  use  when 
the  condition  of  the  lock  work  allowed  the  water  to  be 
turned  in. 

In  regard  to  the  method  used  in  the  treatment  of 
slides,  Colonel  Gaillard's  views,  published  in  Novem- 
ber, 1912,*  are  those  of  an  expert  and  of  the  first  value: 

*  Scientific  American,  Nov.  9,  1912. 


190  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

Innumerable  plans  for  treating  the  slides  have  been 
suggested  by  interested  and  patriotic  citizens  through- 
out the  country,  but  not  one  of  them  has  proven  prac- 
ticable. The  only  successful  method  of  treating  the 
slides  or  breaks,  once  the  material  is  in  motion,  is  to 
dig  it  out  and  haul  it  away  until  the  slide  comes  to 
rest  upon  reaching  the  angle  of  repose  for  the  particular 
material  then  in  motion.  This  angle  of  repose  varies 
much  in  different  localities,  depending  upon  the  char- 
acter of  the  material  composing  the  slide,  the  angle  of 
inclination  of  the  strata  and  the  angles  of  the  numer- 
ous dikes,  faults,  seams,  etc.  At  the  Cucaracha  slide 
the  angle  of  repose  corresponds  to  a  slope  a  little 
steeper  than  one  vertical  to  five  horizontal,  while  on 
the  west  bank  of  the  Cut  at  the  town  of  Culebra,  the 
material  is  still  moving  slightly  on  a  slope  of  about  one 
vertical  to  five  horizontal. 

In  one  or  two  slides  which  have  developed  in  the 
Cut,  the  surface  on  which  the  material  was  sliding  had 
a  slope  of  one  vertical  to  ten  horizontal,  and  in  the 
case  of  another  slide  on  the  west  bank  of  the  canal, 
north  of  the  village  of  Culebra,  the  moving  material, 
which  consisted  of  stratified  rock,  was  moving  en 
masse,  at  the  rate  of  three  feet  in  twenty-four  hours, 
on  a  lignite  layer  about  six  inches  thick,  which  had  a 
slope  of  about  one  vertical  to  seven  horizontal  and  was 
underlaid  by  layers  of  sedimentary  rock,  which  did 
not  move.  A  rather  remarkable  thing  about  this  last 
slide  was  that,  like  two  or  three  other  slides,  it  de- 
veloped in  the  dry  season  and  moved  at  a  faster  rate 
during  the  four  months  when  there  was  no  rain  than 
it  has  done  since  the  rains  have  come. 

The  writer  is  aware  that  there  is  a  very  general  im- 
pression that  slides  are  due  solely  to  saturation  by 
rainfall,  or  underground  water,  'of  the  material  which 
is  in  motion,  and  while  this  is  to  a  great  extent  correct 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  191 

for  the  slides  like  the  one  at  Cucaracha,  yet  there  have 
been  three  large  slides,  involving  in  all  nearly  two  mil- 
lion cubic  yards  of  material,  which  developed  during 
the  dry  season  and  were  composed  wholly  of  material 
so  dry  that  when  loaded  on  the  trains,  the  cars  were 
almost  hidden  during  the  windy  season  by  clouds  of 
dust.  One  of  these  slides  was  moving  on  a  surface  which 
had  a  slope  of  one  vertical  to  six  horizontal,  and  its 
rate  of  advance  was  about  two  and  one-half  feet  per 
day  for  several  months.  A  steam  shovel  made  one 
hundred  and  three  cuts  across  the  toe  of  this  slide  with 
the  position  of  the  loading  track  unchanged. 

But  while  the  slides  were  an  annoyance  and  added 
heavily  to  the  task  in  hand,  they  were  of  great  value  in 
demonstrating  the  utter  impossibility  of  constructing  a 
sea-level  canal  across  the  isthmus,  thus  vindicating  the 
wisdom  of  the  minority  members  of  the  International 
Consulting  Board  and  the  foresight  of  President  Roose- 
velt, Secretary  Taft,  and  the  first  canal  commission  in 
favoring  and  securing  the  adoption  of  the  lock  plan.  A 
sea-level  canal  would  cost  billions  of  money,  in  all 
probability  would  never  be  completed,  and  if  com- 
pleted, could  not  be  kept  open  for  navigation.  This 
is  virtually  the  universal  opinion  among  engineers  to- 
day. 

The  work  in  Culebra  Cut  was  under  the  direction  of 
W.  E.  Dauchy  as  division  engineer  from  November, 
1904,  till  July,  1906.  He  was  appointed  by  Mr.  Wal- 
lace, and  retained  by  Mr.  Stevens  until  the  latter  date. 
He  was  succeeded  by  D.  W.  Bolich,  who  retained  the 
position  of  division  engineer  after  the  Goethals  admin- 
istration came  in,  on  April  1, 1907,  acting  under  Colonel 


192  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

D.  D.  Gaillard  as  head  of  the  Department  of  Excavation 
and  Dredging.  He  retained  the  position  till  May,  1908, 
when  he  resigned  and  was  succeeded  by  L.  K.  Rourke. 
On  July  1,  1908,  a  new  organization  was  created,  con- 
sisting of  three  divisions — Atlantic,  Central,  and  Pa- 
cific, and  Colonel  Gaillard  was  made  division  engineer 
of  the  Central  Division  which  included  Culebra  Cut. 
L.  K.  Rourke  was  made  assistant  division  engineer,  re- 
taining that  position  till  June  1,  1910,  when  he  resigned 
to  accept  the  position  of  superintendent  of  streets  in 
Boston,  Mass.  He  was  the  author  of  the  organiza- 
tion for  work  in  the  Culebra  Cut  which  was  continued 
in  operation  with  remarkable  success  till  the  comple- 
tion of  the  task.  On  his  retirement  the  position  of 
assistant  division  engineer  was  abolished,  and  Colonel 
Gaillard  assumed  personally  its  duties. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
THE  WONDERFUL  CULEBRA  CUT 

THE  special  wonder  of  the  canal,  its  spectacular  show- 
piece, was  and  still  is  the  Culebra  Cut.  Those  who 
see  it  first  from  the  decks  of  passing  ships,  however, 
can  form  only  a  very  inadequate  conception  of  its  ap- 
pearance during  the  final  years  of  construction,  when 
the  fight  of  man  against  Nature  was  at  its  height,  Nature 
striking  back  in  a  quick  succession  of  terrific  blows. 
Then,  indeed,  it  was  one  of  the  world's  wonders,  and 
by  no  means  the  least.  Nothing  else  in  the  work  was 
comparable  to  it,  for  this  alone  was  destructive,  while 
the  other  great  features  were  constructive,  the  mere 
piling  up  of  great  masses  of  earth  and  concrete  in  ac- 
cordance with  well-established  rules  and  without  seri- 
ous obstruction  or  opposition.  Experience  and  trained 
ability  were  necessary  for  the  proper  accomplishment 
of  these  tasks,  and  their  unprecedented  magnitude 
made  them  interesting,  but  there  was  little  in  them  to 
arouse  enthusiasm  or  that  could  be  called  inspiring. 

With  the  struggle  in  the  Cut,  it  was  quite  another 
matter.  Here  the  problems  were  new  and  strange. 
As  John  Hay  once  said  of  one  of  the  most  turbulent 
of  the  South  American  countries,  the  isthmus  was  a 
"land  of  the  fantastic  and  the  unexpected."  No  one 

193 


194  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

could  say  when  the  sun  went  down  at  night  what  the 
condition  of  the  Cut  would  be  when  the  sun  arose  the 
next  morning.  The  work  of  months  and  years  might 
be  blotted  out  by  an  avalanche  of  earth  or  the  toppling 
over  of  a  small  mountain  of  rock. 

It  was  a  task  to  try  men's  souls,  and  it  was  one  also 
to  kindle  in  them  a  joy  of  combat  which  no  repulse 
could  chill  and  a  buoyant  faith  in  ultimate  victory 
which  nothing  could  shake. 

From  all  quarters  of  the  globe  came  engineers  and 
others  engaged  in  construction  operations  to  view  the 
struggle.  They  came  in  doubt  often  as  to  the  outcome, 
but  they  went  away  with  all  doubt  removed.  What 
had  given  them  confidence  was  a  close  view  of  a  work- 
ing organization  the  like  of  which,  for  efficiency,  perfec- 
tion of  detail,  precision,  and  smoothness  of  operation, 
unity  of  spirit  and  enthusiasm,  they  confessed  frankly 
never  to  have  seen  before.  For  an  organization  of 
that  character,  they  said,  no  obstacle  was  insurmount- 
able. They  were  not  surprised,  after  witnessing  this 
wonderful  human  machine  at  work,  that  slide  after 
slide  went  into  the  Cut  without  causing  the  faintest 
shadow  of  uneasiness  to  any  one  concerned,  and  with- 
out delaying  the  final  completion  of  the  task.  A  dis- 
tinguished American  engineer,  who  himself  had  di- 
rected some  of  the  largest  construction  enterprises  in 
the  country,  after  watching  the  organization  in  opera- 
tion, wrote  of  it  to  a  friend:  "I  have  never  seen  its 
superior — such  perfect  co-ordination  and  such  ener- 
getic prosecution  at  every  point,  all  under  absolute  con- 
trol. It  is  something  that  everyone  from  the  chief 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  195 

down  is  entitled  to  the  greatest  credit  for  and  in  which 
everyone  can  justly  take  the  greatest  pride.  I  went 
to  the  Isthmus  with  my  mind  made  up  to  be  impressed, 
but  the  actualities  exceeded  my  anticipations." 

The  spectacle  exceeded  all  anticipations,  for  nowhere 
else  on  earth  was  there  to  be  found  a  display  of  human 
activity  on  so  large  a  scale  and  with  so  marvellous 
a  setting.  It  was  this  combination  which  added  the 
final  touch  of  the  extraordinary  to  the  picture.  To 
stand  at  the  southern  end  of  the  Cut,  between  the  tow- 
ering, majestic  hills  of  the  Great  Divide,  was  an  ex- 
perience which  few  who  had  ever  had  it  could  easily 
forget.  On  either  side  were  the  grim,  forbidding,  per- 
pendicular walls  of  rock,  and  in  the  steadily  widening 
and  deepening  chasm  between — the  first  man-made 
canyon  of  the  world — a  swarming  mass  of  men  and  rush- 
ing railway  trains,  monster-like  machines,  all  working 
with  ceaseless  activity,  all  animated  seemingly  by 
human  intelligence,  without  confusion  or  conflict  any- 
where. Throughout  the  eight  miles  of  the  Cut  the 
scene  varied  only  in  the  setting.  The  rock  walls  gave 
place  here  and  there  to  the  ragged  sloping  banks  of 
rock  and  earth  left  by  the  great  slides,  covering  many 
acres  and  reaching  far  back  into  the  hills,  but  the  cease- 
less human  activity  prevailed  everywhere.  Everybody 
knew  what  he  was  to  do  and  was  doing  it,  apparently 
without  verbal  orders  and  without  getting  in  the  way 
of  anybody  else.  It  was  organization  reduced  to  a 
science — the  endless-chain  system  of  activity  in  per- 
fect operation. 

Instead  of  detracting  from  the  spectacular  or  pictur- 


196  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

esque  effects  of  the  natural  setting  of  the  work,  the 
slides  enhanced  them  by  adding  a  distinct  touch  of  awe, 
possibly  of  terror.  They  revealed  more  clearly  than 
ever  the  tremendous  difficulties  of  the  task  and  the 
magnitude  of  the  victory  which  was  being  achieved 
in  surmounting  them. 

The  effect  of  a  trip  through  the  Cut  while  the  work 
was  in  full  progress  was  the  same  on  all  visitors — 
amazement  coupled  with  admiration.  Tourists  from 
the  United  States  emerged  invariably  in  a  glow  of 
patriotic  enthusiasm,  with  an  irrepressible  desire  to 
remove  their  hats  and  cheer  for  the  American  flag — 
to  let  the  "eagle  scream."  Those  from  other  lands, 
especially  if  they  were  engineers,  and  there  were  many 
of  these  from  all  the  leading  countries  of  the  world,  were 
scarcely  less  enthusiastic,  and  were  astonished  at  the 
magnitude  of  the  task  and  unstinted  in  expressions  of 
admiration  for  the  manner  in  which  it  was  being  ac- 
complished. I  have  seen  many  of  these  during  my  six 
years'  connection  with  the  work,  but  not  one  who  did 
not  declare  it  to  be  the  finest  exhibition  of  engineer- 
ing organization  and  execution  that  he  had  ever  wit- 
nessed. Generally,  the  more  the  observer  knew  of 
engineering  and  construction  work,  the  higher  and 
warmer  was  his  appreciation. 

What  most  impressed  all  observers,  next  to  the  or- 
ganization, not  merely  of  the  Cut,  but  of  the  entire  work, 
was  the  loyalty  and  enthusiasm  of  the  force.  An  emi- 
nent visitor  from  Japan  was  especially  struck  by  this, 
being  apparently  much  surprised  at  its  manifestation. 
"What  are  your  impressions?"  he  was  asked  at  the 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  197 

close  of  a  careful  inspection  of  all  parts  of  the  work, 
extending  over  a  period  of  several  days.  "  Is  the  work  as 
great  as  you  anticipated?"  "Oh,  very  much  greater," 
he  replied;  "it  is  stupendous,  magnificent,  colossal! 
No  nation  but  the  great,  rich  American  nation  could 
build  this  canal.  Japan  has  much  to  learn  from  you." 
What  he  saw  on  every  hand  as  he  moved  about  was 
not  so  much  the  wealth,  resources,  and  power  dis- 
played in  the  task,  but  the  spirit  of  the  nation  itself 
as  revealed  in  the  zeal  and  enthusiasm  of  the  men  who 
were  doing  the  work.  In  the  creation  and  develop- 
ment of  this  spirit  the  struggle  in  the  Cut  was  the  most 
powerful  factor. 


CHAPTER  IX 

CHANGES  IN  CANAL  PLANS  —  LARGER  LOCKS  AND  WIDER 
CHANNEL  — ESTIMATES  OF  TOTAL  COST 

DURING  1907  work  was  prosecuted  with  such  vigor  at 
all  points  along  the  line  of  the  canal  that  a  grand  total 
of  15,765,290  cubic  yards  of  excavation  was  accom- 
plished. In  March  the  million  cubic-yard  limit  was 
reached  for  the  first  time  and  passed.  There  was  a 
decrease  in  May  and  June,  due  partly  to  the  rainy  sea- 
son and  partly  to  temporary  trouble  with  steam-shovel 
operators  over  the  question  of  wages,  but  in  August  a 
total  of  1,274,000  cubic  yards  was  reached,  an  achieve- 
ment which  called  from  President  Roosevelt  a  con- 
gratulatory message  by  cable  to  Colonel  Goethals. 
There  was  a  large  increase  in  September,  October,  and 
November,  and  in  December  the  2,000,000  mark  was 
reached  and  passed  in  a  total  of  2,200,000  cubic  yards, 
making  the  grand  total  for  the  year  15,765,290,  or  an 
average  of  over  1,300,000  a  month.  This  was  more 
than  double  the  amount  excavated  during  the  preceding 
three  years,  which  Jiad  aggregated  less  than  7,000,000 
cubic  yards. 

Changes  in  the  plan  of  the  canal  were  made  in  1908 
which  added  about  $18,500,000  to  the  cost  of  construc- 
tion. On  January  15  President  Roosevelt  approved 

198 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  199 

a  resolution  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  increas- 
ing the  width  of  the  locks  of  the  canal  from  100  to  110 
feet,  in  accordance  with  an  opinion  of  the  General  Board 
of  the  navy  that  such  an  increase  was  desirable.  This 
added  about  $5,500,000  to  the  cost  of  construction. 
On  October  23  the  President  authorized  the  enlarge- 
ment of  the  bottom  width  of  the  canal,  throughout  four 
and  a  half  miles  of  the  deepest  part  of  the  Culebra  Cut, 
from  200  to  300  feet,  making  300  feet  the  minimum 
width  at  any  point  in  the  entire  canal.  This  enlarge- 
ment required  about  13,000,000  cubic  yards  of  addi- 
tional excavation,  and  entailed  an  extra  expense  of 
about  $13,000,000.  Under  the  original  plan  this  sec- 
tion of  the  canal  had  a  bottom  width  of  200  feet.  This 
and  other  changes  in  the  original  plan,  all  in  the  direc- 
tion of  enlargement,  had  increased  the  total  excava- 
tion, estimated  by  the  authors  of  the  project  at  103,- 
796,000  cubic  yards,  to  174,667,000,  or  by  more  than 
two-thirds.  After  these  changes  had  been  made  the 
total  cost  of  the  canal,  including  the  $40,000,000  paid 
to  the  French  canal  company  and  the  $10,000,000 
paid  to  the  Republic  of  Panama,  was  estimated  by  the 
Isthmian  Canal  Commission  at  $375,201,000.  This  es- 
timate was  announced  to  the  House  Committee  on 
Appropriations  by  the  chief  engineer,  Colonel  Goethals, 
at  Washington,  on  February  15,  1909,  and  was  em- 
bodied in  the  annual  report  of  the  commission  for  that 
year. 

So  far  as  excavation  was  concerned,  1908  was  the 
'"record  year"  in  canal  construction.  During  that 
year  the  plant,  or  working  equipment,  reached  its 


200  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

maximum.  There  were  in  service  101  steam-shovels, 
about  300  locomotives,  about  4,000  dirt  or  spoil  cars  of 
various  kinds,  46  car  unloaders  or  ploughs,  25  spreaders, 
and  10  trackshifters.  The  railroad  trackage  had  been 
increased  from  74  miles  in  1904  to  160  miles,  with  50 
miles  of  main  track  and  35  miles  of  double  track  on 
the  Panama  Railroad  line,  all  equipped  with  new  and 
heavy  rails.  The  efficiency  of  the  working  force, 
through  experience,  had  more  than  doubled  during  the 
previous  two  years.  Because  of  familiarity  with  cli- 
matic conditions,  nearly  as  much  work  was  accomplished 
during  each  of  the  eight  or  nine  months  of  the  rainy 
season  as  during  those  of  the  dry  season.  As  a  result, 
the  total  excavation  of  1908  exceeded  37,000,000  cubic 
yards,  and  the  average  for  each  month  of  the  year,  wet 
or  dry,  was  about  3,090,000  cubic  yards.  The  high- 
est total  for  a  single  month  in  1908  was  that  of  March, 
which  was  3,487,287  cubic  yards.  This  was  surpassed 
in  March,  1909,  when  for  the  first  and  only  time 
during  canal  construction  the  four-million  mark  was 
reached,  with  a  total  of  4,062,632  cubic  yards. 

This  was  the  record-mark  in  excavation.  The 
monthly  totals  began  to  drop  after  that  date,  for  the 
reason  that  in  several  localities  the  work  had  been 
completed  and  the  field  of  operation  had  been  nar- 
rowed. From  that  time  forward  excavation  ceased 
to  be  the  primary  and  became  the  secondary  element 
in  canal  work,  the  construction  of  locks  and  dams 
passing  into  the  first  position.  The  excavation  of 
1909,  consequently,  while  exceeding  35,000,000,  fell 
2,000,000  below  that  of  1908.  The  grand  total  for  the 


Old  village  of  Gatun  from  dam  site,  November,  1906. 


Canal  Channel,  looking  south  from  San  Pablo  to  Caimito.     Width  of  chan- 
nel, 800  feet;  surface  of  water,  55  feet  above  sea-level.     October,  1912. 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION          201 

two  years  exceeded  72,000,000  cubic  yards,  making 
the  average  each  month  for  that  period  3,000,000  cubic 
yards.  In  1910  and  1911  the  total  exceeded  31,000,000 
cubic  yards,  the  monthly  average  being  over  2,600,000 
cubic  yards,  and  in  1912  it  exceeded  30,000,000.  The 
grand  total  for  the  five  years  of  greatest  activity,  1908, 
1909, 1910,  1911,  and  1912,  exceeded  165,500,000  cubic 
yards,  an  average  of  over  2,750,000  cubic  yards  a 
month,  comprising  more  than  75  per  cent  of  the  exca- 
vation of  the  entire  canal. 


CHAPTER  X 

GATUN  DAM  AND  LOCKS  — FIRST  SUGGESTION  OF  THE 
SITE  —  ITS  NATURAL  ADVANTAGES  —  HUMOROUS  AND 
OTHER  ASSAULTS 

CREDIT  for  the  first  suggestion  of  Gatun  as  the  site  for 
a  great  dam  belongs  to  Godin  de  Lepinay,  chief  en- 
gineer of  bridges  and  roads,  who  was  one  of  the  French 
delegates  to  the  Lesseps  International  Congress  at 
Paris,  in  1879.  This  able  and  far-seeing  engineer  was 
one  of  the  foremost  of  the  opponents  in  that  congress 
of  the  Lesseps  project  for  a  sea-level  canal  across  the 
isthmus.  He  was  a  member  of  the  committee  on  tech- 
nique in  the  congress  which  had  charge  of  technical 
questions  relating  to  the  proposed  canal,  including 
physical  conditions,  cost  of  construction,  operation, 
and  maintenance,  and  facility  and  security  of  opera- 
tion. He  made  repeated  efforts  to  obtain  from  Les- 
seps and  his  sea-level  advocates  satisfactory  estimates 
on  these  points,  but  could  get  only  the  vaguest  guesses. 
Having  had  personal  experience  in  directing  work  in 
the  tropics — being,  in  fact,  the  only  French  engineer 
in  the  congress  with  such  experience — M.  de  Lepinay 
made  estimates  of  his  own  in  regard  to  the  costs  of  a 
sea-level  canal,  and  reached  the  conclusion  that  they 

were  so  great  as  to  be  prohibitive.    He  prepared  a 

202 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  203 

paper  which  he  read  to  the  congress  setting  forth  this 
conclusion,  and  proposing  a  canal  with  locks,  with  a 
dam  at  Gatun.  In  support  of  this  plan  he  advanced 
arguments  which  were  virtually  identical  with  those 
used  successfully  a  quarter  of  a  century  later  by  the 
advocates  of  the  present  canal. 

He  contended  that  a  lock  canal  could  be  constructed 
for  at  least  500,000,000  francs  ($100,000,000)  less  than 
a  sea-level  canal;  could  be  constructed  in  much  shorter 
time,  and  at  less  cost  of  human  life;  would  be  easier 
and  quicker  in  navigation;  and  would  make  the  Cha- 
gres  River  not  .a  menace  as  a  canal  at  sea-level  would, 
but  an  ally  and  aid  to  navigation. 

M.  de  Lepinay's  paper  made  a  strong  impression  on 
the  congress,  but  Lesseps  would  not  consider  it  or 
permit  it  to  be  put  to  a  vote.  Its  author's  views  had 
such  weight,  however,  with  the  committee  on  tech- 
nique that  when  the  final  vote  on  the  Lesseps  proj- 
ect was  taken  only  nineteen  of  its  forty-two  members 
voted  ay,  while  five  voted  no,  fourteen  were  absent, 
and  four  declined  to  vote. 

The  Gatun  suggestion  had  evidently  attracted  atten- 
tion in  the  United  States,  for  in  1880  it  was  advanced 
by  Ashbel  Welch,  an  American  engineer,  in  a  paper 
before  the  American  Society  of  Civil  Engineers,  and 
again  by  C.  D.  Ward  before  the  same  society  in  1904. 
It  was  not  included  in  the  lock-canal  project  adopted 
by  Lesseps  and  the  new  Panama  Canal  company  in 
1887,  when  he  was  compelled  to  abandon  his  sea-level 
plan,  for  that  project  included  one  dam  at  Bohio  and 
another  at  Bas  Obispo,  on  the  Atlantic  side,  with  a 


204  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

double  flight  of  two  locks  at  each  point;  and  duplicate 
single  locks  at  Paraiso,  Pedro  Miguel,  and  Miraflores, 
on  the  Pacific  side,  with  a  summit  elevation  of  about 
one  hundred  feet  above  sea-level.  The  Isthmian  Canal 
Commission  of  1899-1901,  generally  known  as  the 
Walker  commission,  after  its  chairman,  Rear-Admiral 
John  G.  Walker,  U.  S.  N.,  followed  the  suggestion  of 
the  new  Panama  Canal  company  and  recommended 
Bohio  as  the  site  for  a  dam.  Just  how  much  consider- 
ation, if  any,  this  commission  gave  to  the  Gatun  site 
does  not  appear  from  its  report,  for  there  is  no  mention 
of  it;  merely  a  statement  that  "no  location  suitable  for 
a  dam  exists  on  the  Chagres  River  below  Bohio." 
The  Walker  commission  plan  included  two  double  locks 
at  Bohio,  a  lake  with  a  summit  level  of  ninety  feet,  two 
double  locks  at  Pedro  Miguel  and  one  at  Miraflores. 

When  the  first  commission  that  was  appointed  to 
construct  a  canal  at  Panama  began  its  work,  in  1904, 
it  was  proceeding  under  the  authority  of  the  Spooner 
Act  of  1902,  which  provided  merely  for  the  construc- 
tion of  a  "canal  of  sufficient  capacity  and  depth  as 
shall  afford  convenient  passage  for  vessels  of  the  largest 
tonnage  and  greatest  draft  now  in  use,  and  such  as  may 
be  reasonably  anticipated."  No  specific  type  of  canal 
was  designated,  but  the  general  expectation  was  that 
the  lock  type  would  be  adopted.  Operations  were  be- 
gun with  that  type  in  view,  and  the  engineers  in  charge 
showed  that  they  had  the  Gatun  site  in  mind  by  mak- 
ing surveys  and  soundings  at  that  point  as  well  as  at 
Bohio.  These  had  been  under  way  for  some  weeks 
when  the  first  chief  engineer,  Mr.  Wallace,  took  charge 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  205 

on  July  1,  1904.  He  continued  the  work  during  the 
eleven  months  of  his  administration,  but  he  had  in  the 
meantime  reached  the  conclusion  that  a  sea-level  canal 
was  preferable  to  one  with  locks  and  took  little  inter- 
est in  the  investigations  and  did  not  make  them  suffi- 
ciently thorough  to  be  decisive.  Mr.  Stevens,  who 
succeeded  him  in  July,  1905,  was  impressed  on  his  first 
careful  study  of  the  field  by  the  superior  advantages  of 
the  Gatun  site,  and  had  such  additional  borings  made 
as  convinced  him  of  its  suitableness.  He  recommended 
it  earnestly  both  to  the  canal  commission  and  to  the  In- 
ternational Board  of  Consulting  Engineers  when  that 
body  visited  the  isthmus,  in  1905.  Its  adoption  by  the 
minority  members  of  that  board  in  the  plan  of  canal 
recommended  by  them  and  approved  subsequently  by 
Congress  was  due  largely  to  his  advocacy. 

No  part  of  the  canal  project  was  more  furiously  or 
more  ignorantly  assailed  and  none  has  been  more  lu- 
dicrously misunderstood  than  the  Gatun  Dam.  The 
majority  of  visitors  from  the  United  States  and  else- 
where, who  passed  in  great  swarms  over  the  isthmus 
during  the  final  years  of  construction,  expected  to  see 
a  structure  of  masonry  towering  more  or  less  straight 
into  the  air  for  a  distance  of  several  hundred  feet. 
What  they  did  see  was  a  low-lying  ridge,  which  did  not 
look  in  the  least  like  a  dam,  but  more  like  the  sloping 
bank  of  a  pond  or  river.  James  Bryce,  the  distin- 
guished English  author,  traveller,  and  diplomatist, 
who  visited  the  isthmus  in  September,  1910,  spoke  of 
the  canal  project  as  the  "most  gigantic  effort  yet  made 
by  man  on  this  planet  to  improve  upon  Nature."  No 


206  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

part  of  that  project  is  an  improvement  more  in  har- 
mony with  Nature's  work  than  the  erection  of  this 
dam  at  the  extreme  southern  point  in  the  valley  of  the 
Chagres  where  the  encircling  hills  most  nearly  approach 
each  other.  If  Nature  had  intended  to  place  a  great 
lake  among  the  hills  of  the  isthmus  at  Panama,  she 
would  have  put  a  barrier  across  the  valley  at  this  point. 
It  converts  the  valley  of  the  Chagres  into  a  huge  res- 
ervoir which  impounds  all  the  water  that  flows  into 
it,  not  only  from  the  Chagres  River,  which  is  the  prin- 
cipal source  of  supply,  but  from  many  other  smaller 
streams.  It  is  not  only  as  solid  as  the  everlasting 
hills,  but  more  scientifically  constructed  than  they  are, 
more  pains,  if  one  may  say  so  without  irreverence,  hav- 
ing been  taken  in  its  making.  That  it  will  hold  water 
has  been  demonstrated  to  the  satisfaction  of  everybody 
whose  opinion  has  v^lue.  Tropical  growth  is  cover- 
ing it  with  a  thick  mantle  of  green,  and  all  signs  of 
construction  are  disappearing  from  view. 

The  visitor  stands  on  its  summit  and  asks :  "  Where  is 
the  dam?"  If  he  recalls  the  fierce  and  persistent  as- 
sault which  was  made  upon  both  the  site  and  the 
method  of  construction,  an  assault  which  endured  for 
three  years  and  attracted  the  attention  of  the  whole 
world,  he  will  wonder  what  inspired  it.  It  was  an 
assault  as  unreasoning  as  it  was  venomous.  No 
weapon  was  too  contemptible  or  too  ridiculous  to  be 
used,  and  no  ally  too  unworthy  to  be  welcomed.  En- 
gineers who  had  advocated  the  sea-level  plan  threw 
aside  professional  etiquette  and  even  professional  pride, 
and  sometimes  openly,  but  oftener  anonymously,  gave 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION          207 

the  color  of  expert  knowledge  to  gross  and  shameless 
misrepresentation.  Foreign  engineers,  some  of  whom 
had  been  connected  with  the  Lesseps  failure,  were 
given  front  rank  in  the  onslaught,  and  their  views  com- 
manded unlimited  space  in  portions  of  the  American 
press,  in  ludicrous  disregard  of  the  obvious  fact  that 
if  there  were  in  the  world  persons  whom  it  behooved 
to  keep  silent,  they  were  those  who  had  attempted  to 
perform  the  task  in  hand  and  had  failed.  Every  man 
with  a  canal  plan  of  his  own,  or  with  an  invention  he 
wished  to  have  adopted  for  canal  work;  every  con- 
tractor whose  bid  had  been  rejected  by  the  canal  com- 
mission— all  these  were  sure  of  a  hearing  in  this  chorus 
of  misrepresentation  and  defamation. 

No  rumor  was  too  ridiculous  to  be  credited.  An 
unconscious  humorist,  eager  for  journalistic  fame,  sent 
to  an  American  newspaper  a  report  that  a  great  under- 
ground lake  had  been  discovered  under  the  Gatun 
Dam — and  the  newspapers  published  it,  without  hint 
of  a  grin!  This  feat  excited  the  ambition  of  a  rival, 
who  was  an  equally  unconscious  humorist,  and  he, 
when  an  insignificant  slump  in  one  of  the  toes  of  the 
as  yet  unbuilt  Gatun  Dam  occurred,  cabled  to  New 
York  and  the  world  that  the  dam  had  "sunk."  These 
two  grotesque  "yarns" — underground  lake  and  sinking 
dam — coming  one  after  the  other  upon  a  public  that 
had  been  educated  to  uneasiness  by  the  persistent  as- 
sault on  the  Gatun  site,  were  accepted  at  their  face 
value.  They  spread  instantly,  not  only  throughout 
the  United  States,  but  over  Europe,  carrying  every- 
where with  them  doubt  about  the  canal  project. 


208  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

So  wide-spread  was  the  uneasiness  created,  that  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  in  January,  1909,  requested  Secretary 
Taft  to  go  to  the  isthmus  for  a  personal  inspection  and 
appointed  to  go  with  him  a  special  commission,*  com- 
posed of  seven  of  the  country's  most  eminent  civil  en- 
gineers with  instructions  to  make  a  thorough  investiga- 
tion and  "report  especially  upon  the  feasibility  and 
safety  of  the  Gatun  Dam  project."  Secretary  Taft, 
accompanied  by  Mrs.  Taft  and  the  seven  engineers,  ar- 
rived on  the  isthmus  on  January  29  and  remained  till 
February  7.  This  was  Mr.  Taft's  fifth  visit  as  Secre- 
tary of  War.  He  made  two  visits  subsequently  as 
President,  in  1910  and  1912,  being  again  accompanied 
on  the  latter  by  Mrs.  Taft.  As  was  his  invariable  cus- 
tom in  all  his  visits,  he  devoted  nearly  every  hour  of 
the  day,  in  company  on  this  occasion  with  the  en- 
gineers of  the  special  commission,  to  a  thorough  inspec- 
tion of  all  parts  of  the  work,  and  gave  up  the  evenings 
to  receptions  and  meetings  of  employes  at  which  he 
made  addresses.  In  his  address  in  1909  he  warmly 
praised  the  manner  and  spirit  in  which  the  work  was 
being  carried  forward  and  predicted  certain  and  bril- 
liant success.  On  his  way  back  to  Washington,  in  an 
informal  speech  at  Meriden,  Miss.,  he  said: 

I  do  not  care  whether  you  are  Democrats  or  Repub- 
licans, you  want  the  work  done,  and  when  the  army 
engineers  who  are  doing  this  work  are  giving  all  their 
time  to  the  carrying  out  of  this  work,  you  are  not  men 
to  go  back  on  them  or  to  believe  every  idle  story  that 

*  Frederic  P.  Stearns,  Arthur  P.  Davis,  Henry  A.  Allen,  James  D. 
Schuyler,  Isham  Randolph,  John  R.  Freeman,  Allen  Hazen. 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION          209 

comes  from  the  mouth  of  some  politician  who  is  seeking 
to  make  himself  prominent,  or  to  give  himself  the  ad- 
vertisement of  a  little  unfounded  sensational  statement. 
That  work  is  being  done  honestly.  I  know  what  I 
am  talking  about.  The  Canal  will  be  built,  and  all  the 
windy  opposition  that  comes  merely  from  a  desire  to 
exalt  and  exploit  the  man  who  makes  himself  respon- 
sible will  not  obstruct  it. 

On  February  16,  the  engineers  made  an  elaborate  re- 
port to  the  President  in  which  they  declared  unani- 
mously that  a  full  study  of  the  subject  had  left  no  doubt 
in  their  minds  "as  to  the  safe,  tight,  and  durable  quality 
of  the  Gatun  Dam,"  and  that  they  were  satisfied  that 
"the  dams  and  locks,  the  lock  gates,  and  all  other  en- 
gineering structures  involved  in  the  lock-canal  project 
are  feasible  and  safe,  and  that  they  can  be  depended 
upon  to  perform  with  certainty  their  respective  func- 
tions." 

In  sending  the  report  to  Congress,  on  February  17, 
President  Roosevelt  said:  "This  report  not  only  deter- 
mines definitely  the  type  of  canal,  but  makes  it  evi- 
dent that  hereafter  attack  on  the  type — the  lock  type — 
is  in  reality  merely  attack  upon  the  policy  of  building 
any  canal  at  all." 

Shortly  before  Secretary  Taft  and  the  engineers  had 
gone  to  the  isthmus,  Mr.  John  F.  Stevens,  the  prede- 
cessor of  Colonel  Goethals  as  chief  engineer,  published 
a  letter  *  in  which  he  expressed  the  opinion  that  the 
attack  on  the  Gatun  Dam  was  in  the  interest  of  the 
rejected  Nicaraguan  project,  adding: 

*  Engineering  News,  December  31,  1908. 


210  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

The  question  of  the  advisability  of  building  an 
Interoceanic  Canal  has  nothing  whatever  to  do  with 
the  matter.  The  people  have  decided  they  want  the 
canal  and  they  are  ready  to  pay  for  it.  The  choice  of 
its  location  has  been  wisely  made,  and  the  work  prop- 
erly planned.  It  is  in  competent  hands,  and  is  being 
executed  with  a  rapidity  that  surprises  even  its  friends. 
And  the  thing  to  do  is  to  extend  to  Colonel  Goethals 
and  his  assistants  all  the  encouragement  and  moral 
help  possible,  which  the  importance  of  the  work  de- 
mands. And  the  engineering  world  will  have  every 
reason  to  be  proud  of  the  result  when  it  is  an  accom- 
plished fact. 

The  publication  of  the  report  and  the  plain  and  truth- 
ful characterizations  by  the  President,  Secretary  Taft, 
and  Mr.  Stevens  of  the  real  motives  of  the  prolonged 
assault  upon  the  canal  work  put  an  end  to  the  agi- 
tation. A  few  feeble  and  spasmodic  efforts  were 
made  subsequently  to  revive  it;  but  these,  too,  ceased 
in  August,  1909,  when  Congress  authorized  for  canal 
construction  a  bond  issue  of]  $290,569,000,  in  addition 
to  previous  issues,  bringing  the  total  up  to  the  $375,- 
000,000  estimated  as  necessary  for  constructing  the 
canal. 

As  the  visitor  to  the  isthmus  to-day  stands  at  Gatun 
and  looks  over  the  locks  and  the  low-lying  dam  he  can- 
not fail  to  wonder,  if  he  is  familiar  with  this  long  and 
venomous  assault,  what  it  was  all  about.  The  dam  fits 
so  completely  and  so  unobtrusively  into  the  natural 
conformation  of  the  region  that  it  does  not  seem  to  be 
at  all  artificial,  or  the  work  of  man.  It  is  so  low  and 
flat,  so  broad  and  solid,  and  so  apparently  a  part  of  the 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION          211 

everlasting  hills  themselves,  that  it  seems  incredible 
that  intelligent  men  should  ever  have  raised  the  ques- 
tion of  its  stability  and  efficiency.  Like  the  great 
lake  whose  waters  it  holds  so  surely  in  place,  it  looks 
for  all  the  world  as  if  it  had  been  there  from  the  dawn 
of  time.  So  strong  is  this  impression  that  soon  after 
the  lake  was  formed  an  ingenuous  foreign  visitor,  who 
had  not  grasped  in  its  entirety  the  plan  of  the  canal, 
remarked  to  an  engineer  who  was  showing  him  about 
Gatun:  "You  were  extremely  fortunate,  you  know,  to 
have  this  large  body  of  water  here!"  Another  visitor, 
with  equally  keen  powers  of  observation,  after  having 
been  taken  over  the  Gatun  Dam  in  a  motor-car  run- 
ning on  railway  tracks,  a  proceeding  consuming  nearly 
an  hour's  time,  and  after  having  been  told  that  the 
dam  contained  21,000,000  cubic  yards  of  material, 
asked  his  guide:  "Is  this  a  permanent  or  merely  a  tem- 
porary structure?"  Still  a  third  of  this  joyous  class  of 
visitors,  whose  advent  on  the  isthmus  contributed  a 
welcome  note  of  gayety  to  its  sometimes  monotonous 
life,  after  looking  at  the  spillway  of  the  dam,  a  concrete- 
lined  channel  285  feet  wide  and  1,200  feet  long,  through 
which  water  was  rushing  furiously,  asked  thoughtfully : 
"Where  are  you  going  to  put  the  roof?" 

In  the  interest  of  historic  truth  it  should  be  recorded 
that  the  site  of  the  locks  at  Gatun  was  assailed  as  furi- 
ously and  persistently  as  that  of  the  dam.  It  was  said 
to  be  composed  in  p#rt  of  sand  and  gravel,  to  be  per- 
meable to  water,  and  to  be  unsatisfactory  in  general. 
To  quiet  any  misgivings  that  might  be  raised  by  these 
assertions,  President  Roosevelt,  in  the  spring  of  1907, 


212  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

requested  three  of  the  highest  engineering  authorities 
on  lock  and  dam  construction  in  the  United  States — 
Alfred  Noble,  Frederic  P.  Stearns,  and  John  R.  Free- 
man— to  visit  the  isthmus  and  make  a  personal  exam- 
ination of  the  Gatun  and  other  sites.  They  went  to 
the  isthmus  in  April  with  Secretary  Taft,  and,  by  means 
of  test  pits  which  had  been  dug  for  the  purpose,  inspected 
the  various  sites,  reporting  on  May  2  that  they  found 
that  "all  of  the  locks  will  rest  upon  rock  of  such  a 
character  as  should  furnish  a  safe  and  stable  founda- 
tion." To-day  the  lock  walls  are  in  place  and  furnish 
to  the  eye  an  aspect  of  solidity  and  stability  equal  to 
that  of  the  dam.  They  are  mere  continuations  upward 
of  the  natural  rock  upon  which  they  stand,  and  are  as 
immovable  and  as  indestructible.  There  has  been  no 
sign  of  settling,  or  of  leakage,  or  of  percolation  beneath 
or  around  them.  Like  the  dam,  they  have  confounded 
the  direful  predictions  of  the  prophets  of  evil  and 
silenced  them  forever. 

It  is  impossible  to  convey  in  words  anything  ap- 
proaching an  adequate  conception  of  the  picture  which 
the  series  of  locks,  with  their  massive,  towering  walls 
and  their  equipment  of  colossal  gates,  presents.  It  de- 
fies description,  as  it  does  the  camera,  even  in  its  won- 
derful modern  development,  and  can  be  portrayed 
only  by  the  inspired  pencil  of  a  Pennell.  It  is  stu- 
pendous, prodigious,  overwhelming;  even  these  ad- 
jectives are  inadequate.  As  I  stood  on  the  walls  with 
a  distinguished  engineer,  who  had  been  a  strenuous 
advocate  of  a  sea-level  canal,  I  asked  him  if  he  could 
conceive  of  a  safer  place  in  which  to  put  a  great  ship 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  213 

than  inside  one  of  the  locks,  and  he  replied  without 
hesitation  that  he  could  not.  They  will  be  the  brilliant 
spots  in  the  illuminated  canal,  with  their  great  clusters 
of  electric  lamps,  high  up  on  shapely  concrete  columns, 
flooding  every  portion  of  the  vast  structures  with  noon- 
day brightness,  making  them  the  shining  centres  and 
symbols  of  what  Joseph  Pennell  calls  the  greatest  of 
the  world's  Wonders  of  Work. 

After  the  locks  were  completed  and  the  huge  gates, 
weighing  from  four  hundred  to  seven  hundred  tons 
each,  were  being  erected,  the  final,  despairing  wail  of 
the  assailants  of  the  lock  canal  was  emitted.  Two  of 
the  gates  had  been  finished  and  the  test  of  the  ability 
of  the  new  machinery  for  opening  and  closing  them  was 
about  to  be  made.  A  short  time  earlier,  that  indefati- 
gable, but  invariably  anonymous  and  polyonymous  per- 
sonage, known  indifferently  as  "an  American  engi- 
neer" or  "an  eminent  engineer,"  who  was  very  familiar 
in  the  newspapers  of  the  United  States  during  the  early 
period  of  construction,  emerged  into  view  with  the 
startling  information  that  a  stupendous  disaster  was 
about  to  occur  on  the  isthmus.  He  declared  that  he 
had  returned  recently  from  a  thorough  inspection  of 
the  canal  work  and  knew  what  he  was  talking  about. 
The  Gatun  Dam  was  all  right,  and  the  slides  in  Culebra 
Cut  could  be  disposed  of  easily,  but  a  far  greater  peril 
was  hanging  over  the  project  and  was  to  be  found  in  a 
totally  unsuspected  quarter — namely,  in  the  huge  lock 
gates.  WTien  the  attempt  was  made  to  move  these,  he 
predicted,  a  truly  awful  catastrophe  would  follow,  for 
they  would  move  only  to  fall  in  a  mass  of  ruins — mere 


214  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

junk  or  "scrap."  With  this  portentous  warning  ring- 
ing in  his  ears,  Colonel  H.  F.  Hodges,  the  author  and 
supervising  architect  of  the  gates,  proceeded,  without 
visible  perturbation,  to  Gatun  one  morning  in  May, 
1912,  and  in  the  presence  of  other  canal  officials 
"bowdaciously,"  as  Uncle  Remus  would  say,  turned 
the  small  switch  which  started  the  operating  machinery 
of  a  gate.  As  the  great  wheel  in  the  wall  began  to 
revolve,  a  leaf  of  the  massive  gate  moved  slowly  from 
the  wall  beside  which  it  hung,  and  without  noise  or 
vibration,  and  with  perfect  steadiness,  swung  into  posi- 
tion at  the  opening  of  the  lock.  The  journey  was  made 
in  one  minute  and  forty-eight  seconds,  twelve  seconds 
less  than  was  required  in  the  specifications  under 
which  it  had  been  constructed.  Colonel  Hodges  pulled 
the  switch  again,  and  the  return  journey  was  made 
in  the  same  manner  and  time.  Since  then  other  gates 
have  been  swung  in  other  locks  with  like  success  and 
there  has  been  no  "crash,"  save  in  the  reputation  of 
the  prophet  who,  like  all  his  kind,  concealed  his  iden- 
tity at  the  moment  of  supreme  inspiration. 

The  work  at  Gatun  was  under  the  direction  of  Colo- 
nel William  L.  Sibert  during  the  entire  period  of  con- 
struction. Previous  to  his  arrival  the  work  done  had 
been  nearly  or  quite  all  preparatory,  and  in  this  A.  B. 
Nichols,  in  charge  of  surveys  and  explorations,  arid  F.  B. 
Maltby  and  William  Gerig,  division  engineers  in  the 
Stevens  organization,  had  been  the  chief  agents.  Mr. 
Maltby  resigned  in  August,  1907.  Mr.  Gerig  remained 
as  division  engineer  of  the  Gatun  Dam  division  till 
June  30,  1908,  when  he  resigned.  Under  a  new  organ- 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  215 

ization  which  went  into  effect  on  July  1,  1908,  Colonel 
Sibert  became  the  division  engineer  of  the  Atlantic 
division,  which  included  all  work  at  Gatun  and  the 
Atlantic  entrance  to  the  canal.  Major  Chester  Hard- 
ing, U.  S.  A.,  who  had  been  division  engineer  of  the  Gatun 
Locks  division,  was  appointed  assistant  division  en- 
gineer. He  retained  that  position  till  February  27, 
1913,  when  he  resigned  to  accept  the  position  of  en- 
gineer member  of  the  board  of  commissioners  of  the 
District  of  Columbia.  Others  associated  with  Colonel 
Sibert  in  the  work  were  Major  Edgar  Jadwin,  Major 
J.  C.  Jervey,  Captain  G.  M.  Hoffman,  Captain  Horton 
W.  Stickle,  Captain  W.  S.  Ross,  and  Lieutenant-Colonel 
William  V.  Judson,  all  of  the  United  States  army.  Of 
these,  Major  Jervey  and  Captain  Hoffman  were  engaged 
in  the  work  during  the  entire  period  of  construction, 
and  the  others  for  a  portion  of  that  period,  with  the 
exception'  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Judson,  who  was 
added  to  the  division  force  in  place  of  Colonel  Harding 
in  March,  1913,  after  the  work  was  nearly  completed. 
Full  charge  of  all  the  designing  work  of  the  canal  was 
vested  by  Colonel  Goethals  in  Colonel  H.  F.  Hodges 
when  the  latter  became  a  member  of  the  canal  com- 
mission in  July,  1908.  Previous  to  that  date,  as  gen- 
eral purchasing  officer  of  the  commission  and  chief  of 
the  Washington  office,  Colonel  Hodges  had  been  in 
charge  of  the  designs  for  the  lock  gates.  Colonel  Goe- 
thals had  desired  to  have  him  appointed  to  the  com- 
mission when  it  was  reorganized  in  1907,  but  he  could 
not  be  relieved  from  the  position  which  he  held  at  that 
time — principal  assistant  to  the  chief  of  engineers  at 


216  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

Washington.  He  was  considered  by  Colonel  Goethals 
to  be  the  army  engineer  best  fitted  by  ability  and  expe- 
rience to  supervise  the  designing  work.  He  had  been 
an  assistant  under  General  0.  M.  Poe,  when  the  latter 
was  constructing  the  Poe  lock  in  the  Sault  Ste.  Marie 
Canal,  and  had  designed  the  steel  gates  for  it.  Colonel 
Goethals  authorizes  this  estimate  of  his  services: 

He  took  over  the  designing  work  for  the  Panama 
Canal  at  a  time  when  definite  plans  had  to  be  adopted 
and  the  work  carried  to  completion.  Comprised  in  that 
work  were  designs  for  the  dams,  locks,  gates,  spillways, 
valves,  operating  machinery,  hydro-electric  station,  and 
aids  to  navigation.  He  was  placed  in  charge  subse- 
quently of  the  erection  of  gates  and  the  installation  of 
valves  and  operating  machinery.  Charged  with  the 
solution  of  the  most  important  engineering  problems 
of  the  canal,  it  can  be  said  of  him  truthfully  that  the 
canal  could  not  have  been  built  without  him. 


CHAPTER  XI 

LOCKS  AND  DAMS  ON  THE  PACIFIC  SIDE  — THE  TASK 
MUCH  SIMPLER  THAN  THAT  AT  GATUN 

IT  is  a  curious  fact  that  the  most  vulnerable  feature  of 
the  original  plan  for  an  eighty-five-foot  level  canal  was 
assailed  scarcely  at  all  by  the  opponents  of  the  project. 
They  directed  their  assault  upon  the  Gatun  site,  paying 
little  or  no  heed  to  the  fact  that  at  the  Pacific  end  a 
site  for  two  great  dams  and  a  double  flight  of  two  locks 
had  been  selected  which  had  far  more  questionable 
features.  Work  had  only  begun  at  this  site  when  it 
was  demonstrated  that  no  suitable  foundations  for 
the  proposed  dams  could  be  secured  save  at  much 
larger  expense  than  had  been  estimated.  Then,  too, 
the  locks,  if  erected  on  the  site  proposed,  would  extend 
out  into  Panama  Bay  and  be  exposed  to  bombard- 
ment from  an  enemy's  ships. 

Secretary  Taft,  on  February  19,  1906,  in  his  letter 
to  President  Roosevelt  transmitting  the  reports  of  the 
International  Consulting  Board,  had  recommended  the 
adoption  of  the  lock  plan  except  so  far  as  it  related  to 
the  dam  and  locks  at  the  Pacific  end.  On  this  point 
he  said: 

The  great  objection  to  the  locks  at  Sosa  Hill  is 
the  possibility  of  their  destruction  by  the  fire  from  an 

217 


218  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

enemy's  ships.  If,  as  has  been  suggested  to  me  by 
officers  of  this  Department  entitled  to  speak  with  au- 
thority on  military  subjects,  these  locks  may  be  lo- 
cated against  and  behind  Sosa  Hill  in  such  a  way  as 
to  use  the  hill  as  a  protection  against  such  fire,  then 
economy  would  lead  to  the  retention  of  this  lake.  The 
lake  would  be  useful  to  commerce  as  a  means  for  re- 
lieving any  possible  congestion  in  the  canal  should  the 
traffic  be  very  great  and  would  give,  in  case  of  need,  a 
place  for  concentrating  or  sheltering  the  fleet.  If, 
however,  Sosa  Hill  will  not  afford  a  site  with  such  pro- 
tection, then  it  seems  to  me  wiser  to  place  the  locks  at 
Miraflores. 

John  F.  Stevens,  the  second  chief  engineer,  had  ex- 
pressed similar  views.  In  giving  his  formal  approval 
to  the  plan,  on  January  26,  1906,  he  said: 

As  regards  the  plan  and  alignment  of  the  canal  at 
the  Pacific  end,  I  am  still  inclined  to  my  former  ex- 
pressed opinion  that,  on  account  of  the  military  and 
sanitary  features,  the  location  of  all  the  locks  at  Mira- 
flores and  Pedro  Miguel,  instead  of  part  of  them  at 
La  Boca,  with  the  necessary  dam  at  the  same  place, 
will  be  found  more  satisfactory;  but  as  the  latter  plan 
will  cost  about  $6,000,000  less  to  construct  than  the 
former  one,  I  am  ready  to  waive  my  views  in  favor  of 
the  latter  plan,  although  simply  on  account  of  the 
difference  in  the  estimated  cost. 

Work  had  been  in  progress  only  a  few  months  on  the 
toes  of  one  of  the  dams  when  it  was  discovered,  through 
the  shifting  and  sinking  of  the  trestles  from  which  spoil 
from  Culebra  Cut  was  being  dumped,  that  the  material 
overlying  the  rock  foundations  was  composed  mainly  of 


Spillway  Dam.     Regulation  gates  in  position  between  the  piers,  June  1, 1913. 


Emergency  dam  swung  across  entrance  of  Gatun  Lock,  June  1,  1913. 
The  wicket  girders  will  drop  from  the  portions  of  the  dam  overhanging  the  water. 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  219 

unctuous  blue  clay,  without  grit,  possessing  little  sup- 
porting power,  instead  of  a  stiff  clay,  as  indicated  on 
the  profiles  of  the  original  borings.  The  depth  of  rock 
below  the  surface  varied  from  ten  to  seventy  feet.  A 
new  estimate  of  the  cost  of  constructing  stable  dams 
there,  based  upon  additional  borings,  placed  it  at  $11,- 
574,000,  or  more  than  double  the  original  estimate  of 
$4,314,000.  In  view  of  all  this  a  further  examination 
was  made  of  the  canal  route  from  Pedro  Miguel  to  the 
Pacific  to  ascertain  if  more  suitable  foundations  for 
locks  and  dams  could  be  found.  These  resulted  in 
showing  that  there  existed  satisfactory  foundations  for 
one  lock  at  Pedro  Miguel  and  for  two  at  Miraflores,  a 
point  about  a  mile  and  a  third  nearer  to  the  Pacific. 
The  locks  themselves  would  constitute  a  portion  of  the 
necessary  dams,  and  as  they  would  lie  behind  high 
hills  and  be  from  three  to  four  miles  inland,  they  would 
be  protected  against  possibility  of  distant  bombard- 
ment from  the  sea  and  be  less  exposed  to  gunboat  or 
torpedo  attack.  This  superior  military  position  was  of 
itself  a  very  powerful  reason  for  the  change.  The  new 
project  would  eliminate  the  proposed  large  lake  on  the 
Pacific  side,  as  it  provided  only  for  a  small  lake  about  a 
mile  square  between  Pedro  Miguel  and  Miraflores,  and 
would  entail  a  cost  of  about  eight  million  dollars  less 
than  the  original  one. 

Colonel  Goethals  submitted  the  proposed  change, 
with  the  unanimous  recommendation  of  the  commission, 
to  President  Roosevelt  on  December  9,  1907,  and  the 
President  approved  it  on  December  20.  As  amended, 
the  plan  provided  for  a  double  lock,  with  a  lift  of 


220  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

30M  feet,  at  Pedro  Miguel,  two  double  locks  in  flight, 
with  a  combined  lift  of  54%  feet  at  Miraflores,  and  from 
there  to  deep  water  in  the  Pacific,  a  distance  of  8.31 
miles,  a  channel  500  feet  in  width  and  45  feet  deep 
below  mean  sea-level. 

The  change  of  plan  delayed  somewhat  the  beginning 
of  work  on  the  Pacific  side.  There  was  much  less  clear- 
ing required  than  at  Gatun,  and  this  was  begun  early 
in  January,  1908,  and  active  excavation  for  the  locks, 
both  at  Pedro  Miguel  and  Miraflores,  began  soon  after- 
ward. Both  sites  lie  in  the  valley  of  the  Rio  Grande, 
which  is  about  half  a  mile  wide  at  Pedro  Miguel  and 
about  two-thirds  of  a  mile  wide  at  Miraflores,  with 
hills  on  both  sides.  Between  the  hills  and  the  walls  of 
the  upper  locks  at  both  places  dams  were  erected  form- 
ing a  complete  barrier  to  the  water,  that  at  Pedro 
Miguel  maintaining  the  water-level  of  Gatun  Lake, 
and  that  at  Miraflores  the  level  of  the  intermediate  or 
Miraflores  Lake.  The  natural  level  of  the  valley  in 
which  this  lake  lies  was  so  near  to  that  of  the  bottom 
of  the  canal  prism  that  only  about  one  million  cubic 
yards  of  excavation  was  necessary  for  the  channel 
through  it. 

The  lock  site  at  Miraflores  was  crossed  from  the 
west  by  the  Cocoli  River,  a  tributary  of  the  Rio  Grande. 
It  is  quite  a  formidable  stream  in  times  of  heavy  rains. 
In  order  to  divert  it  from  the  lock  site  during  the  period 
of  construction,  and  to  have  the  use  of  its  waters 
afterward  in  the  Miraflores  Lake,  the  dam  on  the  west 
side,  constructed  in  the  same  manner  as  that  at  Gatun, 
was  run  on  a  line  nearly  parallel  to  the  axis  of  the  locks 


Pedro  Miguel  Locks,  January  25,  1912. 


Gatun  Upper  Locks.     South  entrance  to  east  chamber.     Surface  of  lake, 
48  feet  above  sea-level.     March  15,  1913. 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  221 

from  the  head  of  them  to  Cocoli  Hill,  a  distance  of 
two  thousand  three  hundred  feet.  By  this  means  the 
river  was  made  to  enter  the  Miraflores  Lake  site  at  its 
upper  end,  flowing  through  it  and  out  through  a  diver- 
sion channel  on  the  east  side  of  the  locks.  When  the 
lock  work  was  finished  this  channel  was  closed  with  a 
concrete  dam,  extending  from  the  lock  walls  to  the 
hills.  In  the  dam  a  spillway  allows  the  surplus  water 
of  the  lake  to  escape  and  be  used  to  supply  power  to 
the  electric  plant  near  by. 

The  work  at  Pedro  Miguel  and  Miraflores  was  under 
the  direction  of  Sidney  B.  Williamson,  division  en- 
gineer of  the  Pacific  division,  from  its  beginning  till 
December,  1912,  when  he  resigned  to  accept  the  offer 
of  an  important  position  from  an  English  contracting 
firm  with  headquarters  in  London.  He  had  been  in 
the  canal  service  since  May,  1907;  was  the  only  civilian 
in  charge  of  one  of  the  three  great  divisions  of  canal 
work,  and  in  the  estimation  of  Colonel  Goethals,  who 
had  asked  him  to  enter  the  service,  had  no  superior  in 
the  engineering  force.  At  the  time  of  his  resignation 
the  work  at  Pedro  Miguel  and  Miraflores  was  nearly 
completed.  His  position  was  abolished,  and  the  chief 
engineer,  Colonel  Goethals,  took  personal  charge  of 
the  Pacific  division. 


CHAPTER  XII 

SANITATION  OF  THE  ISTHMUS  —  SCIENTIFIC  DISCOV- 
ERIES WHICH  MADE  IT  POSSIBLE  —  MARTYRDOM  OF 
LAZEAR 

SOMETHING  very  like  a  marvel  has  been  accomplished 
at  Panama.  A  veritable  valley  of  death  has  been  con- 
verted into  a  land  of  health  and  comfort.  So  complete 
is  the  transformation  that  astonished  observers  have 
declared,  with  mild  and  not  unjustifiable  exaggeration, 
that  the  "foremost  pest-hole  of  the  earth  has  become  a 
health-resort."  If  it  be  not  in  the  full  sense  of  the  term 
a  health-resort,  that  part  of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama 
which  is  under  American  control  is  to-day  as  healthful 
a  place  of  abode  as  most  civilized  communities  any- 
where, and  far  more  so  than  many  of  them. 

But  while  the  transformation  that  has  been  wrought 
is  marvellous,  and  takes  rank  easily  as  the  supreme 
achievement  in  sanitation,  not  only  of  the  century,  but 
of  the  ages,  there  is  nothing  miraculous  about  it.  It 
surpasses  all  previous  efforts  in  the  same  field  in  mag- 
nitude, but  not  in  effectiveness,  simply  because  it  was 
the  first  work  on  a  large  scale  undertaken  in  the  illu- 
minating light  of  a  discovery  that,  as  by  a  flash  of 
lightning,  wrought  a  complete  revolution  in  existing 

methods   of  tropical   sanitation.    Old   things   passed 

222 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  223 

away  and  all  became  new  in  those  methods  when  in 
1900  surgeons  and  soldiers  of  the  army  of  the  United 
States,  at  the  risk  of  their  lives,  proved  that  yellow 
fever,  the  supreme  terror  of  the  tropics,  was  not  a 
contagious  or  a  filth  disease,  but  was  transmitted  from 
one  human  being  to  another  solely  by  a  mosquito  of  a 
particular  type,  the  stegomyia.  It  was  this  convic- 
tion of  the  stegomyia  mosquito  of  high  crimes  and  mis- 
demeanors against  the  human  race  which  lifted  medical 
science  out  of  the  bog  of  blind,  groping  experimenta- 
tion in  tropical  sanitation  to  the  firm  ground  of  exact 
knowledge.  The  sanitation  of  the  isthmus  became  a 
mere  matter  of  intelligent  administration,  and  the  san- 
itation of  the  isthmus  made  possible  the  construction 
of  the  Panama  Canal,  for  without  the  light  afforded  by 
this  discovery  yellow  fever  could  not  have  been  ban- 
ished from  the  isthmus,  and  its  periodic  outbreaks 
would  have  made  it  impossible  to  maintain  an  adequate 
working  force  of  Americans.  It  is  to  the  heroic  men 
who  risked  their  lives  in  the  experiments  which  re- 
sulted in  this  discovery,  and  above  all  others  to  the 
martyr  who  both  risked  and  lost  his,  that  highest 
honors  should  be  paid  in  celebrating  the  completion  of 
the  canal.  The  story  of  their  deeds,  one  of  the  most 
inspiring  in  human  annals,  is  entitled  to  first  rank  in 
the  history  of  the  canal,  and  especially  of  the  sanita- 
tion of  the  isthmus. 

When  the  Americans  took  possession  of  the  isthmus 
in  1904  they  began  the  task  of  converting  it  into  a 
healthful  place  of  abode  and  work,  in  the  light  not  only 
of  the  yellow-fever  transmission  discovery,  but  of  an- 


224  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

other,  only  secondary  in  importance,  which  had  been 
made  in  1898,  that  malaria  was  transmitted  in  like 
manner  from  person  to  person  by  a  mosquito  of  a  dif- 
ferent type,  the  anopheles.  The  details  of  these  dis- 
coveries are  so  imperatively  necessary  to  a  proper  com- 
prehension of  the  work  that  has  been  done  on  the 
isthmus  that  they  are  set  forth  here  in  advance  of  the 
account  of  the  work  itself,  considering  first  the  yellow- 
fever  discovery  because  of  its  superior  importance. 

The  theory  that  yellow  fever  was  transmitted  from 
one  person  to  another  solely  by  means  of  a  mosquito 
was  advanced  speculatively  as  early  as  1847,  but  it 
was  first  set  forth  positively  by  Doctor  Carlos  J.  Fin- 
lay,  of  Havana,  in  a  paper  published  in  1881.  Doctor 
Finlay  made  several  experiments  to  test  the  truth  of 
the  theory,  but  they  were  not  successful  because  he 
used  for  inoculation  mosquitoes  that  had  bitten  yellow- 
fever  patients  only  from  two  to  five  days  earlier,  whereas 
later  experiments  proved  that  the  mosquito  is  harmless 
until  twelve  days  or  longer  after  the  biting. 

During  the  occupation  of  Cuba  by  the  United  States 
army  in  1900  yellow  fever  became  epidemic  in  Havana, 
and  in  spite  of  the  use  of  all  known  methods  for  ward- 
ing it  off  there  were  nearly  1,600  cases  and  231  deaths 
among  American  officers  and  men.  It  was  made  evi- 
dent to  the  army  surgeons  who  were  on  duty  there 
that  existing  methods  of  fighting  the  disease  were  well- 
nigh  powerless  to  check  its  spread.  They  knew  neither 
its  cause  nor  its  means  of  transmission.  They  stood 
by  the  death-beds  of  its  victims,  to  quote  one  of  them, 
"in  utter  perplexity  and  wonder."  Doctor  George 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  225 

M.  Sternberg,  Surgeon-General  of  the  United  States 
Army,  considering  the  presence  of  the  disease  as  afford- 
ing opportunity  for  testing  various  theories  that  had 
been  advanced  in  regard  to  it,  appointed  four  army  sur- 
geons, specially  fitted  for  the  task — Walter  Reed,  James 
Carroll,  Jesse  W.  Lazear,  and  Aristides  Agramonte — a 
board  to  conduct  a  series  of  experiments  with  a  view 
to  ascertaining  the  causation  and  method  of  transmis- 
sion of  the  disease  from  one  person  to  another. 

The  board  began  its  experiments  in  June,  1900,  and 
continued  them  into  February,  1901.  It  first  made 
thorough  tests  of  the  theory  of  bacterial  transmission 
and  proved  it  to  be  unfounded.  It  then  turned  its 
attention  to  the  theory  of  mosquito  transmission  and 
decided  to  subject  that  to  a  series  of  experiments.  In 
order  to  do  this,  human  life  must  be  put  in  jeopardy, 
for  only  human  beings  could  be  used  for  the  experi- 
ments. One  member  of  the  board,  Doctor  Agramonte, 
was  immune.  The  other  three  were  not.  These  were 
unwilling  to  assume  the  responsibility  of  asking  others 
to  risk  their  lives  unless  they  first  risked  their  own, 
and  accordingly  they  agreed  to  make  the  first  experi- 
ments upon  themselves. 

To  realize  the  complete  devotion  to  duty  and  the 
high  courage  of  this  resolve  it  should  be  borne  in  mind 
that  these  men  were  physicians  who  had  been  close 
observers  and  students  of  the  disease  for  many  years 
and  were  familiar  with  its  deadly  character.  They 
made  their  resolve  without  proclamation  of  any  sort, 
without  publicity  or  the  desire  of  it. 

The  duty  of  breeding  and  infecting  mosquitoes  for 


226  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

the  tests  was  assigned  to  Doctor  Lazear  because  of  his 
special  knowledge  of  mosquito  work.  Before  the  mos- 
quitoes were  ready  for  the  tests  Doctor  Reed  was  sum- 
moned to  Washington  on  urgent  official  duty  and  was 
prevented  from  entering  the  experiments.  Doctor 
Carroll  was  first  bitten,  and  suffered  a  very  severe  at- 
tack of  yellow  fever  from  which  he  recovered,  but  for 
a  time  his  life  hung  in  the  balance.  Subsequently 
Doctor  Lazear,  while  in  a  yellow-fever  hospital,  col- 
lecting blood  from  the  patients  for  study,  saw  a  mos- 
quito settle  on  the  back  of  his  hand.  He  allowed  it  to 
remain  there,  calmly  studying  its  operations  till  it  had 
satisfied  its  hunger.  Five  days  later  he  came  down 
with  an  attack  of  the  disease  "in  its  most  terrible 
form,"  from  which  he  died.  These  cases  had  demon- 
strated so  conclusively  that  the  disease  was  transmitted 
by  mosquitoes  that  when  Doctor  Reed  returned  from 
Washington  his  friends  persuaded  him  not  to  submit 
himself  to  infection,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  a  foolish 
and  unnecessary  risk  for  him  at  his  age.  He  decided 
to  conduct  a  series  of  more  elaborate  experiments  for 
the  purpose  of  establishing  beyond  dispute  the  truth 
of  the  new  theory,  and  to  demonstrate  that  not  only 
was  yellow  fever  transmitted  by  the  mosquito,  but  by 
the  mosquito  alone. 

In  an  address  which  he  delivered  in  April,  1901, 
describing  the  results  of  the  army  board's  experiments, 
Doctor  Reed  paid  this  affectionate  tribute  to  Lazear: 

Before  proceeding  to  the  discussion  of  this  subject, 
it  is  fitting  that  I  should  pay  brief  tribute  to  the  mem- 
ory of  a  former  member  of  this  faculty,  the  late  Dr. 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  227 

Jesse  W.  Lazear,  United  States  Army.  I  can  hardly 
trust  myself  to  speak  of  my  late  colleague,  since  the 
mention  of  his  name  brings  back  such  scenes  of  anxiety 
and  depression  as  one  recalls  only  with  pain.  Along 
with  these  sad  memories,  however,  come  other  recol- 
lections of  a  manly  and  fearless  devotion  to  duty  such 
as  I  have  never  seen  equalled.  In  the  discharge  of  the 
latter,  Doctor  Lazear  seemed  absolutely  tireless  and 
quite  oblivious  of  self.  Filled  with  an  earnest  enthu- 
siasm for  the  advancement  of  his  profession  and  for 
the  cause  of  science,  he  let  no  opportunity  pass  un- 
improved. Although  the  evening  might  find  him  dis- 
couraged over  the  difficult  problem  at  hand,  with  the 
morning's  return  he  again  took  up  the  task  full  of  eager- 
ness and  hope.  During  a  service  of  less  than  one  year 
in  Cuba  he  won  the  good  will  and  respect  of  his  brother 
officers  and  the  affection  of  his  immediate  associates. 
Almost  at  the  beginning  of  what  promised  to  be  a  life 
full  of  usefulness  and  good  works  he  was  suddenly 
stricken,  and,  dying,  added  one  more  name  to  that 
imperishable  roll  of  honor  to  which  none  others  belong 
than  martyrs  to  the  cause  of  humanity. 

Tests  had  been  made  on  nine  volunteers  before  the 
infection  of  Doctors  Carroll  and  Lazear,  but  had  been 
without  results  because  mosquitoes  had  been  used  too 
soon  after  biting  yellow-fever  patients.  It  was  made 
plain  by  the  cases  of  Carroll  and  Lazear  that  the  in- 
fected mosquito  did  not  become  harmful  till  a  con- 
siderable period  had  elapsed  after  biting.  To  establish 
the  length  of  this  period,  and  also  the  length  of  the 
period  which  must  elapse  after  the  patient  has  been 
stricken  before  the  disease  can  be  conveyed  to  the  mos- 
quito for  transmission,  Doctor  Reed  instituted  a  sec- 


228  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

ond  series  of  experiments  in  a  camp  established  near 
Quemados,  Cuba,  and  named  after  Lazear.  General 
Leonard  Wood,  who  was  then  military  governor  of 
Cuba,  gave  all  possible  assistance  in  the  matter,  and 
to  encourage  volunteers  for  the  tests  offered  a  reward 
of  two  hundred  dollars  for  such  service. 

It  should  be  remembered  that  this  call  for  volun- 
teers was  issued  soon  after  the  death  of  Lazear,  and  at 
a  time  when  it  was  common  knowledge  in  the  army 
that  yellow  fever  had  been  given  both  to  him  and  to 
Carroll  through  the  bites  of  mosquitoes.  Notwith- 
standing this,  records  Major  Walter  D.  McCaw,  of 
the  Medical  Corps  of  the  United  States  army,  "to  the 
everlasting  glory  of  the  American  soldier,  volunteers 
from  the  army  offered  themselves  for  experiment  in 
plenty  and  with  the  utmost  fearlessness." 

The  first  to  present  themselves  were  two  young  sol- 
diers from  Ohio,  John  R.  Kissinger  and  John  J.  Moran. 
Doctor  Reed  talked  the  matter  over  with  them,  ex- 
plaining fully  the  danger  and  suffering  involved,  and 
stating  the  money  consideration  offered  by  General 
Wood.  Both  young  men  declared  that  they  were  pre- 
pared to  undergo  the  experiment,  but  only  on  condi- 
tion that  they  should  receive  no  pecuniary  reward. 
When  he  heard  this  declaration,  Doctor  Reed  touched 
his  hat  with  profound  respect,  saying:  "Gentlemen,  I 
salute  you !" 

How  well  his  respect  was  merited  was  shown  a  few 
days  later  when  the  two  young  soldiers  faced  the  tests. 
Kissinger  on  three  successive  occasions  was  taken, 
clad  only  in  a  nightshirt,  into  a  room  where  mos- 


1,  Dr.  Robert  P.  Cooke, 

U.  S.  A. 

2,  Dr.  Walter  Reed,  U.  S.  A. 

3,  Dr.  Carlos  J.  Finlay. 

4,  John  J.  Moran. 


5,  Dr.  James  Carroll, 

U.  S.  A. 

6,  John  R.  Kissinger. 

7,  Dr.  Jesse  W.  Lazear, 

U.  S.  A. 


Heroes  of  the  yellow-fever  tests. 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  229 

quitoes  known  to  be  infected  were  confined,  and  lying 
down,  remained  there  quietly  while  they  bit  him.  On 
the  third  day,  according  to  Major  Reed's  account,  "we 
concentrated  our  insects  upon  him,  selecting  five  of 
our  most  promising  mosquitoes  for  the  purpose,"  and 
he  was  infected  with  the  fever,  from  which  he  recovered. 
About  the  same  date,  a  room  was  prepared  and  made 
hospitable  by  the  presence  of  fifteen  infected  mosqui- 
toes. What  happened  in  that  inviting  room  is  thus 
described  by  Major  Reed: 

At  noon  on  the  same  day,  five  minutes  after  the 
mosquitoes  had  been  placed  therein,  a  plucky  Ohio  boy, 
Moran  by  name,  clad  only  in  his  nightshirt,  and  fresh 
from  a  bath,  entered  the  room  containing  the  mos- 
quitoes, where  he  lay  down  for  a  period  of  thirty  min- 
utes. Within  two  minutes  from  Moran's  entrance  he 
was  being  bitten  about  the  face  and  hands  by  the 
insects  that  had  promptly  settled  down  upon  him. 
Seven  in  all  bit  him  at  this  visit.  At  4.30  P.  M.,  the 
same  day,  he  again  entered  and  remained  twenty 
minutes,  during  which  time  five  others  bit  him.  The 
following  day  at  4.30  p.  M.,  he  again  entered  and  re- 
mained fifteen  minutes,  during  which  time  three 
insects  bit  him,  making  the  number  fifteen  that  had 
fed  at  these  three  visits.  On  Christmas  morning,  at 
11  A.  M.,  this  brave  lad  was  stricken  with  yellow  fever, 
and  had  a  sharp  attack,  which  he  bore  without  a 
murmur. 

Moran,  like  Kissinger,  recovered.    Well  might  Ma-  • 
jor  Reed  say  of  the  two  heroes:  "In  my  judgment  this 
exhibition  of  moral  courage  has  never  been  surpassed 
in  the  annals  of  the  army  of  the  United  States."    He 


230  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

might  have  added  with  perfect  truth;  "or  anywhere 
else."  The  subsequent  history  of  the  two  men  will  be 
referred  to  later  in  this  narrative. 

There  were  in  all  twenty-two  persons  who  submitted 
to  the  tests,  thirteen  of  them  American  soldiers,  and 
most  of  them  accepted  pecuniary  reward. 

Into  the  tests  to  demonstrate  that  yellow  fever  was 
not  a  contagious  disease,  seven  persons  entered,  Doc- 
tor Robert  P.  Cooke,  acting  assistant  surgeon  of  the 
army,  and  six  privates  of  the  hospital  corps.  The  cour- 
age shown  by  these  men  was  equalled  only  by  that  of 
the  men  who  had  undergone  the  other  tests.  A  small 
building  with  a  single  room,  fourteen  by  twenty  feet, 
was  erected  and  carefully  guarded  against  the  entrance 
of  mosquitoes.  Its  temperature  was  maintained  at 
about  seventy-six  degrees,  with  a  sufficient  amount  of 
humidity.  It  was  supplied  with  a  large  quantity  of 
bed  clothing,  wearing  apparel,  and  night  clothing  taken 
from  the  beds  and  persons  of  patients  who  had  died  of 
yellow  fever.  For  twenty  consecutive  nights  Doctor 
Cooke  and  his  men  went  into  this  room,  handled,  wore, 
and  slept  in  the  contaminated  clothing,  although  the 
stench  was  so  offensive  as  to  be  almost  unbearable. 
They  emerged  from  the  ordeal  in  perfect  health,  prov- 
ing beyond  possibility  of  dispute  that  the  disease  was 
not  contagious  and  that  the  mosquito  was  the  sole 
method  of  transmission.  Let  any  one  who  wishes  to 
comprehend  fully  the  courage  required  for  this  service 
ask  himself  if  he  possesses  it. 

Like  Lazear  and  Carroll  and  the  brave  American 
soldiers  who  underwent  the  first  tests,  Doctor  Cooke 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  231 

and  his  associates  were  acting  solely  in  the  interest  of 
humanity,  were  risking  their  lives  for  their  fellow-men. 
On  a  tablet  erected  to  the  memory  of  Lazear  in  Johns 
Hopkins  Hospital,  at  Baltimore,  there  is  this  inscrip- 
tion, written  by  President  Eliot  of  Harvard  Univer- 
sity: 

WITH  MORE  THAN  THE  COURAGE  AND  THE 
DEVOTION  OF  THE  SOLDIER  HE  RISKED  AND 
LOST  HIS  LIFE  TO  SHOW  HOW  A  FEARFUL 
PESTILENCE  IS  COMMUNICATED  AND  HOW 
ITS  RAVAGES  MAY  BE  PREVENTED. 

Surely  it  can  be  said  of  all  the  men  who  entered  the 
two  series  of  tests  that  they  showed  "more  than  the 
courage  and  the  devotion  of  the  soldier,"  for  there  were 
lacking  the  excitement  of  the  battle-field,  the  inspiring 
and  sustaining  presence  of  thousands  of  companions, 
and  the  hope  of  martial  glory.  Unwitnessed  and  alone 
they  went  into  the  presence  of  death  itself,  remaining 
there  for  hours  and  days  and  weeks,  inviting  it,  without 
thought  of  renown  or  lasting  remembrance.  We  may 
well  be  proud  that  they  were  Americans,  that  we  belong 
to  a  race  capable  of  such  lofty  heroism.  But  like 
Lazear,  who  was  also  American,  and  like  Carroll,  who 
was  of  English  birth,  they  belong  to  no  country,  but 
to  the  human  race.  Their  deeds  are  the  common  her- 
itage and  the  common  glory  of  all  mankind. 

In  order  to  make  complete  the  record  of  experiments— 
in  Cuba,  it  should  be  added  that  Doctor  John  Guiteras, 
of  Havana,  began  in  February,  1891,  a  series  of  tests 
for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  whether  or  not  yellow 


232  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

fever  could  be  propagated  in  a  controllable  form  by 
means  of  infected  mosquitoes,  thus  securing  immuni- 
zation as  is  done  by  the  use  of  vaccination  in  the  case 
of  smallpox.  He  infected  eight  persons  with  mos- 
quitoes, three  of  whom  died,  including  an  American 
nurse,  Miss  Clara  B.  Maas,  of  Orange,  N.  J.,  who  vol- 
unteered herself  for  the  experiment.  This  result  was 
so  unfavorable  to  the  theory  of  controllable  propaga- 
tion that  further  experiments  in  that  field  were  aban- 
doned, but  the  additional  tests  had  afforded  complete 
confirmation  of  the  truth  of  the  mosquito  theory  of 
transmission. 

The  discovery  that  malaria  is  not  due  to  miasma  or 
to  poisonous  air  of  any  sort,  but  is  transmitted  from 
one  person  to  another  by  a  mosquito  of  the  anopheles 
variety,  was  made  by  Major  Ronald  Ross,  a  surgeon 
of  the  British  army,  formerly  in  the  India  service  and 
now  connected  with  the  Liverpool  School  of  Tropical 
Medicine.  He  had  been  a  careful  student  of  the  prob- 
lem for  several  years,  when  in  a  series  of  experiments  in 
1898  he  succeeded  in  infecting  birds  with  malaria  from 
the  bites  of  mosquitoes.  Later  in  the  same  year  and  in 
1899,  three  Italian  physicians,  A.  Bignami,  G.  Bastia- 
nelli,  and  B.  Grassi,  applying  the  methods  of  Ross,  suc- 
ceeded in  infecting  human  beings.  Major  Ross  and 
the  same  physicians  had  proved  in  previous  experi- 
ments that  men  could  not  be  infected  with  malaria 
with  air  or  water  brought  from  malarious  localities. 

Not  only  were  these  discoveries  known  several  years 
before  the  task  of  sanitation  was  begun  on  the  isthmus, 
but  practical  application  had  demonstrated  the  com- 


From  "  Walter  Reed  and  Yellow  Fever,"  by  H.  A.  Kelly. 

Here  the  experiments  with  the  yellow-fever  mosquito  were  first  carried 
out  and  the  transmission  of  the  disease  by  this  means  proved. 


From  "  Walter  Reed'and  Yellow  Fever,"  by  H.  AJ  Kelly. 

Building  where  the  experiments  were  made  which  proved  that  yellow- 
fever  is  not  transmitted  by  means  of  infected  clothing  (fomites). 


Camp  Lazear. 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  233 

plete  effectiveness  of  the  new  theories.  The  board  of 
army  surgeons  that  had  conducted  the  experiments  in 
Cuba  drew  up  a  set  of  regulations  for  the  application 
of  the  new  methods  of  fighting  yellow  fever  in  Havana, 
and  these  were  put  in  force  on  February  15,  1901,  by 
order  of  General  Leonard  Wood,  and  under  the  direc- 
tion of  Surgeon  Major  W.  C.  Gorgas,  at  that  time  chief 
sanitary  officer  of  the  city.  The  main  features  of  the 
new  methods  were  the  segregation  of  all  yellow  fever 
patients  behind  wire  screens  and  the  fumigation  of 
all  infected  houses.  Success  was  immediate  and  con- 
vincing. Within  three  months  yellow  fever  was  ban- 
ished from  Havana,  and  for  a  period  of  fifty-four  days 
the  city  was  free  of  the  disease.  Subsequently  there 
was  an  outbreak  of  it  in  the  town  of  Santiago  de  las 
Vegas,  a  suburb  of  Havana,  whence  it  was  brought 
into  the  city,  but  strict  and  prompt  application  of  the 
new  methods  in  both  places  stamped  it  out  within  six 
weeks,  and  in  the  autumn  of  1901,  the  period  in  which 
for  many  years  the  annual  epidemic  of  yellow  fever 
had  been  at  its  height,  there  was  not  a  single  case  in 
Havana.  There  have  been  sporadic  cases  of  it  since 
from  time  to  time,  but  those  have  been  controlled  easily 
and  there  has  been  no  infection. 

Application  of  suppression  methods  against  the  ma- 
laria mosquito,  in  accordance  with  the  discovery  of 
Doctor  Ross,  was  made  in  Havana  during  the  same 
period  and  with  striking  success.  In  1900  the  number 
of  deaths  from  malaria  in  the  city  had  been  325.  In 
1901,  the  year  in  which  malaria  mosquito  work  was 
begun,  the  number  of  deaths  was  reduced  to  151,  in 


234  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

1902  to  77,  and  in  1903  to  45,  which  has  been  about 
the  average  annual  rate  since. 

Immediately  following  the  discovery  of  Major  Ross, 
application  of  the  new  method  of  suppressing  malaria 
was  made  in  various  parts  of  the  world,  notably  in 
Egypt.  The  most  striking  success  was  that  achieved 
under  the  personal  direction  of  Major  Ross,  acting  for 
the  Suez  Canal  Company,  at  Ismailia.  This  is  a  town 
of  10,000  inhabitants  on  Lake  Timsah,  in  Egypt,  a 
small  sea-water  lake  through  which  the  Suez  Canal 
passes.  Originally  a  healthful  town,  it  had  become, 
through  the  formation  of  shallow  marshes,  defective 
drainage,  and  lack  of  sewerage,  a  hotbed  of  mosquitoes 
and  of  malaria.  Nearly  2,000  cases  were  treated  each 
year,  and  in  1901  there  were  nearly  2,500.  By  strict 
application  of  the  new  methods  the  disease  was  stamped 
out  completely  in  three  years,  and  the  town  has 
remained  free  from  it  since.  The  original  outlay  for 
the  work  was  about  ten  thousand  dollars,  and  the 
annual  expenditure  is  about  five  thousand  dollars. 
Similar  results  were  achieved  subsequently  at  Port 
Said. 

Like  all  revolutionary  discoveries,  those  of  mosquito 
transmission  were  received  with  quite  general  incredu- 
lity, and  even  in  the  medical  profession  scepticism  was 
by  no  means  unusual.  The  most  striking  case  of  it 
was  that  of  Colonel  W.  C.  Gorgas,  the  man  who  was 
destined  to  win  world-wide  fame  in  applying  the  new 
methods.  He  was  present  in  Cuba  when  the  yellow 
fever  experiments  were  made,  and  was  a  close  witness 
of  them;  yet  even  after  they  had  been  concluded,  and 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  235 

Major  Reed  had  declared  the  results  in  a  paper  which 
he  read  before  the  Pan-American  Medical  Congress 
at  Havana,  in  February,  1901,  Colonel  Gorgas  was  still 
incredulous.  Nothing  but  the  success  of  the  new 
methods  which  he  himself  had  applied  in  Havana  suf- 
ficed to  remove  his  doubts,  for  in  an  official  report  of 
that  work  which  he  made  to  General  Wood,  under 
date  of  July  12,  1902,  he  said  of  Major  Reed's  paper  of 
the  previous  year: 

This  idea  was  so  new  and  so  entirely  contrary  to  all 
former  theories  on  the  subject,  and  apparently  to  all 
former  experience,  that  the  paper  was  received  with 
scant  belief.  I  myself  had  seen  the  work,  and  was 
convinced  that  the  mosquito  could  convey  yellow  fever, 
but  I  was  hardly  prepared  to  believe  that  it  was  the 
only  way,  or  even  the  ordinary  way  of  conveying  the 
disease  .  .  . 

I  had  very  little  hope  of  accomplishing  much  (in 
Havana);  it  seemed  to  me  that  even  if  the  mosquito 
did  convey  yellow  fever,  he  could  not  be  gotten  rid  of, 
and,  apparently,  from  all  past  experience,  the  mos- 
quito was  not  the  only  way,  or  even  the  principal  way, 
of  conveying  the  disease;  but,  as  he  evidently  could 
convey  the  disease,  it  was  our  duty  to  take  precaution 
in  this  direction. 

His  conclusion,  in  view  of  his  unexpected  success,  was 
that  "the  stegomyia  mosquito  is  the  only  method  of 
transmitting  yellow  fever — a  fact  proved  by  the  army 
commission."  In  an  address  that  he  made  three  years 
later,  before  the  Pan-American  Medical  Congress,  at 
Panama,  he  said: 


236  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

In  time  Reed's  Army  Board  came  along  and  made 
the  astounding  discovery  that  the  mosquito  alone  con- 
veyed yellow  fever,  and  that  dirt  and  filth  had  very 
little,  if  anything,  to  do  with  the  question.  My  good 
friend,  Dr.  Finlay,  some  twenty  years  before  had 
advanced  this  same  theory,  and  during  the  twenty 
years  preceding  our  occupation  of  the  island  had  writ- 
ten and  advocated  the  theory  continuously.  I  had 
often  heard  him  expound  his  views  on  the  subject,  but, 
like  the  Cuban  woman,  I  smiled  in  a  superior  way  at 
the  "crazy  Cuban  doctor." 

"The  world  requires,"  says  Major  Ross  in  the  pref- 
ace to  his  most  interesting  and  valuable  book,*  "The 
Prevention  of  Malaria,"  "at  least  ten  years  to  under- 
stand a  new  idea,  however  important  or  simple  it  may 
be.  The  mosquito  theorem  of  malaria  was  at  first  ridi- 
culed, and  its  application  to  the  saving  of  human  life 
treated  with  neglect,  jealousy,  and  opposition."  The 
same  thing  could  be  said  of  the  mosquito  theorem  of 
yellow  fever.  In  fact,  when  the  American  occupation 
of  the  isthmus  began  in  1904,  comparatively  few  people 
in  the  United  States  were  aware  that  the  two  discov- 
eries had  been  made,  and  still  fewer  realized  their  in- 
estimable value  in  the  task  of  building  the  canal.  It 
is  a  safe  assertion  that  when  the  sanitation  of  the  isth- 
mus had  been  accomplished  the  general  belief  through- 
out the  world  was  that  the  methods  so  successfully 
applied  had  been  originated  by  those  in  charge  of  the 
work.  It  could  not  be  said  that  the  martyr  Lazear 
and  his  heroic  associates  were  forgotten;  their  deeds 
had  never  been  known.  It  required  the  startling  effect 

*E.  P.  Button  &  Co.,  New  York,  1910. 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  237 

of  a  great  success  to  awaken  the  world  to  a  just  sense 
of  the  priceless  debt  of  gratitude  that  the  human  race 
owes  to  these  modest,  self-effacing  surgeons  and  sol- 
diers of  the  American  army.  To  them  belongs  all  the 
credit  without  division  or  diminution,  for,  as  President 
Eliot,  with  that  aptness  of  phrase  of  which  he  is  so 
enviable  a  master,  has  said,  they  not  only  showed  "how 
a  fearful  pestilence  is  communicated,"  but  "how  its 
ravages  may  be  prevented."  The  showing  was  so 
clear  that  the  sanitation  of  the  isthmus  or  any  other 
part  of  the  tropics  or  of  the  world  became  a  mere 
matter  of  intelligent  administration. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

ACTIVE  WORK  UNDER  COLONEL  GORGAS  AND  THE  DE- 
PARTMENT OF  MUNICIPAL  ENGINEERING  — FINAL 
OUTBREAK  AND  ROUT  OF  YELLOW  FEVER 

PRESIDENT  ROOSEVELT,  who  was  fully  aware  of  the 
value  of  the  discoveries  described  in  the  preceding 
chapter,  instructed  the  first  canal  commission  to  give 
special  attention  to  sanitation,  and  to  secure  the  best 
medical  experts  attainable  for  this  purpose,  saying  fur- 
ther, in  a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  that  "it  is 
the  belief  of  those  who  have  noted  the  successful  re- 
sults secured  by  our  army  in  Cuba  in  the  obliteration 
of  yellow  fever  in  that  island,  that  it  is  entirely  feasible 
to  banish  the  diseases  that  have  heretofore  caused  most 
mortality  on  the  isthmus."  By  unanimous  consent, 
Colonel  William  C.  Gorgas  was  the  expert  best  fitted 
to  take  charge  of  the  work.  His  close  association 
with  the  army  surgeons  who  had  made  the  discoveries, 
and  had  formulated  the  new  methods  of  applying  them, 
gave  him  the  practical  experience  necessary  for  intel- 
ligent administration.  He  had  only  to  adopt  on  the 
isthmus  the  plans  of  the  successful  campaign  in  Cuba 
to  win  a  second  and  more  brilliant  triumph. 

Yellow  fever  was  the  special  curse  of  the  isthmus. 
Dread  of  that  was  the  paramount  obstacle  in  the  way 
of  canal  construction.  Malaria  in  its  most  deadly 
form,  Chagres  fever,  was  a  scarcely  less  venomous  foe 

238 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  239 

to  health,  but  it  excited  far  less  fear.  If  yellow  fever 
could  be  banished  the  canal  could  be  built,  in  spite  of 
malaria  and  all  other  tropical  ills.  The  "astounding 
discovery"  had  shown,  with  a  clearness  that  amounted 
to  a  revelation,  that  existing  methods  of  fighting  yel- 
low fever  were  only  so  much  wasted  energy,  and  that 
the  sure  and  only  way  to  check  and  suppress  it  was  to 
restrict  the  activity  of  the  mosquitoes,  and,  so  far  as 
possible,  suppress  them. 

Colonel  Gorgas,  who  was  familiar  with  the  work  of 
Major  Ross  in  Ismailia  and  elsewhere,  invited  him  to 
visit  the  isthmus,  when  the  work  of  sanitation  began  in 
the  summer  of  1904,  in  order  to  have  the  benefit  of 
his  advice  and  suggestions,  and  the  invitation  was  ac- 
cepted, Major  Ross  making  the  visit  as  the  guest  of 
the  canal  commission.  The  work  was  begun,  there- 
fore, under  most  favorable  conditions,  with  exact  knowl- 
edge of  what  to  do  and  with  expert  ability  to  guide 
in  doing  it.  There  was  still  another  and  scarcely  less 
valuable  aid  to  the  task.  Under  the  treaty  with  Pan- 
ama the  United  States  had  sovereign  power  for  health 
purposes  not  only  in  the  Canal  Zone,  but  in  the  cities 
of  Colon  and  Panama,  and  could  enforce  all  necessary 
regulations. 

When  the  work  began  the  whole  isthmus  was  liter- 
ally a  mosquito  paradise,  with  well-nigh  ideal  condi- 
tions for  propagation  and  infection.  The  temperature 
being  tropical,  and  scarcely  varying  at  all  the  year 
round,  allowed  constant  breeding,  for  which  opportuni- 
ties and  facilities  were  virtually  universal.  During  nine 
months  of  the  year  the  innumerable  stagnant  pools  of 
fresh  water  left  by  the  almost  constant  rains  afforded 


240  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

the  most  favorable  breeding-places  possible  for  the 
malaria  mosquito.  In  the  dry  season,  there  being  no 
water-supply  for  cities  and  towns,  the  rain  was  stored 
in  tanks  and  receptacles  of  various  kinds,  which  made 
equally  favorable  breeding-places  for  the  yellow  fever 
mosquito.  From  one  end  of  the  Canal  Zone  to  the 
other,  a  fifty-mile  strip  ten  miles  in  width,  tropical 
undergrowth  flourished  virtually  undisturbed.  Micro- 
scopical examination  of  the  blood  of  the  inhabitants 
showed  that  fully  seventy  per  cent  of  the  ten  thou- 
sand or  twelve  thousand  of  them  had  the  malarial 
parasite  circulating  in  their  blood.  The  malarial  mos- 
quito thus  had  a  perpetual  feeding-ground  from  which 
to  obtain  the  seeds  of  infection.  When  a  case  of  yel- 
low fever  occurred,  the  stegomyia  was  at  hand,  prop- 
agated often  at  the  very  bedside  of  the  victim,  to  ob- 
tain and  convey  the  infection. 

The  work  of  the  American  sanitary  officers  was  thus 
clearly  marked  out  for  them.  They  must  restrict  the 
activities  of  the  mosquitoes  and,  so  far  as  possible, 
suppress  them.  The  first  needs  were  a  water-supply 
and  sewer  system  for  the  cities  and  towns,  for  until 
these  were  furnished  existing  methods  of  storing  water 
could  not  be  abolished.  While  these  were  being  sup- 
plied houses  could  be  screened  and  their  inmates  pro- 
tected against  infection. 

Plans  were  adopted  by  the  first  commission  almost 
immediately  after  its  appointment  for  the  construc- 
tion of  reservoirs  to  supply  the  cities  of  Panama  and 
Colon  with  water,  and  later  similar  plans  were  adopted 
for  all  labor  centres  along  the  line  of  the  canal.  At 
the  same  time  plans  were  adopted  for  a  system  of 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  241 

sewers  for  the  cities  and  the  paving  or  resurfacing  of 
their  streets.  This  work,  which  was  begun  in  the  first 
six  months  of  American  occupation,  was  separate  from 
the  strictly  sanitary  work,  and  was  performed  by  the 
Division  of  Municipal  Engineering,  which  was  under  the 
general  Department  of  Construction  and  Engineering, 
of  which  the  chief  engineer  was  the  head.  It  was  in 
existence  till  August  1,  1908,  when,  its  work  having 
been  completed,  it  was  abolished.  During  the  four 
years  of  its  activity  it  expended  nearly  $6,000,000,  of 
which  about  $2,250,000  was  for  water-works,  sewers, 
and  pavements  in  the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon,  and 
about  $3,500,000  was  for  work  in  the  Canal  Zone. 
Subsequent  expenditures  in  Colon  and  Panama  brought 
the  total  cost  of  improvements  made  in  them  by  the 
commission  up  to  nearly  $3,500,000.  All  of  this,  in 
accordance  with  the  treaty  between  the  United  States 
and  Panama,  will  be  paid  back  to  the  United  States, 
through  water  and  sewerage  rates,  within  a  period  of 
fifty  years,  at  the  expiration  of  which  the  system  of 
water-works  and  sewers  within  city  limits  will  revert 
to  the  cities,  and  the  use  of  water  will  be  free  to  their 
inhabitants,  with  the  exception  of  a  sufficient  water 
rate  necessary  for  maintenance  and  operation. 

Through  these  expenditures  pure  water  was  supplied 
to  the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon  and  all  settlements 
in  the  Canal  Zone,  the  cities  were  converted  from  hot- 
beds of  disease,  without  water-supply  or  decent  pave- 
ments or  sewers,  into  the  best-paved,  best-watered,  and 
best-sewered  cities  in  Central  or  South  America. 

Moving  side  by  side  with  the  work  of  the  Division  of 
Municipal  Engineering,  though  separate  and  distinct 


242  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

from  it,  was  the  work  of  the  Sanitary  Department. 
The  new  methods  of  fighting  disease,  which  had  been 
shown  to  be  effective  by  the  mosquito  tests  in  Cuba, 
were  put  into  operation.  Repairs  and  additions  were 
made  to  the  hospitals  acquired  from  the  French  at 
Ancon  and  Colon,  and  emergency  hospitals  and  sick- 
camps  were  established  along  the  line  of  the  canal. 

The  supreme  test  of  the  mosquito  theory  as  applied 
to  yellow  fever  came  in  1905.  When  the  Americans 
took  possession  of  the  Canal  Zone  in  1904  there  were 
a  few  scattered  cases  of  yellow  fever,  but  as  this  was 
the  usual  condition  between  periodic  epidemics  of  the 
disease,  little  concern  was  felt.  In  January,  1905, 
however,  there  was  an  increase  in  cases  to  19,  among 
whom  there  were  7  employes  of  the  commission  and 
Panama  Railroad  Company.  Eight  died,  among  them 
a  canal  employe.  There  were  14  cases  in  February,  11 
in  March,  and  9  in  April,  and  of  these  18  were  em- 
ployes, 6  of  whom  died. 

The  7  cases  in  April  were  among  employes  in  the 
French  administration  building,  which  had  become  the 
headquarters  of  the  commission  in  Panama,  where 
about  300  Americans  were  engaged.  When  3  of  them 
died  a  panic  arose  among  Americans  on  the  isthmus, 
and  all  steamers  outward  bound  were  laden  to  the  full 
capacity  with  frightened  employes.  An  increase  of 
the  number  of  cases  in  May  to  33,  including  22  em- 
ployes, 3  of  whom  died,  and  a  further  increase  in 
June  to  62,  including  34  employes,  6  of  whom  died, 
added  to  the  panic,  and  nothing  except  lack  of  sailing 
accommodations  prevented  the  scattering  of  the  entire 
force.  In  July  the  number  of  cases  began  to  decline, 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION 


243 


showing  that  the  progress  of  the  disease  had  been 
checked,  and  a  further  decline  in  August  partially  re- 
stored confidence.  By  the  first  of  September  the  dis- 
ease was  shown  to  be  under  control,  and  in  December 
the  last  case  was  registered  and  there  was  no  death. 
There  had  been  among  employes  of  the  commission 
and  Panama  Railroad  employes  133  cases  and  35 
deaths.  As  this  epidemic  was  the  last  of  its  kind  on 
the  isthmus,  the  full  record  of  it  is  given: 

STATISTICS  OF  THE  LAST  YELLOW-FEVER  EPIDEMIC  ON 
THE  ISTHMUS,   1904-5 


TOTAL 

EMPLOYES 

PLACE  OF  ORIGIN 

MONTH 

CASES 

DEATHS 

CASES 

DEATHS 

PANAMA 

COLON 

CANAL 
ZONE 

FOREIGN 
PORTS 

1904 

July.. 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

August  .... 

September  . 

1 

.. 

.. 

1 

.. 

.. 

October  

2 

,  . 

.  . 

,  . 

1 

i 

November  . 

2 

1 

2 

December.  . 

6 

i 

2 

5 

i 

•• 

•• 

1905 

January  .  .  . 

19 

8 

7 

1 

8 

i 

1 

9 

February.  . 

14 

9 

5 

3 

10 

.  . 

2 

2 

March  

11 

3 

6 

7 

4 

April  

9 

3 

7 

3 

8 

1 

May  

33 

7 

22 

3 

16 

14 

3 

'' 

June.  . 

62 

19 

34 

6 

29 

17 

13 

3 

July  .  . 

42 

13 

27 

10 

15 

9 

8 

10 

August  .... 

27 

9 

12 

1 

11 

10 

5 

1 

September  . 

7 

4 

3 

3 

5 

1 

1 

October  .  .  . 

5 

3 

3 

2 

4 

1 

November  . 

3 

3 

1 

1 

1 

2 

December  . 

1 

1 

1 

Totals. 

246 

84 

133 

35 

125 

62 

33 

26 

244  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

In  applying  the  new  methods  of  fighting  the  disease, 
Colonel  Gorgas  had  the  hearty  co-operation  and  ear- 
nest support  of  Charles  E.  Magoon,  who,  as  member 
of  the  second  Isthmian  Canal  Commission,  which  had 
succeeded  the  first  commission  on  April  3,  1905,  was 
governor  of  the  Canal  Zone  when  the  yellow-fever 
epidemic  began  to  gain  headway.  Governor  Magoon, 
immediately  upon  his  arrival  on  the  isthmus  on  May 
24,  assured  Colonel  Gorgas  that  the  entire  resources  of 
the  commission  and  the  government  of  the  Canal  Zone 
were  available  for  the  work  of  stamping  out  yellow 
fever  on  the  isthmus.  Under  the  joint  labors  of  these 
two  officials  the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon  were  fumi- 
gated house  by  house,  the  towns  of  the  Canal  Zone 
were  Divided  into  districts  for  the  extermination  of 
mosquitoes,  medical  inspectors  were  appointed  to  make 
daily  house-to-house  canvasses  and  to  report  all  sus- 
pected cases,  and  all  such  were  taken  at  once,  willingly 
or  unwillingly,  to  the  hospitals  and  segregated. 

At  the  same  time  that  these  vigorous  measures  were 
being  applied  a  rigid  quarantine,  which  had  been  es- 
tablished at  the  outset  of  American  occupation,  was 
maintained  against  all  infected  ports,  preventing  the 
introduction  of  disease  from  outside. 

Since  December,  1905,  there  has  been  no  case  of 
yellow  fever  on  the  isthmus  which  has  originated  there. 
There  have  been  sporadic  cases  from  time  to  time,  but 
invariably  of  persons  who  have  brought  the  disease 
from  outside  the  isthmus.  In  each  instance  the  vic- 
tim has  been  segregated  and  there  has  been  no  infec- 
tion. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

COMPLETENESS  OF  THE  VICTORY  OVER  YELLOW  FEVER 
—  REWARDS  GIVEN  BY  CONGRESS  TO  THE  MEN  WHO 
MADE  IT  POSSIBLE 

THE  utter  and  final  rout  of  yellow  fever  was  the  most 
convincing  demonstration  yet  made  of  the  truth  of  the 
theory  of  mosquito  transmission.  No  rational  person 
could  thenceforth  question  either  the  truth  or  the 
limitless  beneficence  of  the  discoveries  made  in  Cuba 
in  1900.  Colonel  Gorgas  has  borne  emphatic  testimony 
on  that  point.  In  an  article  which  he  published  in  the 
Medical  Record  of  May  18,  1907,  he  said: 

I  do  not  believe  that  our  present  freedom  from 
yellow  fever  is  in  any  way  accidental.  Our  work  here, 
I  think,  is  another  evidence  of  the  great  obligation  man- 
kind is  under  to  the  Army  Board,  of  which  Major  Walter 
Reed  was  chairman  and  Lazear  and  Carroll  were  mem- 
bers, for  establishing  the  fact  that  the  stegomyia  mos- 
quito was  the  transmitter  of  yellow  fever.  Without 
this  knowledge  I  do  not  believe  we  could  have  done  any 
better  than  did  the  French,  and  judging  from  the  alarm 
that  was  caused  by  the  comparatively  mild  epidemic 
which  we  had  among  our  employes  in  1905,  I  doubt, 
in  case  we  were  having  the  same  amount  of  yellow 
fever  that  the  French  had,  whether  we  could  keep  a 
sufficient  force  of  white  employes  here  to  carry  on  the 
work.  And  even  if  we  could  keep  white  employes 
here  under  such  circumstances  I  doubt  whether  public 

245 


246  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

sentiment  in  the  United  States  would  allow  the  canal 
to  be  built  at  such  a  sacrifice  of  human  life. 

In  that  opinion  all  competent  authorities  must  agree. 
Reed,  Carroll,  and  Lazear,  the  last-named  at  the  cost  of 
his  life,  made  possible  the  Panama  Canal.  Whatever 
honors  may  be  awarded  to  those  who  took  part  in  the 
work  of  actual  construction,  the  first  honor  must  be 
awarded  to  them.  Their  discovery,  of  incalculable 
value  to  human  welfare  and  progress,  was  a  direct 
outcome  of  the  war  between  the  United  States  and 
Spain,  and  will  go  far  to  justify  the  claim  that  that 
contest  was  a  war  in  the  interest  of  humanity. 

What  recognition  have  these  brave  men  received 
for  their  services?  Lazear  left  a  wife  and  two  small 
children,  one  of  them  born  a  few  months  before  his 
death  and  never  seen  by  him.  Congress  appropriated 
for  his  widow  the  magnificent  pension  of  $17  a  month, 
with  $2  additional  for  each  child  until  the  age  of  16! 
This  was  continued  till  May,  1908,  when  it  was  replaced 
with  an  annuity  of  $125  a  month.  A  battery  in  Balti- 
more harbor  has  been  named  in  his  honor,  and  a  tablet 
to  his  memory  has  been  placed  in  Johns  Hopkins  Hos- 
pital, at  Baltimore. 

Reed  died  in  Washington,  November  23,  1902.  In 
March,  1903,  a  pension  of  $125  a  month  was  granted 
to  his  widow.  This  was  so  inadequate  for  her  support, 
that  a  Walter  Reed  Memorial  Association  was  formed, 
and  a  fund  of  $25,000  was  raised,  the  interest  of  which, 
$75  a  month,  is  to  be  paid  to  her  during  life,  and  the 
principal  used  to  erect  a  memorial  to  him  after  her  death. 
A  hospital  in  Washington  has  been  named  in  his  honor. 

Carroll  died  in  Washington,  September  16,  1907. 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  247 

In  May,  1908,  Congress  granted  his  widow  a  pension  of 
$125  a  month. 

Kissinger's  health  failed  so  completely  a  few  years 
ago  that  he  was  dependent  on  his  wife  for  support. 
Application  was  made  to  Congress  for  a  pension,  and 
the  response,  in  March,  1907,  was  a  grant  of  $12  a 
month.  Application  was  made  again  in  1910,  Kis- 
singer being  then  a  hopeless  paralytic,  and  a  grant  of 
a  pension  of  $125  a  month  was  passed  by  the  Senate, 
but  was  objected  to  by  the  committee  on  pensions  in 
the  House  because  "in  carrying  a  rate  in  excess  of 
that  allowed  to  any  other  private  soldier"  it  would 
establish  a  vexing  precedent.  In  February,  1911,  the 
House  cut  down  the  amount  of  the  pension  to  $100 
and  passed  the  grant. 

In  granting  the  $125  pension  for  Lazear's  widow, 
Congress  declared  that  it  was  bestowed  "in  special 
recognition  of  the  eminent  services  of  the  said  Jesse 
W.  Lazear  in  discovering  the  means  of  preventing  as 
well  as  the  cause  and  method  of  transmission  and  prop- 
agation of  yellow  fever  and  demonstrating  on  his  own 
person  the  truth  of  the  theory  of  the  transmission  by 
mosquitoes,  and  the  sacrificing  of  his  life  in  proving 
the  same."  The  same  language  was  used  in  the  grant 
to  Carroll's  widow,  with  the  final  clause  omitted.  In 
the  grant  to  Kissinger,  the  pension  is  awarded  "in 
special  recognition  of  his  eminent  services  rendered, 
suffered,  and  endured,  and  permanent  disabilities  con- 
tracted in  the  interest  of  humanity  and  science  as  a 
volunteer  subject  for  experimentation  in  the  yellow- 
fever  hospital  in  Cuba." 

There  is  a  sad  discrepancy  here  between  the  verbal 


248  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

and  the  pecuniary  appreciations  of  the  service  rendered. 
Not  only  did  that  service  make  the  building  of  the 
Panama  Canal  possible,  but  it  abolished  forever  from 
the  United  States  a  scourge  that  during  more  than  a 
century  had,  through  periodic  outbreaks,  cost  it  a  half 
million  lives  and  many  millions  of  dollars.  Ninety  times 
during  that  period  had  yellow-fever  epidemics  invaded 
American  cities  from  Philadelphia  and  New  York  to 
New  Orleans,  carrying  in  their  wake  terror,  devasta- 
tion, and  death,  paralyzing  industry  and  business,  and 
filling  the  whole  land  with  alarm.  One  epidemic  alone, 
that  of  1878,  in  the  Mississippi  valley,  caused  nearly 
sixteen  thousand  deaths,  and  inflicted  upon  the  coun- 
try a  loss  that  has  been  estimated  at  one  hundred 
million  dollars. 

When  Jenner  discovered  vaccination  he  received  from 
the  British  government  grants  amounting  to  above 
$150,000,  and  also  a  subscription  fund  of  $35,000  dol- 
lars raised  in  India.  This  was  a  hundred  years  ago, 
and  the  discovery,  scarcely  more  valuable  to  human 
welfare  than  that  of  yellow-fever  transmission,  was 
made  without  risk  of  life  to  the  discoverer. 

As  for  Moran,  he  suffered  no  ill  effects  from  the  dis- 
ease, and  has  never  been  an  applicant  for  government 
or  other  aid.  His  ambition  had  been  to  become  a 
physician,  and  in  accordance  with  it  he  entered  the 
University  of  Virginia  as  a  medical  student  in  1901. 
He  was  compelled  to  discontinue  his  studies  a  year 
later  through  lack  of  funds.  Since  1904  he  has  been 
in  the  service  of  the  canal  commission,  in  the  Depart- 
ment of  Sanitation,  holding  various  positions  and  filling 
all  of  them  with  efficiency  and  with  unvarying  modesty. 


CHAPTER  XV 

WARFARE  UPON  MALARIA  — COST  OF  MAKING  THE 
ISTHMUS  HEALTFUL— IS  IT  A  HEALTH  RESORT  ? 

WITH  yellow  fever  banished  from  the  isthmus,  the  De- 
partment of  Sanitation  was  able  to  devote  its  entire 
energies  to  the  task  of  restricting  the  ravages  of  ma- 
laria. The  possibility  of  banishing  that  disease  was 
too  remote  to  be  entertained.  The  problem  was  a  very 
different  one  from  that  of  yellow  fever.  A  victim  of 
yellow  fever  either  recovers  or  dies.  In  either  event 
he  ceases  to  be  a  source  of  germ  supply  for  the  stego- 
myia,  and  without  such  a  source  the  stegomyia  becomes 
an  entirely  harmless  mosquito.  She — for  the  female 
alone  transmits  the  disease — has  nothing  to  carry. 
The  life  period  of  this  mosquito  is  not  known.  In 
captivity  it  is  seldom  more  than  five  weeks,  though 
there  are  records  of  infection  from  its  bites  at  inter- 
vals ranging  from  twelve  to  fifty-seven  days  after  con- 
tamination. It  is  a  house  mosquito,  cannot  live  with- 
out water,  and  is  easily  destroyed  by  fumigation.  If 
there  is  no  fresh  case  of  yellow  fever  within  a  period 
of  sixty  days  after  the  latest  one  in  an  epidemic,  it  is 
a  safe  conclusion  that  the  disease  has  been  stamped 
out,  because  there  is  no  mosquito  alive  to  carry  the 
parasite.  After  a  period  of  ninety  days  all  doubt  on 

249 


250  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

the  subject  ends.  A  community  infested  with  stego- 
myia  can  live  in  absolute  security  from  yellow  fever 
unless  a  case  be  brought  in  from  outside.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  the  measures  applied  against  this  mosquito  in 
the  Canal  Zone  were  so  effective  that  during  the  past 
year  or  more  an  adult  stegomyia  has  been  so  rare  as 
to  be  regarded  as  a  curiosity. 

But  with  the  anopheles  it  is  quite  another  matter. 
This  mosquito  breeds  in  the  country  districts,  in 
marshes,  pools,  and  stagnant  water  of  all  kinds.  Fur- 
thermore, a  victim  of  malaria  seldom  dies  of  the  dis- 
ease, but  is  capable  of  infecting  mosquitoes  with  it 
for  three  years,  or  at  every  recurrence  of  it.  With  a 
population,  seventy  per  cent  of  whom  had  malaria  in 
their  systems,  and  with  a  fifty-mile  strip  of  country 
ten  miles  in  width  breeding  mosquitoes  in  nearly 
every  part,  the  abolition  of  malaria  was  clearly  an 
impossibility.  But  if  it  could  not  be  abolished  its 
volume  could  be  reduced,  and  this  task  was  under- 
taken with  great  zeal,  practically  unlimited  resources, 
and  on  lines  of  demonstrated  effectiveness. 

The  task  would  have  been  hopeless  from  the  outset 
had  it  been  necessary  to  extend  anti-mosquito  opera- 
tions over  the  entire  territory  of  the  Canal  Zone,  com- 
prising 278,848  acres.  The  work  of  the  Sanitary  De- 
partment has  been  confined  to  the  portions  occupied 
by  the  canal  forces,  and  these  aggregate  only  about 
1,200  acres.  These  were  cleared  of  undergrowth  of  all 
kinds  for  a  distance  of  200  yards  around  settlements, 
the  grass  over  that  area  was  kept  less  than  a  foot  in 
height,  marshes  and  swamps  were  drained,  stagnant 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  251 

pools  were  oiled  regularly  to  kill  mosquito  larvae,  and 
all  buildings  were  screened.  In  this  work  there  had 
been  expended  down  to  June  30,  1912,  for  sanitation 
proper,  $3,644,000.  If  it  cost  this  sum  to  create  de- 
sirable sanitary  conditions  in  1,200  acres  of  the  Canal 
Zone,  what  would  it  have  cost  to  accomplish  like  re- 
sults in  278,848  acres?  Happily,  no  such  herculean 
task  was  necessary  to  make  canal  construction  pos- 
sible. 

So  successful  were  these  measures  that  within  two 
years  mosquitoes  were  so  nearly  exterminated  in  the 
occupied  sections  of  the  Canal  Zone  that  during  the 
dry  seasons  one  was  rarely  seen  or  heard,  and  from 
that  time  till  the  present  a  steady  diminution  in  ma- 
laria cases  has  been  recorded,  the  average  number  at 
present  being  about  one-third  as  large  as  that  at  the 
beginning  of  the  work.  In  the  rainy  season  the  task 
of  preventing  mosquito  breeding  is  much  more  difficult, 
and  there  is  uniformly  a  larger  number  of  malaria  cases 
in  consequence.  In  fact  it  has  been  made  apparent 
that  the  final  extirpation  of  anopheles  mosquitoes  is  an 
impossibility.  Nothing  but  unceasing  warfare  suffices 
to  keep  the  number  of  them  restricted.  They  reappear 
in  undiminished  hordes  as  soon  as  efforts  for  their  sup- 
pression are  relaxed,  showing  that  the  cost  of  keeping 
them  in  subjection  must  be  a  permanent  annual  ex- 
penditure. A  very  valuable  result  of  the  restrictive 
work  has  been  the  demonstration,  conclusive  and  con- 
vincing, that  the  mosquito,  and  the  mosquito  alone, 
transmits  malaria,  that  the  disease  is  not  due  to  marsh 
miasma  or  poisonous  air  of  any  sort. 


252  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

When  the  canal  shall  have  been  completed  and 
opened  to  the  shipping  of  the  world  on  Jan.  1,  1915, 
the  health  bill  which  the  United  States  will  have  had 
to  pay  in  connection  with  its  construction  will  be  very 
close  to  $20,000,000.  Down  to  the  end  of  the  calendar 
year  of  1912  the  total  expenditures  of  the  Department 
of  Sanitation  aggregated  about  $15,500,000.  Adding 
to  this  sum  the  $2,500,000  expended  for  water-works, 
sewers,  etc.,  in  the  Canal  Zone,  we  have  a  total  for 
general  health  purposes  of  $18,000,000.  The  expendi- 
tures of  the  final  two  years  will  bring  the  amount  to 
nearly  or  quite  $20,000,000.  It  will  have  cost  the 
United  States  Government  this  sum,  first,  to  make 
the  isthmus  a  normally  healthy  place  in  which  to  live 
and  work;  second,  to  maintain  it  in  that  condition; 
and  third,  to  care  for  the  sick,  the  injured,  the  in- 
sane, etc. 

Under  the  title  "Department  of  Sanitation"  there 
has  been  grouped  on  the  isthmus  all  the  work  done 
in  the  interest  of  health,  both  in  the  Canal  Zone  and 
in  the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon — sanitation  proper, 
hospitals,  quarantine,  street-cleaning,  garbage  collec- 
tion, etc.  For  sanitation  proper  there  will  have  been 
expended  when  the  canal  is  thrown  open  formally  to 
the  commerce  of  the  world  about  $6,000,000.  Of  this 
amount  over  $3,550,000  was  spent  during  the  first  five 
years  of  American  occupation.  The  average  force  of  the 
department  during  most  of  that  period  was  about  3,000 
men,  and  the  average  annual  expense  about  $710,000. 
During  the  next  three  years  the  annual  average  ex- 
pense was  about  $488,000.  At  present  it  is  very  near 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  253 

the  latter  sum.  These  figures  include  certain  over- 
head charges  which  are  imposed  proportionately  upon 
all  departments  of  canal  work. 

By  far  the  largest  item  of  health  expenditure  has 
been  for  hospitals  or  general  care  of  the  sick.  This, 
when  the  outlay  for  construction  and  repair  of  build- 
ings is  included,  will  aggregate  on  January  1,  1915, 
very  nearly  $9,000,000;  that  for  all  other  branches  of 
the  health  service,  about  $7,500,000;  and  that  for  gen- 
eral administration  of  the  department,  close  to  $1,000,- 
000.  Adding  to  these  items  the  $2,500,000  spent  for 
water-works,  sewers,  etc.,  in  the  Canal  Zone,  we  have 
the  $20,000,000  total.  The  average  annual  outlay  for 
all  health  purposes  on  the  isthmus  during  the  ten  and 
one-half  years  of  canal  construction  will  have  been, 
therefore,  about  $1,900,000,  and  for  sanitation  proper 
about  $570,000.! 

Has  this  expenditure  made  the  isthmus  a  "health 
resort"  ?  In  the  full  sense  of  the  term,  it  has  not.  It 
has  made  it  a  reasonably  healthful  place  of  abode  and 
work,  and  an  agreeable  and  healthful  place  of  sojourn, 
especially  during  the  three  months  of  the  dry  season. 
But  this  will  remain  true  of  the  isthmus  only  so  long 
as  stringent  methods  of  health  protection  are  enforced. 
Health  statistics  of  the  Canal  Zone— sick  and  death 
rates — are  misleading  when  used  in  comparison  with 
like  data  of  communities  in  the  temperate  zone,  unless 

1A11  figures  cited,  relating  to  expenditures  by  the  department  of 
sanitation,  were  furnished  to  me  by  Col.  Gorgas,  the  chief  of  the  de- 
partment, who  obtained  them  from  the  examiner  of  accounts,  the  first 
authority  in  the  commission  for  all  expenditures.  Their  absolute  ac- 
curacy is  not  to  be  questioned — J.  B.  B. 


254  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

the  peculiar  conditions  on  the  isthmus  are  taken  into 
account. 

In  the  first  place,  the  American  colony  in  the  Canal 
Zone  is  a  selected  white  community,  with  less  than  the 
average  allotment  of  women  and  children.  All  appli- 
cants for  employment  are  required  to  be  in  good  phys- 
ical condition,  and  all  who  are  unable  to  maintain  such 
condition  after  employment  are  deported.  Thus  the 
American  force  is  composed  at  all  times  of  men  who  have 
shown  themselves  able  to  withstand  the  climate  with- 
out serious  disability,  and  the  colony  is  rid  of  a  per- 
manently sick  or  incapable  class.  Furthermore,  there 
are  no  aged  and  infirm  persons  to  swell  the  sick  and 
death  rates. 

In  the  second  place,  the  health  of  the  American 
colony  is  cared  for  as  that  of  no  other  community 
on  earth  ever  has  been.  Its  members  are  provided 
with  comfortable  and  healthful  furnished  quarters,  free 
of  rent,  constructed  on  sanitary  principles,  and  sup- 
plied with  pure  water.  If  one  of  them  falls  sick,  he 
can  obtain  free  medicines,  free  medical  or  surgical  at- 
tendance, and,  if  taken  to  a  hospital,  free  subsistence 
while  there,  and  full  pay,  provided  the  period  of  his 
absence  from  work  does  not  exceed  thirty  days  in  a 
year.  His  dwelling-place  is  cared  for  at  the  public 
expense,  and  all  sanitary  regulations  in  regard  to  it 
are  rigorously  enforced.  He  lives,  in  short,  under  a 
system  of  compulsory  health  preservation  which  pro- 
tects his  physical  condition  on  every  side.  In  addi- 
tion to  all  this,  he  is  granted  six  weeks'  vacation  each 
year  with  full  pay  in  order  that  he  may  go  to  a  more 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  255 

bracing  climate  and  thus  escape  the  deteriorating  ef- 
fects of  the  tropics. 

All  these  things  must  be  taken  into  account  in  consid- 
ering the  question  of  the  healthfulness  of  the  isthmus 
and  of  the  tropics  in  general,  and  the  allied  question 
of  making  the  tropics  as  healthful  a  region  for  the 
white  man,  or  the  Anglo-Saxon,  as  the  temperate 
zone  is.  Undoubtedly,  the  application  of  the  methods 
employed  in  the  Canal  Zone  to  any  other  section  of 
the  tropics  would  produce  like  results;  that  fact  has 
been  clearly  demonstrated,  but  such  application  re- 
quires for  success  the  presence  behind  it  of  a  rich  and 
powerful  government  as  willing  to  defray  the  cost  as 
the  United  States  Government  has  been  in  the  case 
of  the  isthmus.  Some  white  men  can  undoubtedly 
maintain  as  good  a  condition  of  health  in  the  tropics, 
under  the  methods  of  health  protection  enforced  at 
Panama,  as  the  same  men  would  have  been  able  to 
maintain  in  the  temperate  zone,  but  many  others 
cannot.  This  has  been  demonstrated  clearly  on  the 
isthmus.  The  visitor  to  the  canal  sees  the  hardy, 
healthy-looking  Americans  who  have  been  able  to  remain 
on  the  job,  and  judges  of  the  healthfulness  of  the  coun- 
try from  them,  but  he  does  not  see  those  who  have  been 
obliged  to  return  to  the  United  States  because  they 
could  not  withstand  the  climate,  and  there  have  been 
a  great  many  of  these. 

The  curse  of  the  isthmus  is  malaria,  and  until  the 
anopheles  mosquito  shall  have  been  annihilated  this 
will  remain.  The  warfare  made  against  it  during  six 
years  has  greatly  mitigated  its  ravages,  but  it  still  re- 


256  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

mains  in  formidable  force.  As  I  have  said,  the  num- 
ber of  cases  has  been  reduced  about  one-third  during 
these  six  years;  yet  after  this  reduction  there  were, 
among  about  40,000  employes  during  the  fiscal  year 
ending  June  30,  1912,  over  7,000  cases  in  the  hospitals, 
with  32  deaths:  22  whites,  4  of  whom  were  Americans, 
and  10  blacks.  Since  the  beginning  of  American  oc- 
cupation, in  1904,  47  Americans  have  died  of  malaria, 
35  of  whom  were  men,  3  women,  and  11  children.  It 
is  rarely  a  fatal  disease  among  Americans,  but  its 
effect  is  great  physical  weakness  and  depression  and 
often  lifelong  debilitation.  Constant  care  in  the  man- 
ner of  living,  remaining  behind  screens  at  night,  and 
taking  liberal  doses  of  quinine  at  more  or  less  regu- 
lar intervals  are  necessary  safeguards.  Many  persons 
live  for  years  on  the  isthmus  without  being  infected  by 
it.  I  have  lived  there  with  my  wife  and  daughter  for 
more  than  six  years,  and  none  of  us  has  had  a  touch  of  it, 
but  every  clerk  that  I  have  had  in  my  office  during 
that  time  has  had  it,  though  all  of  them  occupied 
screened  quarters.  During  these  six  years,  beginning 
with  1906,  the  Sanitary  Department  has  distributed 
free  among  employes  15,600  pounds  avoirdupois  of 
quinine,  109,200,000  grains,  an  average  of  2,600  pounds, 
18,200,000  grains,  a  year. 

The  death-roll  among  employes  from  all  diseases 
from  the  beginning  of  American  occupancy  to  the  end 
of  the  fiscal  year  1912,  eight  years,  was  5,141,  of  which 
number  284  were  Americans;  4,119  died  of  disease 
and  1,022  from  violence  or  accident  connected  with 
the  work.  There  were  also  during  that  period  49 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  257 

deaths  of  American  women  and  87  deaths  of  American 
children.  The  most  reasonable  estimate  of  deaths 
among  the  French  during  the  nine  years  of  their  oc- 
cupancy is  about  16,000,  or  a  little  more  than  three 
times  that  of  the  Americans  during  eight  years. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

THE  EVOLUTION  OF  "A  BENEVOLENT  DESPOTISM" —  IN- 
DUCEMENTS TO  ENTER  THE  CANAL  SERVICE 

"WHERE/'  asked  a  British  colonial  governor  who  was 
visiting  a  canal  official  on  the  isthmus,  and  was  exam- 
ining with  many  expressions  of  surprise  and  approval 
the  screened,  wide-verandahed,  airy  dwelling  in  which  he 
was  received,  "where  did  you  get  this  type  of  house? " 
The  official  replied  that  it  was  the  result  of  American 
ingenuity  applied  to  the  needs  of  the  situation.  The 
needs  of  the  situation  being  novel,  novel  methods  of 
meeting  them  had  been  invented.  The  demand  was 
for  a  house  suitable  for  life  in  the  tropics  and  at  the 
same  time  constructed  and  equipped  in  accordance 
with  the  modern  ideas  of  comfortable  living  prevailing 
in  the  United  States  and  with  modern  ideas  in  sani- 
tary science.  By  process  of  evolution  there  was  de- 
veloped a  type  of  building  which  met  the  requirements 
of  the  situation  in  every  respect. 

What  is  true  of  the  dwellings  is  true  of  all  features 
of  the  canal  work  on  the  isthmus,  from  the  dominating, 
autocratic  government  down  to  the  housing  and  feed- 
ing of  the  common  laborers.  All  are  the  results  of  a 
process  of  evolution,  of  the  application  of  American 
intelligence  and  ingenuity  to  the  needs  of  the  situa- 

258 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  259 

tion.  The  nation  was  confronted  with  a  task,  not  only 
unprecedented  in  magnitude,  but  unprecedented  also 
in  the  conditions  and  surroundings  in  which  it  must 
be  performed.  Its  own  experience  afforded  no  light 
for  guidance  and  the  experience  of  other  nations  noth- 
ing except  the  dismal  warnings  of  disaster. 

A  clear  conception  of  this  situation  at  the  outset  is 
necessary  for  a  proper  understanding  of  why  there  was 
built  up  in  the  Canal  Zone  a  system  of  control  which 
has  been  styled  variously  "paternalism/7  "modified 
socialism/'  and  "benevolent  despotism."  It  was  not 
the  work  of  a  month  or  a  year,  but  a  gradual  evolu- 
tion, the  outgrowth  of  practical  experience,  covering 
several  years. 

Congress,  building  better  than  it  knew,  perhaps,  left 
the  direction  of  the  great  work  entirely  in  the  hands 
of  President  Roosevelt.  It  empowered  him,  through 
the  law  known  as  the  Spooner  Act,  to  construct  the 
canal  through  a  commission  of  seven  members  se- 
lected in  accordance  with  certain  requirements  as  to 
personnel.  In  a  separate  act  it  conferred  upon  him  all 
the  military,  civil,  and  judicial  powers  as  well  as  the 
power  to  make  all  rules  and  regulations  necessary  for 
the  government  of  the  Canal  Zone,  which  powers  he 
was  to  exercise  through  such  persons  as  he  might  choose 
and  in  such  manner  as  he  might  direct.  He  was  au- 
thorized to  exercise  these  powers  till  the  expiration  of  the 
Fifty-eighth  Congress;  that  is,  from  the  date  of  the  act, 
April  28,  1904,  down  to  March  4,  1905,  when  the  Con- 
gress named  expired.  That  Congress  went  out  of  ex- 
istence without  taking  further  action  in  the  matter, 


260  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

thus  leaving  the  President  without  congressional  au- 
thority to  continue  the  exercise  of  those  powers  which 
it  had  conferred  in  the  act  of  1904,  and  under  which 
he  had  established  a  form  of  government  in  the  Canal 
Zone,  using  the  canal  commission  as  a  legislative 
body.  As  he  was  directed  to  construct  the  canal,  as 
the  maintenance  of  a  government  in  the  Canal  Zone 
was  essential  to  such  construction,  and  as  there  was 
an  existing  government  bound  by  existing  laws  which 
continued  in  effect,  though  the  power  to  make  or  to 
amend  them  had  ceased,  the  President  decided  that  it 
was  his  duty,  under  his  constitutional  obligation,  to 
see  to  it  that  the  laws  were  enforced  and  that  the  es- 
tablished government  carried  out  its  functions  as  lim- 
ited by  legislative  acts. 

Through  this  failure  of  Congress  to  continue  the 
legislation  which  it  had  enacted  at  the  outset,  the 
government  of  the  Canal  Zone,  as  well  as  the  direc- 
tion of  the  canal  work,  passed  entirely  into  the  hands 
of  the  President,  and  rule  by  executive  order,  rather 
than  through  legislative  action  by  Congress  or  by  the 
canal  commission,  was  established  over  the  canal  work. 
Nothing  more  beneficial  to  that  work  could  have  hap- 
pened. It  substituted  prompt  action  in  place  of  in- 
definite delay  in  all  matters  of  pressing  importance. 
How  valuable  this  was  to  the  successful  prosecution 
of  the  task  will  be  made  apparent  as  this  narrative 
proceeds. 

As  has  been  said  in  a  previous  chapter,  when  the 
Americans  took  possession  of  the  Canal  Zone,  in  the 
spring  of  1904,  it  was  virtually  the  universal  belief  in 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  261 

the  United  States,  and  indeed  throughout  the  civilized 
world,  that  every  person  who  ventured  to  go  to  the 
isthmus  did  so  at  the  peril  of  health  and  life.  Scarcely 
had  a  small  force  been  assembled  when  the  outbreak 
of  yellow  fever  came,  in  1905,  confirming  the  universal 
dread  and  making  the  task  of  assembling  a  competent 
force  more  difficult  than  ever.  The  fact  that  the  pes- 
tilence had  been  checked  and  overcome  through  the 
application  of  newly  discovered  methods  of  suppressing 
it  commanded  far  less  public  attention  than  the  fact 
that  thirty-five  American  employes  had  died  of  it. 
The  gloomy  reports  of  panic-stricken  survivors  who 
had  been  able  to  get  back  to  the  United  States,  and 
equally  gloomy  letters  from  their  less  fortunate  asso- 
ciates who  remained  behind  and  were  determined  to 
get  away  at  the  first  opportunity,  had  a  wide  hearing 
and  intensified  the  original  dread.  These  eye-witnesses 
of  pestilence  in  action,  who  had  seen  their  companions 
stricken  at  their  side,  spoke  with  the  awful  authority 
that  terror  alone  can  supply.  They  had  escaped  the 
supreme  peril,  but  many  of  them  were  the  victims  of 
malaria,  with  its  debilitating  and  depressing  effects, 
and  were  sad  examples  of  what  the  isthmus  climate 
could  do  to  the  health  of  a  sojourner  from  the  tem- 
perate zone. 

It  was  evident  that  extraordinary  inducements  must 
be  offered  to  persuade  competent  and  satisfactory  per- 
sons to  enter  the  canal  service,  in  the  first  place,  and 
other  extraordinary  inducements  to  persuade  them  to 
remain  there  after  arrival.  They  must  be  given  wages 
considerably  in  advance  of  those  paid  at  home.  They 


262  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

must  be  provided  with  living  quarters  that  were  not 
merely  satisfactory,  but  to  some  extent  attractive. 
They  must  be  provided  also  with  a  food  supply  similar 
to  that  to  which  they  had  been  accustomed.  Quarters 
and  food  must  be  furnished  also  on  terms  so  low  as 
not  to  offset  the  higher  wages.  There  were  no  suitable 
quarters  on  the  isthmus,  no  food  supply  worth  consid- 
ering, and  no  supply  of  the  ordinary  necessities  of  life 
that  was  at  all  adequate,  and  what  there  was  could 
be  obtained  only  at  exorbitant  prices. 

In  fact,  the  isthmus  was  a  barren  land  so  far  as  its 
ability  to  supply  the  vital,  pressing  needs  of  the  in- 
vading army  of  American  canal  workers  was  concerned. 
There  was  no  adequate  base  of  supply  nearer  than 
two  thousand  miles  by  water,  and  no  competent  agency 
of  supply  and  transportation  except  the  United  States 
Government.  The  canal  force  was  precisely  in  the 
position  of  an  army  in  the  field  two  thousand  miles 
from  the  base  of  supply.  It  had  been  sent  there  by 
the  government,  it  was  to  be  paid  by  the  government, 
it  was  to  be  ruled  by  the  government,  and  it  must  be 
housed,  fed,  clothed,  and  cared  for  in  all  respects  by 
the  government.  There  was  no  escape  from  this,  for 
no  other  method  of  care  was  possible.  In  due  time 
it  was  to  become  clear  that,  being  an  army  in  the  field, 
it  must  be  ruled  like  an  army — that  is,  by  autocratic 
power. 

The  first  canal  commission  began  its  efforts  to  as- 
semble a  force  by  authorizing  the  payment  of  the 
same  wages  and  salaries  that  the  French  canal  com- 
pany had  paid,  but  it  soon  discovered  that  satisfac- 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  263 

tory  service  could  not  be  secured  in  that  way.  Higher 
rates  were  offered,  but  the  response  was  still  unsatis- 
factory. Special  inducements  were  added  one  after 
another,  until  an  established  system  was  developed 
which  contained  perquisites  and  gratuities  which  in 
number  and  value  far  exceeded  anything  of  the  kind 
bestowed  upon  a  working  force  elsewhere  on  the  face 
of  the  globe. 

Inducements  to  enter  the  service  included  salaries 
and  wages  from  twenty-five  per  cent  to  one  hundred 
per  cent  above  those  paid  in  similar  employments  in 
the  United  States;  free  transportation  from  the  United 
States  to  the  isthmus  to  all  new  employes  and  reduced 
transportation  for  their  families;  free  furnished  quar- 
ters, with  free  fuel,  light,  and  water;  free  hospital  and 
medical  service,  and  thirty  days  of  sick  leave  with  pay 
each  year;  six  weeks'  vacation  with  pay  each  year,  with 
reduced  transportation  to  and  from  the  United  States 
for  salaried  employes  and  their  families;  privilege  for 
all  employes  to  buy  at  commission  commissaries  pro- 
visions, clothing,  and  other  necessary  supplies  at  final 
cost  prices,  and  to  obtain  meals  at  commission  hotels, 
mess-houses,  and  kitchens  at  like  prices. 

Like  all  other  features  of  canal  management,  these 
inducements  were  the  result  of  evolution.  Quarters 
had  to  be  supplied  because  none  existed.  These  had 
to  be  equipped  with  furniture  and  household  articles 
because  employes  could  not  be  expected  to  bring  these 
from  the  United  States,  and  they  could  not  be  bought 
on  the  isthmus,  even  if  employes  had  been  willing  to 
go  to  that  expense.  Furthermore,  if  furnished  by  the 


264  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

government,  they  were  kept  in  that  condition  through 
all  changes  of  occupants.  Being  the  property  of  the 
government,  they  must  be  under  governmental  super- 
vision at  all  times,  both  for  maintenance  and  conform- 
ity to  sanitary  regulation,  so  that  care  and  repairs 
must  be  paid  for  by  the  government.  Fuel,  water, 
and  light  must  be  supplied  by  the  government  be- 
cause obtainable  in  no  other  way.  They  were  a  part 
of  the  system  of  supply  and  control  of  the  commission, 
and  the  question  of  making  occupants  pay  for  them 
was  never  seriously  considered. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

ESTABLISHING  A  FOOD  SUPPLY  AND  ASSEMBLING  A 
LABOR  FORCE 

IN  the  evolution  of  a  system  of  food  supply  an  inter- 
esting experiment  was  made.  There  had  been  on  the 
isthmus  for  several  years  when  the  canal  work  began 
a  commissary  store  operated  by  the  Panama  Railroad 
Company  for  the  benefit  of  its  employes.  This  was 
used  for  a  time  by  the  commission  as  a  base  of  supplies 
for  hotels  and  mess-houses  in  labor  camps  and  other 
settlements  of  employes,  but  as  the  force  grew  in  size 
it  also  became  evident  that  a  more  comprehensive  sys- 
tem must  be  devised,  and,  as  the  commission  had  so 
many  other  pressing  problems  on  its  hands,  it  was  sug- 
gested by  Mr.  Wallace,  the  first  chief  engineer,  who 
had  had  large  experience  in  railway  construction  camps 
in  which  employes  were  fed  by  a  private  contractor, 
that  the  same  method  might  be  advisable  on  the  isth- 
mus. In  accordance  with  this  suggestion,  bids  were 
asked  for  in  the  summer  of  1905,  and  in  September 
of  that  year  a  contract  was  awarded  by  the  Panama 
Railroad  Company  to  the  lowest  bidder.  When  the 
prices  at  which  the  contractor  agreed  to  furnish  meals 
to  employes  were  made  public  on  the  isthmus,  they 
were  seen  to  be  considerably  higher  than  those  hitherto 

265 


266  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

paid,  and  at  once  a  vigorous  protest  was  made  by  the 
employes,  and  Mr.  Stevens,  who  had  succeeded  Mr. 
Wallace  as  chief  engineer,  sent  a  cable  message  to 
the  canal  commission  at  Washington,  saying  that  if  he 
had  that  contract  he  would  guarantee  to  make  a  million 
dollars  a  year  under  it.  The  contract  was  annulled  by 
mutual  consent  before  being  put  into  operation,  and  no 
effort  was  made  to  obtain  another. 

During  the  period  in  which  the  matter  had  been 
under  discussion  the  conclusion  had  been  reached  by 
Mr.  Stevens  and  his  associates  that  the  government 
could  furnish  food  at  lower  rates  than  were  possible 
under  a  contract,  for  the  simple  reason  that  the  gov- 
ernment did  not  seek  a  profit  on  the  business,  while 
a  profit  was  the  only  inducement  which  led  a  con- 
tractor to  undertake  it.  Furthermore,  the  government 
could  obtain  supplies  at  lower  prices  than  a  private 
contractor  could,  and  through  its  ownership  of  the 
Panama  Railroad  Steamship  Line  could  get  lower  rates 
of  transportation.  This  was  the  first  of  several  dem- 
onstrations destined  to  be  made  as  the  canal  work  ad- 
vanced of  the  superior  advantages  possessed  by  the 
government  over  private  operators  or  contractors  both 
in  the  performance  of  the  work  itself  and  in  the  care 
of  those  who  were  engaged  in  it. 

With  the  abandonment  of  the  private-contract  plan 
of  food  supply,  the  commission  turned  its  attention 
to  the  enlargement  and  perfecting  of  its  existing  sys- 
tem. It  had  the  steamers  of  the  Panama  Railroad 
Steamship  Line  equipped  with  cold-storage  facilities, 
established  a  cold-storage  plant  at  Cristobal,  ordered 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  267 

refrigerator  cars  for  the  Panama  Raihoad,  entered 
into  large  contracts  for  meat  and  other  food  supplies, 
increased  its  hotels  and  mess-houses  along  the  line 
until  there  was  one  in  every  settlement  of  employes, 
and  within  a  year  had  an  unbroken  line  of  cold-storage 
provision  supply  between  the  markets  of  New  York, 
Chicago,  and  New  Orleans  and  the  hotels,  mess-houses, 
and  dwellings  of  the  Canal  Zone.  Within  the  same 
period  it  took  possession  of  and  enlarged  the  Panama 
Railroad  commissary,  converting  it  into  a  large  mod- 
ern department  store,  opened  branch  stores  in  all  the 
larger  line  settlements,  established  a  bakery  and  a 
laundry,  and  began  the  construction  of  warehouses  for 
the  storing  of  provisions  at  Cristobal.  Later  an  ice- 
cream plant,  coffee-roasting  plant,  and  other  features 
were  added. 

During  the  most  active  years  of  canal  construction, 
when  the  force  was  at  its  maximum,  the  government, 
acting  through  the  Commissary  and  Subsistence  De- 
partment of  the  canal  commission,  was  housing,  feed- 
ing, and,  in  large  degree,  clothing  and  providing  with 
all  necessities  of  life  nearly  sixty-five  thousand  persons. 
This  was  about  the  number  of  employes  and  their 
families  or  dependents.  It  maintained  a  central  com- 
missary, or  department  store,  and  about  twenty  branch 
stores  in  as  many  villages  and  settlements  of  the  Canal 
Zone.  It  operated  the  Hotel  Tivoli,  a  public  hotel 
with  modern  facilities  and  accommodations  for  five 
hundred  guests;  about  twenty  line  hotels  for  Ameri- 
can employes;  and  about  the  same  number  each  of 
mess-houses  and  kitchens  for  common  laborers.  It  did 


268  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

a  business  of  about  seven  million  dollars  annually  and 
was  self-sustaining. 

There  is  a  steady  diminution  in  the  volume  of  busi- 
ness as  the  canal  nears  completion  and  the  force  is  re- 
duced, but  the  system  continues  in  operation  unchanged 
and  will  continue  till  the  end.  When  the  canal  is 
thrown  open  to  commerce  the  plant  will  be  used  by 
the  government  to  furnish  supplies  to  the  operating 
force,  the  isthmus  military  establishment,  the  United 
States  naval  vessels,  and  all  passing  ships  which  de- 
sire to  purchase  them. 

Every  morning  at  four  o'clock  a  supply  train  starts 
across  the  isthmus  from  Cristobal,  made  up  of  re- 
frigerator and  ordinary  freight  cars  carrying  ice,  cold- 
storage,  and  other  supplies.  These  are  delivered  at 
the  stations  along  the  line  between  the  Atlantic  and  Pa- 
cific, and  by  the  local  quartermasters  are  taken  to  the 
hotels,  mess-houses,  and  dwellings  of  the  employes. 

Prices  in  general  have  been,  and  still  are,  lower  than 
those  prevailing  in  the  United  States,  because  supplies 
are  purchased  on  very  large  contracts,  awarded  on  open 
competitive  bidding,  and  no  profit  is  sought  by  the 
government.  The  only  addition  to  the  original  whole- 
sale cost  is  the  actual  expense  of  transportation,  hand- 
ling, and  delivery.  The  business  is  managed  as  closely 
as  possible  so  as  to  make  both  ends  meet.  Previous 
to  January  1,  1912,  whenever  a  profit  resulted,  which 
was  not  always  the  outcome  of  a  year's  operations,  it 
was  turned  into  a  sinking-fund  to  pay  off  the  cost  of 
cold-storage  and  other  plants.  This  aggregated  $688,- 
000,  and  was  all  paid  off  by  the  end  of  1911.  Since 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  269 

that  time,  whenever  a  profit  is  shown  the  consumer  is 
given  either  a  reduction  in  prices  or  an  improvement 
in  the  quality  of  supplies. 

The  net  resulting  benefit  has  been  that  the  employes 
of  the  canal  commission  have  been  obtaining,  during 
the  past  six  years,  their  food  and  other  supplies  at 
prices  considerably  lower  than  those  prevailing  in  the 
United  States,  and  consequently  have  suffered  less  than 
their  fellow-countrymen  at  home  from  the  "high  cost 
of  living."  This  is  especially  true  in  the  item  of  beef 
and  meats  in  general.  While  the  price  of  beef  was 
soaring  steadily  upward  in  1911  and  1912,  the  canal 
employes  were  paying  the  same  price  that  they  had 
paid  during  the  preceding  year.  This  was  partly  due 
to  the  system  of  purchase  on  large  contracts  and 
partly  to  the  ability  of  the  Subsistence  Department, 
through  its  control  of  all  supplies,  to  equalize  prices 
in  such  a  way  as  to  raise  the  lowest  and  maintain  the 
highest  unchanged. 

When  the  contract  plan  was  under  consideration,  in 
1905,  the  price  of  meals  in  hotels  for  American  em- 
ployes that  was  named  in  the  accepted  contract  was 
thirty  dollars  a  month,  and  that  named  for  all  com- 
mon laborers  was  forty  cents  a  day  for  three  meals. 
Notwithstanding  the  advance  in  prices  which  has  been 
in  quite  steady  progress  since  that  time,  the  canal 
commission  has  maintained  its  price,  fixed  in  1905,  of 
thirty  cents  a  meal  for  American  employes  and  has 
improved  the  quality.  The  price  for  European  labor- 
ers, who  are  mainly  Spaniards  and  Italians,  is  forty 
cents  a  day  for  three  meals,  and  for  West  Indian  la- 


270  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

borers  twenty-seven  cents  a  day.  The  ability  to  main- 
tain these  prices,  while  increasing  the  quantity  and 
improving  the  quality  of  the  food,  demonstrates  clearly 
the  superior  advantages  possessed  by  the  government 
over  the  private  contractor  as  a  caterer,  and  vindicates 
the  judgment  of  the  canal  commission  in  the  course 
which  it  adopted. 

Following  closely  upon  the  decision  in  regard  to  the 
supply  of  food  and  other  necessities,  the  canal  com- 
mission took  up  the  question  of  labor  supply.  When 
the  Americans  arrived  on  the  isthmus,  in  1904,  there 
was  no  labor  available  except  that  of  West  Indians. 
There  was  a  force  of  about  seven  hundred  men,  nomi- 
nally in  employment  by  the  reorganized  French  com- 
pany, but  it  was  incompetent  and  inadequate.  To  at- 
tempt to  construct  the  canal  with  West  Indian  labor 
alone  was  to  invite  indefinite  delay  in  the  time  of  com- 
pletion. More  efficient  labor  must  be  sought  else- 
where. The  first  proposition  was  to  secure  Chinese. 
This  was  viewed  with  so  much  favor  that  the  com- 
mission, in  August,  1906,  asked  for  proposals  to  fur- 
nish twenty-five  hundred  Chinese  laborers  for  a  pe- 
riod of  not  less  than  two  years,  with  the  privilege  of 
increasing  the  number  to  fifteen  thousand.  Four  bids 
were  offered,  two  of  which  complied  with  the  terms 
specified  and  agreed  to  supply  the  labor  at  prices  very 
much  lower  than  those  which  the  commission  paid 
subsequently  to  other  labor.  There  was,  however,  a 
great  outcry  raised  in  the  United  States  against  the 
employment  of  Chinese,  and  partly  because  of  this, 
and  partly  because  of  certain  undesirable  conditions 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  271 

accompanying  the  bids  all  were  rejected  and  the  plan 
was  abandoned. 

The  commission  thereupon,  in  October,  1906,  issued 
invitations  for  proposals  to  have  the  work  done  by 
groups  of  contractors,  the  work  to  be  divided  into 
two  or  more  sections,  and  each  group  of  contractors 
to  be  composed  of  men  who  had  achieved  conspicu- 
ous success  in  their  profession.  The  idea  was  to  se- 
cure for  the  canal  the  services  of  contractors  who  had 
had  experience  in  large  railway  construction  work  and 
who  would  take  to  the  isthmus  their  gangs  of  trained 
laborers.  The  successful  bidders  were  to  be  paid  an 
agreed  percentage  on  the  work  done,  the  government 
furnishing  the  capital.  Several  bids  were  received, 
but  when  they  were  opened,  on  January  1,  1907,  none 
of  them  was  found  to  be  satisfactory,  and  a  call  for 
new  proposals  was  issued.  Before  answers  to  the  sec- 
ond call  were  received  President  Roosevelt  decreed 
that  the  plan  should  be  abandoned. 

In  taking  this  action  he  proceeded  in  accordance 
with  the  views  of  Mr.  Stevens,  the  chief  engineer. 
When  the  plan  was  first  proposed  Mr.  Stevens  favored 
it  as  offering  the  most  available  means  of  obtaining 
an  efficient  working  force.  While  it  was  under  dis- 
cussion, however,  certain  tentative  arrangements  for 
collecting  a  force  had  been  put  in  operation  and  had 
proved  successful.  The  chief  of  these  was  the  impor- 
tation of  laborers  from  northern  Spain.  These  be- 
came the  nucleus  of  an  efficient  force,  and  soon  after 
the  bids  of  contractors  had  been  opened  Mr.  Stevens 
had  become  convinced  that  a  force  could  be  assem- 


272  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

bled  by  the  commission,  without  the  aid  of  the  rail- 
way contractors,  that  would  be  as  efficient  as  any  that 
they  might  supply,  and  that  with  its  own  force  the 
government  could  do  the  work  more  cheaply  than 
would  be  possible  under  a  contract  system.  Experi- 
ence has  fully  justified  this  opinion  arid  the  action  of 
President  Roosevelt  in  accordance  with  it. 

The  working  force  which  Mr.  Stevens  began  to  as- 
semble in  1906  grew  steadily  and  rapidly  into  a  high 
condition  of  efficiency  that  was  maintained  undimin- 
ished  during  the  entire  period  of  active  construction, 
and  was  surpassed  by  that  of  no  other  labor  force  any- 
where and  equalled  by  few.  With  this  force  at  its 
command,  with  the  unlimited  capital  and  credit  of  the 
United  States  Government  behind  it,  and  with  the 
entire  canal  work  and  administration  under  a  single, 
all-powerful  head,  the  commission  was  enabled  to  ac- 
complish its  task,  not  only  more  quickly  and  more 
cheaply  than  would  have  been  possible  under  a  con- 
tract plan,  but  in  a  manner  so  excellent  in  every  part 
as  to  be  beyond  successful  criticism.  So  clearly  was 
the  superiority  of  government  operation  demonstrated 
that  contractors  who  had  made  bids  for  the  work  and 
who  visited  the  isthmus  a  few  years  later  declared 
frankly  that  not  only  was  the  work  better  done  than 
they  could  have  done  it,  but  that  if  they  had  been 
intrusted  with  the  task  the  outcome  would  have  been 
failure  and  financial  ruin  for  themselves. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

PROVISIONS  FOR  THE  COMFORT  AND  CONTENTMENT  OF 
THE  FORCE  —  CLUB-HOUSES  AND  OTHER  AGENCIES 

BY  process  of  evolution  through  practical  experience, 
the  government,  as  shown  in  preceding  chapters,  act- 
ing through  the  canal  commission,  having  been  com- 
pelled, through  necessity,  to  provide  living  quarters  for 
a  canal  force,  and,  through  sound  economic  reasons, 
to  establish  and  operate  its  own  system  of  food  and 
other  necessary  supplies,  was  compelled  to  assemble 
its  own  force  of  laborers  and  take  into  its  own  hands 
the  work  of  construction. 

After  these  problems  had  been  solved  there  remained 
still  another  that  from  the  outset  had  been  pressing 
for  solution.  This  was  to  induce  the  Americans  who 
composed  the  clerical,  subordinate  engineering,  and 
skilled  mechanical  elements  of  the  force  to  remain  in 
the  service  after  arrival.  During  the  first  two  years 
the  annual  changes  in  these  occupations  was  ninety 
per  cent.  It  was  clearly  impossible  to  attain  to  any- 
thing like  efficiency  under  such  conditions  or  to  hope 
for  anything  approximating  a  permanent  force.  After 
a  few  months  on  the  isthmus  the  great  majority  of 
American  employes  became  discontented  and  de- 

273 


274  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

pressed,  lost  interest  in  their  work,  and  had  no  other 
ambition  than  to  "get  back  to  God's  country"  at  the 
earliest  opportunity.  There  were  abundant  reasons 
for  this.  Life  on  the  isthmus  was  without  relief  or  di- 
version of  any  kind.  There  were  no  reputable  places 
of  amusement,  no  clubs,  libraries,  or  reading-rooms. 
The  only  distractions  from  the  constant  dread  of  sick- 
ness and  the  inevitable  loneliness  of  existence  in  a  land 
not  merely  foreign  but  lacking  in  most  of  the  familiar 
comforts  of  modern  civilization,  were  vicious  and  de- 
grading. It  was  evident  that  means  must  be  devised 
to  supply  opportunities  for  amusement  and  recreation, 
and  early  in  1906  the  second  canal  commission,  with 
the  cordial  co-operation  of  President  Roosevelt  and 
Secretary  Taft,  took  up  the  question  of  providing  them. 
Efforts  in  these  directions  had  been  made  by  the  em- 
ployes themselves,  but  lack  of  adequate  means  had 
prevented  these  from  assuming  more  than  very  modest 
dimensions. 

It  was  first  thought  by  the  commission  that  it  would 
be  sufficient  to  build  club-houses  or  recreation  build- 
ings for  the  employes  and  leave  to  them  the  task  of 
furnishing  and  maintaining  them,  but  this  was  found 
to  be  impracticable  because  the  furnishing  alone  was 
far  beyond  the  means  of  the  employes.  Gradually 
the  commission  enlarged  its  benefits,  till  finally  it  pro- 
vided for  five  of  the  principal  centres  of  workers  large 
buildings,  fully  furnished,  at  a  total  cost  of  thirty-five 
thousand  dollars  each.  These  contained  an  assembly- 
room,  a  billiard  and  pool  room,  reading-room,  bowling- 
alleys,  and  other  features  of  similar  institutions  in 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  275 

the  United  States.  Smaller  buildings,  with  less  ex- 
pensive equipment,  were  erected  later  at  minor  points. 

The  supreme  value  of  the  direct  system  of  govern- 
ment through  executive  order  in  the  canal  work  was 
demonstrated  when  the  question  of  spending  the  neces- 
sary money  for  the  erection  and  equipment  of  these 
club-houses  came  before  the  commission.  Doubt  was 
expressed  as  to  whether  it  was  a  proper  and  lawful  use 
of  the  funds  appropriated  for  canal  construction.  If 
they  were  to  be  erected  in  time  to  be  of  service,  they 
should  be  authorized  immediately  and  work  upon 
them  should  be  begun  at  the  earliest  possible  moment. 
Delay  for  any  length  of  time  would  be  fatal.  The 
question  was  taken  to  President  Roosevelt  and  the 
situation  was  explained  to  him.  He  directed  that  the 
expenditure  be  authorized  at  once  and  erection  be 
begun,  saying  that  if  objection  were  raised  later,  and 
the  propriety  of  the  use  of  the  money  were  questioned, 
he  would  appeal  to  Congress  for  a  special  appropriation 
to  cover  the  cost.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  no  objection 
was  ever  made.  If  it  had  been  necessary  to  refer  the 
question  of  expenditure  to  Congress  for  decision,  in- 
definite delay  would  have  been  the  inevitable  outcome, 
with  strong  probability  of  an  inadequate  appropriation 
in  the  end,  and  in  the  meantime  the  beneficial  effect 
which  the  club-houses  began  to  exercise  as  soon  as 
opened  upon  the  contentment  and  well-being  of  the 
force  and  the  resulting  increase  in  permanency  and 
efficiency  would  have  been  lost. 

By  direction  also  of  President  Roosevelt  the  Young 
Men's  Christian  Association,  because  of  its  large  ex- 


276  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

perience  in  work  of  this  kind  in  the  United  States,  was 
asked  by  the  commission  to  take  the  management  of 
the  club-houses,  under  the  supervision  of  an  advisory 
committee  appointed  by  the  commission.  The  Inter- 
national Committee  of  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.  sent  trained 
workers  to  the  isthmus  for  this  duty.  Their  salaries 
were  paid  by  the  commission,  with  the  approval  of 
President  Roosevelt.  For  the  large  club-houses  li- 
braries of  six  hundred  volumes  each  were  purchased 
by  direction  of  the  President  through  the  Secretary 
of  War.  All  employes  on  the  "gold  roll,"  who  were 
virtually  all  white  Americans,  were  eligible  to  member- 
ship on  payment,  at  first,  of  one  dollar  a  month,  sub- 
sequently ten  dollars  a  year.  The  revenues  derived 
from  this  source  and  from  the  sale  of  certain  privileges 
in  the  club-houses  were  placed  in  a  fund.  It  was  hoped 
originally  that  the  clubs  would  become  nearly  if  not 
quite  self-sustaining,  but  this  was  not  realized.  The 
revenues  were  used  to  replenish  worn-out  and  to  pur- 
chase additional  equipment,  and  to  defray  a  portion  of 
the  remaining  expenses,  but  they  were  far  from  ade- 
quate to  meet  all  expenditures.  The  larger  club-houses 
cost  the  commission  during  the  great  part  of  the  period 
of  canal  construction  about  seven  thousand  a  year  each 
for  maintenance,  in  addition  to  the  original  outlay. 

The  club-houses  were  only  one  feature,  though  a 
most  valuable  one,  in  the  general  policy  of  making  life 
more  attractive  to  the  employes  and  of  cultivating 
among  them  at  the  same  time,  a  community  spirit  in 
support  of  public  morality  and  good  order.  A  no  less 
valuable  feature  of  this  policy  was  the  work  of  organized 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  277 

religious  bodies,  and  to  this  hearty  co-operation  and 
generous  aid  were  given  from  the  outset.  Two-story 
buildings  were  provided  in  the  chief  labor  centres,  one 
story  for  use  as  a  church  and  the  other  as  a  lodge 
or  society  room.  All  denominations  were  treated  on 
equal  terms.  Resident  and  visiting  chaplains  were 
employed  by  the  commission  to  hold  services,  to  visit 
the  sick  in  hospitals,  and  to  perform  other  duties  within 
their  calling.  In  1910  there  were  thirty-nine  church 
buildings  in  the  Canal  Zone,  twenty-six  of  which  were 
owned  by  the  commission,  and  all  but  two  of  which 
were  on  sites  owned  by  the  United  States  Government. 
Seven  of  these  were  Catholic,  thirteen  Episcopalian, 
five  Baptist,  two  Wesleyan,  one  Seventh  Day  Advent- 
ist,  eight  non-denominationalist,  including  one  Salvation 
Army.  There  were  at  that  time  in  the  pay  of  the  com- 
mission fifteen  chaplains,  three  Catholics,  four  Episco- 
pal, four  Baptist,  two  Methodist,  one  Wesleyan,  and 
one  Presbyterian. 

Another  feature  of  the  commission's  policy  was  en- 
couragement to  efforts  on  the  part  of  employes  to  de- 
velop among  themselves  amusements  and  other  means 
of  recreation.  When  the  employes  organized  a  band 
of  music  from  their  own  membership  the  commission 
hired  a  leader  and  voted  to  pay  the  players  a  small 
monthly  stipend,  expending  in  this  manner  about 
twelve  thousand  dollars  a  year.  Through  this  aid  a 
very  creditable  musical  organization  was  built  up 
which  gave  regular  concerts  on  Sundays  in  the  various 
villages  of  the  Canal  Zone.  Baseball  nines  were  en- 
couraged by  the  creation  of  parks  with  suitable  grounds 


278  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

and  other  aid,  and  all  forms  of  athletic  sports  received 
similar  support.  The  formation  of  women's  clubs  was 
encouraged  and  assisted  in  like  manner,  and  these  be- 
came one  of  the  most  effective  agencies  of  social  inter- 
course and  contentment  that  existed  in  the  Canal  Zone 
during  the  entire  period  of  canal  construction. 

They  were  organized  originally  through  the  agency 
of  Miss  Helen  Varick  Boswell,  who  was  employed  for 
the  purpose  by  the  canal  commission,  on  the  author- 
ity of  Secretary  Taft.  Government  aid  was  used  in 
this  case,  as  it  was  in  the  construction  of  club-houses 
for  the  men  in  the  canal  service,  for  the  purpose  of 
affording  necessary  recreation  and  thereby  inducing 
contentment  and  promoting  efficiency.  Miss  Boswell 
went  to  the  isthmus  in  September,  1907,  and  spent  a 
month  in  visiting  the  various  canal  settlements  and 
arousing  interest  among  the  women  in  the  club  idea. 
As  a  result  nine  clubs  were  formed  in  as  many  villages, 
and  these  in  turn  were  assembled  in  a  Canal  Zone 
federation  which  was  affiliated  subsequently  with  the 
General  Federation  of  Women's  Clubs,  an  international 
organization  extending  throughout  the  United  States, 
Great  Britain,  Canada,  and  other  countries  and  com- 
prising a  membership  exceeding  a  million.  The  Canal 
Zone  clubs  continued  in  active  existence  for  six  years, 
the  federation  being  formally  disbanded  in  April, 
1913,  because  of  the  approaching  completion  of  the 
canal. 

It  was  estimated  officially  when  the  canal  force  was 
at  its  maximum  that  the  cost  to  the  commission  of 
the  various  privileges  or  perquisites  to  employes,  not 


Four-family  houses,  two  families  upstairs  and  two  down. 


One-family  houses. 


Canal  official's  residence,  at  Ancon,  Canal  Zone. 
Types  of  Canal  quarters. 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  279 

granted  in  similar  employments  in  the  United  States, 
aggregated  over  two  and  a  half  million  dollars  a  year; 
and  that  the  average  value  of  them  to  a  married  "gold/' 
or  American,  employe  was  about  seven  hundred  and 
fifty  dollars  a  year;  to  a  bachelor  American  employe, 
about  four  hundred  and  twenty-five  dollars  a  year;, to 
a  married  "silver,"  or  alien,  employe,  about  fifty  dol- 
lars a  year;  and  to  a  bachelor  alien  employe  about 
thirty  dollars  a  year. 

Many  persons,  including  members  of  Congress,  who 
visited  the  isthmus  during  the  latter  half  of  the  con- 
struction period  regarded  the  expenditure  for  these 
various  objects  as  excessive,  and,  in  some  degree  at 
least,  unwarranted.  The  same  critics  considered  the 
granting  of  free  quarters,  fuel,  light,  and  water,  the 
payment  of  high  wages,  and  the  bestowal  of  other  bene- 
fits upon  employes  as  unnecessarily  generous  treat- 
ment. They  saw  everywhere  among  employes  con- 
tentment, enthusiasm,  pride  in  their  work,  and  the 
resulting  high  efficiency,  and  being  ignorant  of  original 
conditions  on  the  isthmus,  were  unable  to  see  that  the 
end  amply  justified  the  means.  The  fact  that  with  all 
the  special  privileges  afforded,  the  annual  change 
in  the  personnel  of  the  canal  "gold"  force  was  at  no 
time  less  than  fifty  per  cent  per  year,  furnished  in- 
dubitable evidence  that  without  them  nothing  like  a 
permanent  force  could  have  been  maintained.  Through 
their  use  there  was  built  up  gradually  a  Canal  Zone 
community,  with  its  peculiar  social  activities  and  in- 
terests, and  with  no  inconsiderable  public  spirit.  It 
comprised  about  eight  thousand  white  Americans,  of 


280  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

whom  five  thousand  were  employes  and  three  thousand 
women  and  children.  A  more  orderly  community  of 
like  size  could  not  be  found  anywhere.  While  the  an- 
nual change  was  full  fifty  per  cent  a  year,  there  was  a 
permanent  body  of  sufficient  size  to  preserve  a  continu- 
ing public  sentiment. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

AUTOCRATIC  POWER  CONFERRED  ON  THE  CHAIRMAN 
AND  CHIEF  ENGINEER  — RULE  OF  THE  "BENEVO- 
LENT DESPOT" 

THE  imperative  necessity  for  single-handed,  auto- 
cratic control  of  the  entire  enterprise  was  made  ap- 
parent within  a  few  weeks  after  the  first  canal  commis- 
sion came  into  office,  in  1904.  As  stated  in  a  previous 
chapter,  it  was  an  excellent  body  of  seven  men, 
but  incapable  of  prompt  and  efficient  action.  The 
three-headed  plan,  described  in  Chapter  VI,  which 
President  Roosevelt  had  authorized  as  the  best  avail- 
able substitute,  proved  somewhat  more  efficient,  but 
was  still  far  from  satisfactory,  and  the  President  had 
become  convinced  that  a  further  concentration  of  power 
was  desirable,  and  had  made  the  chief  engineer  also 
chairman  of  the  commission.  Before  entering  upon  his 
duties  in  this  dual  capacity,  the  chief  engineer  resigned, 
and  President  Roosevelt  decided  to  make  a  complete 
change  and  put  the  work  in  the  hands  of  United  States 
army  engineers. 

The  third  commission,  composed  mainly  of  army 
engineers,  entered  upon  its  duties  with  the  positions 
of  chairman  and  chief  engineer  consolidated  in  one  per- 
son. The  executive  committee  of  three  had  ceased  to 

281 


282  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

exist,  and  rule  by  seven  executives  had  virtually  been 
restored.  After  a  brief  additional  experience  with 
this  once  rejected  system,  the  President,  who  had 
reached  the  conclusion  some  time  before  that  the  only 
satisfactory  solution  was  one-man  control,  took  steps 
to  secure  it.  On  April  2,  1907,  he  issued  an  executive 
order  decreeing  that  the  "authority  of  the  Governor 
or  Chief  Executive  of  the  Canal  Zone,  under  existing 
laws,  resolutions  and  executive  orders,  shall  be  vested 
in  and  exercised  by  the  Chairman  of  the  Isthmian  Canal 
Commission."  On  January  6,  1908,  he  issued  another 
executive  order  which  placed  virtually  supreme  power 
in  the  hands  of  Colonel  Goethals,  making  the  other 
members  of  the  commission,  who  were  heads  of  de- 
partments and  divisions,  subordinate  to  him,  and  vir- 
tually abolishing  the  commission  as  an  executive  body. 
The  process  of  evolution  through  practical  experience 
had  thus  reached  its  logical  and  final  stage,  passing 
through  various  experimental  stages  of  divided  author- 
ity and  responsibility  to  the  concentration  of  all  au- 
thority and  responsibility  in  one  person  whose  only 
superior  officer  was  the  President  of  the  United  States 
acting  through  the  Secretary  of  War. 

The  period  of  highest  achievement  in  canal  construc- 
tion dates  from  the  issuance  of  this  executive  order. 
During  the  three  years  which  followed,  1908,  1909,  and 
1910,  nearly  three-fifths  of  the  entire  amount  of  ex- 
cavation needed  for  the  canal  was  accomplished  and  the 
whole  work  was  carried  forward  with  such  impetus 
that  the  canal's  completion  a  year  or  more  in  advance 
of  the  date  fixed  for  it  was  assured.  The  force  was 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  283 

knitted  into  a  compact,  harmonious,  enthusiastic  body, 
whose  zeal,  efficiency,  and  pride  in  the  work  commanded 
the  wonder  and  admiration  of  all  observers.  When 
President  Taft  visited  the  isthmus  in  November,  1910, 
he  was  much  impressed  by  it,  saying  on  the  eve  of  his 
return  to  Washington:  "The  first  thing  that  strikes 
one  is  the  fact  that  work  is  being  done  apparently  on 
every  foot  of  the  fifty  miles  of  the  canal,  and  is  being 
done  under  an  organization  of  men,  plants  and  material 
that  operates  as  economically  and  effectively  as  if  it 
were  a  machine  with  the  hand  of  Colonel  Goethals  in 
control  of  the  lever  which  sets  and  keeps  the  whole 
machine  in  operation." 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  canal  organization  was  a 
machine  with  the  hand  of  Colonel  Goethals  on  the  con- 
trolling lever  when  the  President  saw  it  in  operation 
in  1910,  and  it  is  so  to-day — a  huge,  smoothly  work- 
ing engine  of  the  highest  capacity  and  efficiency.  Its 
creation  in  the  first  place  and  its  successful  operation 
subsequently  are  both  due  to  the  possession  of  auto- 
cratic power  by  the  man  at  the  lever.  Without  that 
power  he  could  not  have  set  and  kept  the  machine  at 
"full  speed  ahead,"  with  no  fear  of  interference  from 
any  quarter,  accomplishing  results  which  in  efficiency 
and  economy  are  without  parallel  in  great  construction 
work  either  under  private  or  governmental  direction. 
That  this  is  a  conservative  statement  can  be  shown 
easily  by  a  few  citations  from  the  record. 

In  October,  1908,  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission 
made  a  carefully  revised  statement  of  the  total  excava- 
tion and  cost  of  the  canal.  This  action  had  been  made 


284  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

necessary  by  an  advance  in  the  cost  of  labor  and  in  the 
prices  of  materials  and  manufactured  articles,  and  by 
changes  in  the  plan  of  the  canal  upon  which  the  original 
estimates  had  been  based,  the  most  important  of  which 
were  enlarging  the  size  of  the  locks  and  widening  the 
channel  through  Culebra  Cut  from  200  to  300  feet  at 
bottom.  This  revised  estimate  placed  the  total  amount 
of  excavation  at  174,666,595  cubic  yards,  and  the  total 
cost,  including  the  $40,000,000  purchase  price  to  the 
French  canal  company,  the  $10,000,000  to  the  Pan- 
ama Republic  for  the  Canal  Zone,  and  loans  to  the 
Panama  Railroad  Company,  authorized  by  Congress, 
exceeding  $8,000,000,  at  $375,201,000.  This  estimate 
included  an  allowance  for  about  8,000,000  cubic  yards 
of  "slides"  or  "breaks"  in  the  banks  of  the  canal 
through  the  Culebra  Cut. 

Soon  after  this  revision  was  made  a  great  increase  in 
the  volume  of  slides  and  breaks  began,  lasting  through 
several  years  and  bringing  the  amount  of  material 
that  had  to  be  removed  because  of  them  to  about  25,- 
000,000  cubic  yards.  Because  of  these  and  of  other 
developments  as  the  work  advanced,  further  revisions 
of  excavation  estimates  were  made  in  August,  1912, 
and  in  February,  1913,  and  the  total  required  for 
the  completion  of  the  canal  proper  was  placed  at 
218,138,724  cubic  yards,  or  33,472,129  more  than  the 
estimate  upon  which  the  final  canal  cost  of  $375,201,- 
000  had  been  calculated.  Yet  because  of  the  efficiency 
and  economy  of  operation  which  the  one-man-power 
canal  machine  had  attained,  the  commission  will  be 
able,  even  with  this  considerable  lump  of  unanticipated 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  285 

extra  work  thrown  in,  to  complete  its  great  task  a  full 
year  or  more  ahead  of  time,  and  with  several  millions 
of  its  $375,000,000  of  authorized  expenditure  not 
needed  and  available  for  auxiliary  work. 

An  elaborate  system  of  cost-keeping,  providing  com- 
plete control  over  expenditures  for  labor,  material,  and 
supplies,  and  showing  total  unit  costs  for  various  parts 
of  the  work,  which  has  been  in  operation  since  January 
1,  1910,  has  been  of  great  use  in  promoting  economy. 

Surely,  if  any  form  of  government  or  control  was  ever 
justified  by  results  that  in  force  in  the  Canal  Zone  for 
the  past  five  years  has  been.  The  great  end  sought 
was  the  construction  of  the  canal  in  the  shortest  time, 
at  the  lowest  price,  and  in  the  best  manner  possible. 
Precisely  this  accomplishment  is  assured.  As  the  work 
has  advanced,  hostile  criticism,  which  during  the  early 
years  was  abundant,  often  reckless,  and  not  infrequently 
mendacious  and  malicious,  has  fallen  gradually  into 
total  silence,  and  in  its  stead  there  is  a  world-wide 
chorus  of  praise.  Not  a  shadow  of  scandal  hovers  over 
the  task  as  the  end  approaches,  nor  is  there  audible  the 
faintest  whisper  of  "graft"  in  connection  with  it. 

What  is  the  proper  definition  of  the  form  of  govern- 
ment under  which  this  triumph,  which  is  bringing  credit 
and  honor  to  the  American  name  throughout  the  world, 
has  been  achieved?  Not  "socialism,"  for  there  has 
been  no  suffrage  in  the  Canal  Zone,  and  suffrage  is  the 
foundation-stone  of  the  socialist  creed.  Not  "pater- 
nalism," for  what  the  United  States  Government  has 
been  doing  for  the  canal  workers,  its  great  army  of 
peace,  is  nothing  more  than  it  does  habitually  for  an 


286  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

army  of  its  soldiers  either  in  the  field  or  in  military 
posts.  The  canal  colony  was  merely  a  huge  construc- 
tion camp  in  a  foreign  land,  doing  a  great  piece  of  work 
for  its  employer,  the  United  States  Government,  which, 
like  other  employers,  must  provide  for  all  needs  of  its 
workers.  No  precedent  is  established  by  the  acts  of 
the  government  in  this  respect  on  the  isthmus  except 
for  procedure  in  other  government  work  under  like 
conditions  hereafter. 

It  was  an  autocratic  government  in  the  same  sense 
that  the  direction  of  every  great  enterprise  of  similar 
character  by  private  individuals  or  corporations  is 
autocratic.  In  adopting  the  one-man-power  system 
on  the  isthmus  the  United  States  Government  did 
simply'what  is  the  practice  in  every  great  private  engi- 
neering or  construction  project — select  the  right  man 
for  the  head  of  it  and  give  him  absolute  power  to  exe- 
cute it  without  interference.  No  private  enterprise, 
not  even  a  peanut-stand  on  a  street  corner,  could  be 
conducted  successfully  with  seven  executives  of  equal 
powers,  and  very  few  any  better  with  three.  The 
United  States  Government  tried  both  seven  and  three 
with  most  unsatisfactory  results,  and  was  fairly  com- 
pelled to  select  one  and  give  him  virtually  despotic 
powers.  It  depended  upon  the  man  whether  his  use 
of  those  powers  should  lead  to  success  and  national 
honor,  or  to  failure  and  national  disgrace,  for  it  is  upon 
the  man  and  not  upon  the  system  that  success  or  fail- 
ure hinges  in  all  cases.  Happily,  in  the  case  of  the  canal 
the  man  was  not  wanting. 

A  few  months  after  Colonel  Goethals  had  entered 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  287 

upon  his  duties  President  Roosevelt,  who  had  been 
keeping  a  close  and  somewhat  anxious  watch  upon  the 
situation  on  the  isthmus,  wrote  to  a  friend  in  a  tone 
of  visible  relief:  "Evidently  Goethals  is  exactly  the 
man  for  the  work.  How  fortunate  we  have  been  to 
get  him!  I  shall  back  him  up  on  all  points." 

In  order  to  "back  him  up  on  all  points"  the  exe- 
cutive order  of  January,  1908,  was  issued,  and  under 
that  Colonel  Goethals  became  the  supreme  ruler  of  the 
Canal  Zone,  creating  that  unique  form  of  government 
which  is  best  described  as  "benevolent  despotism/'  or 
"rule  by  a  benevolent  despot,"  which  Carlyle  declared 
to  be  the  ideal  form  of  government  provided  an  able 
and  just  man  be  secured  as  despot.  That  the  Canal 
Zone  has  had  such  a  despot  for  five  years,  a  despot  who 
has  not  abused  his  great  powers  but  has  used  them  with 
justice  and  wisdom,  is  the  unanimous  and  enthusiastic 
verdict  of  the  great  body  of  his  subjects.  No  ruler 
anywhere  has  ever  had  under  him  a  more  loyal,  de- 
voted, and  contented  people  than  Colonel  Goethals  has 
had  during  his  leadership  and  will  have  to  the  end. 
They  have  unbounded  faith  in  his  ability  as  an  en- 
gineer and  like  faith  in  his  ability  and  justice  as  a  ruler. 
"He's  onto  his  job  and  he's  square,"  is  the  terse  way 
in  which  the  average  canal  worker  puts  it;  and  when 
you  come  to  think  of  it,  that  is  not  a  bad  definition  of  a 
benevolent  despot. 

My  official  relations  with  Colonel  Goethals  make 
indecorous  any  close  analysis  of  "his  character  and  per- 
sonal attributes,  but  I  may  be  permitted  to  quote  the 
estimate  of  a  keen  observer  who  has  had  wide  experi- 


288  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

ence  in  the  study  of  affairs  and  men,  and  who,  what- 
ever else  may  be  said  of  him,  has  never  been  accused  of 
too  great  leniency  in  judgment  or  a  tendency  to  over- 
praise. Mr.  Charles  Francis  Adams,  of  Boston,  who 
visited  the  isthmus  in  1911  and  made  a  careful  study 
of  the  canal  work,  said  in  a  paper  read  after  his  return 
before  the  Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  of  which 
he  is  president: 

In  the  course  of  a  fairly  long  and  somewhat  varied 
life  it  has  been  my  fortune  to  be  brought  in  contact 
with  many  men — men  prominent  politically,  and  in 
administrative  and  professional  work;  generals  in  com- 
mand of  armies  in  active  warfare;  executives  in  the 
direction  of  large  enterprises;  financiers;  notables  of 
the  market-place.  The  one  thing  in  these  contacts 
which  has  always  insensibly  but  most  impressed  me 
has  been  the  presence  or  absence  in  individuals  of  that 
element  known  as  Character.  Whether  there  or  not 
there,  the  sense  of  its  being  there,  or  not  being  there, 
is  instinctive.  If  there,  in  the  man  at  the  head,  the 
thing  permeates.  You  are  conscious  of  it  in  every  part. 
The  individuality  and  character  of  Colonel  Goethals 
to-day  permeate,  and  permeate  visibly,  the  entire 
Zone; — unconsciously  on  his  part,  unconsciously  on  the 
part  of  others,  his  influence  is  pervasive.  Nor,  in  ex- 
pressing this  opinion  of  Colonel  Goethals,  do  I  for  a 
moment  wish  to  depreciate,  much  less  to  ignore,  the 
zeal  and  fidelity  shown  by  the  heads  of  departments  in 
the  present  Canal  organization.  One  and  all,  so  far 
as  my  brief  stay  afforded  me  opportunities  of  reaching 
an  opinion,  were  stamped  by  the  same  die.  Of  some, 
of  course,  I  saw  but  little;  others  I  did  not  meet  at 
all;  but  indications  of  the  influence  of  Goethals  were, 
I  thought,  perceptible  everywhere.  Quiet,  reserved, 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  289 

unassuming,  known  to  every  one  engaged  on  the  work, 
but  noticed,  as  he  quietly  moved  around,  by  no  one, 
he  gave  the  impression  of  conscious  because  innate  but 
unobtrusive  force. 

It  is  an  interesting  and  suggestive  fact  that  the  man 
who  has  won  victory  for  his  country  in  the  greatest 
campaign  ever  conducted  in  the  interest  of  world-wide 
peace  and  progress  should  have  been  trained  by  the 
government  to  serve  his  country  as  a  soldier  in  time  of 
war. 

In  conferring  upon  him  the  honorary  degree  of  LL.D. 
in  June,  1912,  President  Lowell,  of  Harvard  Univer- 
sity, said: 

George  Washington  Goethals,  a  soldier  who  has  set 
a  standard  for  the  conduct  of  civic  works;  an  admin- 
istrator who  has  maintained  security  and  order  among 
a  multitude  of  workmen  in  the  tropics;  an  engineer 
who  is  completing  the  vast  design  of  uniting  two 
oceans  through  a  peak  in  Darien. 


CHAPTER  XX 

A  SQUARE  DEAL  FOR  ALL  —  AN  OPEN  DOOR  FOR  ALL  COM- 
PLAINTS —  GOOD  EFFECTS  OF  THE  POLICY  —  A  NOVEL 
COURT  OF  JUSTICE 

NOTHING  contributed  more  powerfully  to  the  efficiency 
of  the  canal  force  than  the  policy  adopted  by  Colonel 
Goethals  toward  complaints  of  all  kinds.  Under  the 
preceding  administration  the  policy  pursued  had  been 
that  generally  enforced  by  railway  and  many  other 
large  employers  of  labor  in  the  United  States,  namely, 
to  pay  as  little  heed  to  complaints  as  possible  and  get 
rid  of  the  complainants.  The  head  of  the  Department 
of  Labor  and  Quarters  was  a  railway  man  of  wide  and 
varied  experience.  It  became  the  established  practice 
during  his  administration  to  greet  all  complainants 
with  the  formula:  "You  don't  like  it  here?  Well, 
then,  get  off  the  isthmus!  There's  a  steamer  every 
five  days."  The  effect  of  this  policy  was  to  create 
throughout  the  force  a  feeling  of  surly  discontent  and 
resentment,  which  did  not  make  for  efficiency,  and 
which  grew  stronger  with  every  additional  rebuff. 

When  the  Goethals  administration  came  in,  a  great 
flood  of  complaints  about  existing  conditions  poured 
in  upon  it,  so  great  that  special  measures  had  to  be 
taken  to  dispose  of  it.  The  secretary  of  the  commission 

290 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  291 

was  directed  to  investigate  fully  all  complaints  and 
give  an  absolutely  "square  deal"  to  all  complainants, 
reporting  to  the  chairman  for  final  action.  Official 
notice  was  sent  out  and  posted  in  all  the  labor  camps 
and  mess-houses,  informing  employes  that  they  would 
be  given  a  fair  hearing  on  all  grievances  and  telling 
them  where  to  present  them. 

When  this  policy  was  announced  the  head  of  the 
Labor  Ddepartment,  who  had  been  retained  from  the 
preceding  administration,  went  to  the  secretary  and  pro- 
tested vigorously  against  it,  saying  that  as  an  experi- 
enced employer  of  labor  he  knew  it  to  be  a  most 
disastrous  policy  to  pursue;  that  it  would  encourage 
complaints  rather  than  diminish  their  number,  destroy 
authority  and  discipline,  and  make  the  employes 
masters  of  the  situation.  Similar  advice  was  given  by 
other  prominent  members  of  the  previous  administra- 
tion and  the  same  direful  results  were  predicted. 

These  gloomy  prognostications  were  destined  never 
to  be  realized.  On  the  contrary,  the  new  policy,  put 
into  operation  with  good  faith  and  thoroughness  in  all 
parts  of  the  work,  accomplished  results  which  justified 
fully  its  practical  wisdom  as  an  agency  of  efficiency. 
All  complaints  by  American  employes,  who  were  com- 
posed mainly  of  clerks,  nurses  in  the  hospitals,  foremen 
and  mechanics,  there  being  no  American  common 
laborers,  were  investigated  by  the  secretary  of  the  com- 
mission. A  special  assistant,  detailed  by  the  chairman 
of  the  commission  for  that  service  because  of  his  famil- 
iarity with  foreign  languages,  investigated  all  com- 
plaints by  the  Spanish,  Italian,  and  other  European 


292  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

laborers  and  reported  the  results  to  the  secretary. 
These  complaints  were  in  the  main  due  to  language 
misunderstandings  and  called  for  no  elaborate  inquiries. 
It  is  an  interesting  fact  that  the  special  assistant  who 
performed  this  service  for  several  years,  and  performed 
it  with  signal  ability  and  unvarying  fairness,  was  Giu- 
seppe Garibaldi,  a  grandson  of  the  Italian  liberator, 
who  figured  later  as  a  revolutionary  leader  in  disturb- 
ances on  the  Mexican  border  in  1912. 

In  regard  to  the  complaints  of  American  employes 
the  method  pursued  was  to  send  for  the  complainant 
and  ask  him  to  make  a  full  statement  to  be  taken  down 
by  a  stenographer,  the  same  to  be  used  as  a  basis  for 
inquiry.  In  a  majority  of  instances,  the  complainant 
before  this  proceeding  was  completed,  concluded,  after 
asking  to  have  one  point  after  another  stricken  from 
the  record,  that  he  had  no  grievance  after  all  and  pre- 
ferred to  drop  the  matter.  The  mere  process  of  talking 
freely  about  it  had  been  all  the  relief  he  needed.  He 
had  "got  it  out  of  his  system,"  where  it  had  been 
seething  for  an  indefinite  period  simply  because  he  had 
been  denied  a  hearing. 

Whenever  the  complainant  completed  his  statement 
and  requested  investigation  it  was  accorded  him.  All 
persons  involved  were  sent  for  and  statements  were 
obtained  from  them.  Finally,  complainant  and  ac- 
cused were  brought  together  in  a  conference,  and  a 
decision  was  reached  which,  in  nearly  every  instance, 
was  accepted  by  all  parties. 

For  fully  six  months  the  time  of  the  secretary  was 
taken  up  almost  entirely  with  this  work.  During  that 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  293 

time  several  hundred  complaints  were  disposed  of, 
and  in  only  one  instance  did  a  complainant  fail  to  ex- 
press himself  as  satisfied  with  the  verdict.  .  He  had 
complained  of  unjust  discharge,  but  had  been  shown  to 
be  incompetent.  When  the  decision  against  him  was 
made  he  boasted  of  "powerful  political  support"  by  a 
United  States  senator  and  declared  that  he  would  go 
home  and  "raise  hell."  If  he  raised  it,  no  news  of  the 
disturbance  reached  the  isthmus. 

The  American  complaints  included  unjust  discharge, 
refusal  of  or  failure  to  get  promotion,  harsh  treatment, 
poor  mess-house  food,  false  charge  of  disorderly  con- 
duct in  mess-houses,  belief  in  existence  of  conspiracy 
to  injure,  denial  of  sick  or  injury  leave  with  pay,  re- 
fusal of  transfer,  and  other  phases  of  alleged  ill 
treatment.  In  all  cases  in  which  the  complaint  was 
sustained  by  the  evidence  the  proper  remedy  was 
decreed  and  accorded,  to  the  expressed  satisfaction  of 
all  parties. 

In  many  cases  the  complainant  confessed  judgment 
by  failing  to  appear  after  the  first  conference  and  leav- 
ing the  isthmus  before  the  inquiry  was  completed. 
Usually  in  such  cases  the  grievance  had  been  unjust 
discharge,  and  the  evidence  was  overwhelmingly 
against  the  complainant,  who  was  shown  to  be  a  poor 
workman  and  an  habitual  trouble-maker  of  whom  the 
service  was  well  rid. 

The  services  required  of  the  special  assistant  among 
the  Europeans,  mainly  Spanish  laborers,  were  varied 
and  interesting.  They  comprised  chiefly  food,  treat- 
ment, troubles  with  the  police  courts,  misunderstand- 


294  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

ings  about  pay,  and  mistakes  in  regard  to  postal 
money-orders.  Through  the  complaints  about  food 
the  commission  was  able  to  ascertain  the  special  needs 
of  the  European  laborers  in  this  regard,  and  by  sup- 
plying it  to  promote  contentment  and  thereby  increase 
efficiency.  Through  complaints  of  ill  treatment  by 
foremen  or  bosses,  usually  the  result  of  language  mis- 
understandings, useful  knowledge  was  obtained  as 
to  the  special  qualities  required  for  an  effective  fore- 
man, and  also  of  the  individual  fitness  of  the  foremen  in 
command,  which  was  of  great  value  in  getting  the  best 
labor  results.  The  chief  value,  however,  of  this  spe- 
cial service  was  to  convince  the  laborers  that  they 
could  get  a  hearing  for  their  grievances  at  all  times, 
that  they  had  a  friend,  supplied  by  their  employers,  to 
whom  they  could  go  for  counsel  and  help  in  all  emer- 
gencies, and  who  would  obtain  justice  and  fair  treat- 
ment in  every  instance.  In  short,  they  were  treated 
like  human  beings,  not  like  brutes,  and  they  responded 
by  giving  the  best  service  within  their  power.  So  im- 
portant did  the  chairman  and  chief  engineer  consider 
this  special  agency  to  be  in  getting  the  best  work  from 
the  European  laborers  that  he  continued  it  in  connec- 
tion with  the  secretary's  office  till  the  end  of  construc- 
tion. 

The  practical  wisdom  of  the  "square  deal"  policy 
was  demonstrated  clearly  during  the  first  six  months 
of  its  operation.  At  the  end  of  that  period  complaints, 
which  had  been  diminishing  steadily  in  numbers, 
ceased  almost  entirely.  Those  that  came  in  were  for 
the  most  part  trivial  in  character  and  called  for  no 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  295 

serious  investigation.  In  the  few  cases  in  which  they 
were  serious  enough  to  require  formal  inquiry  the  chair- 
man either  directed  one  to  be  conducted  by  the  sec- 
retary or  by  a  board  especially  constituted  for  the 
task.  The  custom  of  going  to  the  chairman  person- 
ally with  complaints  because  of  his  known  willingness 
to  listen  to  them  grew  up  gradually,  till  he  gave  up 
each  Sunday  morning  to  receiving  in  his  office  at 
Culebra  any  and  all  persons  who  had  grievances.  He  sat 
there  from  7.30  till  noon,  in  a  court  which  has  had  no 
parallel  in  American  or  any  other  modern  history.  Its 
doors  were  wide  open  to  all  comers,  from  the  highest 
to  the  lowest  degree  in  the  canal  service.  He  was  a 
combination  of  father  confessor  and  Day  of  Judg- 
ment, whose  like  has  rarely  if  ever  been  seen  since  the 
time  of  Solomon.  "If  you  decide  against  me,  Colonel," 
said  a  complainant,  "I  shall  appeal."  "To  whom?" 
asked  the  Colonel,  and  there  was  no  answer,  for  there 
was  none  to  make.  The  man  on  the  bench  was  the 
whole  court,  full  bench  and  chief  justice,  and  there 
was  no  court  of  appeals  above  him.  That  he  was  a 
just  judge  the  absolute  and  united  faith  of  the  canal 
force  in  him  is  sufficient  proof. 

From  time  to  time  there  appeared  in  the  Canal  Zone 
representatives  of  various  organizations  professionally 
devoted  to  the  welfare  of  the  laboring  man,  but  inno- 
cent of  all  practical  knowledge  of  labor  itself,  who  were 
eager  to  tell  the  canal  commission  how  to  care  for  its 
workers.  They  have  in  most  instances  been  excel- 
lent samples  of  that  class  once  characterized  by  ex- 
President  Roosevelt  as  made  up  of  the  "old  maids  of 


296  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

both  sexes."  They  have  failed  invariably  to  perceive 
a  fact  plainly  apparent  to  all  other  observers,  that  the 
Canal  Zone,  under  the  generous  care  of  the  United 
States  Government  and  the  autocratic  rule  of  Colonel 
Goethals,  was  the  paradise  of  the  working-man,  and 
have  proceeded  to  instruct  the  Colonel  in  the  way  he 
and  the  canal  commission  should  go  in  regard  to  the 
welfare  and  happiness  of  employes.  One  of  these  rec- 
ommended the  establishment  of  small  pleasure  re- 
sorts, miniature  Coney  Islands,  at  various  points  across 
the  isthmus,  with  a  trolley-line  connection,  and  hot 
baths  for  the  frail  laborers  who  could  not  stand  water 
at  the  temperature  of  seventy-nine  degrees,  which  is 
the  mean  temperature  of  the  isthmus.  Another,  in 
order  to  relieve  the  canal  officials  of  burdens  of  which 
they  had  made  no  complaint,  suggested  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  labor  commissioner,  at  a  handsome  salary, 
to  have  charge  of  all  questions,  including  complaints, 
salaries,  and  hours  of  work,  that  might  arise  in  the 
canal  force.  He  admitted  that  under  the  existing  sys- 
tem every  worker  could  obtain  a  hearing  and  review 
of  his  case,  and  that  in  consequence  of  this  policy  the 
force  was  permeated  with  a  spirit  of  good-will  and 
loyalty  that  was  most  impressive,  but  he  thought 
Colonel  Goethals  should  be  relieved  of  the  burden  of 
hearing  complaints  personally.  Colonel  Goethals  was 
unable  to  take  this  view,  saying  that,  while  much  of 
his  time  was  consumed  in  such  hearing,  the  advantages 
accruing  more  than  offset  the  time  spent,  since  he  was 
kept  thereby  more  closely  in  touch  with  the  men, 
learned  more  fully  the  relative  merits  of  the  various 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  297 

subofficials,  and  at  the  same  time  acquired  a  more 
intimate  knowledge  of  the  details  of  the  work  itself. 
"Every  employe/7  he  said,  "irrespective  of  race  or 
color;  now  understands  that,  if  his  superior  does  not 
correct  any  abuses  reported  to  him,  or  if  he  cannot  get 
satisfaction  for  any  actual  or  alleged  grievances,  the 
chairman  of  the  commission  and  its  secretary  are  at 
all  times  accessible  and  that  a  prompt  investigation  is 
invariably  made.  I  do  not  know  of  an  employe  who 
has  not  felt  that  full  and  ample  justice  has  been  meted 
out  to  him  by  all  investigations  conducted  by  the  sec- 
retary of  the  commission." 

The  free  accessibility  of  every  worker  to  the  chair- 
man not  only  gave  him  a  knowledge  of  the  relative 
merits  of  the  various  subofficials  and  of  their  conduct, 
but  the  assurance  of  such  accessibility  in  all  cases  of 
dissatisfaction  made  those  officials  very  careful  about 
giving  cause  for  complaint.  Every  foreman  and  gang- 
boss  knew  that  if  he  mistreated  his  men,  oppressed 
them,  endeavored,  as  sometimes  happened,  to  practise 
some  form  of  tribute  or  extortion,  knowledge  of  his 
conduct  would  reach  the  chairman  and  he  would  be 
out  of  a  job  immediately,  for  there  was  no  mercy  at 
headquarters  for  such  offenders.  This  being  the  case, 
great  care  was  exercised  not  to  give  provocation  for 
complaint,  and  the  men  were  in  that  condition  of  con- 
tentment which  is  the  first  essential  of  the  highest 
efficiency,  for  a  surly  and  dissatisfied  body  of  workers 
will  never  do  their  best  for  a  foreman  whom  they  dis- 
like because  of  unjust  or  brutal  treatment. 

The  proof  of  the  pudding  is  in  the  eating.    No  body 


298  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

of  laborers  anywhere  at  any  time  has  developed  a  de- 
gree of  efficiency  superior  to  that  obtained  by  the  canal 
workers,  and  very  few  a  degree  equalling  it.  In  no 
other  body  of  laborers  was  there  ever  found  more 
loyal  devotion  to  the  leader,  or  greater  individual 
pride  in  the  task,  or  a  more  general  spirit  of  cheerful- 
ness and  contentment.  These  characteristics  impressed 
all  visitors  to  the  canal  work  while  it  was  in  progress, 
who  commented  upon  them  as  remarkable  and  almost 
if  not  entirely  without  parallel.  They  commented 
also  upon  the  alertness  and  activity  of  the  force,  noting 
the  absence  of  idleness  everywhere  and  the  complete 
lack  of  grumblers  and  "kickers."  The  policy  of  open 
court  and  square  deal  had  weeded  the  last  named  from 
the  force,  and  this  was  not  the  least  of  its  beneficial 
effects. 

Large  employers  of  labor  everywhere  will  find  in 
the  results  thus  achieved  in  the  canal  force  of  forty 
thousand  men,  made  up  of  many  and  widely  varying 
nationalities,  much  material  for  study.  There  have 
been  no  strikes  worth  mentioning  in  the  Canal  Zone, 
and  no  difficulties  requiring  outside  boards  of  arbitra- 
tion to  settle.  There  has  been  despotic  control  by  a 
single  man  who  was  able  to  make  it  both  popular  and 
effective  to  a  marvellous  degree  because,  through  per- 
sonal contact  and  free  intercourse  with  all  members 
of  his  force,  he  had  exact  and  full  knowledge  of  every 
phase  of  the  work  and  of  the  qualifications  and  con- 
duct of  every  one  of  his  subordinates  engaged  in  its 
direction. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

CANAL  LABORERS  —  DIFFERENT  NATIONALITIES  EM- 
PLOYED —  CHARACTERISTICS  AND  EFFICIENCY  — 
EFFECTS  OF  CLIMATE  AND  OF  CIVILIZATION 

WHEN  the  Americans  began  work  on  the  isthmus  they 
found  a  force  of  laborers  that  had  been  kept  together 
by  the  French  company,  which,  together  with  the  force 
of  the  Panama  Railroad,  numbered  about  seven  hundred 
men,  all  West  Indians.  No  other  kind  of  labor  was 
available.  Mr.  Wallace  and  his  associates  had  arrived 
on  the  isthmus  determined  to  begin  work  at  once  in 
order  to  comply  with  the  demand  of  the  American  press 
that  they  "make  the  dirt  fly."  In  seeking  to  do  this 
they  retained  the  existing  force  and  endeavored  to 
increase  it.  The  consequence  was  that  the  demand  for 
labor  exceeded  the  supply,  and  the  West  Indians  were 
convinced  that  the  canal  could  not  be  built  save  through 
their  aid.  Their  natural  vanity  and  high  sense  of  self- 
importance  were  greatly  enhanced  by  this  belief.  In- 
different laborers  at  best,  they  became  independent 
and  careless,  and  worked  only  enough  to  obtain  money 
for  their  daily  needs,  which  were  few  and  very  inexpen- 
sive. The  idea  of  working  to  save  for  the  future  or  to 
provide  for  their  families  in  old  age,  had  never  been 
known  to  the  race.  They  obeyed  strictly  the  mandate 

299 


300  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

of  the  Scriptures,  to  "take  no  thought  for  the  morrow/' 
knowing  from  lifelong  experience  that  the  morrow 
would  take  care  of  them.  They  had  few  unsatisfied 
wants,  and  consequently  lived  in  contentment.  They 
wore  very  little  clothing  and  that  of  the  cheapest  qual- 
ity, while  their  children  wore  none  at  all  till  they 
reached  six  or  eight  years  of  age.  The  jungle  was 
fruitful  with  bananas  all  the  year  round,  and  yams  and 
like  food  grew  in  the  ground  abundantly  with  very 
little  cultivation.  Meat  they  ate  scarcely  at  all,  car- 
ing very  little  for  it.  One  day's  work  a  week,  at  most 
two,  would  be  ample  to  supply  bodily  necessities,  and 
the  result  was  that  while  ten  thousand  names  might 
be  on  the  pay-rolls,  not  more  than  half  that  number 
might  be  at  work  regularly.  They  were  very  "cocky" 
about  being  rebuked  or  hurried,  and  if  a  foreman  spoke 
to  them  harshly  would  draw  themselves  up  with  amus- 
ing dignity  and  say:  "You  can't  address  me  in  that 
manner,  sah!  I  am  a  British  object!" 

Mr.  Stevens,  the  second  chief  engineer,  had  a  very 
poor  idea  of  their  value  or  usefulness  as  laborers,  reck- 
oning their  efficiency  at  about  a  third  of  that  of  a  white 
man.  Their  tendency  to  illness  contributed  to  his  low 
estimate.  He  said  of  them  in  1906:  "Any  white  man, 
so-called,  under  the  same  conditions  will  stand  the 
climate  on  the  isthmus  very  much  better  than  the 
blacks,  who  are  supposed  to  be  immune  from  practi- 
cally everything,  but  who,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  are  sub- 
ject to  almost  everything."  He  was  convinced  that 
the  canal  could  never  be  built  with  West  Indian  labor 
alone,  and  early  in  his  year  of  service  he  sent  an  em- 


Arrival  of  1,500  laborers  from  Barbados  at  Cristobal  on  S.  S.  Ancon, 
September  2,  1909. 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  301 

ployment  agent  to  northwestern  Spain  to  secure  from 
that  region  a  supply  of  laborers.  He  was  moved  to 
this  action  because  laborers  from  that  region  who  had 
been  employed  on  railway  construction  in  Cuba  and 
had  gone  from  there  to  the  isthmus  had  proved  to  be 
very  satisfactory.  To  induce  them  to  go  to  the  isth- 
mus, the  agent  advanced  their  passage-money,  to  be 
deducted  gradually  afterward  from  their  pay,  prom- 
ised them  free  quarters  and  other  privileges,  employ- 
ment as  long  as  the  canal  work  should  last,  and  twenty 
cents  gold  an  hour  in  wages,  which  was  double  the  wage 
paid  to  the  negro  laborers. 

During  the  first  six  months  of  1906  about  900  Span- 
ish laborers  were  procured,  and  by  the  end  of  that  year 
there  were  about  1,200  at  work.  They  were  a  hearty, 
vigorous  body  of  men,  trained  to  severe  and  continu- 
ous labor,  and  accustomed  to  meagre  wages  and  frugal 
living.  They  proved  to  be  so  satisfactory  that  during 
the  succeeding  two  years,  1907  and  1908,  about  7,000 
more  were  secured,  bringing  the  total  taken  to  the 
isthmus  under  contract  to  8,222.  During  the  same 
period,  1906-7-8,  there  were  also  taken  to  the  isth- 
mus, under  similar  contract  obligations,  about  2,000 
Italians,  1,100  Greeks,  30,000  West  Indians,  1,500 
Colombians,  and  comparatively  small  numbers  of  Ar- 
menians and  French,  bringing  the  total  number  of 
contract  laborers  secured  during  the  period  of  active 
construction  up  to  nearly  45,000.  Of  this  number,  11,- 
797  were  Europeans,  and  in  recruiting  and  transport- 
ing them  there  was  spent  $508,770.83,  of  which  all 
•except  about  $100,000  was  collected  from  wages, 


302  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

making  the  per-capita  cost  to  the  canal  commission 
$8.46.  After  1908  no  recruiting  was  necessary  from 
Spain  and  other  European  countries,  and  no  contracts 
were  made,  because  the  favorable  reports  of  high  wages 
and  good  treatment  which  the  contract  laborers  sent 
home  started  a  voluntary  immigration  to  the  isthmus 
which  furnished  an  abundant  supply  of  labor. 

At  the  outset  the  Spanish  laborers  justified  the  antici- 
pations of  Mr.  Stevens  in  showing  an  efficiency  about 
double  that  of  the  West  Indians,  but  as  time  went  on 
this  diminished,  while  the  efficiency  of  the  negroes  in- 
creased. Several  causes  contributed  to  these  results. 
The  Spaniards  worked  continuously  without  vacations, 
and  after  five  years  of  this  unbroken  labor  in  the  tropics 
they  experienced  a  loss  of  physical  vigor  and  energy 
which  affected  their  work.  Then,  too,  close  associa- 
tion with  a  less  vigorous  and  less  industrious  class  of 
laborers  had  the  natural  effect  of  reducing  their  activ- 
ity. On  the  other  hand,  the  West  Indians,  under  the 
influence  of  competition  and  the  driving  energy  of 
American  foremen,  and  safe  from  the  deterioration  of 
physical  force  which  a  tropical  climate  was  causing  to 
the  Spaniards,  increased  steadily  in  efficiency,  so  that 
at  the  close  of  the  construction  period  the  two  classes 
of  labor  were  reckoned  to  be  approximately  equal  in 
usefulness.  One  had  deteriorated  and  the  other  had 
improved,  but  neither  was  at  the  high  level  held  by 
the  Spanish  at  the  beginning  of  the  work. 

The  Europeans  were  engaged  almost  entirely  in  un- 
skilled labor.  They  were  quick  to  learn  team-work  in 
gang  operations,  dumping  cars,  moving  tracks,  and 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION          303 

labor  of  that  sort  which  afforded  little  opportunity  for 
development.  Some  of  them  were  employed  as  fire- 
men, others  did  mechanical  work  in  the  shops,  and 
these  showed  considerable  capacity;  but  they  were 
handicapped  by  knowing  no  English,  all  superintend- 
ents, foremen,  etc.,  being  Americans. 

Among  the  West  Indians  were  many  experienced 
artisans  who  had  worked  at  various  trades  before 
going  to  the  isthmus,  and  between  4,000  and  5,000  of 
these  were  so  employed  during  the  busiest  years  of 
work  and  proved  to  be  very  satisfactory.  Great  num- 
bers of  others  were  employed  as  mechanics'  helpers, 
in  work  about  wharves  and  docks,  as  waiters  and  serv- 
ants in  hotels,  in  general  work  in  hospitals  and 
offices,  and  in  domestic  service.  They  were  a  quiet, 
generally  honest,  soft-spoken  and  respectful  body,  as 
a  rule,  but  slow  both  in  mental  processes  and  physical 
movement.  They  showed  aptitude  in  learning  essen- 
tials in  the  various  branches  of  work  in  which  they 
were  engaged,  and  acquired  a  kind  of  automatic  regu- 
larity in  the  performance  of  duties.  A  few  developed 
some  initiative  and  some  originality  in  certain  trades, 
but  for  the  most  part  they  had  not  even  a  glimmer 
of  anything  of  the  sort.  What  they  had  always  done 
they  were  content  to  go  on  doing  in  the  same  way, 
and  neither  desired  nor  could  be  induced  to  change  it. 

The  great  bulk  of  them  preferred  to  live  in  Panama 
and  Colon,  or  in  their  native  villages,  or  in  huts  or 
shacks  in  the  brush  or  jungle,  rather  than  in  the  quar- 
ters which  the  commission  offered  them  free  of  rent, 
and  preferred  the  simple  food  to  which  they  were 


304  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

accustomed  to  the  more  nourishing  diet  which  the 
commission  tried  in  various  ways  to  induce  them  to 
eat.  They  were  offered  first  cooked  food  of  excellent 
quality  at  ten  cents  a  meal,  and  the  uncooked  ingre- 
dients of  the  meals  at  lower  rates,  but  they  would  not 
accept  either.  Then,  as  an  experiment,  they  were 
offered  uncooked  food  free,  but  they  did  not  care 
enough  for  it  to  cook  it.  Then  they  were  offered 
cooked  food  free,  and  this  they  ate  heartily.  The  ex- 
periment was  next  made  to  give  them  a  fixed  wage 
and  include  in  it  three  meals  a  day,  to  be  eaten  or 
not  as  they  chose.  It  succeeded  for  a  time,  but  was 
abandoned  as  not  practicable. 

The  object  of  all  these  experiments  was  the  same:  to 
improve  their  physical  condition  and  thus  increase 
their  efficiency.  By  the  same  process  of  evolution 
through  which  all  other  departments  of  canal  commis- 
sion activity  had  arrived  at  the  most  satisfactory  basis 
of  operation,  there  was  adopted  a  method  of  feeding 
which  was  partially  successful.  Kitchens  were  estab- 
lished near  the  main  negro  camps  at  which  a  ration  of 
three  cooked  meals  a  day  was  served  for  twenty-seven 
cents  a  ration.  There  were  seventeen  of  these  in  as 
many  places  and  they  were  patronized  by  from  1,200 
to  1,500  of  the  30,000  or  35,000  West  Indians  in  the 
commission  and  Panama  Railroad  service.  Special 
efforts  were  made  to  supply  them  with  the  articles 
of  diet  which  they  preferred.  But  even  with  this 
attraction  and  the  excellent  quality  of  the  ration,  the 
great  majority  preferred  to  eat  elsewhere.  They  could 
buy  such  provisions  as.  they  liked  at  the  commission 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  305 

commissaries  along  the  line  and  cook  them  in  their 
shacks  or  in  messes  of  their  own.  This  method  suited 
them  best  of  all. 

It  was  much  the  same  with  living  quarters  as  with 
food.  The  great  majority  of  the  negroes  preferred  a 
shack  in  the  jungle  to  the  clean  and  airy  quarters  which 
the  commission  offered  free.  The  movement  to  the 
"bush"  was  a  steadily  increasing  one,  and  during  the 
final  years  of  work  not  more  than  a  fifth  could  be  per- 
suaded to  live  in  the  quarters.  The  others  lived  either 
in  the  cities  of  Panama  or  Colon,  or  in  native  villages 
near  the  American  settlements,  or  in  shacks  scattered 
on  the  hillsides.  This  was  due  mainly  to  a  desire  for 
greater  freedom  of  conduct  and  partly  to  the  fact  that 
the  commission  did  not  furnish  quarters  for  married 
negroes.  In  1908  an  order  was  issued  requiring  that 
every  applicant  for  sleeping  quarters  should  show  a 
kitchen  meal  ticket.  It  was  thought  that  this  would 
have  the  effect  of  inducing  more  of  them  to  eat  the 
kitchen  food.  It  had  precisely  the  opposite  effect, 
driving  several  hundreds  entirely  away  from  both  the 
kitchens  and  quarters  to  the  native  villages  and  the 
jungle  hillsides. 

An  interesting  sociological  phase  of  the  canal  work 
is  the  effect  which  contact  with  American  civilization 
and  ways  of  living  has  had  upon  the  ideas  and  habits 
of  the  West  Indians.  When  the  Americans  began  work 
the  average  native  of  the  isthmus  and  the  adjoining 
islands  was  in  that  ideal  state  of  contentment  which 
comes  from  the  absence  of  unsatisfied  desires.  As  I 
have  said,  he  had  no  wants  that  he  could  not  meet 


306  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

easily,  no  aspirations  for  a  larger  or  more  enjoyable 
life  than  the  one  he  was  living,  and  a  capacity  for  rest 
that  was  unlimited  and  inexhaustible.  As  time  went 
on,  however,  an  insidious  development  of  discontent 
began  within  his  household  because  of  changing  con- 
ditions and  surroundings.  He  was  compelled,  in  obedi- 
ence to  the  behests  of  a  more  advanced  civilization,  to 
put  clothing  upon  his  infants.  This  entailed  slight 
expense  at  first,  but  a  steadily  increasing  one.  A  single 
nondescript  garment  with  very  limited  concealing  capac- 
ity served  for  a  while;  but  it  was  soon  replaced,  in 
obedience  to  maternal  pride  and  feminine  love  of  rib- 
bons and  finery,  by  far  more  adequate  and  costly  ap- 
parel. One  by  one  the  little  black  and  brown  cupids, 
or,  as  a  distinguished  American  lady  visitor  to  Panama 
called  them,  "chocolate  drops,"  disappeared  from 
public  view,  and  in  their  stead  came  the  thoroughly 
garbed  infants  of  civilization,  their  little  toes  incased 
in  pink  and  red  and  white  shoes,  their  little  bodies 
covered  with  fluffy  white  gowns  and  their  bright  little 
faces  peering  from  beribboned  caps.  It  was  a  wonder- 
ful transformation,  but  a  distinct  loss  in  primitive  pic- 
turesqueness,  and  compelled  a  decided  increase  in  the 
parental  earnings  and  expenditure. 

Then,  too,  the  women  of  the  household  began  to 
make  larger  demands.  One  calico  dress,  which  had 
satisfied  all  yearnings  in  the  past,  provided  the  colors 
were  sufficiently  vivid,  would  no  longer  suffice.  A  real 
lady's  hat,  with  ribbons  and  other  embellishments, 
must  be  procured  in  place  of  the  battered  old  straw  or 
felt  that  had  hitherto  been  worn.  In  order  to  satisfy 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  307 

these  new  desires,  the  head  of  the  household  must 
change  his  working  habits.  One  or  two  days  a  week 
would  suffice  no  longer.  He  must  get  and  retain  regular 
employment  and  thus  become  a  steady  earner  and 
larger  provider  for  his  family. 

It  came  about,  therefore,  that  by  introducing  dis- 
content into  the  daily  life  of  the  West  Indian,  the  Amer- 
ican canal  builders  made  him  a  better  laborer  and  a 
more  useful  member  of  society.  White  dwellers  in 
those  West  Indian  islands  to  which  natives  have  re- 
turned after  working  on  the  canal  say  that  they  ex- 
hibit a  marked  increase  in  capacity.  Whether  the  im- 
provement will  be  permanent  or  not  remains  to  be 
seen,  but  that  it  was  made  through  injection  into  their 
lives  of  new  and  unsatisfied  desires,  with  the  consequent 
discontent,  is  the  unquestionable  fact  upon  which  the 
sociologists  of  the  world  may  concentrate  their  minds. 


CHAPTER  XXII 

LIFE  IN  THE  CANAL  COLONY  — ITS  ATTRACTIONS,  DIS- 
TRACTIONS, PECULIARITIES,  AND  SPECIAL  CHARM 

"Do  you  like  it  down  there?"  That  question,  asked 
most  often  with  an  inflection  of  tone  which  implied  a 
conviction  that  no  civilized  being  could  like  life  in  such 
a  place,  was  very  familiar  to  all  persons  connected 
with  the  canal  work  who  were  in  the  United  States  on 
annual  leave  of  absence  during  the  period  of  construc- 
tion. It  was  asked  invariably  by  some  one  who  had 
never  visited  the  isthmus.  Visitors  after  a  few  days' 
sojourn,  especially  if  they  belonged  to  what,  in  days 
that  are  no  more,  was  known  as  the  "gentler  sex," 
seldom  or  never  asked  it,  or,  if  they  asked  it,  did  so  in  a 
quite  different  tone.  They  were  most  apt  to  say:  "I 
think  it  the  most  delightful  place  I  was  ever  in.  I 
would  like  to  stay  here  indefinitely." 

That  the  isthmus,  or  that  portion  of  it  occupied  by 
the  canal  colony,  was  a  delightful  place  of  sojourn,  for 
a  limited  period,  none  of  its  inhabitants  will  deny.  (I 
use  the  past  tense,  for  soon  after  these  lines  appear  in 
print  the  habitations  of  the  colony  will  have  been  de- 
molished, and  their  occupants  will  have  been  scattered 
to  other  parts  of  the  earth.)  It  was  delightful  in  the 
first  place  because,  during  the  three  months  of  the  dry 

308 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  309 

season,  the  period  in  which  visitors  from  the  outside 
world  arrived,  the  weather  and  temperature  were 
nearly  or  quite  all  that  could  be  desired.  Every  day  was 
a  perfect  copy  of  its  predecessor  and  the  exact  prom- 
ise of  what  its  successor  would  be.  The  scorching  rays 
of  the  tropic  sun  were  tempered  by  a  refreshing  wind 
and  any  place  in  the  shade  was  cool  and  enjoyable. 
With  the  decline  of  the  sun  came  an  evening  and  night 
with  a  temperature  that  can  only  be  described  properly 
as  delicious.  It  would  be  difficult  to  find  anywhere 
on  earth  a  spot  where  the  evenings  and  nights  are  more 
delightful  than  they  are  at  Panama.  The  tempera- 
ture varies  scarcely  at  all  the  year  round.  The  mean 
is  seventy-nine  degrees,  the  thermometer  ranging  from 
ninety-six  in  the  middle  of  the  day  to  sixty-five  in  the 
evening  and  night.  A  hot  night,  in  which  comfortable 
sleep  is  not  possible,  is  a  very  rare  occurrence. 

It  is  the  monotony  of  the  climate  that  wears  upon 
the  nerves  and  temper,  but  the  visitor  does  not  remain 
long  enough  to  feel  this.  Toward  the  end  of  the  dry 
season,  when  the  land  is  parched  and  barren  and  all 
freshness  of  the  very  atmosphere  itself  is  burnt  out,  the 
strain  of  monotony  becomes  almost  unbearable,  and 
the  peace  of  more  than  one  household  as  well  as  that 
of  the  community  is  threatened  by  the  ravages  of  a 
general  epidemic  of  raw  nerves.  The  wet  season  has 
drawbacks  of  its  own,  the  chief  of  which  is  a  prevailing 
dampness  that  moulds  and  rots  clothing  and  makes 
drying-rooms  a  necessity.  But  the  rainy  season  does 
not  bring  rain  every  day,  nor  prolonged  storms  like 
the  northeasters  of  the  temperate  zone.  There  are 


310  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

very  few  days  in  which  there  is  no  sun,  and  very  few 
in  which  there  is  continuous  rain.  There  are  heavy 
downpours  in  showers,  usually  between  noon  and  four 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  but  the  mornings  and  even- 
ings are  usually  clear  and  the  country  is  always  fresh 
and  brilliant  in  its  tropical  garb  of  vivid  green.  Most 
regular  dwellers  in  the  Canal  Zone  prefer  the  rainy 
season  to  the  dry,  but  its  partially  unmerited  reputa- 
tion for  excessive  rain  and  discomfort  prevents  out- 
siders from  obtaining  personal  knowledge  of  it. 

Life  in  the  canal  colony  was  agreeable  and  in  the 
main  joyous,  but  it  should  not  be  accepted  as  a  fair 
test  of  the  ability  of  Americans  or  rather  inhabitants 
of  the  temperate  zone  to  find  life  in  the  tropics  per- 
manently comfortable  and  satisfying.  The  canal 
colony  had  all  its  wants  met  without  stint  by  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States.  Artemus  Ward,  in  his 
inimitable  interview  with  Queen  Victoria,  asked  her  if 
Albert  Edward  was  a. "good  provider."  No  visitor 
to  the  isthmus  needed  to  ask  that  question  about  the 
United  States  Government  after  inspecting  the  quarters 
and  general  provisions  for  the  comfort  of  its  employes 
in  the  canal  service.  From  the  highest  official  to  the 
common  laborer,  all  were  housed  and  cared  for  as  no 
body  of  workers  was  ever  cared  for  before.  The  houses, 
made  of  pine  boards  painted  or  stained,  were  models 
of  convenience  and  comfort.  As  time  went  on  and  their 
occupants  had  changed  them  from  mere  houses  into 
homes,  covering  them  with  climbing  vines  and  sur- 
rounding them,  through  government  control  and  aid, 
with  flowering  shrubs,  they  acquired  an  amount  of 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  311 

artistic  beauty  and  charm  which  commanded  the  ad- 
miration of  tourists  and  gave  to  the  villages,  in  spite 
of  the  temporary  character  of  the  buildings,  the  at- 
tractive aspect  of  permanent  abodes.  The  wide 
screened  verandahs  were  converted  into  nature's 
greenhouses  with  flowering  plants  and  spoil  from  the 
jungle — ferns,  palms,  and  orchids.  Behind  these  bar- 
riers of  grateful  foliage  and  bloom  the  occupants 
lived  and  slept  virtually  in  the  open  air,  for  windows 
were  seldom  closed  and  the  screens  were  a  safe  protec- 
tion against  insect  pests.  Many  of  the  houses,  notably 
those  of  two  commissioners  at  Culebra,  became  through 
the  zeal  and  taste  of  their  mistresses,  Mrs.  Gaillard  and 
Mrs.  Rousseau,  veritable  gardens  of  beauty — miniature 
representatives  of  the  jungle — with  a  wealth  of  rare 
orchids  and  ferns  which  made  them  the  showplaces  of 
the  isthmus. 

But  an  influence  far  more  powerful  than  agreeable 
living  was  behind  the  contentment  of  the  canal  colony, 
and  that  was  the  indefinable  charm  of  participation  in 
a  great  work.  The  canal  was  not  merely  a  great  work, 
but  the  greatest  of  its  kind  in  all  the  ages.  It  was,  fur- 
thermore, an  American  work,  carried  on  by  the  nation, 
with  the  eyes  of  the  civilized  world  upon  it,  and 
success  would  bring  honor  not  only  to  the  nation  but 
to  all  who  had  helped  to  secure  it.  Realization  of  all 
this,  however  slight  it  may  have  been  at  the  outset, 
developed  quickly  into  an  enthusiastic  national  pride 
so  controlling  and  absorbing  that  discomforts  of  all 
kinds  were  disregarded. 

Then,  too,  as  construction  advanced  and  the  colossal 


312  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

proportions  of  the  task  began  to  be  apparent,  every  one 
connected  with  it  fell  under  the  spell  which  Joseph 
Pennell  calls  the  Wonder  of  Work.  Pennell  himself, 
when  he  visited  the  canal  work  in  1912,  not  only  fell 
under  the  spell  but  was  so  thoroughly  mastered  and 
possessed  by  it  that  he  was  able  to  transmit  it  to 
paper  and  give  to  the  world  that  incomparable  and  im- 
mortal series  of  drawings  in  which  it  stands  revealed 
to  the  eye.  Many  of  those  engaged  in  the  work  had 
felt  the  sublimity  and  majesty  of  the  spirit  which 
hovered  over  it;  had  seen  it  in  imagination  as  they 
walked  through  Culebra  Cut  or  stood  within  the  tower- 
ing walls  of  the  locks;  many  others  had  felt  its  influence 
unconsciously,  not  knowing  what  was  stirring  the  souls 
within  them;  but  Pennell,  with  the  clear  and  inspired 
vision  of  the  great  artist,  felt  it,  saw  it,  and  with  his 
trained  and  sure  pencil  traced  its  outlines  for  all  the 
world  to  see. 

He  not  only  interpreted  for  the  American  canal 
workers  the  charm  which  they  felt,  but  he  made  known 
to  their  own  countrymen  and  to  the  world  the  true 
proportions  of  the  task  they  were  performing.  They 
had  found  pleasing  to  the  eye  the  arches  and  but- 
tresses of  the  approach  walls  of  the  locks,  he  declared 
that  these  had  "splendid  springing  lines "  and  were 
"as  fine  as  the  flying  buttresses  of  a  cathedral,"  and 
when  they  looked  upon  them  in  his  drawings  they 
knew  that  he  was  right.  "I  went  to  see  and  draw  the 
canal,"  he  says  in  the  preface  to  the  bound  volume  of 
his  pictures,  "  and  from  my  point  of  view  it  is  the  most 
wonderful  thing  in  the  world;  and  I  have  tried  to  ex- 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  313 

press  this  in  my  drawings  at  the  moment  before  it  was 
opened,  for  when  it  is  opened,  and  the  water  turned  in, 
half  the  amazing  masses  of  masonry  will  be  beneath 
the  waters  on  one  side  and  filled  with  earth  on  the 
other  and  the  picturesqueness  will  have  vanished.  I 
saw  it  at  the  right  time  and  have  tried  to  show  what  I 
saw.  And  it  is  American — the  work  of  my  country- 
men/'1 In  another  place  he  said  of  his  drawings: 
"They  are  a  record  of  subjects  which  even  now  exist 
no  longer,  but  which  in  my  lithographs,  I  hope,  may, 
to  the  best  of  my  ability,  be  preserved — a  memory  of 
the  greatest  work  of  modern  time — a  record  of  the 
greatest  American  achievement  of  all  time."  That  the 
drawings  will  be  preserved  for  all  time  is  an  assured 
fact,  for  full  sets  of  them  have  been  purchased  by  the 
Isthmian  Canal  Commission  and  the  principal  museums 
and  art  galleries  of  the  United  States  and  Europe.2 

Pride  and  joy  in  the  work  constituted  the  magic 
bond  which  held  the  canal  colony  together  and  made 
its  members  content  to  remain  on  the  isthmus.  If  any 
one  had  doubts  on  this  point,  he  had  only  to  ask  a 
member  if  he  expected  to  remain  after  the  canal  was 
completed.  The  answer  was  the  same  invariably: 
"  Oh,  no !  I  want  to  stay  here  till  the  work  is  completed, 
want  to  go  through  the  canal  on  the  first  ship,  and 

1  Joseph  Pennell's  "Pictures  of  the  Panama  Canal,"  J.  B.  Lippincott 
&  Co.,  Philadelphia,  1912. 

2  Library  of  Congress,  Washington;  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission; 
the  Pennsylvania  Academy  of  Fine  Arts;  the  St.  Louis  Museum  of 
Fine  Arts;  the  Brooklyn  Museum  of  Art;  the  Chicago  Art  Institute; 
the  Italian  Government  for  the  Uffizzi  Gallery,  Florence;  the  British 
Government  for  the  Victoria  and  Albert  Museum,  London;  the  British 
Museum,  London;  the  Birmingham  Museum,  England. 


314  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

then  I  cannot  get  away  too  soon."  Life  on  the  isth- 
mus, without  the  absorbing  and  inspiring  canal  work, 
was  looked  upon  by  the  overwhelming  majority  of 
Americans  engaged  in  it  as  intolerable.  There  were 
some  who  had  found  the  life  so  agreeable,  so  suited  to 
their  tastes,  temperament,  and  physical  conditions, 
that  they  wished  to  remain  permanently;  but  these 
were  comparatively  few  in  number  and  belonged  mainly 
to  the  laboring  classes. 

Yet  the  canal  colony  had  been  a  reasonably  happy 
and  contented  community.  To  say  more  than  that 
would  be  to  say  that  it  did  not  contain  the  normal 
allotment  of  human  nature.  Careful  and  prolonged 
observation  justifies  the  assertion  that  the  regular  sup- 
ply was  fully  up  to  the  average,  at  times  reaching  pro- 
portions which  led  thoughtful  persons  to  suspect  that 
a  shortage  must  exist  in  other  localities. 

It  was  something  more  than  a  canal  colony,  for  it 
included  the  diplomatic  representatives  of  the  United 
States  and  many  other  countries — Central  and  South 
American  and  European.  These  widened  the  colony's 
social  horizon  and  brought  into  its  activities  and  pleas- 
ures a  cosmopolitan  variety  and  interest  which  added 
perceptibly  to  their  attractiveness. 

The  relations  between  the  two  "sets"  were  quite 
uniformly  harmonious,  the  only 'exceptions  being  rare 
manifestations  of  individual  temperament  more  amus- 
ing than  serious.  Especially  close  and  unvaryingly 
friendly  was  the  association  with  the  representatives 
of  Great  Britain,  headed  by  Sir  Claude  Coventry  Mal- 
let, for  thirty  years  stationed  at  Panama,  as  consul, 


C3 

0 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  315 

consul-general,  and  minister  resident.  His  long  and 
continuous  service  made  the  British  legation  the  one 
fixed  and  stable  point  in  an  otherwise  constantly  chang- 
ing diplomatic  world.  The  envoys  of  other  nations, 
notably  those  of  the  United  States,  came  and  went 
with  fairly  bewildering  rapidity,  but  the  envoy  of  Great 
Britain  remained  at  his  post  as  solid  and  unchanging 
as  the  empire  of  which  he  was  so  worthy  a  represent- 
ative. 

But  there  were  other  qualities  than  permanency 
which  gave  the  British  legation  its  undisputed  leader- 
ship and  its  peculiar  attractiveness  to  the  Americans 
of  the  canal  colony.  The  chief  of  these  was  the  cor- 
dial and  hearty  fellowship  which  from  the  beginning 
to  the  end  of  canal  work  existed  between  Sir  Claude 
and  the  commission.  This  was  of  incalculable  value 
because  the  great  mass  of  West  Indian  laborers  were 
British  subjects — or,  as  they  always  style  themselves, 
"British  objects" — and  there  were  constantly  arising 
questions  in  dispute  which  had  to  be  settled  between 
the  British  minister  and  the  commission.  Each  party 
to  this  settlement  acted  invariably  on  the  assumption 
that  the  other  had  in  view  only  what  was  just  and 
right,  and  the  result  was  a  complete  absence  of  friction, 
with  speedy  and  mutually  satisfactoiy  adjustment  in 
all  cases.  Combined  with  this  official  fellowship  was 
a  social  fellowship,  no  less  complete  and  hearty,  with 
Lady  Mallet  fairly  challenging  her  husband's  title  to 
supreme  popularity.  No  one  else  on  the  isthmus  did 
more  to  banish  the  always  impending  plague  of  monot- 
ony than  these  two  did,  and  the  American  members  of 


316  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

the  canal  colony  will  hold  them  in  grateful  and  lasting 
remembrance. 

The  last  traces  of  monotony  passed  away  as  the 
canal  work  advanced  and  the  fame  of  its  wonders 
spread  through  the  world,  bringing  visitors  from  every 
land  under  the  sun.  From  the  United  States  they 
came  in  hordes  of  hundreds,  all  filled  with  enthusi- 
astic pride  in  the  work  and  exuberant  in  praise  of  the 
workers.  Visitors  from  other  lands,  fewer  in  numbers, 
while  less  vociferous  in  their  admiration,  were  neither 
stingy  nor  backward  in  expressing  it.  A  seasoned 
Scotchman  who  had  inspected  the  work  amid  a  throng 
of  Americans  and  whom  the  persistent  screaming  of 
the  eagle  had  visibly  annoyed,  was  moved  to  say: 
"You  Americans  have  at  last  done  something  worth 
bragging  aboot!" 

This  chorus  of  praise  fell  gratefully  upon  ears  that 
had  heard  less  agreeable  music  in  earlier  days,  and  its 
effect  was  naturally  to  increase  the  general  content- 
ment. Then,  too,  among  the  visiting  throngs  there 
were  men  and  women  of  light  and  leading  in  all  lands, 
of  the  kind  whose  acquaintance  is  one  of  the  supreme 
joys  of  existence — artists,  writers,  scholars,  educators, 
soldiers,  judges,  lawyers,  who  brought  with  them 
glimpses  of  the  best  that  the  world  has  to  give.  They 
imparted  to  the  social  life  of  the  canal,  during  its 
later  years,  an  intellectual  delight  that  will  be  among 
the  pleasantest  memories  of  its  members. 

And  there  will  be  no  lack  of  pleasant  memories.  The 
colony  was  in  many  respects  unique  in  American  ex- 
perience. It  had  some  of  the  elements  of  a  military 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  317 

post,  but  its  general  character  was  more  diversified 
and  democratic  because  of  the  presence  of  many  civil- 
ians. The  disturbing  rule  of  precedence  held  slight 
and  uncertain  sway,  seldom  ruffling  the  calm  surface 
of  good-fellowship  which  close  association  in  a  com- 
mon and  inspiring  cause  naturally  engendered.  Life 
in  it  had  all  the  characteristics  of  life  in  a  small  com- 
munity everywhere,  but  it  was  a  life  in  the  open  air 
the  year  round  and  under  conditions  which  eliminated 
many  discomforts  and  annoyances  usually  to  be  found 
in  such  communities. 

That  it  was  an  enjoyable  life  on  the  whole  was  real- 
ized with  somewhat  unanticipated  keenness  when  the 
time  for  separation  arrived.  Although  the  desire  to 
get  away  now  that  the  task  was  done  was  general  and 
strong,  few  were  able  to  part  forever  from  the  land,  to 
which  many  of  them  had  gone  a  few  years  before  with 
reluctance  and  even  fear,  without  casting  one  "long, 
lingering  look  behind." 


CHAPTER  XXIII 
THE  NEW  PANAMA  RAILROAD 

AFTER  a  full  half-century  of  existence,  during  which  it 
had  rendered  to  the  progress  of  the  world  a  service  im- 
measurably greater  than  any  dreamed  of  by  the  most 
imaginative  of  its  indomitable  builders,  the  original 
Panama  Railroad  was  abandoned  to  make  way  for  the 
canal  in  whose  construction  it  had  been  the  chief  in- 
strument. Its  rails  were  torn  up  and  its  roadway  for 
the  greater  part  of  its  length  disappeared  forever  be- 
neath the  waters  of  Gatun  Lake. 

At  the  time  of  its  abandonment  very  little  of  the 
original  road  except  the  alignment  remained.  When 
the  American  canal-builders  arrived  on  the  isthmus 
they  found  as  the  transportation  agency  of  the  great 
task  before  them  a  railway  that  in  every  important  re- 
spect was  a  quarter  of  a  century  behind  the  times.  Its 
rails  were  too  light  to  sustain  the  weight  of  modern 
locomotives  and  spoil  cars,  its  culverts  and  bridges 
were  in  the  same  condition,  and  it  had  only  a  single 
track.  They  began  at  once  to  convert  it  into  a  double- 
track  system,  with  heavy  modern  rails,  to  strengthen 
or  rebuild  its  bridges  and  culverts,  to  equip  it  with 
modern  locomotives  and  cars,  and  to  supply  it  with  an 
up-to-date  personnel. 

318 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  319 

When  the  road  was  taken  over,  in  1904,  it  had  about 
47  miles  of  a  single  track  and  26  miles  of  siding,  with 
a  rolling-stock  that  was  virtually  worthless.  Five  years 
later  the  total  trackage  was  160  miles:  50  miles  of 
main  track,  35  miles  of  double  track,  all  relaid  with 
90-pound  rails;  the  equipment,  thoroughly  modern, 
comprised  150  locomotives,  1,500  freight  cars,  50  pas- 
senger cars,  and  4,000  spoil  cars.  Over  the  main  track 
there  passed  daily  574  trains,  including  160  trains  of 
spoil  cars.  The  number  of  passengers  carried  in  1910 
exceeded  two  and  a  quarter  millions,  the  amount  of 
commercial  freight  exceeded  one  and  a  quarter  million 
tons,  and  the  amount  of  excavation  spoil  over  its  va- 
rious tracks  was  nearly  or  quite  40,000,000  tons.  It 
was  indisputably  the  busiest  railway,  large  or  small,  in 
the  world. 

Fifty-two  years  after  the  original  Panama  Railroad 
had  been  opened  to  traffic  the  construction  of  the  new 
one  was  begun.  The  surveys  were  made  in  1906  and 
in  June  of  the  following  year  work  was  begun. 

The  situation  was  in  striking  contrast  with  that 
which  had  confronted  the  builders  of  the  original  road. 
Those  brave  pioneers  had  begun  their  task  in  a  pest- 
ridden  and  barren  wilderness  through  which  they  must 
cut  their  way  foot  by  foot.  They  had  only  hand  im- 
plements with  which  to  work,  no  land  habitations  save 
rude  huts  in  swamps  and  jungles,  no  food  supply 
which  would  be  considered  tolerable  in  these  times,  for 
cold  storage  was  unknown,  and  no  accurate  medical 
knowledge  with  which  to  counteract  and  overcome  trop- 
ical diseases.  The  only  road  that  it  was  possible  for 
them  to  build  was  along  the  lines  of  least  resistance, 


320  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

that  is,  through  the  river  valleys,  where  the  natural 
obstacles  were  the  least  formidable.  They  worked 
waist-deep  in  the  slimy  water  of  swamp  and  morass, 
piling  up  slowly  the  low  embankments  upon  which  to 
place  their  road-bed,  and  compelled  to  abandon  all 
progress  from  time  to  time  because  of  sickness  which 
incapacitated  the  entire  force.  The  labor  which  they 
were  able  to  command  was  of  the  poorest  and  most 
ignorant  quality,  for  the  curse  of  pestilence  was  upon 
the  land  and  intelligent  laborers  could  not  be  induced 
to  enter  it. 

A  half-century  later  what  a  marvellous  transforma- 
tion had  been  wrought!  The  isthmus  had  become  a 
land  of  health  and  plenty.  The  progress  in  mechanical 
invention  and  in  the  science  of  engineering  had  been 
so  great  that  such  a  thing  as  an  insurmountable  natu- 
ral obstacle  to  railway  construction  no  longer  existed. 
There  was  assembled  on  the  isthmus,  for  the  construc- 
tion of  the  canal,  a  mechanical  equipment  which  em- 
bodied all  the  latest  and  most  efficient  results  of  scien- 
tific achievement,  and  which  had  never  been  equalled 
in  size  and  perfection  anywhere  else  in  the  world. 
There  was  assembled  also  a  working  force  of  about 
forty  thousand  men,  trained  and  disciplined  in  con- 
struction work,  well  housed,  well  fed,  and  carefully 
safeguarded  against  disease.  The  railway  constructors 
had  this  equipment  and  this  force  to  draw  upon  as 
they  desired,  and  while  the  task  before  them  was  a 
formidable  one,  with  such  an  agency  at  their  command 
it  was  far  from  being  insurmountable. 

What  they  had  to  do  was  to  construct  a  high-level 
railroad  through  what  was  mainly  a  low-level  country. 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  321 

They  must  have  the  level  at  all  points  higher  than  the 
87-foot  level  of  Gatun  Lake.  In  building  it  they  must 
cross  wide  and  deep  valleys  and  pierce  rocky  ridges 
and  hills.  The  valleys  were  covered  with  dense  jungle 
growth  and  traversed  by  numerous  small  streams. 
Their  ground-levels,  which  were  from  20  to  25  feet 
above  sea-level,  proved  on  examination  to  be  composed 
of  a  mass  of  soft  clay,  decomposed  wood  and  vegeta- 
tion, from  150  to  200  feet  in  depth,  resting  upon  a 
solid  rock  foundation.  This  mass  had  near  the  top  a 
hard  stratum  of  clay  and  sand  from  20  to  30  feet  in 
thickness,  but  the  space  between  this  crust  and  the 
rock  foundation  was  filled  with  soft  material.  Across 
these  valleys — one  of  them,  that  of  the  Gatun  River, 
being  about  three  miles  in  width — huge  embankments 
had  to  be  constructed,  ranging  in  height  from  58  to 
74  feet.  When  the  weight  of  these  became  too  great 
for  the  crust  to  sustain,  it  pressed  that  down  upon  the 
soft  material  beneath  and  forced  it  to  the  surface  on 
either  side.  This  action  added  greatly  to  the  amount 
of  material  in  the  embankments,  for  the  upheavals 
had  to  be  counterweighted,  virtually  doubling  the 
width  of  the  foundations,  and  the  settlement  of  the 
ground  surface,  varying  from  25  to  60  feet,  added  the 
distance  in  each  case  to  the  height  of  the  embankment 
at  the  centre  or  road-bed  line. 

Some  conception  of  the  magnitude  of  the  task  may 
be  formed  by  the  statement  that  there  were  in  all  167 
embankments,  containing  a  total  of  16,000,000  cubic 
yards  of  material,  and  164  cuts,  the  heaviest  varying 
in  depth  from  60  to  95  feet.  The  three-mile  fill  across 


322  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

the  Gatun  valley  alone  contained  5,000,000  cubic 
yards  of  material,  and  of  the  cuts  one  was  95  feet  deep 
at  the  highest  point,  another  84  feet,  another  80  feet, 
and  another,  through  solid  and  very  hard  rock,  75 
feet.  It  is  not  surprising,  in  view  of  these  formidable 
obstacles,  that  the  road  cost  nearly  $9,000,000,  or 
about  $200,000  a  mile.  It  had  to  be  constructed  where 
it  was  because  higher  ground  could  have  been  reached 
only  by  going  outside  the  Canal  Zone  and  over  a  much 
longer  distance,  and  at  a  larger  expense. 

As  originally  planned,  the  line  from  Gamboa  to 
Pedro  Miguel  was  to  run  through  Culebra  Cut  on  the 
berm  of  the  canal,  but  this  route  had  to  be  abandoned 
because  of  the  slides.  It  became  necessary  to  run  the 
line  around  Gold  Hill  through  a  very  difficult  region, 
for  a  distance  of  9J^  miles,  a  change  which  added 
$1,200,000  to  the  cost. 

The  work  was  completed  and  the  road  was  turned 
over  formally  to  the  Panama  Railroad  Company  on 
May  25,  1912,  five  years  after  construction  began.  Its 
length  is  a  trifle  less  than  that  of  the  old  line,  the  time 
of  construction  was  about  the  same,  and  its  cost  about 
a  million  dollars  greater.  There  all  comparison  ceases. 
The  old  line  had  no  embankments  worth  mentioning, 
and  only  one  cut,  whose  depth  was  24  feet.  Such  a 
road  as  the  new  line  would  have  been  an  utter  impos- 
sibility a  half-century  earlier,  for  its  difficulties  would 
have  been  insurmountable  and  its  cost,  if  construction 
had  been  attempted,  would  have  been  so  tremendous 
as  to  be  prohibitive. 

It  is  an  interesting  fact,  worthy  of  recording  per- 


PERIOD   OF  CONSTRUCTION  323 

haps,  that  the  original  roadway  was  laid  with  ties  of 
native  wood  which  decayed  so  rapidly  that  soon  after 
the  road  was  open  to  traffic  these  were  replaced  almost 
entirely  with  ties  of  lignum  vitce  brought  from  Carta- 
gena, the  northern  province  of  Colombia.  When  the 
old  line  was  torn  up  these  ties,  after  being  in  the 
ground  for  a  full  half-century,  were  in  almost  perfect 
condition  of  preservation.  Many  ties  of  similar  wood 
have  been  placed  on  the  new  line,  but  the  greater 
part  of  its  road-bed  is  laid  with  ties  brought  from  the 
United  States. 

During  the  first  two  years  of  construction  the  work 
was  in  charge  of  Ralph  Budd,  chief  engineer  of  the 
Panama  Railroad.  He  resigned  in  September,  1909, 
and  was  succeeded  by  Lieutenant  Frederick  Hears, 
U.  S.  A.,  who  was  in  charge  till  the  road  was  com- 
pleted. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

VALUE  OF  THE  FRENCH  PROPERTY  —  WHAT  THE  UNITED 
STATES  RECEIVED  IN  RETURN  FOR  THE  PAYMENT  OF 
$40,000,000  TO  THE  FRENCH  COMPANY 

DID  the  American  Government  get  a  good  bargain 
when  it  paid  the  French  canal  company  $40,000,000 
for  its  rights,  privileges,  and  property  on  the  isthmus? 
This  question  was  answered  decisively  in  the  affirma- 
tive by  the  canal  commission  in  May,  1911.  A  special 
committee,  of  which  the  secretary  of  the  commission 
was  chairman,  was  appointed  by  Colonel  Goethals  to 
ascertain  the  value  of  what  the  United  States  had  re- 
ceived for  the  sum  paid.  The  committee,  after  a  thor- 
ough investigation,  made  a  report  which  fixed  the 
valuation  at  $42,799,826,  and  this  was  adopted  by  the 
canal  commission  as  its  official  appraisement. 

In  reaching  its  conclusions  the  committee  took  as  a 
basis  of  inquiry  the  $40,000,000  estimate  which  had 
been  made  by  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  of  1899- 
1901,  known  as  the  Walker  Commission.  That  com- 
mission had  in  mind  a  canal  project  which  contemplated 
the  use  of  about  39,500,000  cubic  yards  of  the  excava- 
tion accomplished  by  the  French,  and  it  estimated  the 
value  of  this  at  $27,474,000.  The  project  was  for  a 
sea-level  channel  from  Cristobal  to  Bohio,  a  lake  from 

324 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  325 

Bohio  to  Pedro  Miguel,  an  excavated  channel  from 
the  locks  at  Pedro  Miguel  to  Miraflores,  and  a  sea- 
level  channel  from  Miraflores  to  the  Bay  of  Panama. 
For  the  canal,  finally  built,  only  about  30,000,000  cubic 
yards  of  the  French  excavation  were  useful,  and  the 
value  of  this  was  estimated  by  the  committee  at  $25,- 
389,240.  In  reaching  this  estimate,  consideration  was 
given  to  the  fact  that  the  excavation  was  pioneer  work. 
It  included  clearing  the  ground  and  opening  up  the 
work,  and  also  the  diversion  of  several  streams.  It 
is  probable  that  a  large  quantity  of  it  was  handwork, 
and  although  it  was  mostly  earth,  pioneer  excavation 
is  expensive.  There  was  also  a  considerable  amount 
of  rock  removed  from  Culebra  Cut.  For  these  reasons 
it  was  decided  to  value  the  excavation  at  the  average 
price  of  excavation  under  American  direction  previous 
to  June  30,  1909,  at  which  time  a  total  of  about  40,- 
000,000  cubic  yards  of  dry  excavation  had  been  re- 
moved. This  average  price  was  $1.03  for  dry  excava- 
tion and  23  cents  for  wet. 

Included  in  the  purchase  from  the  French  were  68,- 
888  shares  of  Panama  Railroad  stock,  par  value  $100 
each,  leaving  1,112  shares  in  the  hands  of  private  par- 
ties. These  1,112  shares  were  purchased  at  a  cost  of 
$157,118.24,  or  an  average  price  of  $140.  In  arriving 
at  the  value  to  the  canal  commission  of  the  68,888 
shares  the  average  price  paid  for  the  outstanding 
shares  was  used.  This  gave  a  valuation  of  $9,644,320. 
When  it  is  considered  that  the  railroad  has  been  a  very 
valuable  asset  to  the  commission,  and  that  through 
ownership  of  the  property  the  commission  secured  the 


326  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

transportation  of  its  freight  and  passengers  at  cost, 
besides  using  the  Panama  Railroad  Company  in  many 
other  ways,  the  valuation  was  unquestionably  reason- 
able. 

There  were  turned  over  by  the  French  to  the  Amer- 
ican Government  2,148  buildings,  1,536  of  which  were 
repaired  and  used.  The  estimated  value  of  these, 
based  on  their  value  at  the  time  of  transfer,  plus  the 
value  of  repairs,  10  per  cent  to  cover  depreciation,  was 
placed  by  the  committee  as  follows: 

Quarters,  gold $625,483.63 

Quarters,  silver 443,800.30 

Hotels 7,455.23 

Hospitals 482,763.31 

French   Administration    Building,    Pan- 
ama City 125,000.00 

Building    used    as    American    Legation, 

Panama  City 50,000.00 

Jails 13,503.34 

Schoolhouses 12,702.78 

Shops 110,200.85 

Storehouses 94,099.70 

Structures 77,218.20 

Miscellaneous  buildings  of  old  Depart- 
ment of  Sanitation  and  Government .  11,976.46 


Total $2,054,203.80 

A  careful  inventory  was  made  of  the  material  and 
equipment  received  from  the  French,  a  large  portion 
of  which  had  proved  of  much  value  to  the  commission. 
This  was  especially  the  case  with  the  floating  equip- 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  327 

ment  of  dredges  and  dump  barges.  By  the  expendi- 
ture of  from  $20,000  to  $35,000  in  repairs  on  seven 
dredges  they  were  put  into  condition  virtually  as  good 
as  new,  and  during  the  entire  period  of  construction 
were  as  serviceable,  practically,  as  new  dredges  of 
the  same  type  costing  approximately  $100,000  each 
would  have  been.  A  great  deal  of  the  railway  equip- 
ment was  also  very  useful  during  the  early  days  of 
American  work,  pending  the  arrival  of  the  new  equip- 
ment, and  the  same  thing  was  true  of  the  shop  machin- 
ery and  tools.  Taking  all  these  facts  into  considera- 
tion the  committee  made  this  estimate: 

Floating  equipment $651,000 

Shop  machinery  and  tools 111,076 

Rolling  stock 297,900 

Scrap 294,071 

Miscellaneous  material 751,396 

Air  compressors 6,620 


Total $2,112,063 

The  French  company  purchased,  during  its  exist- 
ence, a  total  of  13,520  hectares  of  land,  for  which  it 
paid  $535,120.73  Colombian  money,  then  equivalent  to 
$428,096.58  gold.  This  land  was  included  in  the  prop- 
erty transferred  to  the  United  States,  but  no  estimate 
of  its  value  was  made  by  the  commission  of  1899-1901. 
The  prices  paid  for  those  portions  of  these  lands  lying 
along  the  line  of  the  canal  do  not  vary  materially  from 
the  prices  paid  by  the  United  States  for  lands  which 
it  has  purchased  in  similar  localities  since  construction 


328  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

began,  but  others  of  the  French  lands,  notably  those 
lying  near  the  Pacific  entrance  of  the  canal,  were  pur- 
chased at  much  lower  figures  than  they  could  be  pur- 
chased for  later.  Taking  as  a  basis  for  valuation  the 
prices  which  the  United  States  has  paid  for  lands,  both 
through  private  agreements  and  under  awards  made  by 
joint  commissions,  it  was  the  opinion  of  the  committee 
that  if  the  United  States  were  not  the  owner  of  any  of 
these  lands,  and  was  obliged  to  acquire  them  after  the 
canaPs  completion,  the  cost  would  not  be  less  than 
$1,000,000. 

The  French  left  an  extremely  valuable  collection  of 
maps,  surveys,  drawings,  and  records.  All  their  work 
of  this  kind  was  done  in  an  admirable  manner  and 
proved  to  be  of  great  use.  The  committee  adopted 
as  its  estimate  of  the  value  of  this  material  that 
which  the  Walker  Commission  had  placed  upon  it, 
$2,000,000. 

The  French  constructed  a  channel  in  the  Bay  of 
Panama  from  Balboa  to  deep  water,  and  this  was  used 
by  the  Americans  for  four  years,  it  being  the  only  ap- 
proach for  commercial  shipping  and  for  the  delivery 
of  supplies  on  the  Pacific  side  during  that  period.  The 
value  of  this  use  was  placed  at  $500,000. 

There  was  also  a  considerable  amount  of  clearing 
and  road-making  by  the  French  at  several  points  in 
the  Canal  Zone,  notably  at  Ancon,  Cristobal,  and  Em- 
pire. The  committee  considered  the  sum  of  $100,000 
a  moderate  estimate  of  the  value  of  this  work. 

The  net  result  of  the  committee's  research  was  sum- 
marized as  follows: 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  329 

Excavation $25,389,240 

Panama  Railroad  stock 9,644,320 

Maps,  drawings,  and  records 2,000,000 

Material  and  equipment 2,112,063 

Buildings 2,054,203 

Lands 1,000,000 

Use  of  Pacific  ship  channel 500,000 

Road-making  and  clearing 100,000 


Total $42,799,826 


CHAPTER  XXV 

AMERICAN  AND  FRENCH  MACHINERY  —  RELATIVE  CA- 
PACITY OF  THE  TWO  EXCAVATING  PLANTS 

THE  difference  in  efficiency  between  the  excavation 
plant  of  the  French  canal  workers  and  that  of  the  Amer- 
icans is  the  measure  of  progress  in  mechanical  invention 
during  a  quarter  of  a  century.  Taken  as  a  whole,  the 
efficiency  of  the  American  plant  was  about  five  times 
that  of  the  French.  In  some  branches  of  work  it  was 
much  greater  than  that  and  in  some  it  fell  below,  but 
that  was  the  general  average. 

The  chief  defect  in  the  French  equipment  was  its 
lack  of  strength:  it  was  all  too  light  for  the  work  it 
had  to  do.  This  was  true  of  the  railway  tracks,  lo- 
comotives, dirt  cars,  and  the  various  forms  of  excavat- 
ing machinery.  All  had  been  designed  for  operation 
in  quite  different  material  and  under  quite  other  con- 
ditions than  existed  on  the  isthmus.  Some  portions  of 
it  had  been  used  successfully  at  Suez,  and  were  taken 
to  the  isthmus  with  the  expectation,  based  on  lack  of 
knowledge  as  to  isthmus  conditions,  that  they  would 
work  there  equally  well.  They  were  effective,  in  their 
day,  in  soft  earth  and  sand,  but  were  not  equal  to  the 
heavy  rock  and  clayey  soil  with  which  they  had  to 
contend  at  Panama. 

330 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  331 

John  F.  Stevens,  in  his  testimony  before  the  Inter- 
national Consulting  Board  in  1905,  said:  "We  criticise 
the  French  plant,  but  that  is  not  fair.  At  that  time 
it  was  considered  a  modern  plant.  I  would  liken  it 
to  a  modern  one  as  a  baby  carriage  to  an  automobile. 
This  is  no  reflection  on  the  French,  but  I  cannot  con- 
ceive how  they  did  the  work  they  did  with  the  plant 
they  had." 

The  track  and  car  equipment  made  rapid  progress 
impossible.  The  Belgian  rail  in  use  was  only  19.7  feet 
long,  was  4%  inches  high,  and  only  3M  inches  wide 
at  its  base.  The  joints  were  close  together,  the  rails 
were  laid  in  soft  wood,  with  no  tie-plates  under  them, 
and  the  track  itself  was  laid  on  soft  ground,  without 
ballasting.  Then,  too,  the  dirt  cars,  with  a  capacity  of 
only  from  5M  to  8%  cubic  yards,  had  rigid  axles  and 
varying  gauges.  Mr.  Dauchy,  who  was  the  engineer 
in  charge  of  work  in  Culebra  Cut  under  Mr.  Wallace, 
said  in  his  testimony  before  the  International  Consult- 
ing Board  that  in  attempting  to  use  the  equipment  he 
had  fifteen  or  twenty  derailments  a  day  in  consequence. 
"Take  the  French  dump-cars,"  he  said;  "I  found  upon 
investigation  that  the  wheel  gauge  of  these  cars  varied 
in  almost  every  individual  car.  You  take  a  train  of 
these  cars  and  hardly  any  two  cars  had  exactly  the 
same  wheel  gauge.  We  found  cases  where  the  two 
pairs  of  wheels  under  a  car  were  of  different  gauge." 
It  was  impossible,  under  these  conditions,  to  keep  the 
excavators  supplied  with  trains,  and  the  consequence 
was  that  they  were  idle  a  large  part  of  the  time.  In 
the  rainy  season  the  wet,  clayey  material  stuck  fast  to 


332  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

the  cars,  would  not  dump,  and  had  to  be  shovelled  out 
by  hand. 

The  excavating  machinery  was  as  inadequate  almost 
as  the  railway  equipment.  It  comprised  two  kinds  of 
excavators:  the  American  steam-shovel,  in  its  original 
and  very  crude  form,  and  the  French  side  or  chain- 
bucket  excavators.  There  were  eleven  of  the  Amer- 
ican shovels  in  use,  ten  of  them  supplied  by  the  Osgood 
Dredge  Company,  of  Albany,  N.  Y.,  later  the  Marion- 
Osgood  Company.  Their  frames  were  of  wood,  the 
boiler  was  vertical,  the  "stick"  or  handle  of  the  dipper 
was  of  wood,  and  the  capacity  of  the  dipper  was  two 
cubic  yards.  They  were  used  only  in  soft  earth,  being 
too  light  for  work  in  rock,  and  had  a  capacity  of  about 
56  cubic  yards  per  hour.  They  were  in  service  during 
the  entire  period  of  French  activity,  and  one  of  them 
was  repaired  and  used  for  a  short  time  by  the  Amer- 
icans in  1904,  but  was  soon  abandoned  in  favor  of  the 
modern  powerful  development  of  the  same  machine. 

The  French  had  altogether  116  chain-bucket  ex- 
cavators, with  20  to  22  buckets  on  the  chain,  the  ca- 
pacity of  which  ranged  from  3  to  6  cubic  feet.  Of  the 
total  number,  86  were  up-diggers  and  30  were  down- 
diggers.  They  emptied  their  buckets  into  dump-cars 
or  upon  transporters.  The  transporter  was  a  truss  or 
bridge  about  180  feet  long,  through  the  centre  of  which 
was  a  belt  of  rubber  or  articulated  steel  plates,  3  feet 
4  inches  wide,  travelling  on  rollers.  It  was  designed 
to  carry  the  spoil  away  from  the  canal  prism  and  de- 
liver it  outside.  In  wet  weather  the  clayey  material 
stuck  to  the  belt  and  the  rollers,  throwing  the  belt  out 


Culebra  Cut,  looking  north,  as  left  by  the  French.     Americans  using 
French  equipment,  December,  1904. 


French  transporter. 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  333 

of  its  course  and  against  the  bars  of  the  truss,  tearing 
it  and  greatly  hampering  operation.  The  belt  could 
not  be  given  an  inclination  above  ten  per  cent,  and  the 
best  that  the  machine  could  accomplish  was  to  trans- 
port material  from  150  to  180  feet  on  level  ground. 
It  could  transport  at  most  about  1,400  cubic  yards  in 
a  day  of  ten  hours.  The  company  had  20  of  these 
machines. 

The  average  output  of  the  up-digger  excavators  was 
about  79  cubic  yards  per  hour,  but  as  they  were  in 
operation  only  about  half  the  time  the  average  output 
for  a  day  of  ten  hours  was  about  400  cubic  yards. 
The  average  output  of  the  down-diggers  was  about 
82  cubic  yards  an  hour,  and  in  a  day  of  ten  hours  about 
570  cubic  yards.  Their  boilers  were  30  horse-power 
and  their  weight  about  65  tons.  They  were  used  down 
to  the  collapse  of  the  first  French  company,  and  ex- 
clusively by  the  second  company,  and  a  few  of  them 
were  used  for  a  short  time  by  the  Americans  in  1905. 

Various  other  devices  were  employed  by  the  second 
French  company.  They  stretched  seven  cable-ways 
across  Culebra  Cut,  with  a  span  of  148  feet.  On  these, 
buckets  loaded  by  hand  were  run  and  emptied  into 
cars  below.  The  average  capacity  of  these  was  about 
136  cubic  yards  in  a  day  of  ten  hours.  Another  device 
was  a  kind  of  elevator,  placed  against  the  side  of  the 
excavation.  A  fixed  inclined  plane  reached  to  the  bot- 
tom of  the  cut,  and  on  this  a  trolley  track  ran  up  and 
down.  Decauville  cars  loaded  by  hand  were  pushed 
under  the  foot  of  the  incline,  fastened  to  the  trolley, 
taken  to  the  top,  and  emptied  into  dump-cars.  This 


334  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

machine  was  a  fixed  structure,  and  had  to  be  dismounted 
when  moved.  It  would  have  been  useful  as  a  perma- 
nent plant  for  loading  coal,  sand,  or  grain,  but  was  virtu- 
ally useless  for  the  work  which  it  was  called  upon  to  do. 
Mr.  A.  Raggi,  to  whom  I  am  indebted  for  the  in- 
formation in  regard  to  French  machinery  contained 
in  this  chapter,  and  who  was  in  the  employ  of  the  French 
company  as  an  engineer,  makes  this  general  comment 
upon  the  company's  methods  and  equipment: 

The  French  always  endeavored  to  increase  the  out- 
put of  their  excavation  by  modifying  their  plant. 
This  explains  the  diversity  of  their  machines.  They 
were  well  built,  of  good  material,  but  generally  too 
small,  too  light,  and  of  a  too  low  capacity  to  meet  the 
immense  task  that  was  before  them.  But  the  prin- 
cipal cause  of  trouble  was  the  difficulty  the  French  had 
to  supply  their  excavators  regularly  with  a  sufficient 
number  of  cars.  A  large  percentage  of  the  loss  of  time 
was  in  "waiting  for  cars."  This  was  due  to  the  bad 
conditions  of  their  tracks. 

The  I.  C.  C.  experienced  just  the  same  trouble  in 
1904  and  a  part  of  1905  until  the  French  rail  was  re- 
placed by  the  American  rail.  This  explains  why  the 
French  were  not  in  favor  of  putting  heavy  equipment 
on  their  tracks,  and  always  attempted  to  reduce  the 
transportation  on  temporary  tracks. 

This  is  the  reason  why  the  New  Company  from  the 
beginning  adopted  the  cableways.  Mr.  de  la  Tour- 
neric,  Inspector  of  Fonts  et  Chaussees,  then  in  charge 
of  the  works,  thought  that  with  the  cableways  he 
needed  but  one  well  ballasted  permanent  track,  on  top 
of  the  bank,  outside  of  the  prism,  and  that  he  would 
dispense  with  the  temporary  tracks  in  the  bottom  of 
the  Cut.  But  there  he  fell  into  another  fault,  the  cable- 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  335 

way  was  too  slow  and  of  a  too  small  capacity  for  the 
work  to  be  done. 

When  we  compare  the  excavation  equipment  de- 
scribed in  the  foregoing  pages  with  that  assembled  by 
the  Americans  a  quarter  of  a  century  later  the  pic- 
turesque simile  of  Mr.  Stevens — "as  a  baby  carriage 
to  an  automobile" — does  not  seem  far  out  of  the  way. 
The  French,  like  all  construction  workers  of  the  time, 
used  hand-work  mainly.  The  Americans,  with  all  the 
remarkable  improvements  and  developments  of  me- 
chanical science  at  their  command,  were  able  to  sub- 
stitute for  hand-work  machines  which  did  the  work  of 
hundreds,  and  in  some  instances,  of  thousands,  of  men. 

The  four  great  instruments  of  excavation  in  the 
American  plant  were  steam-shovels,  unloaders,  spreaders, 
and  trackshifters.  None  of  these,  except  the  first  in 
crude  form,  was  known  to  the  French.  The  greatest 
of  the  four  is  the  steam-shovel,  capable  in  its  most 
powerful  form  of  removing  in  an  eight-hour  day 
4,823  cubic  yards  of  rock  and  earth,  or  8,395  tons. 
This  was  the  highest  record  attained  during  American 
work,  and  it  was  accomplished  by  a  90-ton  shovel  with 
a  5-cubic-yard  dipper.  It  demonstrated  the  capacity 
of  the  machine  when  working  under  most  favorable 
conditions.  During  the  busiest  season  of  work  in 
Culebra  Cut  there  was  a  daily  average  of  43  of  these 
shovels  in  operation,  and  the  monthly  output  of  each 
averaged  36,786  cubic  yards,  or  a  daily  average  of 
1,415  cubic  yards.  Frequently  the  output  of  a  shovel 
reached  3,500  cubic  yards  in  an  eight-hour  day.  The 
amount  depended  mainly  on  the  supply  of  dirt  trains, 


336  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

for  the  Americans,  like  the  French,  had  an  insufficient 
supply  of  these  to  keep  the  excavating  machines  in 
constant  operation,  but  for  different  reasons.  With 
the  French  poor  tracks  constituted  the  chief  cause  of 
delay;  with  the  Americans  the  tracks  were  satisfac- 
tory, but  there  was  an  inadequate  supply  of  cars  be- 
cause a  full  supply  would  require  so  large  an  equip- 
ment of  cars  and  locomotives,  unloaders,  men,  etc., 
as  to  greatly  increase  the  cost. 

The  ability  of  the  steam-shovel  to  remove  at  least 
five  times  as  much  material  in  an  hour  as  the  French 
implements  is  only  a  part  of  its  superior  efficiency. 
The  5-cubic-yard  dippers  can  handle  rock  weighing 
from  10  to  12  tons,  whereas  by  hand  labor  150  or  200 
pounds  is  the  limit. 

The  result  is  that  far  less  drilling  and  blasting  and 
a  much  smaller  quantity  of  explosives  are  required  in 
getting  rock  material  into  condition  for  excavation, 
and  consequently  a  smaller  force  of  men.  It  is  esti- 
mated that  from  two  to  three  times  as  much  drilling 
was  required  under  the  French  conditions,  twice  as 
large  a  quantity  of  explosives,  and  three  times  as  many 
men  as  under  American  conditions.  The  average 
amount  of  dynamite  used  by  the  Americans  in  the 
Culebra  Cut  is  about  one-half  pound  for -every  cubic 
yard  of  material  blasted,  while  the  French  used  not 
less  than  a  pound  for  every  cubic  yard. 

But  while  a  less  quantity  of  explosives  was  required 
than  would  have  been  necessary  under  old  methods, 
the  amount  used  on  the  isthmus  during  the  period  of 
canal  construction  has  been  enormous,  and  at  its  close 


Track-shifting  machine  which  does  the  work  of  600  men. 


Steam-shovel  loading  rock,  Culebra  Cut. 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  337 

will  aggregate  no  less  than  77,500,000  pounds  (38,750 
tons),  divided  as  follows: 

pounds 

All  canal  work 75,000,000 

Central  division,  mainly  Culebra  Cut 40,000,000 

Panama  Railroad 2,500,000 

During  the  busiest  period  of  work  the  amount  of 
explosives  used  in  Culebra  Cut  averaged  about  6,000,- 
000  pounds  a  year. 

The  heaviest  single  blast  was  in  the  solid  rock  of 
Contractor's  Hill,  in  the  Cut,  on  November  12,  1906, 
which  contained  nearly  26  tons  of  dynamite  and  black 
powder.  The  second  in  size  was  at  Bas  Obispo,  on 
December  12,  1908,  containing  22  tons  of  dynamite, 
which  went  off  prematurely  from  causes  never  ascer- 
tained, killing  23  people  and  injuring  40  others.  The 
third  in  size  was  at  Caimito,  on  the  canal  line,  in 
February,  1908,  in  which  19^  tons  of  dynamite  were 
used. 

Most  of  the  material  excavated  in  Culebra  Cut  con- 
sisted of  rock  varying  from  very  soft,  which  readily 
disintegrates  on  exposure  to  the  atmosphere,  to  very 
dense  rock  of  great  hardness.  It  was  necessary  before 
excavating  this  material  to  drill  and  blast  it.  Two 
kinds  of  drills  were  used — tripod  and  well — both  ob- 
taining their  power  from  a  10-inch  compressed-air 
main  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Cut  supplied  by  three 
batteries  of  air-compressors  placed  at  equal  distances 
along  the  9  miles  of  the  Cut.  The  usual  depth  of  drill 
holes  was  about  27  feet,  three  feet  deeper  than  the 


338  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

steam-shovels  excavated.  The  drill  holes,  placed  about 
14  feet  apart,  were  loaded  with  45  per  cent  potassium 
citrate  dynamite  in  quantities  depending  upon  the 
character  of  the  rock;  and  connected  in  parallel  and 
fired  by  means  of  a  current  from  an  electric  light  plant. 
The  maximum  number  of  drills  in  use  at  any  one  time 
in  Culebra  Cut  was  377,  of  which  221  were  tripod  and 
156  well.  With  these  over  90  miles  of  holes  have  been 
drilled  in  a  single  month. 

With  the  modern  unloader,  the  second  of  the  great 
American  excavation  instruments,  the  saving  in  labor 
is  greater  than  in  the  case  of  the  steam-shovels.  This 
machine  was  unknown  to  the  French.  It  consists  of 
a  steel  plough,  weighing  about  33^  tons,  which  is  drawn 
from  one  end  of  a  train  of  flat  cars  to  the  other  by  means 
of  a  cable  which  is  wound  on  a  steam-driven  drum. 
The  flat  cars  upon  which  it  is  operated  have  one  high 
and  one  open  side,  and  are  connected  by  steel  aprons 
which  convert  their  floors  into  a  continuous  surface 
throughout  the  train's  entire  length.  As  the  wedge- 
shaped  plough,  which  has  a  surface  sloping  backward  on 
the  open  side  of  the  car,  moves  forward,  the  material 
runs  off  in  a  continuous  stream.  The  flat-car  train  is 
composed  generally  of  20  cars,  each  with  a  capacity  of 
about  19  cubic  yards,  or  610  tons  for  the  train.  An 
unloader  will  empty  an  entire  train  in  from  7  to  15 
minutes.  There  is  a  record  of  one  of  these  machines 
unloading  in  an  eight-hour  day  18  trains,  about  3% 
miles  of  cars,  containing  about  7,560  cubic  yards  of 
material.  It  is  estimated  by  the  engineers  in  charge 
of  the  work  that  20  of  these  machines  with  a  force  of 


A  spreader  at  work,  Corozal  Dump,  August  31,  1907. 


Dirt  train  and  Lidgerwood  unloader,  Juan  Grande,  January,  1907. 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  339 

120  laborers  do  the  work  of  5,666  men  under  the  old 
method  of  unloading  by  hand. 

Another  machine,  also  unknown  to  the  French,  is 
the  spreader,  which  is  a  car  operated  by  compressed 
air,  which  has  steel  wings  on  each  side  that  can  be 
raised  and  lowered,  and  when  lowered  reach  out  from 
the  rails,  with  a  backward  slope,  for  a  distance  of  11 J^ 
feet.  As  the  car  moves  forward  the  material  left  in  a 
ridge  along  the  side  of  the  track  by  the  unloader  is 
spread  out  on  a  level  with  that  on  which  the  tracks 
rest.  This  machine,  like  the  unloader,  does  the  work 
of  between  5,000  and  6,000  men  working  by  hand. 

Finally,  after  the  steam-shovels  have  lifted  the  ma- 
terial on  flat  cars,  after  the  unloaders  have  deposited 
it  at  its  destination,  and  after  the  spreaders  have  re- 
duced it  to  a  level  mass,  there  comes  still  another  labor- 
saving  machine,  also  unknown  to  the  French,  the  track- 
shifter.  This  is  the  invention  of  an  American,  W.  G. 
Bierd,  who  was  the  general  manager  of  the  Panama 
Railroad  Company  from  September  2,  1905,  to  October 
1,  1907,  when  he  resigned  on  account  of  ill  health,  the 
climate  of  the  isthmus  not  agreeing  with  him.  He  is 
at  present  vice-president  and  general  manager  of  the 
Minneapolis  and  St.  Louis  Railway  Company.  The 
machine  was  first  put  in  service  in  January,  1907.  It 
consists  of  a  flat  car  from  which  a  steel  truss  boom  ex- 
tends 35  feet  in  front  over  the  track,  and  a  second  boom 
extends  30  feet  from  the  side  parallel  to  and  above  the 
level  of  the  track.  A  cable  running  over  the  end  of  the 
first  boom  lifts  a  section  of  the  track,  rails  and  ties  to- 
gether, and  a  cable  running  through  the  end  of  the  second 


340  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

boom  pulls  the  raised  section  side  wise.  As  first  oper- 
ated the  machine  carried  its  own  engine,  and  swung  a 
section  of  track  five  feet  to  one  side.  It  now  takes  its 
steam  from  a  locomotive  and  is  capable  of  swinging 
track  a  distance  of  9  feet.  It  is  handled  by  a  force  of 
nine  men  and  is  capable  of  moving  5,400  feet,  or  one 
mile  and  120  feet,  of  track  9  feet  in  eight  hours,  doing 
the  work  of  about  600  men  for  the  same  length  of 
time.  This  has  been  of  great  service  on  the  dumps 
where  the  unloaders  had  deposited  the  spoil  and 
the  spreaders  had  reduced  it  to  a  level,  and  it  was 
necessary  to  move  the  tracks  constantly  to  the  edge 
of  the  dumps.  In  the  busiest  period  of  excavation  the 
American  plant*  comprised  101  steam-shovels,  45  with 
5-cubic-yard  dippers  and  the  others  with  dippersvarying 
from  2Ji  to  3  cubic  yards,  30  unloaders,  26  spreaders, 
and  9  trackshifters.  It  comprised  also  161  powerful 
modern  locomotives,  1,760  flat  cars  for  unloaders  of 
19-cubic-yard  capacity,  and  1,800  dump-cars,  varying 
in  capacity  from  10  to  17  cubic  yards.  With  this  equip- 
ment there  was  removed  from  Culebra  Cut  in  March, 
1913,  1,183,290  cubic  yards  of  material.  The  highest 
monthly  total  of  the  French  at  the  same  point  was 
282,528  cubic  yards.  The  American  force  in  the  Cut  in 
March,  1913,  was  about  7,000  men.  The  working 
French  force,  thirty  years  earlier,  was  about  9,000,  as 
nearly  as  can  be  ascertained.  The  monthly  results  per 
man,  as  shown  by  these  figures,  were  for  the  American 
176  cubic  yards  and  for  the  French  32  cubic  yards,  or 
more  than  five  to  one  in  favor  of  the  Americans.  The 

*  Appendix  D. 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  341 

American  gain,  as  has  been  set  forth  in  preceding  chap- 
ters, is  due  to  the  advance  in  mechanical  invention,  and 
is  in  no  sense  a  reflection  upon  the  work  done  by  the 
French.  After  an  examination  of  their  implements,  one 
is  impelled  to  share  with  Mr.  Stevens  a  feeling  of  wonder 
that  they  were  able  to  accomplish  as  much  as  they  did. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 

VETERANS   IN   THE   CANAL   SERVICE 

IT  has  been  said  of  the  canal  work  that  it  was  a  "young 
man's  job,"  and  that  consequently  it  could  show  no 
list  of  veterans  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word.  This 
is  true  as  a  general  statement,  so  far  as  employes  are 
concerned,  for  not  only  were  young  men  sought  for 
the  work,  both  at  the  outset  and  during  its  progress, 
but  persons  over  thirty  years  of  age  were  barred  from 
some  forms  of  employment,  those  over  forty  from  others, 
and  those  over  forty-five  from  all.  These  rules  applied 
only  to  minor  positions;  there  was  no  fixed  age  limit 
on  official  and  other  of  the  higher  positions.  But  aside 
from  formal  limitations,  the  task  was  a  young  man's 
job  in  that  it  had  about  it  little  to  attract  men  well 
along  in  life.  There  were  too  many  risks  involved, 
and  too  great  demands  made  upon  physical  powers. 
The  result  was  that  the  great  body  of  the  canal  force 
was  composed  of  young  men,  who,  after  six  to  nine 
years  of  service,  were  still  far  away  from  old  age. 

A  collection  of  the  photographs  of  veterans,  such  as 
is  displayed  in  this  chapter,  should  be  viewed  in  the 
light  of  the  foregoing  observations.  The  persons  de- 
picted therein  are  real  veterans,  not  in  years,  but  in 
service  well,  faithfully,  and  unostentatiously  performed. 

342 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  343 

The  oldest  veteran  in  the  list  is  A.  Raggi,  who  was  in 
the  service  of  the  new  French  canal  company,  in  charge 
of  excavation  in  the  Culebra  Cut,  from  1895  to  1904. 
He  was  retained  in  the  service  of  the  Americans  when 
they  took  possession,  acting  as  an  assistant  engineer  on 
surveys,  projects,  estimates,  etc.,  till  1907,  when  he 
was  placed  in  the  office  of  the  office  engineer  of  the  canal 
commission,  with  duties  connected  with  topographical 
work,  geological  surveys,  records,  etc.,  a  position  which 
he  still  holds. 

A.  B.  Nichols  went  to  the  isthmus  in  May,  1904, 
arriving  with  John  F.  Wallace,  the  first  chief  engineer. 
He  had  charge  of  the  surveys  at  Gatun  until  June, 
1905,  when  he  was  made  resident  engineer  of  the  Cu- 
lebra division,  holding  that  position  for  about  a  year 
when  he  was  appointed  by  Colonel  Goethals  office  en- 
gineer of  the  commission,  a  position  which  he  has  since 
retained. 

George  M.  Wells,  who  might  be  called  the  boy  veteran 
of  the  canal,  went  to  the  isthmus  in  June,  1904,  as  a 
transit  man.  He  served  under  Mr.  Wallace  and  Mr. 
Stevens  as  transit  man,  instrument  man,  and  assistant 
engineer  in  connection  with  survey  work.  Subse- 
quently he  had  charge  of  designing  work  in  the  Colon 
dredging  division,  of  construction  work  at  Porto  Bello, 
and  of  the  designs  for  and  construction  of  the  handling 
plant  of  Gatun  Locks.  Since  September,  1909,  he  has 
been  office  engineer  of  the  Atlantic  Division  in  charge 
of  the  designing  office,  of  the  municipal  works  of  that 
division,  and  of  the  design  and  construction  of  perma- 
nent water-works  and  purification  plants  for  Gatun, 


344  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

the  cities  of  Colon  and  Panama,  and  the  southern  end 
of  the  canal. 

W.  G.  Comber,  who  has  won  the  title  of  the  "veteran 
mud-digger  of  the  isthmus,"  entered  the  canal  service 
in  August,  1905.  He  was  in  charge  of  dredging  at  the 
Atlantic  entrance  till  February  1,  1907,  when  he  was 
transferred  to  the  Pacific  entrance  and  made  division 
engineer.  Under  the  new  organization  which  was  put 
into  effect  in  July,  1908,  he  became  resident  engineer 
at  the  same  point,  and  on  May  1,  1913,  he  was  placed, 
by  order  of  Colonel  Goethals,  in  charge  of  all  dredging 
operations  on  the  isthmus. 

James  Macfarlane  entered  the  canal  service  in  Jan- 
uary, 1905,  having  been  on  the  isthmus  in  the  employ 
of  the  Panama  Railroad  Company  since  August,  1901. 
He  was  in  charge  of  the  marine  equipment  of  the  canal 
commission  at  both  ends  of  the  canal  for  a  time,  and 
later  became  superintendent  of  floating  equipment  at 
Balboa,  holding  that  position  under  Mr.  Comber  till 
August,  1910,  when  he  was  appointed  superintendent 
of  dredging,  a  position  which  he  has  held  since  that 
time. 

Mr.  A.  S.  Zinn  entered  the  service  in  October,  1906, 
as  resident  engineer  of  the  Central  Division,  which  in- 
cludes Culebra  Cut,  and  has  retained  that  position 
throughout  the  entire  period  of  active  work.  He  has 
had  charge  of  all  division  estimates  and  plans,  the  most 
important  being  railway  tracks,  stone-crushers,  dumps, 
fifteen  miles  of  pile  trestles,  five  miles  of  diversion  canals, 
Naos  Island  breakwater,  and  the  temporary  suspension 
bridge  over  the  Cut  at  Empire. 


A.  B.  Nichols. 


George  M.  Wells. 


A.  Raggi. 


W.  G.  Comber. 


A.  S.  Zinn. 


James  Macfarland. 


Eduard  J.  Williams.  Mark  W.  Tenny.  Thomas  M.  Cooke. 

Veterans  in  the  Canal  service. 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  345 

Thomas  M.  Cooke  entered  the  service  in  July,  1904. 
He  organized  what  became  later  the  division  of  posts, 
customs,  and  revenues,  and  has  remained  as  its  head 
throughout  the  entire  period  of  construction.  He  has 
had  charge  of  the  customs  work  at  both  the  Atlantic 
and  Pacific  terminals,  of  the  collection  of  license  fees, 
taxes,  and  land  rents,  and  of  the  maintenance  and 
operation  of  seventeen  post-offices  along  the  line  of  the 
canal.  Down  to  May,  1913,  there  had  been  issued 
money  orders  amounting  to  $31,731,592;  the  post- 
office  receipts  had  aggregated  $716,679,  and  collections 
from  all  other  sources  had  reached  $1,480,188.  Under 
the  postal  agreement  with  the  Republic  of  Panama, 
$280,878  had  been  paid  to  its  government  for  postage- 
stamps. 

Edward  J.  Williams  has  been  disbursing  officer  of 
the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  since  November,  1905, 
and  has  had  charge  of  all  expenditures  by  the  com- 
mission since  that  time.  Down  to  May  1,  1913,  there 
had  passed  through  his  office,  for  all  purposes,  cash 
to  the  amount  of  $195,577,988.00. 

Mark  W.  Tenny  entered  the  service  of  the  Isthmian 
Canal  Commission  as  instrument  man  on  May  14, 
1904.  In  March,  1905,  he  was  appointed  assistant 
engineer,  and  in  February,  1913,  superintendent  of 
construction  of  the  Culebra  district  of  the  Central 
Division. 

The  men  whose  careers  are  set  forth  above  do  not  by 
any  means  exhaust  the  list  of  deserving  veterans.  They 
are  merely  the  more  notable  samples  of  a  large  class, 
because  of  the  positions  which  they  held.  The  veteran 


346  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

list  would  have  been  much  longer  than  it  is  had  the 
work  remained  under  civilian  direction.  When  it 
passed  under  military  direction,  many  of  those  who  had 
held  high  engineering  positions  resigned,  not  through 
dissatisfaction  with  the  rule  of  Colonel  Goethals,  or 
through  anticipation  of  discharge,  but  because  nearly 
all  doors  to  promotion  were  closed  by  the  new  order  of 
things.  The  higher  positions  were  all  filled  with  army 
officers,  and  would  remain  so  filled  till  the  end  of  the 
task,  for  as  one  officer  retired  or  was  transferred  else- 
where, another  was  detailed  to  take  his  place.  Colonel 
Goethals,  so  far  as  was  in  his  power,  not  only  retained 
the  civilians  whom  he  found  in  important  positions,  but 
he  appointed  other  civilians  to  some  of  the  highest 
positions,  placing  one  of  them,  Mr.  S.  B.  Williamson, 
at  the  head  of  one  of  the  three  great  divisions.  But 
these  were  exceptions  to  the  general  rule.  Not  only 
were  the  best  places  held  by  army  officers,  but  they  re- 
ceived higher  salaries  than  the  civilians  in  similar  posi- 
tions. The  two  army  officers  who  were  at  the  head  of 
the  other  two  of  the  great  divisions  received  $14,000 
a  year  each  as  members  of  the  commission,  while  Mr. 
Williamson's  pay  was  only  $10,000. 

This  situation,  inevitable  under  the  circumstances, 
was  calculated  to  drive  civilians  who  were  ambitious 
out  of  the  service,  and  many  of  them  resigned  soon 
after  the  change  to  military  control  was  effected. 
Others,  like  Mr.  Williamson,  retired  later  when  the 
work  neared  completion. 

Of  the  men  who  went  to  the  isthmus  from  the  United 
States  during  the  first  year  of  work,  1904,  there  re- 


PERIOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION  347 

mained  in  the  service  in  1913,  about  sixty.  These 
were  all  full-fledged  veterans,  who  had  been  on  the  job 
from  its  very  beginning,  had  withstood  the  yellow-fever 
panic  of  1905,  and  who  would  be  at  their  posts  at  the 
close,  provided  their  lives  were  spared.  Of  those  who 
joined  the  force  in  1905,  about  four  hundred  were  still 
in  the  service  in  1913.  Many  of  these  also  had  with- 
stood the  yellow-fever  panic,  and  the  others  had  ar- 
rived soon  after  it  had  subsided.  If  they  were  not  full- 
fledged  veterans,  they  were  entitled  to  rank  very  closely 
with  the  men  of  1904,  for  like  them  they  had  stuck  to 
their  posts  through  the  dangers  and  hardships  which 
had  marked  the  early  period  of  the  work,  when  life  on 
the  isthmus  was  much  less  agreeable  than  it  became 
afterward. 


PART  V 
THE  COMPLETED  CANAL 


PART  V 
THE  COMPLETED  CANAL 

CHAPTER  I 

NOT  A  CANAL  THROUGH  THE  ISTHMUS,  BUT  A  BRIDGE 
OF  WATER  ABOVE  IT 

THE  Panama  Canal  is  a  huge  water  bridge,  the  first 
in  the  world's  history.  It  is  about  34  miles  in  length, 
87  feet  high,  with  a  channel  of  water  through  its  centre 
varying  in  depth  from  45  to  87  feet,  and  in  width  at 
the  bottom  from  300  to  1,000  feet.  The  bridge  is 
divided  into  two  sections,  Gatun  Lake  and  Culebra 
Cut,  the  latter  being  an  arm  of  the  former.  Access 
to  the  bridge  by  vessels  will  be  by  means  of  water 
elevators,  six  in  duplicate  at  either  end,  each  1,000 
feet  long,  110  feet  wide,  and  with  a  combined  lift  of 
87  feet.  At  the  Atlantic  end  the  elevators  are  grouped 
one  above  another  like  a  flight  of  three  steps.  At  the 
Pacific  end  two  pairs  of  elevators  are  grouped  at  the 
bottom,  and  are  separated  from  the  third  pair  above 
by  a  platform  of  water  in  the  form  of  a  lake  about  a 
mile  and  a  half  in  length.  The  piers  or  walls  which 
hold  the  bridge  in  place  are  the  Gatun  Dam  and  ele- 
vator gates  at  the  Atlantic  end,  and  the  dam  and  ele- 
vator gates  at  Pedro  Miguel  on  the  Pacific  end. 

351 


352  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

In  constructing  the  bridge  and  securing  a  level  for 
its  channel  it  was  necessary  to  cut  a  passage  through  a 
mountain  range  near  the  Pacific  end  and  to  erect  a 
lower  mountain  range  or  ridge  at  the  Atlantic  end. 
The  first  is  known  as  the  Culebra  Cut,  and  the  second, 
composed  in  large  part  of  the  earth  and  rock  taken  from 
the  Cut  and  transported  about  30  miles,  is  known 
as  the  Gatun  Dam.  A  mountain  had  to  be  moved, 
not  by  faith,  but  by  dynamite,  steam-shovels,  and  rail- 
way trains,  and  set  up  30  miles  away.  It  was  placed 
across  the  lower  end  of  a  valley  or  watershed  compris- 
ing, 1,320  square  miles,  and  will  form  in  that  valley  a 
lake  with  an  area  of  164  square  miles,  with  a  depth 
varying  from  45  to  87  feet,  and  containing  183  billion 
cubic  feet  of  water.  This  lake,  with  its  Culebra  Cut 
arm,  is  the  water  bridge  of  the  isthmus.  Twenty- 
four  miles  of  the  channel  for  vessels  will  lie  within  the 
lake  area,  and  about  9  miles  will  be  through  Culebra 
Cut,  and  these  9  miles  constitute  all  that  can  be 
called  a  canal  in  the  usual  sense,  unless  the  sea  ap- 
proaches at  either  end  be  included  in  that  designa- 
tion. 

The  canal  does  not,  as  is  generally  supposed,  cross 
the  isthmus  from  east  to  west.  It  runs  due  south  from 
its  entrance  in  Limon  Bay,  through  the  Gatun  locks 
to  a  point  in  the  widest  portion  of  Gatun  Lake,  a  dis- 
tance of  about  113^  miles;  it  then  turns  sharply  to 
the  east  and  follows  a  course  generally  southeastern, 
till  it  reaches  the  Bay  of  Panama.  Its  terminus  near 
Panama  is  about  22 J^  miles  east  of  its  terminus  near 
Colon.  Its  length  from  shore-line  to  shore-line  is 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  353 

about  40  miles,  and  from  deep  water  in  the  Atlantic 
to  deep  water  in  the  Pacific  is  about  50  miles. 

In  passing  through  the  canal  from  the  Atlantic  to 
the  Pacific,  a  vessel  will  enter  the  approach  channel 
in  Limon  Bay,  which  has  a  bottom  width  of  500  feet 
and  extends  to  Gatun,  a  distance  of  about  7  miles. 
At  Gatun  it  will  enter  a  series  of  three  locks  in  flight 
and  be  lifted  85  feet  to  the  level  of  Gatun  Lake. 
It  may  steam  at  full  speed  through  this  lake,  in  a 
channel  varying  from  1,000  to  500  feet  in  width,  for  a 
distance  of  about  24  miles  to  Bas  Obispo,  where  it 
will  enter  the  Culebra  Cut.  It  will  pass  through  the 
Cut,  a  distance  of  about  9  miles,  in  a  channel  with  a 
bottom  width  of  300  feet  to  Pedro  Miguel.  There  it 
will  enter  a  lock  and  be  lowered  30J^  feet  to  a  small 
lake,  at  an  elevation  of  54%  feet  above  sea-level,  and 
will  pass  through  this  for  about  11A  miles  to  Miraflores. 
There  it  will  enter  two  locks  in  series  and  be  lowered  to 
sea-level,  passing  out  into  the  Pacific  through  a  chan- 
nel about  8^2  miles  in  length,  with  a  bottom  width  of 
500  feet.  The  depth  of  the  approach  channel  on  the 
Atlantic  side,  where  the  maximum  tidal  oscillation  is 
21A  feet,  will  be  41  feet  at  mean  tide,  and  on  the  Pacific 
side,  where  the  maximum  oscillation  is  21  feet,  the 
depth  will  be  45  feet  at  mean  tide.  The  mean  sea-level 
in  both  oceans  is  the  same. 

Throughout  the  first  15  miles  from  Gatun  the  width 
of  the  lake  channel  will  be  1,000  feet,  then  for  4  miles 
it  will  be  800  feet,  and  for  4  miles  more,  to  the  northern 
entrance  of  Culebra  Cut  at  Bas  Obispo,  it  will  be  500 
feet.  The  depth  will  vary  from  87  to  45  feet.  The 


354  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

water-level  in  the  Cut  will  be  that  of  the  lake,  the 
depth  45  feet. 

Three  hundred  feet  is  the  minimum  bottom  width 
of  the  canal.  This  width  begins  about  half  a  mile 
above  Pedro  Miguel  locks  and  extends  about  8  miles 
through  Culebra  Cut,  with  the  exception  that  at  all 
angles  the  channel  is  widened  sufficiently  to  allow  a 
1,000-foot  vessel  to  make  the  turn.  The  Cut  has 
eight  angles,  or  about  one  to  every  mile.  The  300-foot 
widths  are  only  on  tangents  between  the  turning-basins 
at  the  angles.  The  smallest  of  these  angles  is  7°  36', 
and  the  largest  30°. 

In  the  whole  canal  there  are  22  angles,  the  total  cur- 
vature being  600°  51'.  Of  this  curvature  281°  10'  are 
measured  to  the  right  going  south,  and  319°  41'  to 
the  left.  The  sharpest  curve  is  67°  10'. 


CHAPTER  II 

GATUN  DAM,  SPILLWAY,  AND  HYDROELECTRIC 
STATION 

WHEN,  in  November,  1906,  President  Roosevelt  stood 
on  a  hill  at  Gatun  a  few  rods  above  the  site  of  the  pres- 
ent lock,  there  was  only  a  short  and  shallow  trench  to 
show  that  real  work  for  construction  had  begun.  Be- 
low, stretching  away  to  the  south,  was  the  valley  of 
the  Chagres,  through  which  that  river  and  the  French 
canal  and  the  Panama  Railroad  stretched  in  nearly 
parallel  lines.  In  front,  nestled  cosily  in  a  bend  of  the 
Chagres,  was  the  native  village  of  Gatun,  one  of  the 
most  picturesque  objects  on  the  line  of  the  railway.  It 
had  in  its  centre  a  quaint  old  church  with  a  tumbled- 
down  front  door,  a  parsonage  and  school  building,  and 
a  hundred  or  more  other  buildings  and  thatched-roof 
huts.  Its  population  numbered  about  six  hundred  per- 
sons, and  it  was  a  market-place  for  produce  which  was 
brought  in  cayucos,  or  dugouts,  from  the  various  villages 
along  the  river.  Beyond  the  village,  looking  across  the 
valley,  was  an  uneven  stretch  of  country  thickly 
covered  with  jungle  growth.  The  site  of  the  proposed 
dam,  it  was  explained,  would  lie  directly  over  the  vil- 
lage and  across  the  valley  to  the  hills  beyond.  So 
dense  was  the  tropical  growth  that  the  surface  line  of 
the  dam  could  scarcely  be  followed  by  the  eye. 

355 


356  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

Six  years  later  the  great  dam  was  in  place  across  the 
valley,  the  site  of  the  old  village  was  buried  a  hundred 
feet  below,  and  stretching  away  to  the  south  as  far  as 
the  eye  could  reach  was  a  great  lake,  its  waters  filling 
the  valley  and  climbing  far  up  upon  the  sides  of  its 
enclosing  hills.  Village  and  railway  had  been  trans- 
planted to  higher  ground,  and  the  bed  of  the  Chagres 
and  the  French  canal  had  disappeared  forever  from 
view. 

The  site  for  the  dam  had  been  examined  thoroughly 
before  it  was  decided  upon  as  satisfactory  by  Mr. 
Stevens,  but  it  was  not  till  five  hundred  and  seventy- 
three  acres  of  forest  and  jungle  had  been  cleared  that 
its  really  remarkable  suitability  was  disclosed  so  clearly 
as  to  command  instant  approval  by  all  competent  ob- 
servers. It  then  appeared  that  there  was  lying  in  the 
passage  which  Nature  had  left  open  between  the  con- 
verging lines  of  encircling  hills  a  valley  divided  nearly 
in  the  centre  by  an  isolated  hill.  When  examined  this 
hill  was  found  to  be  composed  of  rock  and  to  be  about 
one  hundred  and  ten  feet  in  height,  or  about  the  ele- 
vation of  the  proposed  dam.  This  made  possible  the 
construction,  not  of  one  great  unbroken  dam  nearly  a 
mile  and  a  half  in  length,  but  of  two  dams,  each  about 
three-quarters  of  a  mile  in  length;  one  of  them,  the 
east  dam,  wedded  firmly  to  the  hills  in  which  the  locks 
were  to  be  placed  at  one  end  and  to  the  centre  hill  at 
the  other;  the  second,  the  west  dam,  wedded  firmly 
to  the  centre  hill  at  one  end  and  to  the  high  range  of 
hills  which  bounds  the  west  side  of  the  valley  at  the 
other.  The  centre  hill  itself  supplied  virtually  ideal 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  357 

conditions  for  the  construction  of  a  spillway  through 
which  the  waters  of  the  Chagres  could  flow  during  the 
period  of  dam  construction  and  in  which  the  surplus 
waters  of  the  great  lake  after  construction  had  been 
completed  could  be  regulated  and  controlled.  It  also 
added  greatly  to  the  strength  of  the  dam  as  a  whole. 

Before  work  was  begun  on  the  dam  an  exhaustive 
examination  was  made  of  the  foundation  upon  which 
it  was  to  be  placed  in  order  to  determine  the  character 
of  the  underlying  materials;  to  ascertain  whether  there 
was  any  possible  connection  between  the  swamp  areas 
to  the  north  and  the  ocean  to  the  south  through  the 
deposits  in  the  gorges  across  which  the  dam  was  to  be 
built;  to  test  the  ability  of  the  underlying  material 
to  support  the  proposed  structure;  and  to  discover 
whether  there  could  be  obtained  in  the  immediate 
vicinity  material  for  the  hydraulic  fill  which  was  to 
form  the  core  of  the  dam.  As  a  result  it  was  ascertained 
that  the  underlying  material  was  impervious  to  water; 
that  there  was  no  connection  between  the  swamps 
above  and  the  sea  below;  and  that  the  underlying  ma- 
terial possessed  ample  strength  to  uphold  the  weight 
that  the  dam  would  impose. 

Considered  as  a  single  structure,  the  Gatun  Dam  is 
nearly  one  and  one-half  miles  long,  measured  on  its 
crest;  nearly  one-half  mile  wide  at  the  base;  about  400 
feet  wide  at  the  water  surface;  about  100  feet  wide  at 
the  top,  and  its  crest  is  at  an  elevation  of  105  feet 
above  mean  sea-level.  It  is  in  reality  a  low  ridge 
uniting  the  high  hills  on  either  side  of  the  lower  end 
of  the  Chagres  valley,  so  as  to  convert  the  valley  into 


358  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

a  huge  reservoir.  Of  the  total  length  of  the  dam  only 
500  feet,  or  one-fifteenth,  will  be  exposed  to  the  maxi- 
mum water-head  of  85  to  87  feet.  The  interior  of  the 
dam  is  formed  of  a  natural  mixture  of  sand  and  clay, 
dredged  by  hydraulic  process  from  pits  above  and 
below  the  dam,  and  placed  between  two  large  masses 
of  rock  and  miscellaneous  material  obtained  from 
steam-shovel  excavation  at  various  points  along  the 
canal.  The  top  and  up-stream  slope  are  thoroughly 
riprapped.  The  entire  dam  contains  about  twenty-one 
million  cubic  yards  of  material. 

Work  began  upon  it  in  July,  1907,  when  the  founda- 
tion was  cleared  of  timber  and  other  growth,  and  tres- 
tles were  erected  for  dumping  excavated  material  for 
the  erection  of  the  two  outer  walls  or  toes.  On  August 
10, 1907,  by  this  process  the  Chagres  River  was  dammed 
for  the  first  time,  and  its  waters  were  turned  into  the 
west  diversion,  a  channel  which  had  been  constructed 
by  the  French  to  keep  the  waters  of  the  Chagres  out 
of  their  canal.  This  served  as  an  outlet  for  the  Chagres 
till  April  24,  1910,  when  advancing  construction  closed 
it  and  the  waters  of  the  river  were  forced  through  the 
spillway  and  thus  brought  under  control  for  future  use. 

The  dry  material  in  the  toes  of  the  dam  was  nearly 
all  in  place  at  the  end  of  1912.  Only  a  few  thousand 
cubic  yards  remained  to  be  placed  to  finish  off  the 
crest.  The  hydraulic  fill,  pumped  in  by  suction 
dredges,  was  started  in  December,  1908,  and  completed 
in  September,  1912.  The  core  thus  created  was  carried 
to  a  height  of  ninety-five  feet.  It  is  composed  of  blue 
clay  so  impervious  that  it  was  very  slow  to  dry  out. 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  359 

In  its  watery  condition  it  flowed  into  every  interstice 
in  the  ridges  of  rock  and  earth,  until  the  whole  mass 
at  the  centre  of  the  dam  became  like  a  rubble  wall, 
every  rock  in  it  cemented  to  another.  The  argillaceous 
sandstone,  or  blue  rock,  found  everywhere  on  the 
isthmus,  hard  until  exposed  to  air,  is  formed  of  such 
clay;  and  it  is  thought  probable  that  in  time  the  core 
of  the  dam  itself  will  solidify  into  such  rock. 

.On  top  of  the  hydraulic  material  there  was  dumped  a 
dense  clay  found  in  near-by  borrow  pits,  bringing  the 
core  up  to  the  105-foot  level.  The  workers  on  the 
dam,  under  the  direction  of  Americans,  included 
Spaniards,  Italians,  Greeks,  East  Indian  coolies,  and 
West  Indian  negroes.  They  numbered  200  in  1907 
and  2,000  when  the  force  was  at  its  maximum  in  1911. 
When  the  work  was  at  its  highest  point,  4  suction 
dredges  were  employed  and  100  train-loads  of  rock 
and  earth  were  dumped  daily. 

The  spillway  is  a  concrete-lined  channel  1,200  feet 
long  and  285  feet  wide,  the  bottom  being  10  feet  above 
sea-level  at  the  up-stream  end  and  sloping  to  sea-level 
at  the  toe.  Across  the  up-stream  or  lake  opening  of 
this  channel  there  is  a  concrete  dam  in  the  form  of  an 
arc  of  a  circle  making  its  length  808  feet,  although  it 
closes  a  channel  with  a  width  of  only  285  feet.  The 
crest  of  the  dam  is  69  feet  above  sea-level,  or  16  feet 
below  the  normal  level  of  the  lake.  On  the  top  of  this 
dam  there  are  13  concrete  piers  with  their  tops  115.5 
feet  above  sea-level,  and  between  these  there  are  regu- 
lating gates  of  the  Stoney  type.  The  gates  have  steel 
sheathings  on  a  framework  of  girders  and  move  up 


360  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

and  down  on  roller  trains  in  niches  in  the  piers.  They 
are  equipped  with  sealing  devices  to  make  them  water- 
tight. Machines  for  moving  the  gates  are  designed  to 
raise  or  lower  them  in  approximately  ten  minutes. 
The  highest  level  to  which  it  is  intended  to  allow  the 
lake  to  rise  is  87  feet  above  sea-level,  and  it  is  probable 
that  this  level  will  be  maintained  continuously  during 
wet  seasons.  With  the  lake  at  that  elevation,  the  regu- 
lation gates  will  permit  a  discharge  of  water  greater 
than  the  maximum  known  discharge  of  the  Chagres 
River  during  a  flood.  Work  on  the  spillway  began  in 
April,  1907,  and  was  completed  in  1913. 

Adjacent  to  the  north  wall  of  the  spillway  there  is 
located  a  hydro-electric  station  capable  of  generating 
through  turbines  6,000  kilowatts  for  the  operation  of 
the  lock  machinery,  machine  shops,  dry-dock,  coal- 
handling  plant,  batteries,  and  for  the  lighting  of  the 
locks  and  zone  towns,  and  operating  the  Panama  Rail- 
road. The  building  is  constructed  of  concrete  and  steel, 
and  is  of  a  design  suitable  for  a  permanent  power- 
house in  a  tropical  country.  The  dimensions  permit 
the  installation  of  three  2,000-kilowatt  units,  and  pro- 
vision is  made  for  a  future  extension  of  three  additional 
similar  units.  It  is  rectangular  in  shape,  and  contains 
one  main  operating  floor,  with  a  turbine  pit  and  two 
galleries  for  electrical  equipment.  The  building,  with 
the  machinery  and  electrical  equipment,  is  laid  out 
upon  the  unit  principle,  each  unit  consisting  of  an  in- 
dividual head-gate,  penstock,  governor,  exciter,  oil- 
switch,  and  control  panel. 

Water  is  taken  from  Gatun  Lake,  the  elevation  of 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  361 

which  varies  with  the  seasons  from  80  to  87  feet  above 
sea-level,  through  a  forebay  which  is  constructed  as  an 
integral  part  of  the  curved  portion  of  the  north  spill- 
way approach  wall.  From  the  forebay  the  water  is 
carried  to  the  turbines  through  three  steel-plate  pen- 
stocks, each  having  an  average  length  of  350  feet.  The 
entrances  are  closed  by  cast-iron  head-gates  and  bar- 
iron  trash-racks.  The  head-gates  are  raised  and  lowered 
by  individual  motors  which  are  geared  to  rising  stems 
attached  to  the  gate  castings.  The  driving  machinery 
and  the  motors  are  housed  in  a  small  concrete  gate- 
house erected  upon  the  forebay  wall  directly  over  the 
gate  recesses  and  trash-racks.  The  gate-house  is  con- 
structed for  the  present  requirements  of  three  head- 
gates,  and  provision  is  made  for  a  future  addition  of 
three  more  units. 


CHAPTER  III 

LOCKS  AND  GATES 

ALL  locks  of  the  canal  are  in  duplicate,  are  constructed 
in  the  same  manner,  and  their  chambers,  with  walls 
and  floors  of  concrete,  have  the  same  usable  dimensions 
— 1,000  feet  long  and  110  feet  wide.  There  are  six 
pairs,  making  12  in  all.  The  side  walls  are  from  45  to 
50  feet  wide  at  the  surface  of  the  floor,  are  vertical  on 
the  chamber  side,  and  narrow  on  the  outside  from  a 
point  24K  feet  above  the  floor,  by  means  of  a  series  of 
steps  each  6  feet  high,  to  a  width  of  8  feet  at  the  top. 
The  centre  walls  are  60  feet  wide,  with  perpendicular 
faces.  At  a  point  42Ji  feet  above  the  floor,  and  15 
feet  above  the  top  of  the  middle  culvert,  a  space  much 
like  the  letter  U  in  shape  is  left  open,  measuring  19 
feet  in  width  at  the  bottom  and  44  feet  at  the  top. 
In  this  centre  space  is  a  tunnel  divided  into  three  stories, 
or  galleries;  the  lowest  gallery  for  drainage,  the  mid- 
dle for  the  wires  that  carry  the  electric  current  to 
operate  the  gate  and  valve  machinery  installed  in  the 
centre  wall,  and  the  upper  a  passageway  for  the  oper- 
ators. 

All  walls  are  approximately  81  feet  high,  except  in  the 
lower  pair  of  locks  at  Miraflores,  where,  for  reasons 
which  will  be  given  later,  they  are  82  feet  high.  In 

362 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  363 

those  at  Gatun  about  2,000,000  yards  of  concrete  were 
used,  and  in  those  at  Pedro  Miguel  and  Miraflores, 
nearly  2,400,000.  Work  on  the  locks  at  Gatun  began 
in  September,  1906,  when  the  task  of  clearing  the  site 
down  to  the  rock  foundation  was  instituted.  Five 
years  later  when  this  task  was  completed,  about 
6,000,000  cubic  yards  of  material  had  been  removed. 

On  the  Pacific  side,  work  on  the  locks  began  nearly 
two  years  later  than  at  Gatun.  This  was  due  mainly 
to  the  change  in  plan  for  that  portion  of  the  work,  de- 
scribed in  a  previous  chapter,  by  which  Miraflores  was 
made  the  site  of  the  two  locks  which  under  the  original 
plan  had  been  placed  at  La  Boca,  now  Balboa.  Work 
began  at  Miraflores  in  January,  1908,  and  at  Pedro 
Miguel  in  June  of  the  same  year,  when  excavation  of 
the  lock  site  was  instituted. 

The  first  concrete  was  laid  in  the  locks  at  Gatun  on 
August  24,  1909,  in  those  at  Pedro  Miguel  on  Septem- 
ber 1,  1909,  and  at  Miraflores  in  July,  1910.  The 
cracked  stone  for  those  at  Gatun  was  brought  by  water 
from  Porto  Bello,  about  twenty  miles  east  of  Colon; 
and  the  sand  from  Nombre  de  Dios,  about  twenty  miles 
further  east.  These  were  thought  to  be  the  nearest 
points  at  which  suitable  stone  and  sand  could  be  pro- 
cured. Stone  for  the  locks  on  the  Pacific  side  was 
taken  from  Ancon  Hill,  about  four  miles  from  the  lock 
site,  and  the  sand  was  brought  by  water  from  Point 
Chame,  in  the  Bay  of  Panama,  about  twenty-three 
miles  west  of  Balboa.  Rock-crushing  plants  were 
erected  at  Porto  Bello  and  on  Ancon  Hill. 

For  handling  the  stone,  sand,  and  cement  and  laying 


364  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

the  concrete  two  different  plants  were  erected.  That 
at  Gatun  was  an  elaborate  plan  of  automatic  railways 
and  aerial  cable-ways,  operated  by  electric  power.  That 
at  Pedro  Miguel  and  Miraflores  was  a  system  of  berm 
and  chamber  cranes.  Full  descriptions  of  the  two 
plants  are  obtainable  in  the  annual  reports  of  the  Isth- 
mian Canal  Commission  for  1909  and  1910,  and  in 
issues  of  the  Canal  Record  for  those  years.  Concrete 
laying  for  the  locks  was  completed  at  all  points  in  the 
summer  of  1913. 

The  longest  approach  walls  are  at  the  south  entrances 
at  Pedro  Miguel  and  Miraflores — 1,200  feet.  At  the 
north  entrances  of  the  locks  they  are  1,185  feet  in 
length.  That  at  the  north  entrance  at  Gatun  is  1,031 
feet  long,  and  that  at  the  south  entrance  1,009  feet. 
Both  approach  walls  at  Pedro  Miguel  rest  on  solid  rock 
foundations;  at  Miraflores  the  one  at  the  south  en- 
trance rests  on  rock,  and  that  at  the  north  entrance 
rests  on  concrete  piers  of  caisson  construction  sunk  to 
rock.  At  Gatun  the  one  at  the  north  entrance  in  the 
lake  rests  upon  piles  driven  from  35  to  70  feet  into  the 
ground;  the  one  at  the  south  rests  on  long  piles  reach- 
ing to  rock,  which  in  some  places  is  over  100  feet  below 
sea-level.  Cellular  form  of  reinforced  concrete  is  used 
in  all  approach  walls  except  those  at  the  lower  locks  at 
Gatun  and  Miraflores,  where  mass  concrete  is  used  be- 
cause of  the  effect  of  salt  water  on  steel  reinforcement. 

The  lock  gates,  each  composed  of  two  leaves,  are  of 
much  larger  dimensions  than  any  previously  made. 
Each  leaf  is  65  feet  wide,  from  47  to  82  feet  high,  7 
feet  thick,  and  weighs  from  390  to  730  tons.  There  are 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  365 

92  leaves  in  all,  and  their  combined  weight  is  60,000 
tons.  Placed  end  to  end  they  would  make  a  tower 
more  than  a  mile  and  a  quarter  high. 

They  are  constructed  to  float  like  a  ship.  Each  is  a 
huge  webbed  steel  box,  the  girders  of  which  are  covered 
with  a  steel  sheathing.  All  portions  of  the  interior  are 
accessible,  with  water-tight  compartments  providing  for 
an  adjustment  of  the  buoyancy  so  as  to  control  within 
limits  the  dead  load  on  the  bearings,  making  the  leaf 
practically  float  in  the  water.  This  water-tight  com- 
partment is  subdivided  vertically  into  three  sections, 
each  independently  water-tight,  so  that  if  the  shell 
should  be  broken  in  any  way,  or  begin  to  leak,  only 
one  section  would  probably  be  affected.  An  air-shaft, 
26  inches  in  diameter,  runs  from  the  bottom  compart- 
ment up  to  the  top  of  the  gate,  and  this  also  is  water- 
tight where  it  passes  through  the  upper  half  of  the  leaf. 

The  girders  are  made  with  man-holes  through  the 
webs,  providing  communication  from  the  top  to  the 
bottom  of  the  leaf,  and  are  connected  by  several  sets 
of  vertical-transverse  diaphragms  of  solid  plates,  run- 
ning from  top  to  bottom  of  the  leaf,  thus  making  a 
cellular  construction,  and  dividing  the  spaces  between 
the  horizontal  girders  into  small  pockets,  all  of  which 
are  accessible  through  man-holes. 

Each  leaf  rests  at  the  bottom  of  its  heel  post  upon  a 
hemispherical  pivot  of  forged  nickel  steel,  and  is  hinged 
at  the  top  to  the  masonry  of  the  lock  wall.  It  swings 
free  on  the  pivot  like  a  door,  without  wheels  or  other 
support  beneath  it. 

Intermediate  gates  are  used  in  all  except  one  pair  of 


366  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

locks,  and  are  so  placed  as  to  divide  the  space  into  two 
chambers,  one  600  and  the  other  400  feet  in  length. 
This  makes  possible  a  saving  of  water  and  time  in 
locking  small  vessels  through,  about  95  per  cent  of 
vessels  navigating  the  high  seas  being  less  than  600 
feet  hi  length. 

The  highest  gates  and  the  highest  lock  walls  on  the 
canal  are  those  of  the  lower  locks  at  Miraflores,  and 
these  locks  are  the  only  ones  which  have  no  intermediate 
gates.  The  total  lift  from  mean  sea-level  to  the  level 
of  Miraflores  Lake,  54%  feet,  is  equally  divided  be- 
tween the  upper  and  lower  locks,  and  under  ordinary 
conditions  all  should  be  of  equal  volume.  The  waters 
of  the  Pacific,  however,  extend  into  the  lower  locks,  and 
the  range  of  tide  is  from  10  feet  below  to  10  feet  above 
mean  sea-level.  Furthermore,  the  area  of  the  upper 
locks  is  greater  than  the  lower,  because  of  the  omission 
of  the  intermediate  gates  in  the  latter.  The  combined 
result  is  that  the  volume  of  each  lower  lock  is  less  than 
that  of  the  upper  when  the  tide  is  higher  than  about  2 
feet  below  mean  tide,  and  the  lock  is  incapable  of  re- 
ceiving the  full  contents  of  an  entire  upper  lock  with- 
out causing  an  overflow  of  the  walls  and  gates.  A 
portion  of  the  water  from  an  upper  lock  must  be 
wasted  through  the  culverts,  or  cross-emptied  into  the 
twin  lock.  To  diminish  this  waste  as  much  as  prac- 
ticable, the  volume  of  the  lower  locks  has  been  en- 
larged by  increasing  the  height  of  the  walls  and  gates 
to  82  feet,  which  is  the  maximum  consistent  with  econ- 
omy and  safety  in  construction. 

The  locks  are  filled  and  emptied  through  a  system 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  367 

of  culverts.  One  culvert,  254  square  feet  in  area  of 
cross-section,  about  the  area  of  the  Hudson  River  tun- 
nels of  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad,  extends  the  entire 
length  of  each  of  the  middle  and  side  walls,  and  from 
each  of  the  large  culverts,  there  are  several  smaller  cul- 
verts, 33  to  44  square  feet  in  area,  which  extend  under 
the  floor  of  the  lock  and  communicate  with  the  lock 
chamber  through  holes  in  the  floor.  The  large  culverts 
are  controlled  at  points  near  the  mitre  gates  by  large 
valves,  and  each  of  the  small  culverts  extending  from 
the  middle  wall  feeds  in  both  directions  through  laterals, 
thus  permitting  the  passage  of  water  from  one  twin 
lock  to  another,  effecting  a  saving  of  water. 

To  fill  a  lock  the  valves  at  the  upper  end  are  opened 
and  the  lower  valves  closed.  The  water  flows  from  the 
upper  pool  through  the  large  culverts  into  the  small 
lateral  culverts,  and  thence  through  the  holes  in  the 
floor  into  the  lock  chamber.  To  empty  a  lock,  the 
valves  at  the  upper  end  are  closed  and  those  at  the 
lower  end  are  opened,  and  the  water  flows  into  the  lower 
lock  or  pool  in  a  similar  manner.  This  system  distrib- 
utes the  water  as  evenly  as  possible  over  the  entire 
horizontal  area  of  the  lock,  and  reduces  the  disturbance 
in  the  chamber  when  it  is  being  filled  or  emptied. 

The  depth  of  water  over  the  mitre  sills  of  the 
locks  will  be  forty  feet  in  salt  water,  and  forty-one  and 
one-third  feet  in  fresh  water. 

The  average  time  for  filling  and  emptying  a  lock  is 
about  fifteen  minutes,  without  opening  the  valves  so 
suddenly  as  to  create  disturbing  currents  in  the  locks 
or  approaches.  The  time  required  to  pass  a  vessel 


368  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

through  all  the  locks  is  estimated  at  three  hours;  one 
hour  and  a  half  in  the  three  locks  at  Gatun  and  about 
the  same  time  in  the  three  locks  on  the  Pacific  side. 
The  time  of  passage  of  a  vessel  through  the  entire 
canal  is  estimated  as  ranging  from  ten  to  twelve  hours, 
according  to  the  size  of  the  ship  and  the  rate  of  speed 
at  which  it  can  travel. 


CHAPTER  IV 

PASSAGE  OF  THE  LOCKS 

No  vessel  is  permitted  to  enter  or  pass  through  the 
locks  under  its  own  power.  The  worst  accidents  which 
have  occurred  in  locks  hitherto  have  been  due  to  an 
engineer  in  the  engine-room  misinterpreting  a  signal 
from  the  bridge,  either  going  ahead  when  he  should 
have  gone  back,  or  vice  versa,  and  ramming  a  gate. 
When  a  vessel  arrives  at  a  lock  at  Gatun  or  Miraflores, 
it  is  tied  up  to  the  approach  wall  and  turned  over  to 
the  absolute  control  of  the  canal  authorities.  These 
place  a  representative  of  their  own  on  the  bridge  and 
another  in  the  engine-room.  They  then  connect  the 
towing  locomotives,  or  "electric  mules,"  with  the  ship. 
These  locomotives  operate  on  tracks,  on  the  lock  walls, 
and  proceed  at  the  rate  of  two  miles  an  hour.  The 
number  of  locomotives  varies  with  the  size  of  the  ves- 
sel. The  usual  number  required  is  four:  two  ahead, 
one  on  each  wall,  imparting  motion  to  the  vessel,  and 
two  astern,  one  on  each  wall,  to  aid  in  keeping  the  ves- 
sel in  a  central  position  and  to  bring  it  to  rest  when 
entirely  within  the  lock  chamber.  They  are  equipped 
with  a  slip  drum,  towing  windlass,  and  hawser,  which 
permits  the  towing  line  to  be  taken  in  or  paid  out  with- 
out actual  motion  of  the  locomotive  on  the  track. 


370  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

The  locomotives  run  on  a  level,  except  when  in  passing 
from  one  lock  to  another  they  climb  heavy  grades. 
There  are  two  systems  of  tracks,  one  for  towing  and 
the  other  for  the  return  of  the  locomotives  when  not 
towing.  The  towing  tracks  have  centre  racks  or  cogs 
throughout,  and  the  locomotives  always  operate  on 
this  rack  when  towing.  At  the  incline  between  locks 
the  return  tracks  also  have  rack  rails,  but  elsewhere 
the  locomotives  run  by  friction.  The  only  crossovers 
between  the  towing  and  return  tracks  are  at  each  end 
of  the  locks,  and  there  are  no  switches  in  the  rack  rail. 

Before  a  lock  can  be  entered,  a  fender  chain,  stretched 
across  the  walls  of  the  lock,  must  be  passed.  If  all  is 
proceeding  properly,  this  chain  is  dropped  in  its  groove 
at  the  bottom  of  the  channel.  If  by  any  chance  the 
ship  is  moving  too  rapidly  for  safety,  the  chain  remains 
stretched  and  the  vessel  runs  against  it.  The  chain, 
which  is  operated  by  hydraulic  machinery  in  the  walls, 
then  plays  out  slowly  by  automatic  release  until  the 
vessel  is  brought  to  a  stop.  The  chain,  which  weighs 
24,098  pounds,  and  is  the  strongest  ever  made,  is  capa- 
ble of  stopping  a  10,000-ton  ship,  running  at  four  miles 
an  hour,  within  73  feet,  or  less  than  the  distance  be- 
tween the  chain  and  the  first  gate. 

If  the  vessel,  by  a  remote  possibility,  gets  away  from 
the  towing  locomotives  and,  breaking  through  the 
chain,  rams  the  first  gate,  there  is  a  second  gate,  fifty 
feet  away,  protecting  the  lock,  which  is  certain  to  ar- 
rest further  advance.  When  the  leaves  of  this  gate 
swing  open,  the  vessel  is  towed  in,  and  the  gate  is 
closed  behind  it.  Then,  from  openings  placed  at 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL 


371 


regular  intervals  in  the  lock  floor,  water  pours  in,  lifting 
the  vessel  to  the  level  of  the  lock  above.  This  inflow, 
coming  equally  from  all  points,  does  not  move  the  ship 
from  a  stable  position.  The  gates  are  never  opened  or 
closed  with  a  head  of  water  on  either  side  of  them. 
The  process  of  lifting  is  repeated  until  the  vessel  reaches 


Diagram  of  lock-gate-operating  machine,  showing  relation  of 

bull-wheel  to  strut  and  gate 
A,  Strut  or  connecting-rod.    B,  Bed-plate.    C,  Bearing-wheel 

the  lake  level.  At  all  times  the  vessel  is  in  full  view 
of  the  men  who  are  controlling  it  and  as  safe  as  if  tied 
to  a  wharf. 

A  simple  and  powerful  machine  is  used  for  opening 
and  closing  the  lock  gates;  it  was  invented  by  Edward 
Schildhauer,  an  electrical  and  mechanical  engineer  in 
the  employ  of  the  canal  commission,  who  describes  it 
as  follows: 

It  consists  essentially  of  a  crank  gear,  to  which  is 
fastened  one  end  of  a  strut  or  connecting  rod,  the  other 
end  of  which  is  fastened  to  a  lock  gate.  The  wheel 
moves  through  an  arc  of  197  degrees,  closes  or  opens 
the  gate  leaf,  according  to  the  direction  in  which  it  is 


372  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

turned.  One  operation  takes  2  minutes.  The  crank 
gear  is  a  combination  of  gear  and  crank,  is  constructed 
of  cast  steel,  is  19  feet  2  inches  in  diameter,  and  weighs 
approximately  35,000  pounds.  It  is  mounted  in  a 
horizontal  position  on  the  lock  wall;  turns  on  a  large 
center  pin,  and  is  supported  at  the  rim  in  four  places 
by  rollers.  The  center  pin  is  keyed  into  a  heavy  cast- 
ing anchored  securely  to  the  concrete.  The  crank  gear 
has  gear  teeth  on  its  rim,  and  is  driven  through  a  train 
of  gears  and  pinions  by  an  electric  motor  in  a  contiguous 
room.  The  motor  is  remotely  controlled  by  an  operator 
who  is  stationed  at  a  center  control  house  near  the  lower 
end  of  the  upper  locks.  A  simple  pull  of  a  small  switch 
is  sufficient  to  either  close  or  open  a  730-ton  gate,  the 
operation  being  perfectly  automatic. 

It  is  connected  with  the  lock  gate  at  the  top,  17  feet 
from  the  pintle,  or  hinge,  by  means  of  a  strut  anchor. 
In  use  it  is  required  to  move  a  floating  gate  through 
level  and  quiet  water.  It  was  put  to  the  extreme  test 
of  opening  and  closing  the  heaviest  of  the  gates  as  they 
stood  in  the  waterless  locks  and  met  it  with  perfect 
success.  The  massive  structures,  weighing  from  390 
to  730  tons,  were  opened  and  closed  as  easily  and 
steadily  as  one  would  open  an  ordinary  door,  and  each 
movement  occupied  less  than  two  minutes. 

In  addition  to  the  fender  chains  and  double  gates, 
other  protective  devices  are  provided.  The  most 
elaborate  of  these  is  a  ponderous-looking  structure 
called  the  emergency  dam.  In  repose  on  the  walls  at 
each  entrance  to  the  upper  locks  it  resembles  an  iron 
railway  bridge.  It  is  in  fact  a  steel  truss-bridge  of  the 
cantilever  type.  It  is  so  placed  that  it  can,  in  emer- 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  373 

gency,  be  swung  across  the  lock  entrance  in  two  min- 
utes. If  such  an  extreme  improbability  should  occur 
as  the  carrying  away  of  the  fender  chain  and  the  double 
gates  of  an  upper  lock,  allowing  the  waters  of  the  lake 
to  rush  in  and  flood  the  lower  locks,  carrying  destruc- 
tion through  them,  the  emergency  dam  can  be  swung 
across  the  channel,  and  through  the  application  of  its 
ingenious  devices  the  rush  of  water  can  gradually  be 
checked.  First,  a  series  of  wicket  girders  will  be  lowered 
into  the  channel,  and  their  ends  will  drop  into  iron 
pockets  in  the  concrete  lock  floor.  Down  the  runways 
in  these  girders  steel  plates  will  be  lowered  one  by  one, 
in  tiers,  building  a  dam  from  the  bottom  upward  and 
dimishing  progressively  the  flow  of  water  until  a  com- 
plete barrier  is  erected. 

For  examining,  cleaning,  painting,  and  repairing  the 
lower  guard  gates  of  the  locks  and  the  Stoney  gates  of 
the  spillway  dam,  and  for  access  in  the  dry  to  the  sills 
of  the  emergency  dams,  floating  caisson  gates  of  the 
moulded  ship  type  are  provided.  When  their  use  is 
required  they  will  be  towed  into  position  in  the  fore- 
bay  of  the  upper  lock  above  the  emergency  dam,  or 
between  the  piers  of  the  spillway,  and  sunk.  The  cais- 
sons are  equipped  with  electric  motor-driven  pumps  for 
use  in  pumping  them  out  and  for  unwatering  the  locks. 

The  question  is  raised  frequently  as  to  the  sufficiency 
of  the  Gatun  Lake  water  supply  for  the  operation  of 
the  canal  in  case  of  an  exceptionally  small  rainfall.  It 
should  be  borne  in  mind  that  during  eight  or  nine 
months  of  the  year  the  lake  will  be  kept  constantly 
full  by  the  prevailing  rains,  and  consequently  a  sur- 


374  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

plus  will  need  to  be  stored  for  only  three  or  four  months 
of  the  dry  season.  The  smallest  run-off  of  water  in 
the  basin  during  the  past  twenty-two  years,  as  measured 
at  Gatun,  was  that  of  the  fiscal  year  1912,  which  was 
about  132  billion  cubic  feet.  Previous  to  that  year  the 
smallest  run-off  of  record  was  146  billion  cubic  feet. 
In  1910  the  run-off  was  360  billion  cubic  feet,  or  a  suf- 
ficient quantity  to  fill  the  lake  one  and  a  half  times. 

The  low  record  of  1912  is  of  interest  as  showing  the 
effect  which  a  similar  dry  season,  occurring  after  the 
opening  of  the  canal,  would  have  upon  its  capacity  for 
navigation.  Assuming  that  the  Gatun  Lake  was  at 
elevation  plus  87  at  the  beginning  of  the  dry  season, 
on  December  1,  and  that  the  hydro-electric  plant  at 
the  Gatun  spillway  was  in  continuous  operation,  and 
that  48  lockages  a  day  were  being  made,  the  elevation 
of  the  lake  would  be  reduced  to  its  lowest  point,  plus 
79.5,  on  May  7,  at  the  close  of  the  dry  season,  after 
which  it  would  continuously  rise.  With  the  water  at 
plus  79  hi  Gatun  Lake  there  would  be  39  feet  of  water 
in  Culebra  Cut,  which  would  be  ample  for  navigation. 
The  water  surface  of  the  lake  will  be  maintained  during 
the  rainy  season  at  87  feet  above  sea-level,  making  the 
minimum  depth  in  the  canal  47  feet.  As  navigation 
can  be  carried  on  with  about  39  feet  of  water,  there  will 
be  stored  for  the  dry  season  surplus  over  7  feet  of  water. 
Making  the  allowance  for  evaporation,  seepage,  leakage 
at  the  gates,  and  power  consumption,  this  would  be 
ample  for  41  passages  daily  through  the  locks  using 
them  at  full  length,  or  about  58  lockages  a  day  when 
partial  length  is  used,  as  would  be  usually  the  case, 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  375 

and  when  cross-filling  from  one  lock  to  the  other  through 
the  central  wall  is  employed.  This  would  be  a  larger 
number  of  lockages  than  would  be  possible  in  a  single 
day.  The  average  number  of  lockages  through  the 
Sault  Ste.  Marie  Canal  on  the  American  side  was  39 
per  day  in  the  season  of  navigation  of  1910,  which  was 
about  eight  months  long.  The  average  number  of 
ships  passed  was  about  1J^  per  lockage.  The  freight 
carried  was  about  26,000,000  tons.  The  Suez  Canal 
passed  about  12  vessels  per  day,  with  a  total  tonnage  for 
the  same  year  of  16,582,000. 


CHAPTER  V 

ELECTRIC  CONTROL  OF  LOCK  MACHINERY 

ONE  man  in  a  building  on  the  top  of  the  centre  wall  of 
the  locks,  so  placed  as  to  command  an  unobstructed 
view  of  every  part  of  the  locks,  directs  and  controls  every 
operation  in  the  passage  of  a  vessel  except  the  move- 
ment of  the  towing  locomotives.  He  has  before  him 
on  a  table  a  control  board  about  sixty-four  feet  long  and 
five  and  one-third  feet  wide,  at  the  Gatun  locks,  which 
is  a  complete  model  of  the  flight  of  locks  in  duplicate 
with  switches  and  indicators  in  the  same  relative  posi- 
tions as  the  machines  which  they  control  occupy  in 
the  lock  walls.  Standing  before  this  board  the  operator 
throws  the  switches,  and  in  response  to  his  action  he 
sees  on  the  model  the  fender  chains  rise  and  fall,  the 
gates  open  and  close  inch  by  inch,  the  water  rise  or 
fall  in  the  locks,  and  knows  the  exact  position  of  the 
vessel  at  every  stage  of  its  progress. 

Each  gate,  each  valve  for  letting  in  the  water  to  the 
culverts,  each  fender  chain,  is  operated  by  a  separate 
motor  mounted  near  the  machinery  in  chambers  in 
the  lock  wall.  In  each  machinery  chamber  there  is  a 
starting  panel  containing  contractors  by  which  cur- 
rent is  applied  to  the  motor,  and  these  panels  in  turn  are 
controlled  from  a  main  unit  in  the  central  control-house. 

376 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  377 

Some  of  the  machinery  chambers  at  Gatun  are  2,700 
feet  distant  from  the  point  of  control,  90  per  cent  of 
them  are  within  2,000  feet,  and  50  per  cent  within 
1,200  feet. 

The  control  system  for  Gatun  locks  is  typical  of  all. 
Water  is  let  into  the  lock  chambers  or  withdrawn  from 
them  by  means  of  culverts  under  the  lock  floors,  which 
connect  with  larger  culverts  in  the  lock  walls,  through 
which  water  is  carried  from  the  higher  to  the  lower 
levels.  The  main  supply  culverts  are  eighteen  feet  in 
diameter,  and  the  flow  of  water  through  them  is  con- 
trolled by  rising-stem  gate-valves,  which  can  be  com- 
pletely opened  or  closed  in  one  minute.  In  the  centre 
wall  the  culvert  feeds  both  lock  chambers,  and  there- 
fore at  each  outlet  into  the  lateral  culverts  there  is  a 
valve  of  the  cylindrical  type  in  order  that  water  may  be 
let  into  or  withdrawn  from  either  chamber  at  will.  A 
complete  opening  or  closing  of  these  cylindrical  valves 
takes  ten  seconds.  The  mitre-gates  are  never  opened 
or  closed  with  a  head  of  water  on  either  side  of  them, 
the  chambers  being  first  emptied  or  filled  by  means 
of  the  valve  and  culvert  system.  The  time  required 
either  to  open  or  close  the  mitre-gates  is  two  minutes. 

A  ship  to  be  raised  to  the  lake  level  comes  to  a  full 
stop  in  the  forebay  of  the  lower  lock,  prepared  to  be 
towed  through  one  of  the  duplicate  locks  by  electric 
locomotives.  The  water  in  the  lower  lock  chamber  is 
equalized  with  the  sea-level  channel,  after  which  the 
mitre-gates  are  opened,  the  fender  chain  lowered  and 
the  vessel  passed  into  the  first  chamber,  where  the 
water  is  at  sea-level.  Then  the  mitre-gates  are  closed. 


378  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

The  rising-stem  gate-valves  at  the  outlet  of  the  main 
culverts  are  closed,  while  those  above  are  opened,  al- 
lowing water  to  flow  from  the  lock  above  into  the  lower 
chamber,  which  when  filled  raises  the  vessel  twenty- 
eight  and  one-third  feet,  to  the  second  level.  This 
operation  is  repeated  in  the  middle  and  upper  locks 
until  the  ship  has  been  raised  to  the  full  height  of 
eighty-five  feet  above  the  level  of  the  sea.  At  Gatun 
in  the  passing  of  a  large  ship  through  the  locks  it  is 
necessary  to  lower  four  fender  chains,  operate  six  pairs 
of  mitre-gates,  and  force  them  to  mitre,  open  and  close 
eight  pairs  of  rising-stem  gate-valves  for  the  main  sup- 
ply culverts,  and  thirty  cylindrical  valves.  In  all,  no 
less  than  eighty-two  motors  are  set  in  motion  twice 
during  each  lockage  of  a  single  ship,  and  this  number 
may  be  increased  to  one  hundred  and  sixty-three,  de- 
pendent upon  the  previous  condition  of  the  gates, 
valves,  and  other  devices. 

The  system  is  interlocking,  so  that  certain  motors 
cannot  be  started  in  a  particular  direction  until  other 
motors  are  operated  in  a  proper  manner  to  obtain  con- 
sistent operation  on  the  whole,  and  to  avoid  any  unde- 
sirable or  dangerous  combinations  in  the  positions  of 
valves,  gates,  or  fender  chains.  In  this  way  and  by  the 
use  of  limit  switches  the  factor  of  the  personal  equation 
in  operating  the  machines  is  reduced  to  a  minimum, 
almost  mechanical  accuracy  being  obtained.  Before 
the  operating  pair  of  valves  in  the  main  culverts  can 
be  opened,  at  least  one  pair  of  valves  at  the  other  ends 
of  the  locks,  both  up-stream  and  down-stream,  must 
first  be  closed.  This  limits  an  operator  to  the  act  of 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  379 

equalizing  water  levels  between  locks,  and  keeps  him 
from  allowing  water  to  flow  from,  say,  the  lake  level 
to  the  middle  lock  past  the  upper  lock,  thus  preventing 
a  possible  flooding  of  the  lock  walls  and  machinery 
rooms.  Interlocks,  devoted  to  the  control  of  action 
between  the  gate-valves  in  the  main  culverts  and  the 
mitre-gates,  prevent  valves  being  opened  a  lock  length 
above  or  below  a  mitre-gate  which  is  being  opened  or 
closed,  and  thus  prevent  an  operator  causing  a  flow  of 
water  while  the  mitre-gates  are  being  moved.  Inter- 
locks for  the  cylindrical  valves  guarding  the  openings 
from  the  centre-wall  culvert  to  the  lateral  culverts 
keep  those  of  one  side  or  the  other  closed  at  all  times, 
except  when  it  may  be  desired  to  cross-fill  the  chambers, 
when  they  may  be  opened  by  special  procedure.  An 
interlock  prevents  the  operator  from  starting  to  open  a 
mitre-gate  before  unlocking  the  mitre-forcing  machine. 
The  mitre-gates  guarded  by  a  fender  chain  must  be 
opened  before  the  chain  can  be  lowered,  and  the  chain 
must  be  raised  again  before  the  gate  can  be  closed,  or, 
more  exactly,  the  switches  must  be  thrown  in  this  order, 
but  the  operations  may  proceed  at  the  same  time.  The 
simple  interlocks  will  prevent  such  a  mistake  as  leaving 
the  chain  down  through  lapse  of  memory,  when  it 
should  be  up  to  protect  the  gate. 


CHAPTER  VI 
LIGHTING  SYSTEM 

THE  canal  is  lighted  from  end  to  end  by  electricity  and 
gas.  Here  and  there  along  its  course,  high  up  on  the 
hillsides  and  in  cleared  spots  in  the  jungle,  are  visible 
concrete  lighthouses  which  seem  curiously  out  of  place. 
These  are  for  the  range-lights  of  the  channel,  which  are 
used  in  all  sections  of  the  canal  save  in  Culebra  Cut, 
where  beacons  are  substituted  as  being  more  practica- 
ble. Electricity  is  used  wherever  accessibility  will  per- 
mit, but  in  the  floating  buoys  which  mark  the  channel 
through  Gatun  Lake,  and  in  towers  and  beacons  in 
inaccessible  places,  compressed  acetylene,  dissolved  in 
acetone,  is  used.  The  candle-power  of  the  range-lights 
varies  according  to  the  length  of  the  range,  from  about 
2,500  to  15,000.  The  most  powerful  lights  are  those 
marking  the  sea  channels  at  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
entrances,  they  being  visible  for  from  about  12  to  18 
nautical  miles.  The  beacons  and  gas-buoy  lights  have 
about  850  candle-power.  White  lights  are  used  through- 
out, and  in  order  to  eliminate  the  possibility  of  confus- 
ing the  lights  with  one  another  and  with  the  lights  on 
shore,  all  range-lights,  beacons,  and  buoys  have  indi- 
vidual characteristics,  formed  by  flashes  and  combina- 
tions of  flashes  of  light  and  dark  intervals. 

380 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  381 

Satisfactory  lighting  of  the  locks  was  a  difficult 
problem.  The  end  sought  was  an  illumination  that 
would  approach  sunlight  distribution  as  nearly  as  pos- 
sible; causing  the  least  inconvenience  to  the  eye.  As 
vessels  are  to  pass  through  the  locks  at  night,  it  is 
necessary  that  the  lock  walls  and  chambers  be  brightly 
illuminated,  while  at  the  same  time  it  is  no  less  neces- 
sary that  the  brilliant  sources  of  illumination  be  shaded 
from  the  eye  of  an  approaching  pilot,  in  order  that  he 
may  have  unhampered  vision  of  all  range  and  signal 
lights.  The  eye  can  untiringly  accommodate  itself, 
with  excellent  vision,  to  a  very  low  intensity  of  illumi- 
nation, such  as  moonlight,  provided  there  exists  no 
random  interference  of  a  relatively  intense  brilliancy. 
Any  bright  spot,  however,  renders  vision  indistinct, 
difficult,  and  fatiguing. 

In  the  selection  of  exterior  lamp  units,  a  thorough 
investigation  was  made  of  different  types  of  lamps  and 
reflectors,  and  tests  were  conducted  at  Gatun  locks  to 
determine  the  general  characteristics  and  suitableness 
of  certain  promising  lamp  and  reflector  units. 

The  type  finally  selected  is  a  large-power  tungsten 
bulb  (500  watt)  placed  inside  a  concrete  hood,  which 
serves  both  as  a  shade  and  as  a  reflector.  The  area  to 
be  illuminated  extends  three  hundred  feet  back  of  the 
lock  chamber,  calling  for  two  types  of  lamp  stand- 
ards— single-bracket  and  double-bracket.  The  single- 
bracket  standards  are  used  on  the  centre  wall,  where 
the  lamps  are  staggered  so  as  to  illuminate  both  lock 
chambers.  The  double-bracket  is  used  on  the  side 
wall,  where  it  is  desired  to  throw  the  lighting  flux  for  a 


382  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

considerable  distance  back  of  the  lock  chamber.  The 
reflecting  hood  is  provided  with  shading  skirts,  which 
prevent  the  glare  of  the  lamp  filament  from  penetrating 
into  distance  along  the  axis  of  the  canal.  The  direct 
rays  of  light  are  cut  off  on  the  coping  level  at  approx- 
imately forty-one  feet  from  the  centre  of  the  post. 

Clustered  under  the  concrete  hoods,  the  lamps  are 
suspended  from  brackets  which  are  placed  near  the 
tops  of  heavy  concrete  columns,  twelve-sided  and  taper- 
ing from  3^2  feet  at  the  base  to  one  foot  at  the  top. 
The  columns  are  capped  with  balls  of  concrete  2  feet 
in  diameter,  making  their  total  height  about  34  feet. 
They  are  aligned  longitudinally  and  transversely,  alter- 
nate lamps  being  spaced  on  from  50-  to  60-foot  centres. 
Both  the  pedestal  and  column  contain  a  large  core, 
serving  the  double  purpose  of  reducing  the  weight  and 
of  furnishing  a  runway  for  the  electric  wires.  About 
3%  yards  of  concrete  and  750  pounds  of  steel  reinforce- 
ment were  required  in  the  construction  of  each  standard, 
of  which  there  is  a  total  of  511 — 211  at  Gatun,  131  at 
Pedro  Miguel,  and  169  at  Miraflores. 

Electrically,  the  lamps  are  connected  alternately 
upon  separate  circuits,  providing  thereby  a  duplication 
of  wiring,  as  well  as  a  means  of  economical  operation 
whenever  half-illumination  only  may  be  required  on 
bright  moonlight  nights.  Arrangement  is  made  in  the 
wiring  so  that  all  the  lamp  circuits  are  remotely  con- 
trolled by  the  attendant  in  the  control-house — the 
operating  centre  for  all  the  lock  machinery  and  indicat- 
ing apparatus. 

Each  lamp  standard  is  provided  with  a  special  out- 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  383 

let  box,  located  in  the  concrete  pedestal.  The  outlet 
box  is  to  permit  the  insertion  of  plugs  to  connect  a 
portable  lamp  circuit  and  a  portable  telephone  circuit. 
A  portable  lamp  may  be  required  at  any  moment  in  the 
operation  of  the  locks  to  place  light  at  an  electric  loco- 
motive or  on  the  deck  of  a  passing  vessel.  A  portable 
telephone  is  to  permit  a  supervisor  of  lockages  to  com- 
municate with  the  central  control-house  from  any  posi- 
tion on  the  lock  walls.  The  outlet  is  placed  in  the 
pedestal  of  the  lamp  standard  merely  as  a  matter  of 
operating  convenience  during  lockages,  the  standards 
being  accessible  through  the  entire  length  of  the  lock 
walls. 

Concrete  reflectors  are  used  also  below  the  surface 
of  the  lock  walls,  in  the  operating-tunnels  and  machine- 
rooms.  The  tunnel  which  connects  the  various  ma- 
chine-rooms and  operating  centres  is  seven  feet  in 
height,  the  floor  being  eight  feet  below  the  coping  level. 
It  is  lighted  normally  during  daylight  hours  through 
deck-lights  located  in  the  ceiling.  For  illumination  at 
night  and  on  dark  days,  small  sixteen-candle-power 
carbon-filament  lamps  (or  twenty-five-watt  tungstens) 
are  set  in  recesses  in  the  ceiling,  the  lamps  alternating 
with  the  deck-lights.  A  special  reflector  cast  from  con- 
crete is  used.  It  is  so  designed  that  a  proper  diffusion 
of  the  light  along  the  operating-tunnel  is  accomplished 
without  a  severe  glare  striking  the  eye.  There  will  be 
a  total  of  approximately  2,025  tunnel  and  machine- 
room  reflectors — 950  at  Gatun,  675  at  Miraflores,  and 
400  at  Pedro  Miguel. 


CHAPTER  VII 
THE  APPROACH  CHANNELS 

As  stated  in  a  previous  chapter,  the  approach  channels 
in  the  two  oceans  have  a  common  width  of  500  feet. 
That  on  the  Atlantic  side  has  a  depth  of  41  feet  at 
mean  sea-level,  and  that  on  the  Pacific  45  feet.  Their 
combined  length  is  15J^  miles,  so  that  nearly  one- 
third  of  the  entire  canal  is  at  sea-level.  The  total  ex- 
cavation for  the  Atlantic  entrance  was  about  39,000,- 
000  cubic  yards,  and  for  the  Pacific  entrance,  including 
about  7,000,000  cubic  yards  for  the  Balboa  terminal 
basin  and  docks,  was  about  48,000,000.  Work  was  be- 
gun in  both  entrances  in  June,  1907. 

The  French  did  a  large  amount  of  work  in  both 
oceans,  but  only  a  small  portion  of  it  was  of  use  to  the 
American  canal  because  of  changes  in  the  location  of 
the  entrance  channels.  At  the  Atlantic  end  the  change 
was  complete,  and  while  the  French  canal  between 
Colon  and  Gatun  was  useful  for  a  time  in  transporting 
material  for  lock  construction,  only  about  182,000  cubic 
yards  of  French  excavation  were  of  permanent  value. 
At  the  Pacific  end  the  location  of  the  entrance  channel 
from  Balboa  out  into  Panama  Bay  was  changed  from 
the  French  line,  but  about  3,250,000  cubic  yards  of 
their  excavation  were  useful. 

384 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  385 

The  French  dredged  a  canal  from  Colon  to  Bohio, 
all  of  which,  except  the  section  below  Gatun,  has  dis- 
appeared beneath  the  waters  of  Gatun  Lake.  In  point 
of  efficiency  their  dredging  equipment  approached  more 
nearly  to  the  modern  standard  than  their  dry  excava- 
tion plant.  They  had  in  service  37  dredges  of  various 
makes — Scotch,  Holland,  Belgian,  and  American.  Most 
of  these  were  chain-bucket  or  ladder  dredges  capable  of 
excavating  to  a  depth  of  from  34  to  41  feet.  Each  chain 
had  from  28  to  31  buckets,  each  with  a  capacity  of  41 
cubic  feet.  The  material  was  emptied  through  a  side 
chute  into  barges,  or  sluiced  through  pipes  164  feet 
long  to  the  banks  on  either  side.  Three  of  them  were 
sea-going  dredges  with  larger  buckets.  The  French 
had  also  five  suction  dredges,  forerunners  of  the  modern 
dredge  of  that  type,  but  they  were  not  a  success. 

When  the  Americans  took  control  they  found  several 
of  the  ladder  dredges  in  fairly  good  condition,  and  they 
repaired  seven  of  them*  and  used  them  during  the 
entire  period  of  construction.  They  were  extremely 
well  built  and  did  excellent  service  according  to  their 
size  and  capacity,  but  it  is  a  question  with  the  American 
dredging  engineers  whether  the  money  spent  in  re- 
habilitating them  was  good  economy  in  the  long  run — 
that  is,  whether  it  would  not  have  been  a  better  in- 
vestment to  discard  them  and  buy  new  and  more 
powerful  modern  dredges  of  similar  type. 

A  modern  dredge  of  the  ladder  type,  the  Corozal,  was 
made  to  order  for  the  commission  at  Renfrew,  Scot- 
land, and  arrived  at  Panama  under  its  own  steam  on 

*  See  Chap.  XXIV,  Part  IV. 


386  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

March  27,  1912.  Its  engines  have  a  total  of  1,893 
horse-power;  its  chain  carries  39  buckets,  those  for 
soft  excavation  having  a  capacity  of  54  cubic  feet, 
and  those  for  hard  material  35  cubic  feet.  It  can  ex- 
cavate to  a  depth  of  50  feet.  Compared  with  the  sea- 
going French  dredge  of  the  same  type,  the  Corozal  has 
buckets  of  five  times  the  capacity,  can  excavate  10 
feet  deeper,  and  can  dump  either  into  a  barge  or  into 
its  own  bins.  Its  full  capacity,  working  under  favor- 
able conditions,  is  ten  times  that  of  a  French  dredge  of 
the  same  type.  Its  average  output  is  easily  20,000 
cubic  yards  in  a  24-hour  day.  Its  buckets  cut  into 
soft  rock,  which  has  not  been  blasted,  and  remove  it 
with  ease. 

Most  of  the  excavation  in  the  approach  channels  in 
both  oceans  was  done  by  two  powerful  sea-going  suc- 
tion dredges,  each  with  an  average  capacity  of  about 
22,000  cubic  yards  in  a  24-hour  day.  These  dredges 
are  built  like  ocean  steamships,  which  in  outward  ap- 
pearance they  resemble,  and  their  crews,  numbering 
about  60  men,  eat  and  sleep  on  board,  working  in  shifts 
day  and  night  throughout  the  week,  resting  only  on 
Sundays.  There  were  no  dredges  in  the  French  equip- 
ment at  all  comparable  to  these.  In  all  the  Americans 
had  in  service  during  the  period  of  construction  20 
dredges  of  varying  capacities.* 

An  additional  equipment  for  use  in  emergency  work 
in  the  Culebra  Cut  and  permanent  work  after  the 
canal  is  in  operation  was  ordered  by  the  canal  commis- 
sion in  February,  1913,  and  will  be  delivered  at  the 

*  See  Appendix  D, 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  387 

close  of  1913  and  the  beginning  of  1914.  This  includes 
two  dipper  dredges  with  dippers  of  10-cubic-yard  ca- 
pacity for  use  in  rock,  and  others  of  15-cubic-yard 
capacity  for  use  in  earth.  For  service  in  connection 
with  them  six  dump  barges,  each  with  a  capacity  of 
1,000  yards,  have  also  been  ordered. 

Long  breakwaters  have  been  constructed  near  the 
approach  channels  in  both  oceans.  One  in  Limon  Bay 
or  Colon  harbor,  called  the  West  Breakwater,  extends 
into  the  bay  from  Toro  Point  at  an  angle  of  42° 
53'  northward  from  a  base-line  drawn  from  Toro  Point 
to  Colon  light,  and  is  11,526  feet  in  length,  with  a 
width  at  the  top  of  15  feet  and  a  height  above  mean 
sea-level  of  10  feet.  The  width  at  the  bottom  varies 
with  the  depth  of  water.  It  will  contain  approximately 
2,840,000  cubic  yards  of  rock,  the  core  being  formed  of 
rock  quarried  on  the  mainland  near  Toro  Point,  ar- 
mored with  hard  rock  from  Porto  Bello.  Work  began 
on  the  breakwater  in  August,  1910. 

A  second  construction,  known  as  the  East  Break- 
water, is  to  be  made.  It  will  be  without  land  connec- 
tion, about  one  mile  in  length  and  will  run  in  an  east- 
erly direction  at  nearly  a  right  angle  with  the  canal 
channel.  It  will  be  so  placed  that  the  opening  between 
its  end  and  that  of  the  West  Breakwater  will  be  2,000 
feet — that  is,  the  end  of  each  breakwater  will  be  1,000 
feet  away  from  the  centre  of  the  channel.  The  purpose 
of  the  West  Breakwater  is  to  protect  the  harbor  against 
"northers,"  very  severe  gales  which  are  likely  to  blow 
from  October  to  January.  The  purpose  of  the  East 
Breakwater  is  to  prevent  silting  in  the  canal  channel, 


388  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

which  has  been  found  to  be  very  heavy.  The  cost  of 
the  West  Breakwater  is  about  $7,500,000  and  of  the 
East  is  estimated  at  about  $4,000,000. 

The  breakwater  at  the  Pacific  entrance  extends  from 
Balboa  to  Naos  Island,  a  distance  of  about  17,000  feet, 
or  a  little  more  than  three  miles.  It  lies  from  900  to 
2,700  feet  east  of,  and  for  the  greater  part  of  the  dis- 
tance nearly  parallel  to,  the  axis  of  the  canal  prism, 
varies  from  20  to  40  feet  in  height  above  mean  sea-level, 
and  is  from  50  to  3,000  feet  wide  at  the  top.  It  con- 
tains about  18,000,000  cubic  yards  of  earth  and  rock, 
all  of  which  was  brought  from  Culebra  Cut,  It  was 
constructed  for  a  twofold  purpose:  first,  to  divert 
cross-currents  that  would  carry  soft  material  from 
the  shallow  harbor  of  Panama  into  the  canal  channel; 
second,  to  furnish  rail  connection  between  the  islands 
and  the  mainland.  A  railway  track  and  a  driveway 
will  be  constructed  on  the  top  for  the  entire  distance 
between  Balboa  and  Naos  Island.  Work  was  begun 
on  it  in  May,  1908,  and  on  November  6,  1912,  the  last 
piles  were  driven  connecting  Naos  Island  with  the 
mainland. 

Dredging  operations  at  the  Atlantic  entrance  were 
under  the  direction  of  F.  B.  Maltby  from  the  beginning 
of  American  work  until  April,  1907,  when,  together  with 
those  at  the  Pacific  entrance,  they  passed  under  the 
direction  of  Major  D.  D.  Gaillard,  head  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  Excavation  and  Dredging.  In  July,  1908, 
when  the  new  organization  of  the  work  into  three  great 
divisions — Atlantic,  Central,  and  Pacific — went  into 
effect,  dredging  at  the  Atlantic  entrance  passed  under 


I 

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THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  389 

the  direction  of  Colonel  Sibert,  and  that  at  the  Pacific 
entrance  under  the  direction  of  S.  B.  Williamson.  In 
immediate  charge,  under  Colonel  Sibert,  of  dredging  at 
the  Atlantic  entrance  was  Major  Edgar  Jadwin;  as. resi- 
dent engineer,  who  held  the  position  till  June  15,  1911, 
when  he  was  succeeded  by  Major  Chester  Harding,  who 
held  it  till  February  27,  1913. 

On  the  Pacific  side  W.  G.  Comber,  who  as  resident 
engineer  was  in  charge  of  dredging  under  Mr.  Maltby 
in  the  Atlantic  entrance  from  August  14,  1905,  till 
February  1,  1907,  when  he  was  transferred  to  the 
Pacific  entrance,  was  continued  in  charge  as  resident 
engineer  under  Mr.  Williamson.  On  May  1,  1913,  Mr. 
Comber,  by  order  of  the  chairman  and  chief  engineer, 
was  placed  in  charge  of  all  dredging  operations  on  the 
isthmus. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

PERMANENT  CANAL  BUILDINGS 

THE  simple  wooden  buildings  in  which  the  canal  force 
was  housed  during  the  period  of  construction  were  de- 
signed and  erected  with  the  expectation  that  they 
would  withstand  the  effects  of  the  climate  for  ten  or 
twelve  years.  Under  constant  watchfulness  and  care 
they  have  met  this  expectation,  but  without  those  safe- 
guards they  would  not  have  lasted  more  than  half  as 
long.  Their  most  destructive  enemy,  next  to  the  rot- 
ting effects  of  the  damp  climate,  is  the  isthmus  ant, 
almost  infinite  in  variety,  illimitable  in  numbers,  and 
untiring  and  really  diabolical  in  activity. 

Left  at  the  mercy  of  this  enemy,  working  in  unison 
with  the  dampness  of  the  climate,  a  wooden  house  has 
a  very  poor  chance  for  more  than  a  few  years  of  exist- 
ence. The  temporary  commission  buildings  were  saved 
from  rapid  deterioration  and  decay  by  incessant  watch- 
fulness, prompt  repair,  and  unceasing  warfare  upon 
ants.  Large  sums  were  spent  each  year  for  these  pur- 
poses, and  by  means  of  them  the  buildings  as  a  whole 
were  in  such  good  condition  when  the  task  neared  com- 
pletion that  they  might  have  been  kept  in  use  for  sev- 
eral years  longer.  Many  of  them,  in  those  settlements 
that  were  not  on  the  abandoned  side  of  the  canal,  in- 

390 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  391 

eluding  the  towns  at  both  entrances  and  Gatun,  Pedro 
Miguel,  and  Corozal,  will  be  kept  in  use  till  they  are 
replaced  by  permanent  structures  of  concrete. 

Whole  towns,  containing  populations  varying  from  a 
few  hundred  up  to  seven  thousand,  have  either  van- 
ished from  sight  or  will  disappear  within  a  year.  Their 
buildings  will  either  be  demolished  or  taken  apart, 
transported  to  the  sites  of  permanent  towns,  and  put 
together  again  for  temporary  use,  either  by  the  civilian 
force  of  the  canal  or  by  the  military  contingent.  This 
change  can  be  made  at  a  cost  of  about  one-third  of  the 
first  cost  of  the  buildings.  In  the  original  erection  of 
them  and  in  repairs  the  commission  expended  over 
$10,250,000. 

All  permanent  buildings  will  be  of  concrete,  both  for 
civil  and  military  uses.  For  the  administrative  and 
operating  force  of  the  canal  a  group  of  buildings  will  be 
erected  on  a  site  between  Ancon  and  Sosa  Hills.  The 
main  structure  will  be  the  administration,  or  canal 
headquarters,  building.  This  will  stand  on  a  knoll, 
about  seventy-five  feet  above  the  plain  below,  on  which 
the  other  buildings  will.be  arranged,  commanding  a 
fine  view  of  the  Pacific  entrance  and  terminal  piers. 
It  was  designed  by  Austin  W.  Lord,  of  New  York,  and 
is  classic  in  style.  It  will  be  three  stories  in  height, 
with  a  frontage  of  about  327  feet  and  a  depth  at  the 
wing  ends  of  182  feet.  It  will  be  constructed  of  con- 
crete blocks  about  a  steel  framework,  and  the  surface 
of  the  blocks  will  be  covered  with  cement  stucco.  Its 
roof  will  be  covered  with  dark-red  vitreous  tiles.  There 
will  be  a  square  pier  colonnade  along  the  front  and  end 


392  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

elevations,  rising  from  the  first-floor  level  to  the  second- 
floor  ceiling,  protecting  the  building  against  sun  and 
rain.  The  principal  entrance,  facing  Sosa  Hill,  will  be 
enclosed  by  massive  end  bays  and  pylons/ and  will  be 
reached  by  a  grand  flight  of  steps  and  ramps  from  the 
plain  below.  The  rear  of  the  building,  with  its  central 
wing  and  two  end  wings,  will  enclose  a  large  court, 
treated  as  a  patio,  which  will  serve  as  carriage  entrance 
to  the  building,  with  a  porte-cochere  at  the  central 
wing. 

The  three  floors  will  be  divided  into  office-rooms, 
about  a  central  rotunda  43  feet  in  diameter.  The  entire 
floor  area  will  be  67,000  square  feet,  in  addition  to  the 
space  occupied  by  halls,  stairways,  elevators,  toilets, 
etc.  The  basement,  with  an  area  of  20,000  square  feet, 
will  be  used  as  a  storage  vault  for  canal  archives.  The 
total  building  area  at  the  grade  line  is  23,000  square 
feet.  The  total  cost  is  not  to  exceed  $375,000.  Work 
on  the  site  began  in  February,  1913. 

On  the  plain  lying  seventy-five  feet  below  the  site  of 
the  administration  building,  a  town  site  for  other  perma- 
nent buildings  has  been  planned.  This  plain  was  for- 
merly a  swamp,  and  was  raised  to  an  elevation  twenty 
feet  above  sea-level  by  material  from  Culebra  Cut 
and  by  hydraulic  fill  from  the  excavation  for  the  ter- 
minal structures  at  Balboa.  On  this  will  be  erected 
quarters  of  different  types  for  employes,  accommodat- 
ing one,  two,  and  four  families  each;  a  police-station; 
post-office;  chief  sanitary  office;  fire-station;  dispen- 
sary; telephone  building;  club-house;  hotel;  lodge  hall; 
church;  commissary;  and  schoolhouse.  All  these  struc- 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  393 

tures  will  be  ranged  on  either  side  of  a  central  avenue, 
extending  on  a  direct  axis  from  the  approach  to  the 
administration  building  through  the  town  site,  and 
terminating  in  a  grove  of  mango-trees  at  the  foot  of 
Sosa  Hill.  All  buildings  will  be  of  concrete  blocks, 
and  of  the  same  general  style  of  architecture  as  the 
administration  building.  They  will  be  connected  with 
one  another  by  a  continuous  arcade,  which  will  serve 
as  protection  against  sun  and  rain.  There  will  be  in- 
cluded in  the  plan  a  baseball-field,  tennis-courts,  and 
a  band-stand. 

Permanent  structures,  also  of  concrete  blocks,  will 
be  erected  for  the  marine  contingent  and  for  the  mili- 
tary force  with  a  minimum  strength  of  7,000  men.  It 
is  proposed  to  place  the  marine  camp  on  Ancon  Hill, 
on  the  elevated  plateau  in  front  of  the  quarry  which 
has  been  used  to  obtain  crushed  stone  for  the  concrete 
in  the  Pacific  locks.  This  site  overlooks  that  of  the 
administration  building,  and  is  second  in  attractive- 
ness and  beauty  of  prospect  to  no  other  within  the 
Canal  Zone.  It  is  estimated  that  $400,000  will  be 
necessary  to  construct  barracks  for  500  marines.  The 
camp  will  be  used  as  an  advance  post  by  the  Navy  De- 
partment, and  the  marines  quartered  there  will  not  be 
considered  as  part  of  the  defence  force  of  the  canal. 

It  is  proposed  to  erect  on  the  filled  area  in  Panama 
Bay,  known  as  the  Balboa  Dump,  quarters  for  8  com- 
panies of  coast  artillery,  872  men,  at  an  estimated 
cost  of  $536,000;  on  Culebra  Island  an  outpost  guard 
building,  at  an  estimated  cost  of  $40,000;  on  Toro 
Point  quarters  for  two  companies,  at  an  estimated 


394  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

cost  of  $200,000;  and  for  a  like  force  at  Margarita  Is- 
land at  the  same  estimated  cost;  making  the  total  ex- 
penditure for  the  coast  artillery  barracks  $976,000. 

The  site  for  the  camp  for  mobile  troops  in  the  in- 
terior of  the  Canal  Zone  has  not  been  decided  finally. 
Two  locations  are  under  consideration,  one  on  the  high 
ground  on  the  east  side  of  Culebra  Cut,  north  of  Gold 
Hill,  and  the  other  on  the  filled  ground  near  Mira- 
flores.  In  one  or  the  other  of  these  locations  barracks 
will  be  constructed  of  concrete  blocks  for  three  regi- 
ments of  infantry,  one  squadron  of  cavalry,  and  one 
battalion  of  field  (mountain)  artillery,  at  an  estimated 
cost  of  about  $4,000,000. 

There  will  be  permanent  settlements  of  concrete 
construction,  ultimately,  at  Pedro  Miguel  for  employes 
of  the  Pacific  locks,  and  at  Gatun  for  employes  of  the 
Atlantic  locks. 


CHAPTER  IX 

TERMINAL  FACILITIES,  DRY-DOCKS,  AND  REPAIR-SHOPS 

THE  terminals  of  the  canal  in  both  oceans  will  be 
equipped  with  such  facilities  as  will  make  them  most 
serviceable  to  the  military  and  naval  needs  of  the 
United  States  and  most  attractive  to  the  shipping  of 
the  world.  There  are  under  construction  at  both  en- 
trances systems  of  concrete  piers  with  a  length  of  not 
less  than  1,000  feet,  a  width  of  200  feet,  and  slips 
300  feet  wide  between  them.  Dock  and  wharf  con- 
struction is  of  permanent  character,  either  of  rein- 
forced concrete  or  steel  protected  by  concrete.  The 
dock-sheds  will  have  steel  frames  suitably  protected 
against  corrosion,  and  a  roof  covering  either  of  con- 
crete or  of  other  material  capable  of  resisting  indefi- 
nitely climatic  effects.  In  addition  to  berthing  space 
for  large  vessels,  the  piers  will  be  provided  with  ample 
landing  room  for  launches  and  smaller  boats. 

The  docks  will  be  provided  with  standard-gauge  rail- 
road tracks  for  the  convenient  handling  of  cargo.  Each 
dock-shed  will  be  provided  along  each  side  with  a 
longitudinal  steel  girder  to  which  blocks  and  lines  may 
be  attached  to  assist  in  the  handling  of  cargo.  The 
depth  of  water  alongside  the  Cristobal  docks  will  be 
41  feet,  and  alongside  the  Balboa  docks  45  feet  above 

395 


396  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

mean  sea-level;  the  increased  depth  at  the  latter  being 
necessary  because  of  the  extreme  tidal  oscillation  in  the 
Bay  of  Panama. 

At  Balboa  there  will  be  a  length  of  2,200  feet  of  un- 
covered docks  immediately  in  front  of  the  repair-shops, 
which  in  time  of  peace  will  be  available  for  commercial 
use.  In  time  of  war  it  will  be  available  for  berthing 
vessels  requiring  repairs.  The  Balboa  piers  will  be  at 
right  angles  with  the  axis  of  the  canal  channel,  with 
their  ends  about  2,650  feet  away  from  it. 

Only  one  pier  will  be  built  at  first  at  either  terminal. 
If  later  the  commercial  requirements  of  the  canal  de- 
mand them,  four  others  will  be  added.  The  pier  at 
Cristobal  is  behind  a  mole  and  breakwater  extending 
3,085  feet  from  the  shore-line  and  paralleling  the  bound- 
ary-line between  Canal  Zone  and  Panama  waters. 
The  wharves  on  both  sides  will  not  be  equipped  with 
cargo  cranes  until  canal  operations  show  the  character 
and  amount  of  freight  that  will  have  to  be  handled. 

The  establishment  of  dry-docks  and  repair-shops  of 
ample  capacities  to  meet  all  demands  was  considered 
by  the  fortifications  board  as  a  necessary  part  of  the 
scheme  of  national  defence.  Such  action  was  considered 
by  the  canal  commission  also  to  be  a  necessary  part 
of  the  operation  of  the  canal.  An  agreement  was 
reached  to  place  both  dry-docks  and  repair-shops  at 
the  Pacific  terminal,  since  the  chief  demand  for  them 
would  be  at  that  point.  The  dry-docks,  excavation 
for  which  began  in  January,  1913,  are  situated  behind 
Sosa  Hill,  at  Balboa,  and  the  repair-shops  will  be  near 
by  on  the  site  of  the  old  marine  repair-shop  of  the 


First  of  the  permanent  docks  at  Cristobal.  Vessels  of  the  Atlantic  Squad- 
ron, U.  S.  N.,  first  to  make  landing,  January  14,  1913.  Officers  and 
men  taking  observation  train  to  see  canal. 


Letting  the  Pacific  Ocean  into  the  canal,  May  18,  1913.     Sixteen  tons  of 
dynamite  were  used  in  the  explosion  which  destroyed  the  dike. 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  397 

French  company.  The  main  dry-dock  will  be  capable 
of  accommodating  any  vessel  that  can  pass  through  the 
canal  locks.  It  will  have  a  usable  length  of  1,000  feet, 
a  depth  over  the  keel  blocks  of  35  feet  at  mean  sea- 
level,  and  an  entrance  width  of  110  feet.  The  entrance 
will  be  closed  by  mitre-gates  similar  to  those  used  in 
the  locks.  The  dry-dock  will  have  a  rock  foundation, 
and  its  sides  will  be  lined  with  concrete.  Its  equip- 
ment will  include  a  forty-ton  locomotive  crane,  with  a 
travel  on  both  sides. 

For  vessels  of  smaller  type,  an  auxiliary  dry-dock 
will  be  built  near  the  main  one,  in  lieu  of  the  marine 
railways  originally  contemplated.  It  will  have  a  usable 
length  of  350  feet,  a  width  of  80  feet,  and  a  depth  over 
the  keel  blocks  of  13^  feet  at  mean  sea-level.  It  will 
be  provided  with  a  floating  caisson.  The  forty-ton 
locomotive  crane  and  the  pumping  plant  on  the  main 
dry-dock  will  be  utilized  for  this  dock  also.  The  work 
of  providing  space  for  these  dry-docks,  as  well  as  for 
the  new  shops,  required  the  excavation  of  about  300,- 
000  cubic  yards  of  material  from  the  northwest  face 
of  Sosa  Hill.  The  excavated  material  was  used  in 
filling  the  site  for  the  shops  and  terminal  yard. 

On  the  Atlantic  side,  where  it  is  thought  only  limited 
repair  facilities  will  be  required,  it  is  proposed  to  re- 
tain the  old  French  dry-dock  at  Mount  Hope,  which 
has  a  usable  length  of  300  feet,  a  width  at  entrance  of 
50  feet,  and  a  depth  over  the  sill  of  13  feet  at  mean 
sea-level.  It  was  the  opinion  of  the  board  in  charge 
of  the  dock  projects  that  the  commercial  requirements 
in  sight  would  not  warrant  the  construction  of  a  dry- 


398  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

dock  at  Cristobal  capable  of  accommodating  large  ves- 
sels, in  view  of  the  building  of  a  dry-dock  at  Balboa, 
to  which  any  large  vessel  on  the  Atlantic  side  could  be 
taken  and  returned  in  case  it  was  found  necessary  to 
dock  it  for  repairs. 

Both  dry-docks  and  repair-shops  have  been  placed  so 
as  to  secure  protection  against  naval  bombardment, 
and  at  the  same  time  give  vessels  convenient  access  to 
the  shop  water-front.  With  these  ends  in  view,  the 
dry-docks  have  been  located  on  a  rocky  ledge  forming 
the  base  of  Sosa  Hill,  and  the  main  repair-shops  in  an 
area  600  feet  wide,  between  the  dry-dock  and  the  re- 
pair wharf.  The  shop  buildings  are  of  steel  frame, 
open  on  the  sides  for  ventilation  and  light,  with  a  re- 
inforced concrete  tile  roof,  and  fully  equipped  for  con- 
venient and  economical  handling  with  overhead  elec- 
tric travelling  cranes.  The  shop  equipment  includes 
a  two-story  fire-proof  storehouse,  400  feet  by  120  feet, 
for  general  supplies  required  in  the  manufacturing  and 
repair  work.  Installed  in  the  shops  will  be  all  of  the 
machinery,  tools,  etc.,  used  during  canal  construction 
which  have  a  permanent  value.  In  addition,  new  tools 
will  be  installed,  especially  adapted  for  large  marine 
work.  Tools  will  be  driven  by  electric  motors,  indi- 
vidual motors  being  provided  for  special  tools,  and  group 
drives  being  adapted  where  practicable.  These  shops 
are  intended  to  handle  all  the  repair  work  for  the  canal 
equipment  as  well  as  for  the  Panama  Railroad,  all  com- 
mercial work,  and  all  naval  work. 

For  the  handling  of  the  lock-gate  leaves,  as  well  as 
for  other  canal  requirements  and  commercial  and  gen- 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  399 

eral  wrecking  purposes,  two  powerful  floating  cranes 
of  two  hundred  and  fifty  gross  tons  capacity  have  been 
ordered  of  a  manufacturing  firm  in  Germany,  and  they 
will  be  delivered  about  January  1,  1915. 

For  handling  vessels  of  the  largest  size  at  Cristobal 
and  Balboa  two  high-power  harbor  tugs  will  be  pro- 
vided, and  for  the  transportation  of  coal,  fuel  oil,  and 
fresh  water  alongside  of  vessels  a  sufficient  number  of 
barges  and  lighters  will  be  placed  in  service.  Steel 
barges,  now  in  use  by  the  canal  commission,  after  the 
necessary  modifications  have  been  made,  will  be  placed 
in  the  barge  and  lighter  service.  A  tender  for  passen- 
gers and  mail  will  be  furnished  at  each  terminus  also, 
provided  the  business  justifies  it. 


CHAPTER  X 
FOOD,  COAL,  OIL,  AND  OTHER  SUPPLIES 

IN  addition  to  the  terminal  facilities  described  in  the 
foregoing  chapter  the  United  States  Government  has 
decreed  that  all  vessels  passing  through  the  canal  shall 
have  the  opportunity  to  purchase  at  reasonable  and 
stated  prices  all  supplies  that  they  may  need,  cold  stor- 
age and  general  articles  of  food,  coal  and  oil  for  fuel 
and  other  purposes,  fresh  water,  or  anything  else  held 
in  stock  by  the  government  for  the  supply  of  its  canal, 
naval,  and  military  forces.  For  the  first  time  in  its 
history  the  United  States  Government  will  go  into 
commercial  business. 

The  main  object  is  to  attract  shipping  to  the  canal 
by  holding  out  inducements  to  use  it.  If  the  owners 
of  vessels  desiring  to  pass  through  it  can  be  assured 
that  they  can  obtain  at  Panama  and  Colon  supplies  of 
all  kinds,  and  get  all  necessary  repairs  made,  at  mod- 
erate prices,  completely  safeguarding  them  against 
extortion  in  all  respects,  the  advantages  of  the  route 
will  be  greatly  enhanced.  Vessels  making  long  voy- 
ages can  cut  their  coal-bunker  space  in  half,  and  also 
their  cold-storage  and  food-supply  spaces,  gaining 
thereby  more  room  for  freight. 

While  it  was  a  new  departure  for  the  United  States 

400 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  401 

Government  to  go  into  the  public  supply  business,  the 
step  was  a  logical  one.  In  constructing  the  canal  it 
had  been  engaged  in  that  business  on  its  own  account 
for  ten  years  or  more.  It  had,  in  order  to  feed  its  army 
of  employes,  erected  a  large  cold-storage  plant,  a 
central  commissary  or  great  department  store,  with  a 
line  of  branch  stores,  a  bakery  and  laundry  and  other 
necessary  agencies.  These  were  used,  not  only  to 
meet  the  wants  of  its  employes,  but  of  marine  and 
military  camps,  and  of  visiting  naval  vessels.  It  was 
obliged  to  keep  on  hand  supplies  of  coal  for  naval 
vessels  as  well  as  for  its  own  work. 

With  the  opening  of  the  canal  to  traffic,  the  demand 
for  supplies  for  government  purposes  will  continue  and 
must  be  met.  The  operating  force  of  the  canal,  esti- 
mated at  1,500  men;  the  military  contingent,  with  a 
minimum  force  of  7,000  men;  the  marine  force  of 
1,500  men,  and  the  operating  force  of  the  Panama 
Railroad  must  be  fed  and  otherwise  cared  for.  The 
coal  supply  for  the  navy  must  be  greatly  increased, 
and  a  fuel-oil  supply  provided.  By  including  all  per- 
sons in  need  of  food  and  other  necessities  in  a  single 
body,  to  be  supplied  from  a  central  plant,  a  great 
saving  in  operating  expenses  is  effected,  and  conse- 
quently in  the  cost  of  supplies  to  the  "  ultimate  con- 
sumer." The  central  commissary,  with  its  laundry, 
bakery,  etc.,  makes  unnecessary  separate  establish- 
ments of  the  kind  in  the  military  and  marine  camps, 
and  thereby  saves  the  government  money. 

To  extend  all  these  privileges  to  the  vessels  of  all 
nations  passing  through  the  canal  includes  them  in  the 


402  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

benefits  conferred  and  makes  the  Panama  route  both 
an  economical  and  an  attractive  one,  and  thereby  aids 
it  in  its  direct  competition  with  the  Suez  Canal. 

It  is  the  policy  of  the  United  States  Government  to 
keep  complete  control  of  the  terminals,  water-frontage, 
and  transportation  by  land  and  water  across  the 
isthmus,  and  to  this  end  no  land,  nor  land  under  water, 
near  the  terminals  that  may  later  be  needed  by  the 
United  States  will  be  leased.  It  is  not  the  policy  to 
attempt  to  monopolize  the  fuel  business,  and  every 
means  has  been  taken  to  encourage  the  establishment 
of  private  coal  and  oil  depots  on  the  isthmus  under 
proper  conditions.  The  duplication  of  plants  for  private 
coal  and  oil  stations  is  undesirable,  and  therefore  the 
government  plants  are  being  so  laid  out  as  to  afford 
ample  wharf  room,  and  to  provide  modern  coal  handling 
machinery  for  unloading  colliers  into  the  coal  pile  and 
reloading  coal  to  lighters  or  barges. 

The  Navy  Department  requires  that  there  be  kept 
at  all  times  on  the  isthmus  100,000  tons  of  coal  at  the 
Atlantic  terminus,  and  50,000  tons  at  the  Pacific  ter- 
minus. This  supply  could  not  be  maintained  at  a 
reasonable  price  through  individuals  or  companies. 
The  government  must  be  its  own  purchaser.  As  a 
storage  basis  for  this  supply  a  basin  will  be  constructed 
at  Cristobal  with  a  capacity  of  290,000  tons,  and  one 
at  Balboa  with  a  capacity  of  160,000  tons.  In  each 
place  the  basin  will  be  made  of  reinforced  concrete,  in 
which  approximately  half  of  the  coal  will  be  stored 
under  water  for  use  in  time  of  war,  and  the  other  half 
above  water,  to  be  added  to  and  taken  from  continually 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  403 

for  the  ordinary  uses  of  commercial  and  government 
vessels.  It  is  also  planned  to  lease  parts  of  the  storage 
basins  to  such  private  coaling  companies  as  may  wish 
to  maintain  their  own  coal  stores  on  the  isthmus;  but 
in  such  cases  all  of  the  handling  will  be  done  by  the 
government  plant,  a  suitable  charge  being  made  for 
the  service. 

The  coaling  plant  at  the  Atlantic  entrance  will  be 
situated  on  the  north  end  of  the  island  formed  by  the 
old  French  canal,  the  American  canal,  and  the  Mindi 
River.  It  will  be  reached  from  the  mainland  by  means 
of  a  bridge  to  be  built  by  the  Panama  Railroad  over  the 
French  canal  south  of  the  dry-dock  shops.  The  storage 
basin  will  be  opposite  Dock  No.  13,  at  Mount  Hope, 
and  it  will  be  1,000  feet  long  and  250  feet  wide.  The 
bottom  of  the  basin  will  be  19  feet  below  mean  tide, 
and  the  elevation  of  the  decks  of  the  wharves  10  feet 
above  mean  tide.  There  will  be  41  feet  depth  of  water 
alongside  the  wharves.  The  wharves  will  be  founded 
upon  steel  cylinders  filled  with  reinforced  concrete, 
resting  upon  hard  rock.  The  maximum  tidal  oscilla- 
tion in  Limon  Bay  is  2.65  feet. 

For  this  type  of  storage  basin,  at  least  two  layouts  of 
coaling  plant  are  feasible;  the  first  being  that  in  which 
the  loading  and  unloading  wharves  occupy  opposite 
sides  of  the  basin  parallel  with  one  another,  with  the 
coal  piles  between  them,  and  the  second  that  in  which 
the  unloading  wharf  will  be  at  right  angles  to  the  load- 
ing wharf.  The  normal  capacity  will  be  240,000  tons, 
capable  of  increase  to  290,000  tons  by  piling  coal  to 
10  feet  above  normal  height. 


404  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

The  coaling  plant  at  the  Pacific  entrance  will  be  on 
the  quay  wall  south  of  the  entrance  to  the  large  dry- 
dock.  The  size  of  the  basin  will  be  500  feet  long  and 
250  feet  wide  for  one  design  of  plant,  and  the  same 
length  and  340  feet  wide  for  a  second  design.  The  ex- 
treme tidal  difference  here  is  21.8  feet.  As  at  the  At- 
lantic entrance,  the  loading  wharf  will  be  founded  upon 
concrete  cylinders  resting  upon  hard  rock;  the  unload- 
ing wharf  will  be  gravity  section  concrete  wall  resting 
on  rock.  The  normal  capacity  of  the  Balboa  plant 
will  be  135,000  tons,  capable  of  increase  to  160,000 
tons  by  piling  coal  10  feet  above  normal  height. 

The  layout  is  somewhat  different  from  that  at  the 
Atlantic  entrance,  although  the  methods  of  handling 
the  coal  will  be  similar.  The  unloading  wharf  will  be 
situated  at  the  outer  end  of  the  dry-dock  slip,  while 
the  line  of  the  loading  wharf  makes  an  angle  of  about 
forty-five  degrees  with  that  of  the  unloading  wharf, 
running  out  toward  the  canal  prism  from  the  end  of  the 
unloading  wharf. 

A  certain  ground  area  will  be  set  aside  for  the  stor- 
age of  coal  by  individuals  or  companies,  and  this  area 
will  be  served  by  the  government  handling  machinery 
with  the  same  effectiveness  as  coal  in  the  government 
storage  basin. 

This  arrangement  will  obviate  the  necessity  of  any 
dredging,  wharf  construction,  or  purchase  of  coal- 
handling  machinery  by  private  owners  and  companies, 
and  at  the  same  time  will  enable  them  to  obtain  the 
benefits  of  the  rapid  coal-handling  machinery  to  be 
purchased  by  the  United  States.  The  cost  of  taking 


THE   COMPLETED  CANAL  405 

coal  in  and  out  of  storage,  and  of  the  wharfage  facili- 
ties and  dredging  thus  availed  of,  will  be  apportioned 
at  a  reasonable  price  per  ton  to  all  individuals  and  com- 
panies alike  on  an  equitable  basis.  For  the  area  to  be 
occupied  by  the  coal  pile  a  rental  charge  based  upon  the 
cost  of  fitting  up  the  area  for  private  coal  storage  will 
be  charged  in  addition.  Assurance  of  satisfactory  ser- 
vice can  be  given  by  the  canal  authorities.  It  is  ex- 
pected that  the  government  coaling  plant  will  be  in 
operation  before  January  1,  1915.  Suitable  temporary 
arrangements  will  be  made  to  take  care  of  any  business 
originating  before  the  permanent  plant  is  completed. 
Such  a  permanent  plant  will  require  no  outlay  for  im- 
provements on  the  part  of  individuals  and  companies, 
and  will  enable  them  to  participate  in  the  coal  business 
on  what  appear  to  be  more  advantageous  terms  than 
if  they  should  each  proceed  with  the  construction  and 
installation  of  their  own  docks  and  coal  piles  and  coal- 
handling  machinery. 

Similar  facilities  will  be  provided  for  furnishing 
vessels  with  fuel  oil.  Two  large  oil  tanks  will  be  in- 
stalled at  each  end  of  the  canal.  By  the  time  the 
canal  is  ready  for  operation  the  United  States  will  have 
an  oil  pipe  line  across  the  isthmus  with  the  necessary 
pumping  plants,  and  dock  space  will  be  provided  at 
each  end  of  the  canal  for  vessels  to  deliver  or  receive 
fuel  oil.  Pumps  of  suitable  capacity  will  also  be  pro- 
vided to  pump  oil  from  the  water-front  to  tanks  in  the 
vicinity  or  at  points  along  the  canal  line.  Individuals 
and  companies  desiring  to  enter  this  business  can  make 
application  for  revocable  licenses  covering  the  plats 


406  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

of  ground  more  or  less  removed  from  the  water-front 
which  can  be  assigned  for  the  erection  of  oil  tanks. 
Under  the  Taft  agreement  with  Panama,  coal  and  oil 
for  fuel  for  canal  use  and  for  supplying  vessels  using 
the  canal  may  enter  the  Canal  Zone  without  the  pay- 
ment of  duty  to  Panama. 

The  Navy  Department  is  erecting  a  high-power 
wireless  telegraph  station  at  a  point  situated  about 
midway  of  the  isthmus.  It  is  near  the  site  of  the  old 
town  of  San  Pablo,  now  underneath  Gatun  Lake. 

The  site  is  from  sixty  to  one  hundred  and  ten  feet 
above  the  normal  level  of  Gatun  Lake,  accessible  by 
means  of  the  Panama  Railroad,  and  near  to  the  electric 
transmission  and  telegraph  and  telephone  lines  which 
will  follow  the  right  of  way  of  the  railroad.  In  ad- 
dition to  this  high-power  station,  which  will  be  capable 
of  communicating  with  points  at  a  distance  of  three 
thousand  miles,  there  will  be  stations  of  less  power  at 
Porto  Bello  and  Colon,  where  the  navy  now  maintains 
stations,  and  one  at  Balboa,  near  the  Pacific  entrance 
to  the  canal.  The  status  of  wireless  telegraph  communi- 
cation on  the  isthmus  has  been  fixed  by  the  President 
in  accordance  with  the  following  recommendation  of 
the  joint  board  of  the  army  and  navy  appointed  for 
that  purpose: 

That  no  private  or  commercial  wireless  installations 
be  permitted  in  the  Canal  Zone. 

That  an  understanding  be  reached  with  Panama  to 
prevent  the  establishment  of  private  and  commercial 
wireless  installations  in  its  territory. 

That  the  Navy  Department  shall  have  authority  to 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  407 

install,  maintain,  and  operate  under  its  jurisdiction  a 
high-power  wireless  station  in  the  Canal  Zone,  to  be 
used  in  connection  with  its  other  stations  in  the  At- 
lantic and  Pacific,  and  for  controlling  the  movements 
of  its  fleets  in  waters  adjacent  to  the  Panama  Canal. 

That  wireless  stations  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Navy  Department  shall  be  opened  to  the  public  serv- 
ice and  shall  transmit  commercial  business  under  such 
regulations  as  the  President  of  the  United  States  may 
prescribe. 


CHAPTER  XI 

FORTIFICATIONS 

ALL  information  in  this  chapter  is  derived  from  the  pub- 
lic writings  and  utterances  of  various  army  authorities, 
including  H.  L.  Stimson,  ex-Secretary  of  War;  Major- 
General  Leonard  Wood,  Chief  of  Staff;  Brigadier- 
General  Bixby,  Chief  of  Engineers;  Colonel  Rogers 
Birnie,  acting  Chief  of  Ordnance;  Brigadier-General 
E.  M.  Weaver,  Chief  of  Coast  Artillery;  Colonel  Ed- 
ward Burr,  Assistant  to  Chief  of  Engineers,  and  others. 
The  information  derived  from  the  army  officers  named 
was  given  by  them  in  hearings  before  a  subcommittee 
of  the  House  Committee  on  Appropriations,  in  January, 
1913,  and  published  as  a  congressional  document. 

The  defences  of  the  canal  will  be  divided  into  two 
general  parts:  first,  the  protection  by  heavy  fortifica- 
tions of  the  entrances  in  both  oceans;  second,  by  field- 
works  about  the  locks  and  a  mobile  force  of  troops  with 
a  minimum  strength  of  7,000  men.  The  fortifications 
at  the  Atlantic  entrance  will  be  placed  on  Toro  Point, 
on  the  west  side  of  Colon  Bay,  from  which  the  West 
Breakwater  extends  for  a  distance  of  two  miles  into 
the  bay,  and  on  Margarita  Island,  on  the  east  side, 
which  is  about  one  mile  north  of  Colon,  is  nearly  op- 
posite Toro  Point,  and  is  outside  the  two  breakwaters. 

408 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  409 

On  the  Pacific  side  the  fortifications  will  be  placed  on 
three  small  islands,  Flamenco,  Perico,  and  Naos,  lying 
in  the  Bay  of  Panama,  about  three  miles  from  Balboa, 
and  abreast  of  the  entrance  to  the  canal.  The  arma- 
ment of  these  fortifications  will  be  of  more  powerful 
and  effective  types  than  those  installed  in  any  other 
locality  in  the  world.  On  the  Atlantic  side,  on  Mar- 
garita Island,  it  will  include  two  14-inch  and  two  6- 
inch  guns  on  Toro  Point,  two  14-inch,  two  6-inch,  and 
eight  mortars;  and  at  Manzanilla  Point,  city  of  Colon, 
two  6-inch  guns.  On  the  Pacific  side  it  will  include 
one  16-inch  gun  on  Flamenco,  the  outermost  of  the 
three  islands;  one  14-inch  gun  each  on  Perico  and  Naos 
islands,  two  6-inch  guns  also  on  Naos  and  some  12- 
inch  mortars  of  a  new  and  powerful  type.  There  will 
also  be  at  both  entrances  6-inch  guns  and  howitzers 
to  protect  the  forts  on  the  land  side  and  submarines 
at  the  entrances. 

In  regard  to  the  adequacy  of  the  defences  the  gen- 
eral board  of  the  navy,  in  a  report  published  in  1912, 
said: 

The  General  Board  believes  that  the  proposed  forti- 
fications at  the  termini  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  would 
be  invaluable  in  assisting  the  transfer  of  a  United  States 
fleet  from  one  ocean  to  the  other,  through  the  canal,  in 
the  face  of  an  opposing  fleet.  The  function  of  the 
fortifications  in  this  particular  is  precisely  the  same  at 
the  canal  termini  as  it  is  at  any  fortified  place  from 
which  a  fleet  may  have  to  issue  in  the  face  of  an  enemy's 
fleet. 

Guns  mounted  on  shore  are  on  an  unsinkable  and 
steady  platform,  and  they  can  be  provided  with  un- 


410  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

limited  protection  and  accurate  range-finding  devices. 
Guns  mounted  on  board  ship  are  on  a  sinkable,  unsteady 
platform,  their  protection  is  limited,  and  range-find- 
ing devices  on  board  ship  have  a  very  limited  range  of 
accuracy.  The  shore  gun  of  equal  power  has  thus  a 
great  advantage  over  the  ship  gun  which  is  universally 
recognized,  and  this  advantage  is  increased  if  the  former 
be  mounted  on  disappearing  carriages,  as  are  the  sea- 
coast  guns  of  the  United  States.  The  mere  statement 
of  these  elementary  facts  is  a  sufficient  proof  of  the 
value  of  seacoast  guns  to  assist  a  fleet  in  passing  out 
from  behind  them  to  engage  a  waiting  hostile  fleet  out- 
side, provided  the  shore  guns  are  mounted  in  advance 
of,  or  abreast,  the  point  where  the  ship  channel  joins 
the  open  sea.  Even  if  somewhat  retired  from  that 
point  they  would  be  useful,  but  to  a  less  extent. 

At  the  Pacific  terminus  of  the  canal,  there  are  outlying 
islands  that  afford  sites  for  fortifications,  the  usefulness 
of  which  in  assisting  the  egress  of  a  fleet  in  the  face  of 
opposition  is  universally  admitted,  as  far  as  the  Gen- 
eral Board  knows;  but  there  has  been  unfavorable 
criticism  of  the  possibility  of  fortifications  at  the 
Atlantic  end  to  serve  this  purpose.  The  General 
Board  regards  these  criticisms  as  unfounded  and  be- 
lieves, on  the  contrary,  that  the  conditions  at  the  At- 
lantic terminus  of  the  canal  are  unusually  favorable 
for  the  emplacement  of  guns  that  would  be  of  assist- 
ance to  a  fleet  issuing  in  the  face  of  hostile  ships. 

On  both  sides  of  Limon  Bay,  in  which  the  canal  ter- 
minates at  the  Atlantic  end,  there  are  excellent  sites 
for  forts,  well  advanced  on  outlying  points.  The  line 
joining  these  sites  is  3,000  yards  in  front  of  the  point 
where  the  canal  prism  reaches  a  low  water  depth 
sufficient  for  battleships,  and  Limon  Bay  from  this 
point  outward  is  wide  enough  for  a  formation  of  eight 
ships  abreast.  The  outer  end  of  the  most  advanced 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  411 

breakwater  proposed  is  only  600  yards  in  front  of  the 
line  joining  the  sites  for  the  forts;  and  as  long  as  ships 
remain  behind  the  breakwater,  it  will  afford  them  a  con- 
siderable  amount  of  protection  from  the  enemy's  fire, 
while  they  will  themselves  be  able  to  fire  over  it.  In 
order  to  make  his  fire  effective  against  the  issuing  ships 
the  enemy  must  come  within  the  effective  fire  of  the 
fortifications.  Under  these  circumstances,  it  is  impos- 
sible to  deny  the  usefulness  of  fortifications  in  assist- 
ing the  issue  of  a  fleet  against  opposition.  The  con- 
ditions in  this  respect  at  the  Atlantic  end  of  the  canal 
are  incomparably  better  than  those  existing  at  Sandy 
Hook,  whose  forts  nobody  would  dream  of  dismantling. 

On  the  same  point  of  the  adequacy  General  Weaver, 
in  his  testimony  before  the  subcommittee  of  the  Com- 
mittee on  Appropriations,  January  16, 1913,  made  reply 
to  a  criticism  that  had  been  raised  frequently  about  the 
Pacific  fortifications. 

I  think  that  the  defenses  are  wholly  adequate. 
The  only  question  I  have  noted  raised  as  to  the  ade- 
quacy of  the  defense  has  been  as  to  whether  guns 
would  not  be  mounted  by  an  enemy  on  Taboga  Island, 
and  as  to  whether  an  enemy's  ship  could  not  stand  be- 
hind Taboga  Island,  and  as  to  whether  these  land  guns 
and  naval  guns  could  not  from  there  control  the  water 
area  in  front  of  the  Pacific  terminus.  The  new  type 
of  mortars  that  the  Ordnance  Department  is  making 
for  the  fortifications  at  Panama  will  have  a  range  of 
20,000  yards.  They  will  cover  the  water  well  over 
beyond  Taboga  Island,  and  have  under  fire  all  of  Ta- 
boga Island  and  the  water  for  a  considerable  distance 
beyond  the  outermost  shore  lines  of  Taboga  Island. 
It  is  about  12,000  yards  from  the  fortifications  at  the 
canal  terminus  to  Taboga  Island.  The  mortars  will 


412  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

reach  8,000  yards  beyond  Taboga.  The  16-inch  gun 
on  Flamenco  will  have  a  range  of  20,000  yards.  The 
14-inch  guns  on  Perico  and  Naos  Islands  will  have 
ranges  of  18,400  yards.  The  6-inch  guns  on  Naos 
Island  and  on  the  mainland  have  a  range  of  6,000  yards, 
and  are  well  placed  to  oppose  any  attempt  at  landing 
on  the  islands  on  which  the  fortifications  are  located. 

On  the  Atlantic  side  the  defense  is,  in  my  opinion, 
equally  adequate.  At  Fort  Randolph,  on  Margarita 
Island,  there  are  eight  mortars  of  the  new  type,  two 
14-inch  guns  and  two  6-inch  guns.  That  armament 
will  protect  the  Margarita  Island  side  of  the  entrance, 
and  it  also  controls  the  waters  to  the  south.  On  the 
Toro  Point  side  at  Fort  Sherman,  we  have  eight  mor- 
tars, two  14-inch  guns,  and  two  6-inch  guns.  There 
are  in  addition  two  6-inch  guns  provided  at  Manza- 
nilla  Point,  city  of  Colon.  In  my  opinion,  this  arma- 
ment is  entirely  adequate  for  the  defense  of  the  Atlantic 
side. 

We  have  what  we  consider  a  wholly  adequate  min- 
ing defense  for  the  approaches  to  each  canal  terminus. 
The  waters  on  both  sides  lend  themselves  admirably 
to  mine  defense.  There  are  no  swift  currents  and  the 
water  is  not  excessively  deep.  The  narrowness  of  the 
approaches  and  the  absence  of  fog  make  range  finding 
easy  and  accurate.  We  know  exactly  the  line  on 
which  approach  must  be  made. 

The  fortifications  at  both  entrances  were  assigned 
names  in  advance  of  construction  by  the  Secretary  of 
War,  Henry  L.  Stimson,  in  January,  1912.  The  forts 
and  batteries  comprising  them  on  Toro  Point  were 
named  Fort  Sherman,  in  honor  of  General  W.  T.  Sher- 
man, U.  S.  A.,  who  died  February  14,  1891 ;  those  on 
Margarita  Island,  Fort  Randolph,  in  honor  of  Major- 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  413 

General  Wallace  F.  Randolph,  U.  S.  A.,  who  died  Sep- 
tember 9;  1910;  and  those  at  Manzanilla  Point,  Colon, 
Fort  De  Lesseps,  in  honor  of  Count  Ferdinand  de  Les- 
seps,  who  died  December  7,  1894;  those  on  the  three 
islands  in  Panama  Bay,  Fort  Grant,  in  honor  of  General 
U.  S.  Grant,  U.  S.  A.,  who  died  July  23, 1885;  and  those 
at  Balboa,  Fort  Amador,  in  honor  of  Doctor  Manuel 
Amador  Guerrero,  first  President  of  the  Panama  Re- 
public, who  died  May  2,  1909.  The  batteries  in  the 
forts  were  named  as  follows: 

FORT  GRANT  MILITARY  RESERVATION 

Battery  Newton,  in  honor  of  Major-General  John 
Newton,  U.  S.  Vols.  (Brigadier-General,  Chief  of  Engi- 
neers, U.  S.  A.),  who  died  May  1,  1895. 

Battery  Merritt,  in  honor  of  Major-General  Wesley 
Merritt,  U.  S.  A.,  who  died  December  3,  1910. 

Battery  Warren,  in  honor  of  Major-General  Gouver- 
neur  K.  Warren,  U.  S.  Vols.  (Lieutenant-Colonel,  Corps 
of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A.),  who  died  August  8,  1882. 

Battery  Buell,  in  honor  of  Major-General  Don  Carlos 
Buell,  U.  S.  Vols.  (Colonel,  Assistant  Adjutant-General, 
U.  S.  A.),  who  died  November  19,  1898. 

Battery  Burnside,  in  honor  of  Major-General  Ambrose 
E.  Burnside,  U.  S.  Vols.  (First  Lieutenant,  Third  U.  S. 
Artillery),  who  died  September  13,  1881. 

Battery  Parke,  in  honor  of  Major-General  John  G. 
Parke,  U.  S.  Vols.  (Colonel,  Corps  of  Engineers,  U.S.A.), 
who  died  December  16,  1900. 

FORT  AMADOR  MILITARY  RESERVATION 

Battery  Smith,  in  honor  of  Major-General  Charles  F. 
Smith,  U.  S.  Vols.  (Colonel,  Third  U.  S.  Infantry), 
who  died  April  25,  1862. 


414  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 


FORT  SHERMAN  MILITARY  RESERVATION 

Battery  Howard ,  in  honor  of  Major-General  Oliver 
0.  Howard,  U.  S.  A.,  who  died  October  26,  1909. 

Battery  Stanley,  in  honor  of  Major-General  David 
S.  Stanley,  U.  S.  Vols.  (Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  A.), 
who  died  March  13,  1902. 

Battery  Mower,  in  honor  of  Major-General  Joseph 
A.  Mower,  U.  S.  Vols.  (Colonel,  Twenty-fifth  Infantry), 
who  died  January  6,  1870. 

Battery  Kilpatrick,  in  honor  of  Major-General  Judson 
Kilpatrick,  U.  S.  Vols.  (Captain,  First  Artillery),  who 
died  December  2,  1881. 

FORT  RANDOLPH  MILITARY  RESERVATION 

Battery  Tidball,  in  honor  of  Brigadier-General  John 
C.  Tidball,  U.  S.  A.,  who  died  May  15,  1906. 

Battery  Webb,  in  honor  of  Brevet  Major-General 
Alexander  S.  Webb,  U.  S.  A.  (Lieutenant-Colonel, 
Forty-fourth  U.  S.  Infantry),  who  died  February  12, 
1911. 

Battery  Weed,  in  honor  of  Brigadier-General  Stephen 
H.  Weed,  U.  S.  Vols.  (Captain,  Fifth  U.  S.  Artillery), 
who  was  killed  in  action,  July  2,  1863,  at  Gettysburg, 
Pa. 

FORT  DE   LESSEPS  MILITARY  RESERVATION 

Battery  Morgan,  in  honor  of  Brigadier-General 
Charles  H.  Morgan,  U.  S.  Vols.  (Major,  Fourth  Artil- 
lery), who  died  December  20,  1875. 


CHAPTER  XII 
THE  CANAL  ZONE  A  MILITARY  RESERVATION 

As  an  important  factor  in  the  plan  of  canal  defence 
the  entire  Canal  Zone,  with  the  exception  of  about 
seven  square  miles,  has  been  made  a  military  reserva- 
tion. The  act  passed  by  Congress*  and  approved  by 
President  Taft  on  August  24,  1912,  "for  the  opening, 
maintenance,  protection  and  operation  of  the  Panama 
Canal,  and  the  sanitation  and  government  of  the 
Canal  Zone/7  authorized  the  President  "to  declare  by 
Executive  Order  that  all  land  and  land  under  water 
within  the  limits  of  the  Canal  Zone  is  necessary  for  the 
construction,  maintenance,  operation,  sanitation,  or 
protection  of  the  Panama  Canal,  and  to  extinguish,  by 
agreement  when  advisable,  all  claims  and  titles  of  ad- 
verse claimants  and  occupants.  Upon  failure  to  secure 
by  agreement  title  to  any  such  parcel  of  land  or  land 
under  water  the  adverse  claim  or  occupancy  shall  be 
disposed  of  and  title  thereto  secured  in  the  United 
States  and  compensation  therefor  fixed  and  paid  in  the 
manner  provided  in  the  aforesaid  treaty  with  the  Re- 
public of  Panama,  or  such  modification  of  such  treaty 
as  may  hereafter  be  made." 

Exercising  the  authority  thus  conferred,  President 
Taft,  on  December  5,  1912,  issued  an  executive  order 

*Appendix  C. 
415 


416  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  act.  In  a  subse- 
quent order,  issued  on  February  18,  1913,  he  exempted 
from  the  area  defined  in  the  preceding  order  the  land 
known  as  the  Sabanas,  a  tract  comprising  approxi- 
mately seven  square  miles,  lying  between  the  city  of 
Panama  and  the  northeast  boundary  of  the  Canal  Zone 
and  bordering  on  the  Pacific  Ocean.  It  is  a  rolling 
country  of  fields  and  hills,  and  is  occupied  sparsely  by 
the  country  residences  of  the  more  wealthy  citizens  of 
Panama  city.  Its  fields,  or  sabanas,  are  used  for  graz- 
ing purposes  mainly.  Morgan  and  his  piratical  army 
marched  over  them  when  they  advanced  to  the  sack- 
ing of  Old  Panama  in  1671,  and  on  the  northeastern 
portion  of  them  the  battle  between  his  forces  and  those 
of  the  city  was  fought.  It  was  not  much  of  a  battle, 
for  the  Panama  army,  which  marched  forth  with  much 
noise  of  drums  and  imposing  display  of  banners,  turned 
tail  after  the  first  clash  of  arms  and  fled  in  a  panic 
back  into  the  city,  where  they  made  a  brief  and  futile 
resistance. 

The  Canal  Zone,  bought  by  the  United  States  from 
the  Republic  of  Panama  for  $10,000,000,  contains 
about  436  square  miles.  Of  this  area,  at  the  time  of  the 
President's  first  order,  the  United  States  owned  about 
363  square  miles,  and  73  square  miles  were  held  in 
private  ownership.  The  Zone  begins  at  a  point  three 
marine  miles  from  mean  low-water  mark  in  each  ocean, 
and  extends  for  five  miles  on  each  side  of  the  centre  line 
of  the  route  of  the  canal.  It  includes  the  group  of 
islands  in  the  Bay  of  Panama  named  Perico,  Naos 
Culebra,  and  Flamenco,  and  any  lands  and  waters 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  417 

outside  of  the  prescribed  limits  which  are  necessary  or 
convenient  for  canal  purposes.  About  95  square  miles 
of  the  Canal  Zone  are  beneath  the  waters  of  Gatun 
and  Miraflores  Lakes. 

The  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon  are  excluded  from 
the  Zone,  but  the  United  States  has  the  right  to  en- 
force sanitary  ordinances  in  those  cities,  and  to  main- 
tain public  order  in  them  in  case  the  Republic  of  Pan- 
ama should  not  be  able,  in  the  judgment  of  the  United 
States,  to  do  so. 

Under  the  treaty  with  Panama,  the  United  States 
has  the  right  to  acquire  by  purchase  or  by  the  exercise 
of  the  right  of  eminent  domain  any  lands,  buildings, 
water  rights,  or  other  properties  necessary  and  con- 
venient for  the  construction,  maintenance,  operation, 
sanitation,  and  protection  of  the  canal,  and  it  can  there- 
fore at  any  time  acquire  the  lands  needed  either  within 
or  without  the  Zone  boundaries  which  are  owned  by 
private  persons.  The  United  States  will  also  control 
the  area  to  be  covered  by  Gatun  Lake,  which  extends 
beyond  the  lines  of  the  Canal  Zone. 

The  population  of  the  Canal  Zone  in  1912,  official 
census,  was  62,810;  of  Panama  City,  35,368;  of  Colon, 
17,749. 

Four  joint  commissions  have  been  appointed  for  the 
purpose  of  adjudicating  the  prices  that  shall  be  paid 
to  the  owners  of  private  lands  needed  for  canal  pur- 
poses. In  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  treaty 
with  Panama,  these  commissions  have  been  composed 
of  four  persons,  two  for  each  country,  Panama  and  the 
United  States;  and,  in  case  of  disagreement,  an  umpire, 


418  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

appointed  jointly  by  the  two  governments,  is  provided 
whose  decision  shall  be  final. 

The  first  commission,  appointed  in  1905,  made  awards 
aggregating  $55,607.07.  The  second,  appointed  in  1907, 
adjudicated  the  half-interest  of  the  Pacific  Mail  Steam- 
ship Company  in  the  islands  of  Culebra,  Flamenco, 
Naos,  and  Perico,  in  Panama  Bay,  awarding  the  com- 
pany $20,000  for  its  improvements  and  $20,000  for  the 
land.  The  Panama  Railroad  Company  held  the  other 
half-interest.  This  commission  also  assessed  the  dam- 
age done  by  a  conflagration  in  the  Malambo  district 
of  the  city  of  Panama  in  1906,  which,  it  was  claimed, 
was  started  by  fumigation  directed  by  the  Isthmian 
Canal  Commission.  The  commission  did  not  fix  the 
responsibility  on  the  United  States,  and  the  matter  is 
still  pending;  a  bill  providing  for  $53,800  in  payment 
for  it  has  been  introduced  in  several  sessions  of  Con- 
gress, but  has  never  been  passed. 

The  third  commission,  appointed  in  1908,  agreed 
upon  awards  aggregating  $123,980,  and  its  chairman, 
chosen  as  umpire  in  cases  upon  which  the  commission 
had  failed  to  agree,  made  additional  awards  aggregating 
$61,000. 

The  fourth  commission,  appointed  by  President 
Taft  in  January,  1913,  was  organized  formally  on  the 
isthmus  on  March  6, 1913.  It  had  before  it  a  far  greater 
task  than  had  confronted  any  of  its  predecessors,  for 
its  prescribed  duty  was  the  "appraisement  and  settle- 
ment of  damages  to  property  in  the  Canal  Zone" 
caused  by  making  it  a  military  reservation — that  is, 
ridding  it  of  all  human  habitation  save  that  of  the  canal 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  419 

civil  and  military  forces.  Previous  commissions  had 
been  called  upon  to  appraise  and  settle  claims  for  par- 
ticular tracts  of  land,  but  the  duty  of  this  body  was  to 
extinguish  all  claims  for  land  or  damages  or  improve- 
ments throughout  the  entire  territory  required  for  canal 
purposes.  The  various  claims  mounted  into  the  thou- 
sands, and  the  hearing  of  them  alone  consumed  many 
months.  Before  the  commission  began  its  work  the 
entire  area  covered  by  the  waters  of  Gatun  Lake  was 
cleared  of  human  habitation  below  the  eighty-seven- 
foot  level.  All  buildings,  commission  and  other,  were 
removed.  A  large  number  of  squatters  were  paid  by 
the  commission  for  their  property,  and  many  small 
claims  were  settled  in  that  way  through  the  legal  coun- 
sel of  the  canal  commission. 

Decision  to  make  the  Canal  Zone  a  military  reserva- 
tion was  reached  only  after  prolonged  discussion  in 
which  considerable  opposition  was  developed.  It  was 
thought  at  one  time  that  the  land  in  the  Zone  might 
be  leased  for  agricultural  purposes,  and  that  many 
Americans  in  the  employ  of  the  canal  commission 
who  had  become  accustomed  to  life  in  the  tropics 
might  wish  to  remain  and  take  up  farming  on  the  isth- 
mus. Several  ventures  of  this  kind  were  made,  but 
without  success.  All  efforts  to  raise  American  vege- 
tables on  the  isthmus  have  ended  in  failure.  Only 
tropical  products — bananas,  mangoes,  pineapples,  pa- 
payas, and  the  like — can  be  grown  to  advantage,  but  for 
these  there  was  very  little  suitable  land  remaining  in 
the  Zone  after  Gatun  Lake  was  filled.  In  fact,  virtually 
all  the  really  productive  land  in  the  Zone  was  buried 


420  THE  PANAMA  GATEWAY 

under  the  lake,  for  it  all  lay  in  the  valleys.  It  was  made 
plain  that  very  few,  if  any,  Americans  would  become 
residents  in  the  Zone  if  it  were  continued  open  to  set- 
tlement, and  no  other  nationality  was  wanted  there, 
for  settlements  along  the  borders  of  the  canal  would 
be  so  many  avenues  of  approach  to  it,  and  safety  re- 
quired that  these  should  be  under  friendly  control. 

The  area  available  for  settlement  was,  at  most,  very 
small.  No  settlement  of  any  kind  could  be  allowed  in 
the  neighborhood  of  the  earthworks  about  the  locks 
or  upon  the  lands  over  which  an  enemy  would  have  to 
march  to  reach  them.  If  settlement  in  the  regions 
about  Gatun  Lake  were  permitted,  roads  would  have 
to  be  kept  open  to  them,  a  form  of  civil  government, 
with  schools,  post-offices,  and  police  protection,  would 
have  to  be  supplied,  sanitation  control  and  supervision 
exercised,  and  in  case  of  settlements  near  canal  works 
and  structures  fire  protection  would  have  to  be  given. 
All  this  would  greatly  increase  the  cost  of  governing 
the  Zone,  and  the  revenues  would  be  inconsiderable. 

With  no  settlements  whatever  along  the  borders  of 
Gatun  Lake,  the  dense  jungle  growth,  unbroken  by 
trails,  will  be  the  best  possible  protection,  for  it  is 
virtually  impassable  for  a  hostile  force.  Fortifications 
at  the  entrances  and  about  the  locks  are  all  that  is 
necessary  for  canal  protection,  therefore,  and  with  no 
one  but  Americans  and  their  dependents  in  the  Zone 
settlements  the  entrance  of  any  persons  with  hostile 
intent  will  be  instantly  detected. 

It  has  been  asserted  in  many  quarters  that  the  locks 
might  be  destroyed  by  one  or  two  men  placing  dyna- 


THE  COMPLETED  CANAL  421 

mite  or  other  high  explosives  in  them.  Colonel  Goe- 
thals  was  asked  for  his  views  on  this  point  at  the  hear- 
ing on  fortification  plans  at  Washington  in  January, 
1913,  and  in  his  reply  he  said: 

"In  order  to  accomplish  the  destruction  of  the  locks 
it  would  be  necessary  to  place  the  charge  very  carefully 
in  them.  To  do  that  would  take  time,  and  what  would 
our  men  be  doing  in  the  meantime?  One  man  could 
not  carry  a  sufficient  quantity  to  destroy  the  locks. 
You  would  have  to  locate  the  charge  behind  a  gate 
and  in  a  certain  place  behind  the  gate  in  order  to  dis- 
able the  canal,  and  you  must  destroy  the  gates  to  de- 
stroy the  canal.  I  cannot  imagine  what  the  people 
operating  the  canal  and  the  men  having  charge  of  its 
defense  would  be  doing  in  the  meantime."  The  same 
thing  is  true  of  dynamite  dropped  from  a  flying- 
machine.  If  it  fell  in  the  locks  or  on  the  lock  walls,  it 
could  do  no  serious  harm — it  must  get  behind  a  lock 
gate  to  be  effective  for  damage. 


APPENDIXES 


APPENDIX  A 

CANAL  COMMISSIONS 
FOR  PRELIMINARY  SURVEYS  AND  RECOMMENDATIONS 

First  Commission 

Appointed  by  Proclamation  by  President  Grant,  March  13,  1872. 
Brevet  Major-General  Andrew  A.  Humphreys,  U.  S.  A. 
*Professor  Benjamin  Pierce,  of  Massachusetts. 
Captain  Daniel  Ammen,  U.  S.  N. 

Made  final  report,  February,  1876,  in  favor  of  Nicaraguan 
route  as  possessing,  both  for  the  construction  and  maintenance 
of  a  canal,  greater  advantages  and  offering  fewer  difficulties, 
from  engineering,  commercial,  and  economical  points  of  view, 
than  any  one  of  the  other  routes  surveyed.  Report  sent  to 
Congress  in  April,  1879,  and  printed. 

Second  Commission 

DESIGNATED    "NICARAGUAN    CANAL   COMMISSION " 

Appointed  by  President  McKinley,  June  4,  1897. 
Rear-Admiral  John  G.  Walker,  President. 
Colonel  Peter  C.  Hains,  Corps  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A. 
Lewis  M.  Haupt,  C.E. 
Made  first  report  May  9,  1899. 

Third  Commission 

DESIGNATED    "  ISTHMIAN    CANAL   COMMISSION" 

Appointed  by  President  McKinley  on  June  10,  1899. 
Rear-Admiral  John  G.  Walker,  U.  S.  N.,  President. 
Samuel  Pasco. 

*  Resigned,  December  1874;  succeeded  by  Carlisle  P.  Patterson,  Supt. 
U.  S.  Coast  Survey. 

425 


426  APPENDIX  A 

George  S.  Morison,  C.E. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Oswald  H.  Ernst,  Corps  of  Engineers, 
U.  S.  A. 

Lewis  M.  Haupt,  C.E. 

Alfred  Noble,  C.E. 

Colonel  Peter  C.  Hains,  Corps  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A. 

William  H.  Burr,  C.E. 

Professor  Emory  R.  Johnson. 

Lieutenant-Commander  Sidney  A.  Staunton,  U.  S.  N.,  Sec- 
retary. 

Reported  on  November  16,  1901,  in  favor  of  the  Nicaraguan 
route;  in  a  supplementary  report  on  January  18,  1902,  with- 
drew this  finding  and  recommended  the  Panama  route  because 
the  French  Canal  Company  offered  to  sell  its  rights,  privileges, 
etc.,  for  $40,000,000,  having  previously  asked  $109,000,000. 

FOR  CANAL  CONSTRUCTION 

First  Commission 
Nominated  by  President  Roosevelt,  February  29,  1904. 

Confirmed  by  the  Senate,  March  3,  1904. 
John  G.  Walker,  Rear-Admiral,  U.  S.  N. 
George  W.  Davis,  Major-General  (retired),  U.  S.  A. 
William  Barclay  Parsons,  C.E.,  New  York  City.^ 
William  H.  Burr,  C.E.,  New  York  City. 
Benj.  M.  Harrod,  C.E.,  New  Orleans,  La. 
Carl  E.  Grunsky,  C.E.,  San  Francisco,  Cal. 
Frank  J.  Hecker,  Detroit,  Mich. 

Salary,  $12,000  each. 

On  June  6,  1904,  Dominick  I.  Murphy  was  elected  secretary 
of  the  commission,  holding  the  position  till  May  31,  1905,  when 
he  resigned. 

Second  Commission 

Nominated  by  President  Roosevelt,  March  4,  1905. 
Theodore  P.  Shonts,  Chairman;  salary,  $30,000. 
Charles  E.  Magoon,  Member  and  Governor  of  the  Canal 
Zone;  salary,  $10,000. 


APPENDIX  A  427 

John  F.  Wallace,  Member   and   Chief  Engineer;  salary, 

$25,000. 
Rear- Admiral   Mordecai   T.   Endicott,   U.  S.  N.;   salary, 

$7,500. 
Brigadier-General  Peter  C.  Hains,  U.  S.  A.  (retired);  salary, 

$7,500. 
Colonel  Oswald  H.  Ernst,  Corps  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A; 

salary,  $7,500. 

Benj.  M.  Harrod,  C.E.,  salary,  $7,500. 

Nominated  after  adjournment  of  Congress  and  never  con- 
firmed in  its  original  form.  All  nominations  save  that  of  Wal- 
lace, who  resigned  on  June  28,  1905,  and  Ernst,  who  was  trans- 
ferred in  1906  to  the  Mississippi  River  Commission,  were 
confirmed  March,  1907. 

On  September  7,  1905,  Joseph  Bucklin  Bishop  was  elected 
secretary  of  the  commission. 

Third  Commission 
Nominated  by  President  Roosevelt,  March,  1907. 

Confirmed  by  the  Senate,  March,  1907. 
Lieutenant-Colonel  George  W.  Goethals,  U.  S.  A.,  Chair- 
man and  Chief  Engineer;  salary,  $15,000. 
Major  D.  D.  Gaillard,  U.  S.  A. 
Major  William  L.  Sibert,  U.  S.  A. 

Civil  Engineer  H.  H.  Rousseau,  U.  S.  N.    salary  $14,000. 
Colonel  W.  C.  Gorgas,  U.  S.  A. 
*J.  C.  S.  Blackburn. 
fJackson  Smith. 
Joseph  Bucklin  Bishop,  Secretary 

*  Succeeded  by  Maurice  H.  Thatcher,  April  10,  1910,  who  was  suc- 
ceeded by  Richard  L.  Metcalfe  on  August  8,  1913. 

f  Succeeded  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  H.  F.  Hodges,  Engineering  Corps, 
U.  S.  A.,  July  16,  1908. 


APPENDIX  B 

CANAL  APPROPRIATIONS  AND  EXPENDITURES 
APPROPRIATIONS 

Payment  to  the  new  Panama  Canal  company .  .  $40,000,000.00 

Payment  to  Republic  of  Panama 10,000,000.00 

Appropriation,  June  28,  1902 10,000,000.00 

Appropriation,  December  21, 1905 11,000,000.00 

Deficiency,  February  27,  1906 5,990,786.00 

Appropriation,  June  30,  1906 25,456,415.08 

Appropriation,  March  4,  1907 27,161,367.50 

Deficiency,  February  15,  1908 12,178,900.00 

Appropriation,  May  27,  1908 29,187,000.00 

Deficiency,  March  4,  1909 5,458,000.00 

Appropriation,  March  4,  1909 33,638,000.00 

Deficiency,  February  25,  1910 76,000.00 

Appropriation,  June  25,  1910 37,855,000.00 

Appropriation,  March  4,  1911 45,560,000.00 

Appropriation,  August  24,  1912 28,980,000.00 

Appropriation,  June  23,  1913 16,265,393.00 

Private  Acts  and  Court  Judgments 21,608.01 

Total $338,828,469.59 

Appropriations  for  fortifications,  March  4, 191 1 . .  3,000,000.00 
Appropriation  for  fortifications,  August  24, 1912 .  2,806,950.00 
Appropriation  for  fortifications,  June  23,  1913. .  4,870,000.00 

CLASSIFIED  EXPENDITURES  TO  MARCH  1,  1913 

Department  of  Construction  and  Engineering.  .$171,790,041.08 
Department  of  Construction  and  Engineering 

Plant 2,396,127.35 

428 


APPENDIX  B  429 

Department  of  Sanitation $15,796,420.16 

Department  of  Civil  Administration 6,197,073.40 

Department  of  Law 37,360.43 

Panama  Railroad,  second  main  track 1,123,477.93 

Panama  Railroad,  relocated  line 8,984,922.18 

Purchase  and  repair  of  steamers 2,680,112.01 

Zone  water- works  and  sewers 5,289,485.06 

Zone  roadways 1,599,153.86 

Loans  to  Panama  Railroad  Company 3,247,332.11 

Construction  and  repair  of  buildings 10,245,919.64 

Purchase  from  new  Panama  Canal  company .  .  .  40,000,000.00 

Payment  to  Republic  of  Panama 10,000,000.00 

Miscellaneous 4,185,412.41 

Total $283,572,837.62 

Expenditures  for  fortifications  to  March  1, 1913 . .      2,537,752.38 

The  balances  carried  in  expenditure  accounts,  which  are  in- 
cluded in  the  last  item  above,  for  water-works,  sewers,  and 
pavements  in  the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon  amounted  alto- 
gether to  $2,405,727.91.  The  unexpended  balance  in  the  appro- 
priation for  sanitation  in  the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon,  avail- 
able for  expenditures  on  water-works,  sewers,  and  pavements, 
was  $77,131.29,  including  transfer  of  appropriations  for  quarter 
ended  December  31,  1912. 


APPENDIX  C* 

AN  ACT 

To  PROVIDE  FOR  THE  OPENING,  MAINTENANCE,  PROTECTION, 
AND  OPERATION  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL,  AND  THE  SANITA- 
TION AND  GOVERNMENT  OF  THE  CANAL  ZONE. 

Be  it  enacted  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the 
United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled,  That  the  zone 
of  land  and  land  under  water  of  the  width  of  ten  miles  extend- 
ing to  the  distance  of  five  miles  on  each  side  of  the  center  line 
of  the  route  of  the  canal  now  being  constructed  thereon,  which 
zone  begins  in  the  Caribbean  Sea  three  marine  miles  from  mean 
low-water  mark  and  extends  to  and  across  the  Isthmus  of  Pan- 
ama into  the  Pacific  Ocean  to  the  distance  of  three  marine  miles 
from  mean  low-water  mark,  excluding  therefrom  the  cities  of 
Panama  and  Colon  and  their  adjacent  harbors  located  within 
said  zone,  as  excepted  in  the  treaty  with  the  Republic  of  Pan- 
ama dated  November  eighteenth,  nineteen  hundred  and  three, 
but  including  all  islands  within  said  described  zone,  and  in  addi- 
tion thereto  the  group  of  islands  in  the  Bay  of  Panama  named 
Perico,  Naos,  Culebra,  and  Flamenco,  and  any  lands  and  waters 
outside  of  said  limits  above  described  which  are  necessary  or 
convenient  or  from  time  to  time  may  become  necessary  or 
convenient  for  the  construction,  maintenance,  operation,  sani- 
tation, or  protection  of  the  said  canal  or  of  any  auxiliary  canals, 
lakes,  or  other  works  necessary  or  convenient  for  the  construc- 
tion, maintenance,  operation,  sanitation,  or  protection  of  said 
canal,  the  use,  occupancy,  or  control  whereof  were  granted  to 

*  [Public— No.  337.]    [H.  R.  21969.] 
430 


APPENDIX  C  431 

the  United  States  by  the  treaty  between  the  United  States  and 
the  Republic  of  Panama,  the  ratifications  of  which  were  ex- 
changed on  the  twenty-sixth  day  of  February,  nineteen  hundred 
and  four,  shall  be  known  and  designated  as  the  Canal  Zone,  and 
the  canal  now  being  constructed  thereon  shall  hereafter  be 
known  and  designated  as  the  Panama  Canal.  The  President 
is  authorized,  by  treaty  with  the  Republic  of  Panama,  to  ac- 
quire any  additional  land  or  land  under  water  not  already 
granted,  or  which  was  excepted  from  the  grant,  that  he  may 
deem  necessary  for  the  operation,  maintenance,  sanitation,  or 
protection  of  the  Panama  Canal,  and  to  exchange  any  land  or 
land  under  water  not  deemed  necessary  for  such  purposes  for 
other  land  or  land  under  water  which  may  be  deemed  necessary 
for  such  purposes,  which  additional  land  or  land  under  water 
so  acquired  shall  become  part  of  the  Canal  Zone. 

SEC.  2.  That  all  laws,  orders,  regulations,  and  ordinances 
adopted  and  promulgated  in  the  Canal  Zone  by  order  of  the 
President  for  the  government  and  sanitation  of  the  Canal  Zone 
and  the  construction  of  the  Panama  Canal  are  hereby  ratified 
and  confirmed  as  valid  and  binding  until  Congress  shall  other- 
wise provide.  The  existing  courts  established  in  the  Canal  Zone 
by  Executive  order  are  recognized  and  confirmed  to  continue 
in  operation  until  the  courts  provided  for  in  this  Act  shall  be 
established. 

SEC.  3.  That  the  President  is  authorized  to  declare  by  Execu- 
tive order  that  all  land  and  land  under  water  within  the  limits 
of  the  Canal  Zone  is  necessary  for  the  construction,  mainte- 
nance, operation,  sanitation,  or  protection  of  the  Panama  Canal, 
and  to  extinguish,  by  agreement  when  advisable,  all  claims  and 
titles  of  adverse  claimants  and  occupants.  Upon  failure  to  se- 
cure by  agreement  title  to  any  such  parcel  of  land  or  land  under 
water  the  adverse  claim  or  occupancy  shall  be  disposed  of  and 
title  thereto  secured  in  the  United  States  and  compensation 
therefor  fixed  and  paid  in  the  manner  provided  in  the  aforesaid 
treaty  with  the  Republic  of  Panama,  or  such  modification  of  such 
treaty  as  may  hereafter  be  made. 


432  APPENDIX  C 

SEC.  4.  That  when  in  the  judgment  of  the  President  the  con- 
struction of  the  Panama  Canal  shall  be  sufficiently  advanced 
toward  completion  to  render  the  further  services  of  the  Isth- 
mian Canal  Commission  unnecessary  the  President  is  author- 
ized by  Executive  order  to  discontinue  the  Isthmian  Canal 
Commission,  which,  together  with  the  present  organization,  shall 
then  cease  to  exist;  and  the  President  is  authorized  thereafter 
to  complete,  govern,  and  operate  the  Panama  Canal  and  gov- 
ern the  Canal  Zone,  or  cause  them  to  be  completed,  governed, 
and  operated,  through  a  governor  of  the  Panama  Canal  and 
such  other  persons  as  he  may  deem  competent  to  discharge  the 
various  duties  connected  with  the  completion,  care,  maintenance, 
sanitation,  operation,  government,  and  protection  of  the  canal 
and  Canal  Zone.  If  any  of  the  persons  appointed  or  employed 
as  aforesaid  shall  be  persons  in  the  military  or  naval  service  of 
the  United  States,  the  amount  of  the  official  salary  paid  to  any 
such  person  shall  be  deducted  from  the  amount  of  salary  or 
compensation  provided  by  or  which  shall  be  fixed  under  the 
terms  of  this  Act.  The  governor  of  the  Panama  Canal  shall  be 
appointed  by  the  President,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  con- 
sent of  the  Senate,  commissioned  for  a  term  of  four  years,  and 
until  his  successor  shall  be  appointed  and  qualified.  He  shall 
receive  a  salary  of  ten  thousand  dollars  a  year.  All  other  per- 
sons necessary  for  the  completion,  care,  management,  main- 
tenance, sanitation,  government,  operation,  and  protection  of 
the  Panama  Canal  and  Canal  Zone  shall  be  appointed  by  the 
President,  or  by  his  authority,  removable  at  his  pleasure,  and 
the  compensation  of  such  persons  shall  be  fixed  by  the  Presi- 
dent, or  by  his  authority,  until  such  time  as  Congress  may  by 
law  regulate  the  same,  but  salaries  or  compensation  fixed  here- 
under  by  the  President  shall  in  no  instance  exceed  by  more 
than  twenty-five  per  centum  the  salary  or  compensation  paid 
for  the  same  or  similar  services  to  persons  employed  by  the 
Government  in  continental  United  States.  That  upon  the  com- 
pletion of  the  Panama  Canal  the  President  shall  cause  the  same 
to  be  officially  and  formally  opened  for  use  and  operation. 


APPENDIX  C  433 

Before  the  completion  of  the  canal,  the  Commission  of  Arts 
may  make  report  to  the  President  of  their  recommendation  re- 
garding the  artistic  character  of  the  structures  of  the  canal,  such 
report  to  be  transmitted  to  Congress. 

SEC.  5.  That  the  President  is  hereby  authorized  to  prescribe 
and  from  time  to  time  change  the  tolls  that  shall  be  levied  by 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  for  the  use  of  the  Panama 
Canal:  Provided,  That  no  tolls,  when  prescribed  as  above,  shall 
be  changed,  unless  six  months'  notice  thereof  shall  have  been 
given  by  the  President  by  proclamation.  No  tolls  shall  be  lev- 
ied upon  vessels  engaged  in  the  coastwise  trade  of  the  United 
States.  That  section  forty-one  hundred  and  thirty-two  of  the 
Revised  Statutes  is  hereby  amended  to  read  as  follows: 

"SEC.  4132.  Vessels  built  within  the  United  States  and  be- 
longing wholly  to  citizens  thereof;  and  vessels  which  may  be 
captured  in  war  by  citizens  of  the  United  States  and  lawfully 
condemned  as  prize,  or  which  may  be  adjudged  to  be  forfeited 
for  a  breach  of  the  laws  of  the  United  States;  and  seagoing 
vessels,  whether  steam  or  sail,  which  have  been  certified  by  the 
Steamboat-Inspection  Service  as  safe  to  carry  dry  and  perish- 
able cargo,  not  more  than  five  years  old  at  the  time  they  apply 
for  registry,  wherever  built,  which  are  to  engage  only  in  trade 
with  foreign  countries  or  with  the  Philippine  Islands  and  the 
islands  of  Guam  and  Tutuila,  being  wholly  owned  by  citizens 
of  the  United  States  or  corporations  organized  and  chartered 
under  the  laws  of  the  United  States  or  of  any  State  thereof,  the 
president  and  managing  directors  of  which  shall  be  citizens  of 
the  United  States  or  corporations  organized  and  chartered  under 
the  laws  of  the  United  States  or  of  any  State  thereof,  the  presi- 
dent and  managing  directors  of  which  shall  be  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  and  no  others,  may  be  registered  as  directed  in 
this  title.  Foreign-built  vessels  registered  pursuant  to  this  Act 
shall  not  engage  in  the  coastwise  trade:  Provided,  That  a  for- 
eign-built yacht,  pleasure  boat,  or  vessel  not  used  or  intended 
to  be  used  for  trade  admitted  to  American  registry  pursuant  to 
this  section  shall  not  be  exempt  from  the  collection  of  ad  va- 


434  APPENDIX  C 

lorem  duty  provided  in  section  thirty-seven  of  the  Act  approved 
August  fifth,  nineteen  hundred  and  nine,  entitled  'An  Act  to 
provide  revenue,  equalize  duties,  and  encourage  the  industries 
of  the  United  States,  and  for  other  purposes.'  That  all  mate- 
rials of  foreign  production  which  may  be  necessary  for  the  con- 
struction or  repair  of  vessels  built  in  the  United  States  and  all 
such  materials  necessary  for  the  building  or  repair  of  their 
machinery  and  all  articles  necessary  for  their  outfit  and  equip- 
ment may  be  imported  into  the  United  States  free  of  duty 
under  such  regulations  as  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  may 
prescribe:  Provided  further,  That  such  vessels  so  admitted  under 
the  provisions  of  this  section  may  contract  with  the  Postmaster 
General  under  the  Act  of  March  third,  eighteen  hundred  and 
ninety-one,  entitled  'An  Act  to  provide  for  ocean  mail  service 
between  the  United  States  and  foreign  ports,  and  to  promote 
commerce/  so  long  as  such  vessels  shall  in  all  respects  comply 
with  the  provisions  and  requirements  of  said  Act." 

Tolls  may  be  based  upon  gross  or  net  registered  tonnage, 
displacement  tonnage,  or  otherwise,  and  may  be  based  on  one 
form  of  tonnage  for  warships  and  another  for  ships  of  com- 
merce. The  rate  of  tolls  may  be  lower  upon  vessels  in  ballast 
than  upon  vessels  carrying  passengers  or  cargo.  When  based 
upon  net  registered  tonnage  for  ships  of  commerce  the  tolls 
shall  not  exceed  one  dollar  and  twenty-five  cents  per  net  regis- 
tered ton,  nor  be  less,  other  than  for  vessels  of  the  United 
States  and  its  citizens,  than  the  estimated  proportionate  cost 
of  the  actual  maintenance  and  operation  of  the  canal,  subject, 
however,  to  the  provisions  of  article  nineteen  of  the  convention 
between  the  United  States  and  the  Republic  of  Panama,  en- 
tered into  November  eighteenth,  nineteen  hundred  and  three. 
If  the  tolls  shall  not  be  based  upon  net  registered  tonnage,  they 
shall  not  exceed  the  equivalent  of  one  dollar  and  twenty-five 
cents  per  net  registered  ton  as  nearly  as  the  same  may  be  de- 
termined, nor  be  less  than  the  equivalent  of  seventy-five  cents 
per  net  registered  ton.  The  toll  for  each  passenger  shall  not 
be  more  than  one  dollar  and  fifty  cents.  The  President  is  au- 


. 
APPENDIX  C  435 

thorized  to  make  and  from  time  to  time  amend  regulations 
governing  the  operation  of  the  Panama  Canal,  and  the  passage 
and  control  of  vessels  through  the  same  or  any  part  thereof, 
including  the  locks  and  approaches  thereto,  and  all  rules  and 
regulations  affecting  pilots  and  pilotage  in  the  canal  or  the  ap- 
proaches thereto  through  the  adjacent  waters. 

Such  regulations  shall  provide  for  prompt  adjustment  by 
agreement  and  immediate  payment  of  claims  for  damages  which 
may  arise  from  injury  to  vessels,  cargo,  or  passengers  from  the 
passing  of  vessels  through  the  locks  under  the  control  of  those 
operating  them  under  such  rules  and  regulations.  In  case  of 
disagreement  suit  may  be  brought  in  the  district  court  of  the 
Canal  Zone  against  the  governor  of  the  Panama  Canal.  The 
hearing  and  disposition  of  such  cases  shall  be  expedited  and  the 
judgment  shall  be  immediately  paid  out  of  any  moneys  appro- 
priated or  allotted  for  canal  operation. 

The  President  shall  provide  a  method  for  the  determination 
and  adjustment  of  all  claims  arising  out  of  personal  injuries  to 
employes  thereafter  occurring  while  directly  engaged  in  actual 
work  in  connection  with  the  construction,  maintenance,  opera- 
tion, or  sanitation  of  the  canal  or  of  the  Panama  Railroad,  or 
of  any  auxiliary  canals,  locks,  or  other  works  necessary  and 
convenient  for  the  construction,  maintenance,  operation,  or  sani- 
tation of  the  canal,  whether  such  injuries  result  in  death  or  not, 
and  prescribe  a  schedule  of  compensation  therefor,  and  may  re- 
vise and  modify  such  method  and  schedule  at  any  time;  and 
such  claims,  to  the  extent  they  shall  be  allowed  on  such  adjust- 
ment, if  allowed  at  all,  shall  be  paid  out  of  the  moneys  here- 
after appropriated  for  that  purpose  or  out  of  the  funds  of  the 
Panama  Railroad  Company,  if  said  company  was  responsible 
for  said  injury,  as  the  case  may  require.  And  after  such  method 
and  schedule  shall  be  provided  by  the  President,  the  provisions 
of  the  Act  entitled  "  An  Act  granting  to  certain  employees  of 
the  United  States  the  right  to  receive  from  it  compensation  for 
injuries  sustained  in  the  course  of  their  employment,"  approved 
May  thirtieth,  nineteen  hundred  and  eight,  and  of  the  Act  en- 


436  APPENDIX  C 

titled  "An  Act  relating  to  injured  employees  on  the  Isthmian 
Canal,"  approved  February  twenty-fourth,  nineteen  hundred 
and  nine,  shall  not  apply  to  personal  injuries  thereafter  received 
and  claims  for  which  are  subject  to  determination  and  adjust- 
ment as  provided  in  this  section. 

SEC.  6.  That  the  President  is  authorized  to  cause  to  be  erected^ 
maintained,  and  operated,  subject  to  the  International  Conven- 
tion and  the  Act  of  Congress  to  regulate  radio-communication, 
at  suitable  places  along  the  Panama  Canal  and  the  coast  adja- 
cent to  its  two  terminals,  in  connection  with  the  operation 
of  said  canal,  such  wireless  telegraphic  installations  as  he  may 
deem  necessary  for  the  operation,  maintenance,  sanitation,  and 
protection  of  said  canal,  and  for  other  purposes.  If  it  is  found 
necessary  to  locate  such  installations  upon  territory  of  the  Re- 
public of  Panama,  the  President  is  authorized  to  make  such 
agreement  with  said  Government  as  may  be  necessary,  and  also 
to  provide  for  the  acceptance  and  transmission,  by  said  system, 
of  all  private  and  commercial  messages,  and  those  of  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Panama,  on  such  terms  and  for  such  tolls  as  the 
President  may  prescribe:  Provided,  That  the  messages  of  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  and  the  departments  thereof, 
and  the  management  of  the  Panama  Canal,  shall  always  be 
given  precedence  over  all  other  messages.  The  President  is 
also  authorized,  in  his  discretion,  to  enter  into  such  operating 
agreements  or  leases  with  any  private  wireless  company  or  com- 
panies as  may  best  insure  freedom  from  interference  with  the 
wirelesss  telegraphic  installations  established  by  the  United 
States.  The  President  is  also  authorized  to  establish,  main- 
tain, and  operate,  through  the  Panama  Railroad  Company  or 
otherwise,  dry  docks,  repair  shops,  yards,  docks,  wharves,  ware- 
houses, storehouses,  and  other  necessary  facilities  and  appur- 
tenances for  the  purpose  of  providing  coal  and  other  materials, 
labor,  repairs,  and  supplies  for  vessels  of  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  and,  incidentally,  for  supplying  such  at  rea- 
sonable prices  to  passing  vessels,  in  accordance  with  appropri- 
ations hereby  authorized  to  be  made  from  time  to  time  by 


APPENDIX  C  437 

Congress  as  a  part  of  the  maintenance  and  operation  of  the 
said  canal.  Moneys  received  from  the  conduct  of  said  busi- 
ness may  be  expended  and  reinvested  for  such  purposes  without 
being  covered  into  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States ;  and  such 
moneys  are  hereby  appropriated  for  such  purposes,  but  all  de- 
posits of  such  funds  shall  be  subject  to  the  provisions  of  exist- 
ing law  relating  to  the  deposit  of  other  public  funds  of  the 
United  States,  and  any  net  profits  accruing  from  such  business 
shall  annually  be  covered  into  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States. 
Monthly  reports  of  such  receipts  and  expenditures  shall  be  made 
to  the  President  by  the  persons  in  charge,  and  annual  reports 
shall  be  made  to  the  Congress. 

SEC.  7.  That  the  governor  of  the  Panama  Canal  shall,  in 
connection  with  the  operation  of  such  canal,  have  official  con- 
trol and  jurisdiction  over  the  Canal  Zone  and  shall  perform  all 
duties  in  connection  with  the  civil  government  of  the  Canal 
Zone,  which  is  to  be  held,  treated,  and  governed  as  an  adjunct 
of  such  Panama  Canal.  Unless  in  this  Act  otherwise  provided 
all  existing  laws  of  the  Canal  Zone  referring  to  the  civil  governor 
or  the  civil  administration  of  the  Canal  Zone  shall  be  applicable 
to  the  governor  of  the  Panama  Canal,  who  shall  perform  all 
such  executive  and  administrative  duties  required  by  existing 
law.  The  President  is  authorized  to  determine  or  cause  to  be 
determined  what  towns  shall  exist  in  the  Canal  Zone  and  sub- 
divide and  from  time  to  time  resubdivide  said  Canal  Zone  into 
subdivisions,  to  be  designated  by  name  or  number,  so  that  there 
shall  be  situated  one  town  in  each  subdivision,  and  the  boun- 
daries of  each  subdivision  shall  be  clearly  defined.  In  each 
town  there  shall  be  a  magistrate's  court  with  exclusive  original 
jurisdiction  coextensive  with  the  subdivision  in  which  it  is  situ- 
ated of  all  civil  cases  in  which  the  principal  sum  claimed  does 
not  exceed  three  hundred  dollars,  and  all  criminal  cases  wherein 
the  punishment  that  may  be  imposed  shall  not  exceed  a  fine  of 
one  hundred  dollars,  or  imprisonment  not  exceeding  thirty  days, 
or  both,  and  all  violations  of  police  regulations  and  ordinances 
and  all  actions  involving  possession  or  title  to  personal  property 


438  APPENDIX  C 

or  the  forcible  entry  and  detainer  of  real  estate.  Such  magis- 
trates shall  also  hold  preliminary  investigations  in  charges  of 
felony  and  offenses  under  section  ten  of  this  Act,  and  commit 
or  bail  in  bailable  cases  to  the  district  court.  A  sufficient  num- 
ber of  magistrates  and  constables,  who  must  be  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  to  conduct  the  business  of  such  courts,  shall  be 
appointed  by  the  governor  of  the  Panama  Canal  for  terms  of 
four  years  and  until  their  successors  are  appointed  and  quali- 
fied, and  the  compensation  of  such  persons  shall  be  fixed  by  the 
President,  or  by  his  authority,  until  such  time  as  Congress  may 
by  law  regulate  the  same.  The  rules  governing  said  courts  and 
prescribing  the  duties  of  said  magistrates  and  constables,  oaths 
and  bonds,  the  times  and  places  of  holding  such  courts,  the 
disposition  of  fines,  costs,  forfeitures,  enforcements  of  judgments, 
providing  for  appeals  therefrom  to  the  district  court,  and  the 
disposition,  treatment,  and  pardon  of  convicts  shall  be  estab- 
lished by  order  of  the  President.  The  governor  of  the  Panama 
Canal  shall  appoint  all  notaries  public,  prescribe  their  powers 
and  duties,  their  official  seal,  and  the  fees  to  be  charged  and 
collected  by  them. 

SEC.  8.  That  there  shall  be  in  the  Canal  Zone  one  district 
court  with  two  divisions,  one  including  Balboa  and  the  other 
including  Cristobal;  and  one  district  judge  of  the  said  district, 
who  shall  hold  his  court  in  both  divisions  at  such  time  as  he 
may  designate  by  order,  at  least  once  a  month  in  each  division. 
The  rules  of  practice  in  such  district  court  shall  be  prescribed 
or  amended  by  order  of  the  President.  The  said  district  court 
shall  have  original  jurisdiction  of  all  felony  cases,  of  offenses 
arising  under  section  ten  of  this  Act,  all  causes  in  equity;  admi- 
ralty and  all  cases  at  law  involving  principal  sums  exceeding 
three  hundred  dollars  and  all  appeals  from  judgments  rendered 
in  magistrates'  courts.  The  jurisdiction  in  admiralty  herein 
conferred  upon  the  district  judge  and  the  district  court  shall 
be  the  same  that  is  exercised  by  the  United  States  district 
judges  and  the  United  States  district  courts,  and  the  procedure 
and  practice  shall  also  be  the  same.  The  district  court  or  the 


APPENDIX  C  439 

judge  thereof  shall  also  have  jurisdiction  of  all  other  matters 
and  proceedings  not  herein  provided  for  which  are  now  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  Canal  Zone,  of  the 
Circuit  Court  of  the  Canal  Zone,  the  District  Court  of  the  Canal 
Zone,  or  the  judges  thereof.  Said  judge  shall  provide  for  the 
selection,  summoning,  serving,  and  compensation  of  jurors  from 
among  the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  to  be  subject  to  jury 
duty  in  either  division  of  such  district,  and  a  jury  shall  be  had 
in  any  criminal  case  or  civil  case  at  law  originating  in  said  court 
on  the  demand  of  either  party.  There  shall  be  a  district  attor- 
ney and  a  marshal  for  said  district.  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the 
district  attorney  to  conduct  all  business,  civil  and  criminal,  for 
the  Government,  and  to  advise  the  governor  of  the  Panama 
Canal  on  all  legal  questions  touching  the  operation  of  the  canal 
and  the  administration  of  civil  affairs.  It  shall  be  the  duty  of 
the  marshal  to  execute  all  process  of  the  court,  preserve  order 
therein,  and  do  all  things  incident  to  the  office  of  marshal.  The 
district  judge,  the  district  attorney,  and  the  marshal  shall  be 
appointed  by  the  President,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  con- 
sent of  the  Senate,  for  terms  of  four  years  each,  and  until  their 
successors  are  appointed  and  qualified,  and  during  their  terms 
of  office  shall  reside  within  the  Canal  Zone,  and  shall  hold  no 
other  office  nor  serve  on  any  official  board  or  commission  nor 
receive  any  emoluments  except  their  salaries.  The  district  judge 
shall  receive  the  same  salary  paid  the  district  judges  of  the 
United  States,  and  shall  appoint  the  clerk  of  said  court,  and 
may  appoint  one  assistant  when  necessary,  who  shall  receive 
salaries  to  be  fixed  by  the  President.  The  district  judge  shall 
be  entitled  to  six  weeks'  leave  of  absence  each  year  with  pay. 
During  his  absence  or  during  any  period  of  disability  or  dis- 
qualification from  sickness  or  otherwise  to  discharge  his  duties 
the  same  shall  be  temporarily  performed  by  any  circuit  or  dis- 
trict judge  of  the  United  States  who  may  be  designated  by  the 
President,  and  who,  during  such  service,  shall  receive  the  addi- 
tional mileage  and  per  diem  allowed  by  law  to  district  judges 
of  the  United  States  when  holding  court  away  from  their  homes. 


440  APPENDIX  C 

The  district  attorney  and  the  marshal  shall  be  paid  each  a  sal- 
ary of  five  thousand  dollars  per  annum. 

SEC.  9.  That  the  records  of  the  existing  courts  and  all  causes, 
proceedings,  and  criminal  prosecutions  pending  therein  as  shown 
by  the  dockets  thereof,  except  as  herein  otherwise  provided, 
shall  immediately  upon  the  organization  of  the  courts  created 
by  this  Act  be  transferred  to  such  new  courts  having  jurisdic- 
tion of  like  cases,  be  entered  upon  the  dockets  thereof,  and  pro- 
ceed as  if  they  had  originally  been  brought  therein,  whereupon 
all  the  existing  courts,  except  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  Canal 
Zone,  shall  cease  to  exist.  The  President  may  continue  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  Canal  Zone  and  retain  the  judges  thereof 
in  office  for  such  time  as  to  him  may  seem  necessary  to  deter- 
mine finally  any  causes  and  proceedings  which  may  be  pending 
therein.  All  laws  of  the  Canal  Zone  imposing  duties  upon  the 
clerks  or  ministerial  officers  of  existing  courts  shall  apply  and 
impose  such  duties  upon  the  clerks  and  ministerial  officers  of 
the  new  courts  created  by  this  Act  having  jurisdiction  of  like 
cases,  matters,  and  duties. 

All  existing  laws  in  the  Canal  Zone  governing  practice  and 
procedure  in  existing  courts  shall  be  applicable  and  adapted  to 
the  practice  and  procedure  in  the  new  courts. 

The  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  of  the  Fifth  Circuit  of  the 
United  States  shall  have  jurisdiction  to  review,  revise,  modify, 
reverse,  or  affirm  the  final  judgments  and  decrees  of  the  Dis- 
trict Court  of  the  Canal  Zone  and  to  render  such  judgments  as 
in  the  opinion  of  the  said  appellate  court  should  have  been  ren- 
dered by  the  trial  court  in  all  actions  and  proceedings  in  which 
the  Constitution,  or  any  statute,  treaty,  title,  right,  or  privilege 
of  the  United  States,  is  involved  and  a  right  thereunder  denied, 
and  in  cases  in  which  the  value  in  controversy  exceeds  one 
thousand  dollars,  to  be  ascertained  by  the  oath  of  either  party, 
or  by  other  competent  evidence,  and  also  in  criminal  causes 
wherein  the  offense  charged  is  punishable  as  a  felony.  And 
such  appellate  jurisdiction,  subject  to  the  right  of  review  by  or 
appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  as  in  other 


APPENDIX  C  441 

cases  authorized  by  law,  may  be  exercised  by  said  circuit  court 
of  appeals  in  the  same  manner,  under  the  same  regulations,  and 
by  the  same  procedure  as  nearly  as  practicable  as  is  done  in 
reviewing  the  final  judgments  and  decrees  of  the  district  courts 
of  the  United  States. 

SEC.  10.  That  after  the  Panama  Canal  shall  have  been  com- 
pleted and  opened  for  operation  the  governor  of  the  Panama 
Canal  shall  have  the  right  to  make  such  rules  and  regulations, 
subject  to  the  approval  of  the  President,  touching  the  right  of 
any  person  to  remain  upon  or  pass  over  any  part  of  the  Canal 
Zone  as  may  be  necessary.  Any  person  violating  any  of  such 
rules  or  regulations  shall  be  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor,  and  on 
conviction  in  the  District  Court  of  the  Canal  Zone  shall  be 
punished  by  a  fine  not  exceeding  five  hundred  dollars  or  by 
imprisonment  not  exceeding  a  year,  or  both,  in  the  discretion 
of  the  court.  It  shall  be  unlawful  for  any  person,  by  any  means 
or  in  any  way,  to  injure  or  obstruct,  or  attempt  to  injure  or 
obstruct,  any  part  of  the  Panama  Canal  or  the  locks  thereof  or 
the  approaches  thereto.  Any  person  violating  this  provision 
shall  be  guilty  of  a  felony,  and  on  conviction  in  the  District 
Court  of  the  Canal  Zone  shall  be  punished  by  a  fine  not  exceed- 
ing ten  thousand  dollars  or  by  imprisonment  not  exceeding 
twenty  years,  or  both,  in  the  discretion  of  the  court.  If  the 
act  shall  cause  the  death  of  any  person  within  a  year  and  a  day 
thereafter,  the  person  so  convicted  shall  be  guilty  of  murder 
and  shall  be  punished  accordingly. 

SEC.  11.  That  section  five  of  the  Act  to  regulate  commerce, 
approved  February  fourth,  eighteen  hundred  and  eighty-seven, 
as  heretofore  amended,  is  hereby  amended  by  adding  thereto 
a  new  paragraph  at  the  end  thereof,  as  follows: 

"  From  and  after  the  first  day  of  July,  nineteen  hundred  and 
fourteen,  it  shall  be  unlawful  for  any  railroad  company  or  other 
common  carrier  subject  to  the  Act  to  regulate  commerce  to  own, 
lease,  operate,  control,  or  have  any  interest  whatsoever  (by 
stock  ownership  or  otherwise,  either  directly,  indirectly,  through 
any  holding  company,  or  by  stockholders  or  directors  in  com- 


442  APPENDIX  C 

mon,  or  in  any  other  manner)  in  any  common  carrier  by  water 
operated  through  the  Panama  Canal  or  elsewhere  with  which 
said  railroad  or  other  carrier  aforesaid  does  or  may  compete  for 
traffic  or  any  vessel  carrying  freight  or  passengers  upon  said 
water  route  or  elsewhere  with  which  said  railroad  or  other  car- 
rier aforesaid  does  or  may  compete  for  traffic;  and  in  case  of 
the  violation  of  this  provision  each  day  in  which  such  violation 
continues  shall  be  deemed  a  separate  offense." 

Jurisdiction  is  hereby  conferred  on  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  to  determine  questions  of  fact  as  to  the  competi- 
tion or  possibility  of  competition,  after  full  hearing,  on  the  ap- 
plication of  any  railroad  company  or  other  carrier.  Such  appli- 
cation may  be  filed  for  the  purpose  of  determining  whether  any 
existing  service  is  in  violation  of  this  section  and  pray  for  an 
order  permitting  the  continuance  of  any  vessel  or  vessels  already 
in  operation,  or  for  the  purpose  of  asking  an  order  to  install  new 
service  not  in  conflict  with  the  provisions  of  this  paragraph. 
The  commission  may  on  its  own  motion  or  the  application  of 
any  shipper  institute  proceedings  to  inquire  into  the  operation 
of  any  vessel  in  use  by  any  railroad  or  other  carrier  which  has 
not  applied  to  the  commission  and  had  the  question  of  compe- 
tition or  the  possibility  of  competition  determined  as  herein 
provided.  In  all  such  cases  the  order  of  said  commission  shall 
be  final. 

If  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  shall  be  of  the  opin- 
ion that  any  such  existing  specified  service  by  water  other  than 
through  the  Panama  Canal  is  being  operated  in  the  interest  of 
the  public  and  is  of  advantage  to  the  convenience  and  com- 
merce of  the  people,  and  that  such  extension  will  neither  exclude, 
prevent,  nor  reduce  competition  on  the  route  by  water  under 
consideration,  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  may,  by 
order,  extend  the  time  during  which  such  service  by  water  may 
continue  to  be  operated  beyond  July  first,  nineteen  hundred 
and  fourteen.  In. every  case  of  such  extension  the  rates,  sched- 
ules, and  practices  of  such  water  carrier  shall  be  filed  with  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission  and  shall  be  subject  to  the 


APPENDIX  C  443 

act  to  regulate  commerce  and  all  amendments  thereto  in  the 
same  manner  and  to  the  same  extent  as  is  the  railroad  or  other 
common  carrier  controlling  such  water  carrier  or  interested  in 
any  manner  in  its  operation:  Provided,  Any  application  for 
extension  under  the  terms  of  this  provision  filed  with  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  prior  to  July  first,  nineteen  hun- 
dred and  fourteen,  but  for  any  reason  not  heard  and  disposed 
of  before  said  date,  may  be  considered  and  granted  there- 
after. 

No  vessel  permitted  to  engage  in  the  coastwise  or  foreign 
trade  of  the  United  States  shall  be  permitted  to  enter  or  pass 
through  said  canal  if  such  ship  is  owned,  chartered,  operated, 
or  controlled  by  any  person  or  company  which  is  doing  busi- 
ness in  violation  of  the  provisions  of  the  Act  of  Congress  ap- 
proved July  second,  eighteen  hundred  and  ninety,  entitled  "  An 
Act  to  protect  trade  and  commerce  against  unlawful  restraints 
and  monopolies,"  or  the  provisions  of  sections  seventy-three  to 
seventy-seven,  both  inclusive,  of  an  Act  approved  August 
twenty-seventh,  eighteen  hundred  and  ninety-four,  entitled  "  An 
Act  to  reduce  taxation,  to  provide  revenue  for  the  Government, 
and  for  other  purposes,"  or  the  provisions  of  any  other  Act  of 
Congress  amending  or  supplementing  the  said  Act  of  July  sec- 
ond, eighteen  hundred  and  ninety,  commonly  known  as  the 
Sherman  Antitrust  Act,  and  amendments  thereto,  or  said  sec- 
tions of  the  Act  of  August  twenty-seventh,  eighteen  hundred 
and  ninety-four.  The  question  of  fact  may  be  determined  by 
the  judgment  of  any  court  of  the  United  States  of  competent 
jurisdiction  in  any  cause  pending  before  it  to  which  the  owners 
or  operators  of  such  ship  are  parties.  Suit  may  be  brought  by 
any  shipper  or  by  the  Attorney  General  of  the  United  States. 

That  section  six  of  said  Act  to  regulate  commerce,  as  here- 
tofore amended,  is  hereby  amended  by  adding  a  new  paragraph 
at  the  end  thereof,  as  follows: 

"When  property  may  be  or  is  transported  from  point  to 
point  in  the  United  States  by  rail  and  water  through  the  Pan- 
ama Canal  or  otherwise,  the  transportation  being  by  a  common 


444  APPENDIX  C 

carrier  or  carriers,  and  not  entirely  within  the  limits  of  a  single 
State,  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  shall  have  juris- 
diction of  such  transportation  and  of  the  carriers,  both  by  rail 
and  by  water,  which  may  or  do  engage  in  the  same,  in  the  fol- 
lowing particulars,  in  addition  to  the  jurisdiction  given  by  the 
Act  to  regulate  commerce,  as  amended  June  eighteenth,  nine- 
teen hundred  and  ten: 

"  (a)  To  establish  physical  connection  between  the  lines  of 
the  rail  carrier  and  the  dock  of  the  water  carrier  by  directing 
the  rail  carrier  to  make  suitable  connection  between  its  line  and 
a  track  or  tracks  which  have  been  constructed  from  the  dock 
to  the  limits  of  its  right  of  way,  or  by  directing  either  or  both 
the  rail  and  water  carrier,  individually  or  in  connection  with 
one  another,  to  construct  and  connect  with  the  lines  of  the  rail 
carrier  a  spur  track  or  tracks  to  the  dock.  This  provision  shall 
only  apply  where  such  connection  is  reasonably  practicable,  can 
be  made  with  safety  to  the  public,  and  where  the  amount  of 
business  to  be  handled  is  sufficient  to  justify  the  outlay. 

"The  commission  shall  have  full  authority  to  determine  the 
terms  and  conditions  upon  which  these  connecting  tracks,  when 
constructed,  shall  be  operated,  and  it  may,  either  in  the  con- 
struction or  the  operation  of  such  tracks,  determine  what  sum 
shall  be  paid  to  or  by  either  carrier.  The  provisions  of  this 
paragraph  shall  extend  to  cases  where  the  dock  is  owned  by 
other  parties  than  the  carrier  involved. 

"  (b)  To  establish  through  routes  and  maximum  joint  rates 
between  and  over  such  rail  and  water  lines,  and  to  determine 
all  the  terms  and  conditions  under  which  such  lines  shall  be 
operated  in  the  handling  of  the  traffic  embraced. 

"  (c)  To  establish  maximum  proportional  rates  by  rail  to  and 
from  the  ports  to  which  the  traffic  is  brought,  or  from  which  it 
is  taken  by  the  water  carrier,  and  to  determine  to  what  traffic 
and  in  connection  with  what  vessels  and  upon  what  terms  and 
conditions  such  rates  shall  apply.  By  proportional  rates  are 
meant  those  which  differ  from  the  corresponding  local  rates  to 
and  from  the  port  and  which  apply  only  to  traffic  which  has 


APPENDIX  C  445 

been  brought  to  the  port  or  is  carried  from  the  port  by  a  com- 
mon carrier  by  water. 

"  (d)  If  any  rail  carrier  subject  to  the  Act  to  regulate  com- 
merce enters  into  arrangements  with  any  water  carrier  operating 
from  a  port  in  the  United  States  to  a  foreign  country,  through 
the  Panama  Canal  or  otherwise,  for  the  handling  of  through 
business  between  interior  points  of  the  United  States  and  such 
foreign  country,  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  may  re- 
quire such  railway  to  enter  into  similar  arrangements  with  any 
or  all  other  lines  of  steamships  operating  from  said  port  to  the 
same  foreign  country." 

The  orders  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  relating 
to  this  section  shall  only  be  made  upon  formal  complaint  or  in 
proceedings  instituted  by  the  commission  of  its  own  motion  and 
after  full  hearing.  The  orders  provided  for  in  the  two  amend- 
ments to  the  Act  to  regulate  commerce  enacted  in  this  section 
shall  be  served  in  the  same  manner  and  enforced  by  the  same 
penalties  and  proceedings  as  are  the  orders  of  the  commission 
made  under  the  provisions  of  section  fifteen  of  the  Act  to  regu- 
late commerce,  as  amended  June  eighteenth,  nineteen  hundred 
and  ten,  and  they  may  be  conditioned  for  the  payment  of  any 
sum  or  the  giving  of  security  for  the  payment  of  any  sum  or 
the  discharge  of  any  obligation  which  may  be  required  by  the 
terms  of  said  order. 

SEC.  12.  That  all  laws  and  treaties  relating  to  the  extradition 
of  persons  accused  of  crime  in  force  in  the  United  States,  to  the 
extent  that  they  may  not  be  in  conflict  with  or  superseded  by 
any  special  treaty  entered  into  between  the  United  States  and 
the  Republic  of  Panama  with  respect  to  the  Canal  Zone,  and 
all  laws  relating  to  the  rendition  of  fugitives  from  justice  as 
between  the  several  States  and  Territories  of  the  United  States, 
shall  extend  to  and  be  considered  in  force  in  the  Canal  Zone, 
and  for  such  purposes  and  such  purposes  only  the  Canal  Zone 
shall  be  considered  and  treated  as  an  organized  Territory  of  the 
United  States. 

SEC.  13.  That  in  time  of  war  in  which  the  United  States  shall 


446  APPENDIX  C 

be  engaged,  or  when,  in  the  opinion  of  the  President,  war  is 
imminent,  such  officer  of  the  Army  as  the  President  may  desig- 
nate shall,  upon  the  order  of  the  President,  assume  and  have 
exclusive  authority  and  jurisdiction  over  the  operation  of  the 
Panama  Canal  and  all  of  its  adjuncts,  appendants,  and  appur- 
tenances, including  the  entire  control  and  government  of  the 
Canal  Zone,  and  during  a  continuance  of  such  condition  the 
governor  of  the  Panama  Canal  shall,  in  all  respects  and  partic- 
ulars as  to  the  operation  of  such  Panama  Canal,  and  all  duties, 
matters,  and  transactions  affecting  the  Canal  Zone,  be  subject 
to  the  order  and  direction  of  such  officer  of  the  Army. 

SEC.  14.  That  this  Act  shall  be  known  as,  and  referred  to  as, 
the  Panama  Canal  Act,  and  the  right  to  alter,  amend,  or  repeal 
any  or  all  of  its  provisions  or  to  extend,  modify,  or  annul  any 
rule  or  regulation  made  under  its  authority  is  expressly  reserved. 

Approved,  August  24,  1912. 


APPENDIX  D 

EQUIPMENT  AT  PERIOD  OF  GREATEST  ACTIVITY 

CANAL  SERVICE 
Steam  shovels: 

105-ton,  5-cubic-yard  dippers 15 

95-ton,  4-  and  5-cubic-yard  dippers 30 

70-ton,  2 J^-  and  3-cubic-yard  dippers 33 

66-ton,  2j^-cubic-yard  dippers 10 

45-ton,  1%-cubic-yard  dippers 11 

26-ton 1 

Trenching  shovel,  %-cubic-yard  dipper 1 

Total 101 

Locomotives : 
American — 

106  tons 100 

105  tons 41 

117  tons 20 

Total 161 

French 104 

Narrow  gauge,  American,  16  tons 33 

Electric..  9 


Total 307 

Drills: 

Mechanical  churn,  or  well 196 

Tripod 357 

Total 553 

447 


448  APPENDIX  D 

Cars: 

Flat,  used  with  unloading  plows 1,760 

Steel  dumps,  large 596 

Steel  dumps,  small 1,207 

Ballast  dumps 24 

Steel  flats 487 

Narrow  gauge 209 

Motor 6 

Pay  Car 1 

Pay  Certificate 1 

Automatic,  electric 45 

Decauville 224 

Special,  shops 12 


Total 4,572 

Spreaders 26 

Trackshifters 9 

Unloaders 30 

Pile-drivers 14 

Dredges: 

French  ladder 7 

Dipper 3 

Pipe-line 7 

Sea-going  suction 2 

Clamshell..  1 


Total 20 

Cranes 47 

Rock-breaker 1 

Tugs 11 

Towboat 1 

House-boats 3 

Clapets 12 

Pile-driver,  floating 3 

Crane-boat . .                                               1 


APPENDIX  D  449 

Barges,  lighters  and  scows 72 

Launches 29 

Drill-boats 2 

Floating  derricks 2 

PANAMA  RAILROAD 
Locomotives: 

Road  (12  oil-burners) 36 

Switch..  26 


Total 62 

Cars: 

Coaches 57 

Freight 1,434 

Total 1,491 

Cranes: 

Locomotive 2 

Wrecking 2 

Total 4 

Pile-drivers : 

Track 1 

Floating 1 

Total 2 

Tugboat 1 

Lighters : 

Coal,  all  steel 5 

Cargo,  steel  and  iron 8 


Total 13 

Motor-boats 2 

Steam  ditcher .  .  1 


APPENDIX  E 
DISTANCES  IN  NAUTICAL  MILES 

SAVED  FROM  NEW  YORK  VIA  THE  PANAMA  CANAL  ON 
TRADE  ROUTES 

San  Francisco :  Honolulu : 

Magellan 13,135         Magellan 13,312 

Panama 5,262          Panama 6,700 


Saved 7,873 

Guayaquil : 

Magellan 10,215 

Panama 2,810 


Saved 


6,612 


Saved 7,405 


Manila: 

Suez 11,589 

*Panama 11,548 

Saved..  41 


Callao :  Yokohama : 

Magellan 9,613         Suez 13,079 

Panama..  3,363          *  Panama  .  9,798 


Saved 6,250 

Iquique: 

Magellan 9,143 

Panama..  4,004 


Saved 3,281 

Hongkong: 

Suez 11,628 

*  Panama..               .  11,383 


Saved 5,139 

Valparaiso : 

Magellan 8,380 

Panama..  4,633 


Saved 


245 


Melbourne: 

Magellan 12,852 

Panama..  .   10,030 


Saved 3,747  Saved 2,822 

*  Via  San  Francisco  and  the  Great  Circle. 
450 


INDEX 


INDEX 


ABBOT,  Henry  L.,  165,  166. 

Acla,  9. 

Adams,  Charles  Francis,  288. 

Adams,  John  Quincy,  36. 

Agramonte,  Dr.  Aristides,  225. 

Allen,  Henry  A.,  208  n. 

Amador,  Fort,  413. 

Amador,  Mrs.,  170. 

Amador,  President.  (See  Ama- 
dor Guerrero.) 

Amador  Guerrero,  Dr.  Manuel, 
23,  139,  170,  413. 

Amaya,  General,  127,  128,  132. 

Ammen,  Captain  Daniel,  56,  425. 

Ancon,  151,  153,  328. 

Ancon  Hill,  23,  79,  95,  363,  391, 
393. 

Ancon  Hospital,  79,  89,  97. 

Andagoya,  Pascual,  29. 

Anderson,  Mr.,  36. 

Appleton,  Nathan,  70,  82. 

Arosema,  Pablo,  139. 

Aspinwall  (Colon),  city  of,  47,  80, 
81. 

Aspinwall,  W.  H.,  45. 

Atlanta,  U.  S.  Ship,  126,  132. 

Atrato  River,  55. 

Avila,  Pedro  Arias  de  (Pedrarias), 
7,  8,  9,  13,  15,  16. 

BALBOA,  Vasco  Nunez  de,  4,  5,  6, 
7,  8,  9,  10,  11,  13,  14,  28. 

Balboa,  town  of,  95,  328,  363,  384, 
392,  396,  398,  399,  402,  406,  438. 

Balboa  Dump,  393. 

Balboa  Hill,  7. 

Baldwin,  James  L.,  47,  48. 

Bas  Obispo,  79,  203,  353. 

Bastianelli,  Dr.  G.,  232. 


453 


Bernhardt,  Sarah,  79  n. 

Bertrans,  Marcel,  185. 

Biddle,  Charles,  33. 

Bierd,  W.  G.,  339. 

Bigelow,  John,  82. 

Bignami,  Dr.  A.,  232. 

Bionne,  Henry,  93,  94. 

Bishop,  Joseph  Bucklin,  427. 

Bixby,  General,  408. 

Blackburn,  Senator  J.  C.  S.,  177, 

427. 

Elaine,  James  G.,  40. 
Blanchet,  94. 
Blasert,  94. 

Bohio,  203,  204,  324,  325. 
Bolich,  D.  W.,  191,  192. 
Boston,  U.  S.  Ship,  126,  133. 
Boswell,  Helen  Varick,  278. 
Boyer,  Leon,  95,  99. 
Brenner,  Victor  D.,  172. 
Brooke,  Lieutenant  Mark,  146. 
Bryce,  James,  205. 
Budd,  Ralph,  323. 
Buell,  General  Don  Carlos,  413. 
Bunau-Varilla,  Philippe,  95,  137. 
Burnside,    General    Ambrose    E., 

413. 

Burr,  Colonel  Edward,  408. 
Burr,  William  H.,  165,  166,  186, 

426. 

CALEDONIA  BAY,  10. 

California,  44. 

Callao,  450. 

Canal  Zone,  138-139,  145-146, 
147-148,  149-154,  160-163,  238 
ff.,  250  #,  259  jf.,  415-421,  430- 
446. 

Caribbean  Sea,  430. 


454 


INDEX 


Carpenter,  Admiral,  82. 

Carroll,  Dr.  James,  225,  226,  227, 

228,  230,  231,  245,  246,  247. 
Cartagena,  Colombia,  23  n. 
Cartagena,    Colombian     gunboat, 

127,  130. 

Carter,  Dr.  H.  R.,  148. 
Cass,  Lewis,  39. 
Castilla  del  Oro,  7,  13. 
Cathedral  Plaza,  23. 
Central  America,  Republic  of,  33, 

37. 

Cermoise,  H.,  85,  93,  94. 
Ceron,  Alvaro  de  Saavedra,  28. 
Chagres  River,  4,  27,  29,  80,  92, 

100,  203,   206,  355,   356,   357, 

358. 

Chame",  Point,  363. 
Charles  V,  Emperor,  11,  15,  29. 
Chauncey,  Henry,  45. 
Clay,  Henry,  32,  36. 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  39,  40,  41, 

54,  55,  58. 

Cleveland,  Grover,  41,  81. 
Cocoli  Hill,  221. 
Cocoli  River,  220. 
Colombia,  Republic  of,  34,  53,  66, 

79,  107,  115-122,  123-131. 
Colon,  city  of,  28,  47,  78,  80,  84- 

88,  126,  127,  128,  129,  130,  138, 

147,  148, 163,  170,  239,  240,  244, 

252,  406,  409,  417,  429,  430. 
Colon,  harbor  of,  4. 
Columbus,  Christopher,  3,  4,  11, 

12,  28. 

Comber,  W.  G.,  344,  389. 
Cooke,  Dr.  Robert  P.,  230. 
Cooke,  Thomas  M.,  345. 
CordiUeras,  the,  4,  6,  14. 
Corozal,  dredge,  385-386. 
Corozal,  town,  391. 
Costa  Rica,  32. 
Costa  Rica,  Bishop  of,  82. 
Cristobal,  79,  151,  170,  266,  267, 

324,  328,  396,  399,  402,  438. 
Cruces,  27,  28. 
Cuba,  224  jf. 
Cucaracha  slide,  185-188,  190. 


Cueva  Indians,  15. 
Culebra,  village  of,  156,  188. 
Culebra  Cut,  6,  7,  73,  108,  162, 

168,  171,  178,  184-192,  193-197, 

284,  312,  322,  325,  333-341,  351, 

352,  353,  354,  380. 
Culebra  Island,  138,  393,  416,  418, 

430. 


DARIEN,  Gulf  of,  3,  5,  7,  8. 
Darien,  Isthmus  of,  30,  66. 
Dauchy,  W.  E.,  191,  331. 
Davis,  Admiral  Charles  H.,  55. 
Davis,  Arthur  P.,  208  n. 
Davis,  General  George  W.,  146, 

147-148,  158,  165,  166,  426. 
De  Lesseps,  Fort,  413,  414. 
Devol,  Colonel  C.  A.,  180. 
Dexter,  Dr.  E.  G.,  24. 
Dickman,  Ernest,  40. 
Dingier,  Jules,  80,  94-95. 
Dixie,  U.  S.  Ship,  126,  132. 
Douglas,  Stephen  A.,  55. 
Drake,  Sir  Francis,  28. 
Dziembowski,  92,  93. 


ECUADOR,  34. 

Egypt,  234. 

Eiffel,  Alexandre  Gustave,  100. 

Eliot,  President,  231,  237. 

Empire,  328,  344. 

Endicott,  Admiral  Mordecai,  167, 

176,  427. 
Ernst,   Colonel  Oswald  H.,    176, 

426,  427. 

Espinosa,  Gaspar  de,  15. 
Esquemeling,  John,  19,  20,  21,  49. 
Evarts,  W.  M.,  40. 

FERDINAND  V  of  Spain,  12,  15. 
Finlay,  Dr.  Carlos  J.,  224,  236. 
Fish,  Hamilton,  40,  56. 
Flamenco,  island  of,  14,  138,  409, 

416,  418,  430. 

Freeman,  John  R.,  208  n.,  212. 
Froude,  J.  A.,  89. 


INDEX 


455 


GAILLARD,    Colonel  D.   D.,   189- 

191,  192,  388,  427. 
Gaillard,  Mrs.,  311. 
Gamboa,  80,  322. 
Garella,  Napoleon,  35. 
Garibaldi,  Giuseppe,  292. 
Gatun,  202,  203,  204,  205,  210, 

353,  355,  364,  382,    383,   391, 

394. 
Gatun  Dam,  202-211,  351,  352, 

355-361. 
Gatun  Lake,  49,  318,  321,  351,  352, 

360-361,  373-374,  380,  385,  406, 

417,  419,  420. 
Gatun  River,  321. 
Gerig,  William,  214. 
Gillette,  Captain  C.  E.,  147. 
Goethals,  Colonel  George  W.,  176- 

182,  198,  199,  209,  210,  215,  216, 

219,  221,  282,  283,  286-289,  290, 

295,  296,  324,  345,  346,  421,  427. 
Gogorza,  Anthoine,  66. 
Gold  Hill,  6,  186,  188,  322,  394. 
Gorgas,  Colonel  W.  C.,  96,  97,  98, 

147,  177,  233,  234-236,  238-246, 

253  n.,  427. 
Gorgona,  79. 
Gracias  d  Dios,  Cape,  7. 
Grant,  Fort,  413. 
Grant,  Ulysses  S.,  39,  40,  56,  57, 

65,  413,  425. 
Grassi,  Dr.  B.,  232. 
Great  Britain,  39,  41,  42,  44,  54, 

55. 

Grunsky,  Carl  E.,  426. 
Guam,  433. 
Guatemala,  32. 
Guayaquil,  450. 
Gu6rard,  Adolph,  166. 
Guiteras,  Dr.  John,  231-232. 

HAINS,  General  Peter  C.,  176,  425, 

426,  427. 

Harding,  Major  Chester,  215,  389. 
Harrod,  Benjamin  M.,  159,  176, 

426,  427. 

Haupt,  Lewis  M.,  425,  426. 
Havana,  224  J.,  233. 


Hay,  John,  118,  119,  120, 121, 123, 

124,  125,  133,  134,  135,  136,  137, 

193. 

Hayes,  Rutherford  B.,  57,  76. 
Hay-Herran  treaty,  118,  123,  134, 

139. 
Hay-Pauncefote  treaty,  41,  42,  58- 

59. 

Hayti,  4. 

Hazen,  Allen,  208  n. 
Hecker,  Frank  J.,  158,  426. 
Herran,  Tomas,  118. 
Hispaniola,  island  of,  4. 
Hodges,  Colonel  H.  F.,  180,  182, 

214,  215,  427  n. 
Hoffman,  Captain  G.  M.,  215. 
Honduras,  3,  7,  32. 
Hongkong,  450. 
Honolulu,  450. 
Horn,  Cape,  11,  45. 
Howard,  General  Oliver  O.,  414. 
Hubbard,  Commander  John,  125, 

126,  127,  128,  129. 
Huertas,  General  Esteban,  131. 
Hughes,  Colonel  G.  W.,  46. 
Humboldt,  Alexander,  30,  31. 
Humphreys,  General  A.  A.,  56,  65, 

425. 

Hunter,  William  Henry,  166. 
Hurlbut,  S.  A.,  40,  56. 


INDEPENDENCE  PLAZA,  23. 
Iquique,  450. 
Ismailia,  234. 


JACKSON,  Andrew,  33. 
Jacquet,  L.,  99. 

Jadwin,  Major  Edgar,  215,  389. 
Jervey,  Major  J.  C.,  215. 
Jewett,  Admiral,  82. 
Johnson,  Andrew,  39. 
Johnson,  Emory  R.,  426. 
Jouett,  Admiral  James  E.,  81. 
Juana,  Princess,  15. 
Judson,   Lieutenant-Colonel  Wil- 
liam V.,  215. 


456 


INDEX 


KILPATRICK,  General  Judson,  414. 
Kissinger,  John  R.,  228-230,  247. 
Klein,  Mateo,  45. 

LA  BOCA,  95,  218,  363. 

La  Garde,  Major  Louis,  147. 

La  Plata  River,  11. 

Lazear,  Dr.  Jesse  W.,  225,  226, 
227,  230,  231,  236,  245,  246,  247. 

Le  Maire,  11. 

Lepinay,  Godin  de,  202-203. 

Le  Prince,  Joseph,  148. 

Lesseps,  Charles  de,  103,  104. 

Lesseps,  Ferdinande  de,  57,  65,  66, 
67,  68,  69,  70,  71,  72,  73,  75,  76, 
77,  78,  79,  80,  81,  82,  83,  97,  99, 
100,  101,  104-105,  202,  203,  413. 

Limon  Bay,  4,  67,  352,  353,  387, 
403,  410. 

Lord,  Austin  W.,  391. 

Louisiana,  U.  S.  Ship,  169,  170. 

Lowell,  A.  Lawrence,  289. 

Lowell,  James  Russell,  40. 

MAAS,  Clara  B.,  232. 
McCaw,  Major  Walter  D.,  228. 
Macfarlane,  James,  346. 
McKinley,  William,  114,  427. 
Magellan,  Ferdinand,  11. 
Magellan,  Strait  of,  450. 
Magoon,  Charles  E.,  148, 150, 164, 

176,  244,  426. 
Maine,  U.  S.  Ship,  133. 
Mallet,  Sir  Claude  Coventry,  92, 

93,  314-315. 
Mallet,  Lady,  315. 
Maltby,  F.  B.,  214,  388. 
Manila,  450. 
Manzanilla  Island,  47. 
Manzanilla  Point,  409,  413. 
Margarita  Island,  394,  408,  409, 

412. 
Maritime     Canal     Company     of 

Nicaragua,  58. 

Mears,  Lieutenant  Frederick,  323. 
Melbourne,  450. 
Mendoza,  Carlos,  139. 


Merritt,  General  Wesley,  413. 

Metcalfe,  Richard  L.,  427  n. 

Millet,  Francis  D.,  171. 

Mindi,  79. 

Mindi  River,  403. 

Miraflores,  204,  218,  219,  220,  221, 

353,  362,  363,  364,  366,  382,  383, 

394. 

Miraflores  Lake,  220,  221,  366. 
Monkey  Hill,  79,  129. 
Moran,  John  J.,  228-230,  248. 
Morgan,  General  Charles  H.,  414. 
Morgan,  Sir  Henry,  18,  28,  416. 
Morison,  George  S.,  426. 
Mount  Hope,  79,  397,  403. 
Mower,  General  Joseph  A.,  414. 
Munos,  Herman,  9. 
Murphy,  Dominick  I.,  426. 

NAOS,  island  of,  14,  138,  409,  416, 

418,  430. 
Napier,  Lord,  39. 
Nashville,  U.  S.  Ship,  126, 127, 128, 

129. 

Nelson,  Dr.  Wolfred,  47. 
New  Granada,  34,  37,  38,  39,  44, 

45,  46,  53,  81. 
New  St.  Andrew,  10. 
Newton,  General  John,  413. 
New  York  City,  450. 
Nicaragua,  16,  28,  29,  30,  32,  58. 
Nicaragua  route,   32-35,  55,  57, 

113,   114,    115,    116,    209,  425, 

426. 

Nichols,  A.  B.,  214,  343. 
Noble,  Alfred,  165,  166,  212,  426. 
Nombre  de  Dios,  27,  28,  363. 

OBALDIA,  Jose*  Domingo  de,    124, 

131,  139,  150. 
Oregon,  44. 

Orinoco,  R.  M.  steamer,  130,  132. 
Otis,  Dr.  F.  N.,  47,  48-49,  50,  51. 

PACIFIC  OCEAN,  6,  9,  11,  29,  430. 
Palmer,  Aaron  H.,  32,  33. 
Panama,  the  name,  14-15. 


INDEX 


457 


Panama,  Bay  of,  9,  14,  17,  18,  23, 

67,  71,  95,  138,  325,  328,  396, 

409,  430. 

Panama,  Bishop  of,  25,  71,  72,  74. 
Panama,  city  of  (old),  13,  15,  16- 

22,  418;  (new)  14,  23-26,  27,  28, 

81,  82,  83,  84-88,  138,  147,  148, 

163,  239,  240,  244,  252,  417,  429, 

430. 

Panama,  Indian  village  of,  14. 
Panama,  Isthmus  of,  3,  6,  16,  27, 

38,  4:5  ff.,  222  ff. 

Panama  Canal,  3,  28,  36-43,  57  ff. 
Panama  Railroad,  first,  44-53,  79- 

80,  146,  157,  163,  265,  266,  267; 

the  new,  318-323,  398,  401,  403, 

406,  429,  435,  436,  449. 
Panama  Railroad  Company,  45- 

46. 
Panama  Republic,  130,  131,  132- 

139,  147,  430,  431,  434,  436,  445. 
Paraiso,  79,  204. 
Park,  Trenor  W.,  70. 
Parke,  General  John  G.,  413. 
Parsons,    William    Barclay,    158, 

165,  166,  426. 
Pasco,  Samuel,  425. 
Paterson,  William,  10. 
Patterson,  Carlisle  P.,  57,  425  n. 
Pearl  Islands,  9,  10,  14. 
Pedrarias.     (See  Avila.) 
Pedro  Miguel,  204,  218,  219,  220, 

221,  322,  325,  363,  364,  382,  383, 

391,  394. 

Pennell,  Joseph,  212,  213,  312-313. 
Perico,  island  of,  14,  16,  138,  409, 

416,  418,  430. 
Peru,  10,  12,  16,  29. 
Pezet,  F.  A.,  95. 
Philip  II  of  Spain,  29. 
Philippine  Islands,  433. 
Pierce,  Benjamin,  56,  57,  425. 
Pizarro,  Francisco,  10,  11,  16. 
Poe,  General  O.  M.,  216. 
Polk,  James  K.,  38. 
Porto  Bello,  363,  406. 
Port  Said,  234. 
Puerto  Bello,  28. 


Puerto  Bello,  Bay 

Puerto  Carreto\(Careta),  5,  8. 

Puerto  Escoces,  10. ...... 

QUELLENNEC,  Edouard,  166. 

RAGGI,  A.,  334,  343. 

Raleigh,  Sir  Walter,  30. 

Randolph,  Fort,  412,  414. 

Randolph,  Isham,  166,  208  n. 

Randolph,  General  Wallace  F., 
413. 

Reclus,  Armand,  66,  67,  78. 

Reed,  Major  Walter,  225,  226- 
230,  235,  236,  245,  246. 

Reyes,  General  Rafael,  119-120, 
121,  133,  134,  135,  136. 

Rhodes,  James  Ford,  136. 

Rio  de  las  Balsas,  8. 

Rio  Grande,  220,  221. 

Ripley,  Joseph,  166. 

Robinson,  Tracy,  47,  73-74. 

Rojo,  Gabriel,  9. 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  23,  42,  114, 
115,  126,  134-135,  137,  138, 
143-145,  146,  148,  150,  158-159, 
160, 164,  165,  167,  168,  169-174, 
175, 176,  180,  181,  185, 191, 198, 
199,  208,  209,  211,  219,  238, 
259-260,  271,  272,  274,  275,  276, 
281,  287,  295,  355,  426,  427. 

Roosevelt,  Mrs.,  169. 

Root,  Elihu,  43. 

Ross,  Dr.  John  W.,  147,  148. 

Ross,  Major  Ronald,  232,  233,  234, 
236,  239. 

Ross,  Captain  W.  S.,  215. 

Rourke,  L.  K.,  192. 

Rousseau,  Armand,  81,  99. 

Rousseau,  Rear-Admiral  H.  H., 
181-182,  427. 

Rousseau,  Mrs.,  311. 

SABANA  RIVER,  9. 
Sabanas,  the,  416. 
San  Francisco,  450. 
San  Miguel,  Gulf  of,  6,  7,  8,  9,  10, 
14. 


458 


INDEX 


San  Pablo,  406. 

San  Salvador,  32. 

Santa  Maria  de  la  Antigua  del 

Darien,  5,  8,  15,  16. 
Santiago  de  las  Vegas,  233. 
Santo  Domingo,  church  of,  Pan- 
ama, 24. 

Sault  Ste.  Marie  Canal,  375. 
Schildhauer,  Edward,  371. 
Schouten,  Willem  Cornelis,  11. 
Schuyler,  James  D.,  208  n. 
Sergeant,  John,  36. 
Sherman,  Fort,  412,  414. 
Sherman,  General  W.  T.,  412. 
Shonts,    Theodore   P.,    162,    164, 

175,  426. 
Sibert,  Colonel  William  L.,  214, 

215,  389,  427. 
Simonin,  L.,  49. 

Smith,  General  Charles  F.,  413. 
Smith,  Jackson,  177,  180,  427. 
Sosa,  Juan  B.,  9  n.,  10,  15,  18,  19, 

21. 
Sosa  Hill,  218,  391,  392,  393,  396, 

397,  398. 

South  Sea,  6,  8,  10,  11,  15. 
Spooner  Act,  115, 117,  121, 138  n., 

144,  158,  160,  204,  261. 
Stanley,  General  David  S.,  414. 
Staunton,  Lieutenant-Commander 

Sidney  A.,  426. 
Stearns,  Frederic  P.,  165,  166,  208 

n.,  212. 

Stephens,  John  L.,  34,  45,  47. 
Sternberg,  Dr.  George  M.,  224- 

225. 
Stevens,  John  F.,  161,  162,  164, 

167, 175, 176,  178-179, 180, 184, 

191,    205,    20^-210,    218,    266, 

271-272,  300-301,  302,  331,  335, 

341,  356. 

Stickle,  Captain  Horton  W.,  215. 
Stimson,  H.  L.,  408,  412. 
Suez  Canal,  65,  69,  375,  402,  450. 
Sutherland,  Duke  of,  82. 

TABOGA,  island  of,  14,  16,  411. 
Taboguilla,  island  of,  14. 


Taft,  William  H.,  42,  95  n.,  146, 
150,  152,  158,  159,  161,  167,  174, 
191,  208-209,  217-218,  274,  276, 
278,  283,  415-416,  418. 

Taft,  Mrs.,  208. 

Tehuantepec,  city  of,  55. 

Tehuantepec  route,  28,  29,  30,  57. 

Tehuantepec,  state  of,  28,  29,  30. 

Thatcher,  Maurice  H.,  427  n. 

Thiel,  Monsignor,  82. 

Tidball,  General  John  C.,  414. 

Tincauzer,  Eugen,  166. 

Tivoli,  Hotel,  169,  267. 

Tomes,  Robert,  47  n. 

Toro  Point,  387,  393,  408,  409, 
412. 

Torres,  Colonel,  127,  128, 129, 130, 
132. 

Totten,  Colonel  George  M.,  47,  48, 
70,  75. 

Tourneric,  Mr.  de  la,  334. 

Tovar,  General,  127,  128,  129, 132. 

Trautwine,  John  C.,  47,  48,  51-52. 

Tiirr,  Etienne,  66,  67,  68. 

Tutuila,  433. 

UNITED  STATES,  32,  33,  36,  37,  38, 
39-43,  44,  54-59,  113  #.,  133- 
139  #. 

Ureba,  Gulf  of,  7. 

VALDERRABANO,  Andre's  de,  9. 

Valparaiso,  450. 

Van  Buren,  Martin,  34. 

Venezuela,  34. 

Venta  Cruz,  27. 

Veraguas,  province  of,  17. 

WALKER,  Rear-Admiral  J.  G.,  114, 

144,  150,  204,  425,  426. 
Walker  Commission,  114-115,  204, 

324-325,  328,  425. 
Wallace,  John  F.,  156,  157,  159, 

161, 184,  191,  204-205,  265,  266, 

299,  331,  343,  427. 
Ward,  C.  D.,  203. 
Warren,  General  Gouverneur  K., 

413. 


INDEX 


459 


Weaver,  General  E.  M.,  408,  411. 
Webb,  General  Alexander  S.,  414. 
Weed,  General  Stephen  H.,  414. 
Welch,  Ashbel,  203. 
Welcker,  J.  W.,  166. 
Welles,  Gideon,  55. 
Wells,  George  M.,  343. 
Williams,  Edward  J.,  345. 
Williams,  Captain  John  J.,  47. 
Williamson,  Sidney  B.,  221,  346, 

389. 
Wilson,  Colonel  Eugene  T.,  180. 


Wilson,  Woodrow,  43. 

Wood,  General  Leonard,  228,  233, 

235,  408. 
Wyse,  Lucien  N.  B.,  48,  66,  67,  78, 

107. 


YOKOHAMA,  450. 
Young,  General,  125. 

ZINN,  A.  S.,  344. 
Ziircher,  Philippe,  185. 


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